A denouncement of ethical egoism

[SlateGreySky]

One general (and frequently non-specific) model for ethics that seems to have been popularized in the late 20th/early 21st century is something like the following:

"Whatever you think is 'right' is right for you; whatever I think is 'right' is right for me. That is to say, ethics are an entirely 'subjective' discipline, and (at least for the ethical egoist) there exists no overarching (objective) 'code of ethics' by which actions can be universally judged to be right or wrong."

I counter this with the following thought experiment (which, although I'm sure it's not original to me, I have nevertheless not been able to find a philosopher that has articulated it thus): Adam and Brian are having an ethical debate. Adam asserts that there exists an objective code (call it 'code x') of ethics by which actions may be universally judged to be right or wrong. Brian counters with the above argument for ethical egoism. Adam responds thus:

"Brian, that can't be right. You hold that code x is right for me, while your code of ethics (call it 'code y') is right for you. I, however, hold that code x is right for both me and you. Brian, as a subjective ethical egoist, you cannot deny that my viewpoint is right for me (Adam). But, since my viewpoint (code x) entails that it be right for you also, you must now accede to the rightness of code x. If you deny this by saying that everyone's individual opinion of right and wrong is valid for himself only, you have asserted an objective ethical criterion (i.e., there exists no universalizable ethical code) and are, therefore, no longer a subjective ethical egoist. Furthermore, if you deny that code x is right for you also, you have denied that code x is valid even for me."

By this argument, it seems to me that Adam has refuted the logical foundation of subjective ethical egoism. Simplistic though it may seem, I cannot find a flaw in it. I hope someone will comment on this, even if only to note that it also seems to him/her that this argument is valid. Please provide me with some feedback.

[premjan]

this is why "objective" religous beliefs such as Christianity and Islam work. The very tyranny of such a belief overwhelms all other notions of ethics and God.

[Keith Russell]

slate, are you sure that the ethical system you describe (and denounce) is 'ethical egoism'?

It sounds (far) more like 'situational ethics', to me.

You've also done far more than refute 'subjective ethical egoism'. Apply the basic principle in the argument to subjectivism in general.

Subjectivism, of any sort, is self-defeating.

K

[Robert Anthony]

Originally posted by SlateGreySky

"Brian, that can't be right. You hold that code x is right for me, while your code of ethics (call it 'code y') is right for you. I, however, hold that code x is right for both me and you. Brian, as a subjective ethical egoist, you cannot deny that my viewpoint is right for me (Adam). But, since my viewpoint (code x) entails that it be right for you also, you must now accede to the rightness of code x. If you deny this by saying that everyone's individual opinion of right and wrong is valid for himself only, you have asserted an objective ethical criterion (i.e., there exists no universalizable ethical code) and are, therefore, no longer a subjective ethical egoist. Furthermore, if you deny that code x is right for you also, you have denied that code x is valid even for me."


This is mere word-play, a la scholasticism.

Not to offend good-natured, credulous ears, but...

Human morality excuses and grants a level of release to our enrooted biological imperia. That's the whole story. There is nothing 'subjective' or 'objective' about it.

[Crouton]

Originally posted by SlateGreySky
"Brian, that can't be right. You hold that code x is right for me, while your code of ethics (call it 'code y') is right for you. I, however, hold that code x is right for both me and you. Brian, as a subjective ethical egoist, you cannot deny that my viewpoint is right for me (Adam). But, since my viewpoint (code x) entails that it be right for you also, you must now accede to the rightness of code x. If you deny this by saying that everyone's individual opinion of right and wrong is valid for himself only, you have asserted an objective ethical criterion (i.e., there exists no universalizable ethical code) and are, therefore, no longer a subjective ethical egoist. Furthermore, if you deny that code x is right for you also, you have denied that code x is valid even for me."

By this argument, it seems to me that Adam has refuted the logical foundation of subjective ethical egoism. Simplistic though it may seem, I cannot find a flaw in it... Please provide me with some feedback.
Implicit in Brian's position is the notion that whatever you think is good for you, is good for only you. People other than Adam may subscribe to code x, but they will do so coincidentally, not necessarily.

There is another issue with the experiment. Code x is asserted as universal and objective. Consider that code y has tenets contrary to those in code x, but it may also be asserted as universal and objective. Which is correct? How can we evaluate the veracity of a moral code that is universal and objective without it being circular (ie, one of the tenets of code x says that code x is true to the exclusion of all other codes)? It is not testable. This is a central problem to the study of ethics.

Crouton

[thefugitivesaint]

Keith, I don't want to initate another debate over the nature of morality or ethics but i have to object to the notion that:

Subjectivism, of any sort, is self-defeating.

All our ethical pronouncements are, ultimiately, subjective. This does not mean that they are all arbitrary nor does that leave societies without a workable foundation for constructing parameters to constrain behaviour.

I just have to reject the notion that our ethical positions are "objective" which your post seems to imply.
-theSaint

[SlateGreySky]

All our ethical pronouncements are, ultimiately, subjective.

Saint, you noted this in response to Keith, who declared that "subjectivism, of any sort, is self-defeating."

I'm interested in hearing a more detailed explanation on Keith's part as to what he means by his above statement. What, Keith, do you mean by "subjectivism" there, and why is it "self-defeating?" Were you just agreeing with my original line of thought, or were you making a larger metaphysical/epistemic point?

Saint, I wonder also what you mean by your above quote. How is it that all of our ethical pronouncements are subjective? Do you mean that since all pronouncements originate with some subject (whoever pronounces them), or are you asserting that there is something about ethics that, a priori, disables any kind of objectivity? Maybe you mean something else entirely.

Guys, please let me know your thoughts.

[SlateGreySky]

Crouton,

I was a little confused by some elements of your post.

First, what do you mean when you say that people may subscribe to a given code of ethics "coincidentally" rather than "necessarily?" I guess I don't know what it means to "subscribe necessarily" or "subscribe coincidentally."

Second, it's not clear to me why a code with a tenet which states, "this code is true to the exclusion of all other codes of ethics" is circular, unless one purpose of that code is to prove that it is true to the exclusion of all other codes of ethics. Given (ex hypothesi) that this is not the case with sample code x, I'm not seeing why a code that asserts its superiority over other moral codes is necessarily circular.

You ask, "How can we evaluate the veracity of a moral code that is universal and objective without it being circular . . . ? It is not testable."

I don't understand this either. It seems to me that the veracity of a (purportedly) objective moral code is at least testable by appeal to reason or to experience. For example, if the code said, "both murder and do not murder," we would know it to be false, given that it contradicts itself (glaring and ridiculous example, I know). Similarly, if a moral code told us to murder as many innocents as possible, we would know it to be false because of its extremely strong and nearly universal intuitive implausibility for properly functioning human minds. These seem to me to be ways in which a moral code that professes objectivity is testable.

Any thoughts? Have I missed your point?

[Keith Russell]

the saint:
just because I believe that subjectivism is self-defeating, does not mean that the only remaining option is to believe that ethics is objective.

I believe that there is an objective component to ethics, as opposed to the notion that ethics is entirely subjective--

--but also as opposed to the idea that ethics is an intrinsic quality of reality, independent of human beings.

K

[Keith Russell]

slate, your description as to why 'ethics' isn't subjective, seems to me to apply to other things which might be believed to be subjective, as well.

I still believe you are attacking 'situational ethics', rather than the ethics of ethical egoism...

K

[SlateGreySky]

slate, your description as to why 'ethics' isn't subjective, seems to me to apply to other things which might be believed to be subjective, as well.

I think you're exactly right here. I'm inclined to believe that the argument works for really any branch of value theory (aesthetics, political philosophy, ethics, etc.). Do others agree or disagree?

I still believe you are attacking 'situational ethics', rather than the ethics of ethical egoism...

I think you're right here, too: I was playing fast and loose with terminology. Ethical egoism, I guess, wouldn't necessarily have to be subjective: in fact, it would probably be more likely to be held (by certain people) to be an objective code of ethics. I think I meant something like "ethical relativism." Thanks for the clarification.

[Will I Am]

That is to say, ethics are an entirely 'subjective' discipline,


There’s one theoretical approach that denies that rather effectively.

What’s the one thing that 98% of us can agree on? That unnecessary suffering is ‘bad’.

(Only those most of us define as ‘insane’ people don’t agree).

So… an ‘objective’ theory of universal ethics can be built from this one assumption.

Basically, that’s “Utilitarianism”.

“The greatest good, for the greatest number.”

It’s not subjective (if ‘suffering’ is not subjective).

QED?

[Adrian Selby]

What’s the one thing that 98% of us can agree on? That unnecessary suffering is ‘bad’.

Depends on how you define necessary and unnecessary. Cheesy example, some super being decides that I should either watch 50 people die for no reason, or, if I approve of the super being inflicting exquisite torture on an infant, he/she will set about removing cancer from the world.

Whether you think the infant's suffering is necessary or not is subjective isn't it?

[99Percent]

SlateGreySky, you might be interested in reading a similar denouncement in the Moral Foundations and Principles forum by Alonzo Fyfe - Death of Subjectivism (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=61688)

[99Percent]

Originally posted by Will I Am
That is to say, ethics are an entirely 'subjective' discipline,


There’s one theoretical approach that denies that rather effectively.

What’s the one thing that 98% of us can agree on? That unnecessary suffering is ‘bad’.

(Only those most of us define as ‘insane’ people don’t agree).

So… an ‘objective’ theory of universal ethics can be built from this one assumption.

Basically, that’s “Utilitarianism”.

“The greatest good, for the greatest number.”

It’s not subjective (if ‘suffering’ is not subjective).

QED? The difference between a moral objectivist and a subjectivist one is that the objectivist doesn't say we must agree on an ethical stance, but rather some people don't or refuse to understand objective morality.

Its like asking - "Do you agree gravity exists?". A more proper question would be "Do you understand the effects of gravity?"

[Keith Russell]

If a situation arose where the greatest good for the greatest number required that some suffer, I suppose the utilitarian would claim that the suffering wasn't 'needless'...

...I'd rather operate under a system that acknowledges certain individual rights.

K

[SlateGreySky]

99percent, thanks for the link.

Will I Am,

I don't think you can tack a QED to your argument just yet, and here's why. Even if 99.9999% of the people of the world affirmed that "unnecessary suffering" was a bad thing, there is still no logical compulsion to believe that it is. That is to say, someone could deny that unnecessary suffering was a bad thing, and even then no one could accuse her of being self-contradictory or inconsistent. She would, of course, be shouted down by the majority, but then again, so would Socrates.

This is why I believe some a priori demonstration of the irrational nature of ethical relativism is required, and I've tried to provide us with one above.

[Adrian Selby]

If you deny this by saying that everyone's individual opinion of right and wrong is valid for himself only, you have asserted an objective ethical criterion

This is a statement about ethical criteria, not an ethical criterion in itself. I think your mistake is in conflating the two.

In affirming that the objective moralist believes their code is right for both of them, they're not asserting that it must be, rather that the former's opinion that it must be is subjective. Acknowledging this does not seem to be an objective ethical criterion in itself.

------------
the incorrigible analytics' club (http://incorrigible.adrianselby.com)

[SlateGreySky]

This is a statement about ethical criteria, not an ethical criterion in itself.
It's both, really. The statement, "each individual's opinion of right and wrong is valid for himself only" is a normative statement about ethical statements: it is a kind of ethic for ethics. Thus, I don't think it's a conflation, given that the "statement about ethical criteria" is itself an "ethical criterion," just one level, so to speak, removed.

In affirming that the objective moralist believes their code is right for both of them, they're not asserting that it must be, rather that the former's opinion that it must be is subjective.
I'm not sure I understand this sentence, but I think you mean something like, "just because someone perceives his moral code to be objective doesn't mean that he thinks everyone agrees with it." If this is what you mean, then we're in total agreement.

The force of Adam's original argument comes from his observation that if (as Brian says) Adam is "right" for himself, then because Adam believes his moral code to be objective, he can "rightly" say that Brian must also abide by code x's constraints if Brian is to be a morally upright person. That's the difference between the relativist's position and the position of the non-relativist: the former can (logically) only assert the dominance of his code over himself, while the latter can logically assert the dominance of his own code over everyone. (note: this applies only to the validity of the non-relativist's argument, not necessarily to its soundness).

[Adrian Selby]

while the latter can logically assert the dominance of his own code over everyone.

While he can assert it, it doesn't mean that his code is objectively right, only that he believes it to be so, and this does not refute the notion that what situation someone wants to come about is a reflection of their own views on the matter, and that in asserting so, they're not stating something that is objectively the case per se.

Also, the former doesn't only assert the dominance of his code over himself alone, he can acknowledge that his code is no more right than any other, but he can exhort others to abide by his code for subjective reasons. He can request if you like, intersubjective agreement on codes, without once asserting that where there is agreement reached through argument, that argument must somehow be undergone with the notion that one view is objectively more right than another.

We can thus disagree on the issue of abortion, but my view that there is no objective right answer doesn't mean I can't persuade you that my subjective view is better than yours, perhaps because I can get you to see that the reasons for your view, when we analyse closely your predilections and ultimate goals, may in fact show you to be thinking less than clearly on the abortion issue in relation to those. Equally, I could explain where I'm coming from, how my view fits into a coherent metaphysical framework, albeit with subjective axioms, and you might find this to be worth adhering to. In no instance are we arriving at a 'more right' view of whether to abort objectively speaking, we're only arguing the merits of our cases.

[SlateGreySky]

While he can assert it, it doesn't mean that his code is objectively right, only that he believes it to be so, and this does not refute the notion that what situation someone wants to come about is a reflection of their own views on the matter, and that in asserting so, they're not stating something that is objectively the case per se.

Duh.

Also, the former doesn't only assert the dominance of his code over himself alone, he can acknowledge that his code is no more right than any other, but he can exhort others to abide by his code for subjective reasons. He can request if you like, intersubjective agreement on codes, without once asserting that where there is agreement reached through argument, that argument must somehow be undergone with the notion that one view is objectively more right than another.

Again, I have absolutely no problem with this statement. Nowhere in my post did I say that the ethical relativist is unable to convince others of the rightness of his views; I just said that he is logically prohibited - he prohibits himself, really - from presuming that his ideas of right and wrong apply to anyone but himself.

when we analyse closely your predilections and ultimate goals, may in fact show you to be thinking less than clearly on the abortion issue in relation to those.

You had me up to this point. I don't think that this line of reasoning is open to the ethical relativist, and I don't think I have any reason to suppose that it should be. After all, if no objectively normative criteria for morality exist, why should we believe that there exist objectively normative criteria for clear thinking? That is, if the relativist can level the "who are you to say?" objection to the non-relativist's moralizing, then the non-relativist can just as easily level the "who are you to say?" objection against the relativist's assertions about what constitutes "clear thinking."

In no instance are we arriving at a 'more right' view of whether to abort objectively speaking, we're only arguing the merits of our cases.

1. If you believe this, then why would we be arguing about abortion? See my objection to your ideas about the objectivity of "clear thinking," above.

2. I'm not even sure that one could believe this. Arguing the "merits" of one's case just is an attempt at determining which view on an issue is "more right."

[Adrian Selby]

he prohibits himself, really - from presuming that his ideas of right and wrong apply to anyone but himself.

He doesn't, he just prohibits himself from presuming that his ideas of right and wrong could in principle be objectively right.

After all, if no objectively normative criteria for morality exist, why should we believe that there exist objectively normative criteria for clear thinking?

Because thinking per se is not solely normative? Clear thinking is suggestive, to me, of rational thinking, of thoughts in logically coherent patterns. Insofar as there is a law of non contradiction, and that when we say one thing, we are not saying another thing by it, it follows that we have a basis by which its possible to discern more or less 'clear thinking'.

If you believe this, then why would we be arguing about abortion?

Because you might believe that your view leads to greater overall happiness, and I might disagree over how you define your conclusion? Or vice versa of course? It might be that you have a rights theory that differs in its precepts from mine, and that the justification for precepts is not necessarily wholly normative?

Arguing the "merits" of one's case just is an attempt at determining which view on an issue is "more right."

Yes, but not 'more right objectively speaking' just 'more right' with reference to a common social framework of beliefs, or more right insofar as the view coheres more rationally with one's wider views than anothers.

Adrian