Dennett solved the dichotomy? [Archive I]

DigitalChicken

September 16, 2003, 09:01 PM

Originally posted by boneyard bill

You really think you can leave it at that? I have the sensation of a computer screen in front of me. There isn't anything else to it I suppose. I have the sensation of a computer screen in front of me because there is, in fact, a computer screen in front of me. And by that logic, I have the sensation of free will because my will is, in fact, free.

I agree that my original comments were too exuberant.

However, you are making a category mistake here. That is, the sensation of freewill is not like a direct sensation of an object. You cannot point ot the dimensions of "will" like you can a computer screen. In fact, the word "sensation" probably isn't an apt one in my description.

The key is, "Free will is the experience of having free will" in much the same way the experience of tasting an apple is what it means to taste an apple. The explanations of things are not the things themselves. THis is why I believe that any philosophy of mind can never be complete.

DC

Godless Wonder

September 16, 2003, 09:55 PM

I'm with DC. There is no free will. That doesn't mean I'm a determinist. Determinism* (as I understand the word) means (to me) that everything is predetermined, like clockwork. I think that there is room for randomness in the system, so that it is not predetermined (Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and all that). However, this does not mean that I think we have any control over this randomness. So in that case, we have neither free will nor determinism, the way I see it.

If one goes through life acting as if one does have free will, and thinking that one does have free will, it is only because one's lack of free will means that it could not have been any other way, or if it could have been so, chance events did not in fact cause it to be so.

*The word "determinism" may be colored in my mind by my computer science background.

Clutch

September 17, 2003, 08:34 AM

Determinism is also frequently equated with the denial of free will. I see no tension between the thesis that all events fall under physical laws -- deterministic, indeterministic, stochastic, whatever -- and the thesis that I have free will. Why not? Because I act freely just in case I act in accordance with my desires, and no particularly abnormal conditions are involved; ie, I'm not hypnotized, haven't been surreptitiously drugged, etc.

Of course I have free will, in the sense that we use the term in any practical context: I signed the contract freely, and so forth.

And that, I think, is really what Dennett's saying.

Thomas Ash

September 17, 2003, 10:25 AM

Originally posted by DigitalChicken
The entire "problem of free will" is usually discussed incorrectly and that is why it is a problem.

You have the sensation of free will and that's that. Free will is the experience of having free will. There isn't anything else to it.

DC

Hi DC, I know you've said you went a bit far with this statement. But though I agree that the "problem of freewill" is mostly a result of misunderstanding (ie. I'm a compatibilist), you do agree it's too much to say free will is the experience of having free will, don't you? What we commonly mean by free will has some content, and includes things like choosing without coercion and arguably having been able (in some sense) to have chosen differently. So the question of whether we have free will is oneof whether these conditions are met. I'd say the first unequivocally is, and the second equivocally is, though we don't have free will 100% in some senses of it.

Best wishes, Thomas

PS: I forget the name of the philopher I get this from, but he's recently written a relatively pop-philosophy book called "How Free Are YOU?" by OUP.

PPS: Is Dennet's idea the one of emergence?

DigitalChicken

September 17, 2003, 10:54 AM

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
But though I agree that the "problem of freewill" is mostly a result of misunderstanding (ie. I'm a compatibilist), you do agree it's too much to say free will is the experience of having free will, don't you?

No. Free will is the experience of having free will.

There are lots of things in our experience that are the things themselves and the best your understanding will probably get.

I ask, "How are you?" You say, "Good." Is it reasonable to then ask (assuming you were truthful), "Are you sure? Is it possible that you are not 'good' and that you might be mistaken? Is it possible that you actually having a lousy day?"

Of course not. Its silly because the state of being good, whatever that might mean to the person is what it is as the experience.

Let us assume that someone is able to show that the universe is completely deterministic in a Newtonian way. Does this then mean that I won't then have the experience of free will where I am forced to make choices, illusions or not? Of course not. I will still have that experience and I will still have to deal with it.

What we commonly mean by free will has some content, and includes things like choosing without coercion and arguably having been able (in some sense) to have chosen differently. So the question of whether we have free will is oneof whether these conditions are met. I'd say the first unequivocally is, and the second equivocally is, though we don't have free will 100% in some senses of it.

I think that you are misunderstanding free will. You could just as well, using my previous analogy, say that the apple has no taste because its just a set of electrochemical reactions on my tongue and into my brain. We wouldn't say that because we accept that the experience is the thing itself. Free will is no different.

DC

DigitalChicken

September 17, 2003, 10:55 AM

Originally posted by Godless Wonder
I'm with DC. There is no free will.

That's not what I said. Quite the opposite.

I am saying that having the experience of free will is enough to say that there is free will.

DC

the_cave

September 17, 2003, 12:52 PM

Originally posted by Godless Wonder
I'm with DC. There is no free will.

I understand where DC is coming from. If everything is determined, then free will is merely a perception. In which case I'm uncomfortable calling it "free will"--since it actually isn't free at all.

That doesn't mean I'm a determinist. Determinism* (as I understand the word) means (to me) that everything is predetermined, like clockwork. I think that there is room for randomness in the system, so that it is not predetermined (Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and all that). However, this does not mean that I think we have any control over this randomness. So in that case, we have neither free will nor determinism, the way I see it.

That's something close to what I tenatively believe--except that I'm willing to call that "free will"! If we're able to make uncaused choices, those choices are not only free, but they can also be willed, in the sense that they're desired...imagine two choices, both desirable alternatives. Our minds then enter a state, by the collapse of some wave function (assuming a quantum model of the mind--big assumption) where it becomes committed to one of those alternatives. It just made a choice--and we willed it, because we desired the outcome.

I admit this means admitting we don't "control" our free choices in the way it seems we do, but I'm willing to surrender that in exchange for retaining a conception of free will that I can call "free will".

Clutch also states Dennett's position; "free will" is just "unobstructed action". Think of it as a kind of "weak" free will.

I disagree with this conception, simply because it has little to do with "will". So far as I can tell, from this perspective, a tree also has free will, as do the Himalayan mountains.

Clutch

September 17, 2003, 01:26 PM

Originally posted by the_cave
Clutch also states Dennett's position; "free will" is just "unobstructed action". Think of it as a kind of "weak" free will.

I disagree with this conception, simply because it has little to do with "will". So far as I can tell, from this perspective, a tree also has free will, as do the Himalayan mountains. I think you have to explain just what desires you think trees and mountains have.

In my view -- not unreasonable, really -- they don't have desires. A fortiori they do not act in accordance with their desires. Hence they do not satisfy the sketch of free will I provided.

the_cave

September 17, 2003, 02:02 PM

Originally posted by Clutch
In my view -- not unreasonable, really -- they don't have desires. A fortiori they do not act in accordance with their desires. Hence they do not satisfy the sketch of free will I provided.

Very true--alright, I guess you can call it "free will", so long as it's made clear that it isn't everything we mean by "free will". (You have in fact made that clear, so thank you.)

It's merely the equivocation on "free" that we're on different sides of. You (and Dennett) are satisfied so long as we're free to enact our determined desires, whereas I want more than that; I'm willing to sacrifice control over our decisions, in exchange for a more metaphysical concept of "freedom", i.e. freedom from determinism.

Afghan

September 17, 2003, 02:16 PM

Originally posted by the_cave
It's merely the equivocation on "free" that we're on different sides of. You (and Dennett) are satisfied so long as we're free to enact our determined desires, whereas I want more than that; I'm willing to sacrifice control over our decisions, in exchange for a more metaphysical concept of "freedom", i.e. freedom from determinism.

Surely freedom from determinism would be randomness. Is that really any closer to 'free' will? To me, will indicates something deliberate.

On the other hand, the 'unobstructed desire' definition also seems to want for something. I might want to live forever but I cannot. Does that mean I do not possess free will?

Finally, there seems to be something quite strange about the nature of the debate. People seem to want ensure they have something called 'free will' and are willing to scrabble around for some definition that allows them to possess it.

sophie

September 17, 2003, 03:36 PM

I'm with Denett on this one. I have a few points to add. It is said that every cause has an effect. If I were to rewrite this as Every cause has a pending effect until the pending effect takes effect then we can examine the scope of hard determinism.

For example if you were thirsty, how many times can you put your change in the pepsi machine and press refund without at some point having to accept the pepsi as your sole thirst quencher?

In my mind this gives us the scope of our free will over things that are determined. How many times can you change your mind without having tp accept the final effect. This is one aspect of determinism.

Clutch

September 17, 2003, 03:44 PM

Originally posted by the_cave
Very true--alright, I guess you can call it "free will", so long as it's made clear that it isn't everything we mean by "free will". (You have in fact made that clear, so thank you.)You're totally welcome!
It's merely the equivocation on "free" that we're on different sides of. You (and Dennett) are satisfied so long as we're free to enact our determined desires, whereas I want more than that; I'm willing to sacrifice control over our decisions, in exchange for a more metaphysical concept of "freedom", i.e. freedom from determinism. I don't know if "equivocation" is quite the right word. But in any case I agree with your assessment. The thing is, I'm unaware of any good reason to think we need the notion of freedom you're selling.

I've given my reasons for this elsewhere, in a pretty careful way. (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=45654) Feel free to resurrect the thread if you like.

the_cave

September 18, 2003, 07:59 PM

In replying to this message, I'm going to try and tie it in with Clutch's observation that we don't really need any other kind of free will besides that which determinism provides (it seems to me that this is also Dennett's position.)

Originally posted by Afghan
Surely freedom from determinism would be randomness. Is that really any closer to 'free' will? To me, will indicates something deliberate.

True, but I think the feedback loop of our desires helps to make this something we might call "deliberate". We might find that after making a choice, it didn't really have the consequences we wanted. So that might change the chances that we'll make one choice and not another in an uncaused decision down the road. (This is all completely speculative, I'm just trying to suggest a plausible framework. Maybe brain science will eventually solve the problem--or, maybe not.) It's not really the same thing as the "deliberation" we feel like we have; but it's part of it.

In other words, our previous decisions change our brains a little bit, thus changing what we do when we "deliberate" before a decision. The weights get changed, if you see what I mean.

It's still kind of random, but the interesting thing is the determined parts of our minds work with it to make it less so! Each influences the other, in a feedback loop.

Finally, there seems to be something quite strange about the nature of the debate. People seem to want ensure they have something called 'free will' and are willing to scrabble around for some definition that allows them to possess it.

You're right. I think it's because the kind of free will that Clutch subscribes to leaves many (maybe not all) feeling helpless--indeed, less than human. Also (and this is part of why we feel helpless and less than human) we're used to judging people on the basis of their actions and behaviors--"They're a good person" "They're a bad person." Which means that if you're a bad person, you were born that way--you were destined to do evil. Nobody wants that. For one thing, nobody wants to be destined to do evil, and for another, punishment no longer becomes moral; it simply becomes pragmatic. I'm curious as to what others' reactions might be to this idea.

(It seems to me that the person who committs evil actually becomes a victim, too--they're a victim of their own natures, a passive and helpless spectator to their immoral deeds, even if it feels like they're choosing to do evil! Yipes! Do we really think this is the case?)

QuickSilver

September 18, 2003, 08:35 PM

2human and Keith Russell:

I am also reading FE (only 1/4 way through though) and enjoying it immensely.

Dennett is a subscriber of naturalism, a proponent of Neural Darwinism and a determinist. In this book his aim seems to be to dispel the myth that only with the existence of 'a ghost in the machine' � magic � we can have free will. His approach so far demonstrates that it is our abilities � e.g. to obtain information and utilize it when necessary; to react rationally to the circumstances and etc. � which we as evolved highly complex systems possess, that allow for free will in spite of determinism.

He tells the reader in advance of the conclusion he will reach:

�"Free will is real, but it is not a preexisting feature of our existence, like the law of gravity. It is also not what tradition declares it to be: a God-like power to exempt oneself from the causal fabric of the physical world. It is an evolved creation of human activity and beliefs, and it is just as real as such other human creations as music or money." p13

Back to my reading...

Clutch

September 19, 2003, 09:06 AM

Originally posted by the_cave
I think it's because the kind of free will that Clutch subscribes to leaves many (maybe not all) feeling helpless--indeed, less than human. You're free to feel less than human in response to whatever you wish, but plaintiveness does not rise to the level of an argument. Indeed, the view I've sketched is in essence that used by Harry Frankfurt to explain personhood, not to eliminate it. Vague assertion to the effect that we need some further notion of freedom to "feel human" conspicuously fails to address the central question: what phenomenon of action or explanation requires explanation in terms of some more exotic notion? In the thread I linked to, I showed how, on my view, Ted is correct to think he could have done otherwise, and can plausibly intend to do differently in similar future cases. Should Ted feel less than human? An argument, please. Also (and this is part of why we feel helpless and less than human) we're used to judging people on the basis of their actions and behaviors--"They're a good person" "They're a bad person." Which means that if you're a bad person, you were born that way--you were destined to do evil.Non-sequitur. The second sentence simply fails to follow from the first. Putting it another way: "She used to be a bad person, but now she's a better person"; please demonstrate the contradiction, on my view. I'm curious as to what others' reactions might be to this idea.My reaction is that there's no reason to think it correct.

Thomas Ash

September 19, 2003, 10:56 AM

Originally posted by DigitalChicken
No. Free will is the experience of having free will.

There are lots of things in our experience that are the things themselves and the best your understanding will probably get.

I ask, "How are you?" You say, "Good." Is it reasonable to then ask (assuming you were truthful), "Are you sure? Is it possible that you are not 'good' and that you might be mistaken? Is it possible that you actually having a lousy day?"

Yes! :p I think you get what I mean there, if you think about it. The point is that...

Of course not. Its silly because the state of being good, whatever that might mean to the person is what it is as the experience.

Let us assume that someone is able to show that the universe is completely deterministic in a Newtonian way. Does this then mean that I won't then have the experience of free will where I am forced to make choices, illusions or not? Of course not. I will still have that experience and I will still have to deal with it.

I think that you are misunderstanding free will. You could just as well, using my previous analogy, say that the apple has no taste because its just a set of electrochemical reactions on my tongue and into my brain. We wouldn't say that because we accept that the experience is the thing itself. Free will is no different.

DC

While 'feeling good' is undoubtedly simply a state of mind, 'free will' is not - it's a concept with a theological and philophical background. Surely you can see that? Like the_cave hinted, what you're talking about isn't really what's called free will. There's a limit to how much you can redefine the words - if there wan't, 'God' could just be defined as some vague higher meaning. Please desist from using the word free will forthwith, and come up with a new one ;) .

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash

Thomas Ash

September 19, 2003, 11:39 AM

Originally posted by the_cave
I understand where DC is coming from. If everything is determined, then free will is merely a perception. In which case I'm uncomfortable calling it "free will"--since it actually isn't free at all.

My point exactly, except I think many elements of what we understand by free will is maintained in determinism, apart from some rather fanciful notions like people in situations literally having every option equally, without any distinction.

That's something close to what I tenatively believe--except that I'm willing to call that "free will"! If we're able to make uncaused choices, those choices are not only free, but they can also be willed, in the sense that they're desired...imagine two choices, both desirable alternatives. Our minds then enter a state, by the collapse of some wave function (assuming a quantum model of the mind--big assumption) where it becomes committed to one of those alternatives. It just made a choice--and we willed it, because we desired the outcome.

Pretty fanciful right? I mean, is there any science to back this up? Randomness is the enemy of choice, not the ally.

I admit this means admitting we don't "control" our free choices in the way it seems we do, but I'm willing to surrender that in exchange for retaining a conception of free will that I can call "free will".

Fair enough, but it has to sorrespond at least aprtly with what we generally mean by "free will" to be called that, no? But I'm a compatibilist - I basically agree.

DigitalChicken

September 19, 2003, 11:43 AM

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
'free will' is not - it's a concept with a theological and philophical background. Surely you can see that?

No I do not.

Back to the taste analogy: "Taste is merely electrochemical reactions in the mouth and brain. Surely you can see that."

I don't need theology or philosophy to have the exeprience of free will.

Like the_cave hinted, what you're talking about isn't really what's called free will.

Do you hear nothing I say grasshopper!? :D

I am trying to point out that the will problem as it is often discussed deviates (usually immediately) from that which we identify by experience as free will.

DC

Thomas Ash

September 19, 2003, 01:04 PM

Originally posted by sophie
I'm with Denett on this one.

Don't you mean Dennet's with Sophie on this one ;) ?

For example if you were thirsty, how many times can you put your change in the pepsi machine and press refund without at some point having to accept the pepsi as your sole thirst quencher?

I'm not quite sure I see what this example is getting at. Could you spell it out for me? Thanks.

Thomas Ash

September 19, 2003, 01:14 PM

Originally posted by the_cave
<snipping>...it's because the kind of free will that Clutch subscribes to leaves many (maybe not all) feeling helpless--indeed, less than human. Also (and this is part of why we feel helpless and less than human) we're used to judging people on the basis of their actions and behaviors--"They're a good person" "They're a bad person." Which means that if you're a bad person, you were born that way--you were destined to do evil. Nobody wants that. For one thing, nobody wants to be destined to do evil, and for another, punishment no longer becomes moral; it simply becomes pragmatic. I'm curious as to what others' reactions might be to this idea.

(It seems to me that the person who committs evil actually becomes a victim, too--they're a victim of their own natures, a passive and helpless spectator to their immoral deeds, even if it feels like they're choosing to do evil! Yipes! Do we really think this is the case?)

Well, yes, I do. That's always been my position - that dessert (though not dessert... mmm :D) is a fundamentally misguided notion. Of course, this means some sentences are ridiculously over-long. I don't see any particular problem with punishment being solely pragmatic. In fact, that's supposed to be what punishment currently is, and almost all judges I've read on the issue (except for backwoods Roy Moore types.) Though juries routinely admit they take punishment into account, despite express instructions from judges not to. Guess a crash course in determinism is in order ;) ...

sophie

September 20, 2003, 09:36 AM

Thomas Ash : Don't you mean Dennet's with Sophie on this one ?Ah he got there first. My take on this is : From atom to object.

Thomas Ash : I'm not quite sure I see what this example is getting at. Could you spell it out for me? Thanks. It is said that every cause has an effect. If I were to rewrite this as Every cause has a pending effect until the pending effect takes effect then we can examine the scope of hard determinism.

Saying this helps us to look at the range between determinism and free will, should be a step foward in clarifying my points.

If I look at this from the perspective of
[list=1]
past - determined.
present - in the process of determination.
future - impending determination.
[/list=1]
When an event receedes into the past it is determined, it has moved out of one's present ability to restrain it, it has already undergone changes.

The future which may only be a few nanoseconds ahead of us, and in its motion draws the impending events into our direct path to facilitate change, is in essence the continuum of motion. We make changes in the present and its impending effect rebervates through the future and receedes into the past

This leaves us with the most important concept of our lives - the present. It is through the present all change is processed. The present has a metaphysical simultaneity attached to it. We as humans have to be simultaneous proximate to events in order to assist in the changes.

Two points which show the differences between free will and hard determinism are as follows :

[list=1]
How long can we restrain an event in the present before we are forced to release it, so it receedes into the past?
How much influence can we exert on the crieteria for change which directly alters the path of an impending event?
[/list=1]

The above list shows #1 as linked to hard determinism, while #2 is directly linked to free will.

the_cave

September 20, 2003, 12:36 PM

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Pretty fanciful right? I mean, is there any science to back this up? Randomness is the enemy of choice, not the ally.

I'm thinking of "quantum mind" theories, like that of Penrose. I realize Penrose gets dissed by the cog scientists...

the_cave

September 20, 2003, 12:59 PM

Originally posted by Clutch
You're free to feel less than human in response to whatever you wish, but plaintiveness does not rise to the level of an argument....Vague assertion to the effect that we need some further notion of freedom to "feel human" conspicuously fails to address the central question....
I apologize for any confusion; all I was attempting to do is account for Afghan's observation that "People seem to want ensure they have something called 'free will' and are willing to scrabble around for some definition that allows them to possess it." I'm claiming that they scrabble around because determinism makes them feel less than human. In doing so, they're not trying to respond to any central question; they're just trying to feel better about things.

In the thread I linked to, I showed how, on my view, Ted is correct to think he could have done otherwise, and can plausibly intend to do differently in similar future cases. Should Ted feel less than human? An argument, please.
On the other hand, it's true that I think that Ted has cause to feel less than human (so I'm not saying he should, but I'm saying he's permitted to.) I guess this involves your claim that Ted indeed "could have done otherwise":
If he�d wanted to do otherwise, he would have. His wanting to do otherwise, however, would have entailed a physical variation in the situation. Ted may not know this, of course. But this is no more relevant than that Ted may not know what percentage of his body is water.
But that's not the same kind of "could have" that most people usually mean when they use the phrase. Sure, I can see how it might still be semantically consistent, in some sense, I'm just saying it's not what most people mean by the phrase. They mean "could have" in an actual sense; in the sense that, at that moment, actually taking into account all the actual facts of the situation, a different result could have entailed. Without chaning any of the inputs. Losing that meaning of the phrase "could have" would make many people feel uneasy, and rightly so, because they're used to assuming that events are actually capable of going in multiple directions at any given point, regardless of the limitations of our knowledge.

Now maybe we can learn to live with Dennett's vision of freedom, and still be happy. I'm just saying it will require a revision of our everyday ideas about things like hope, happiness, satisfaction, regret, despair, courage, and the like.

Non-sequitur. The second sentence simply fails to follow from the first. Putting it another way: "She used to be a bad person, but now she's a better person"; please demonstrate the contradiction, on my view.
I would love it if people actually began to think that way. But I'm skeptical, that's all.

sophie

September 20, 2003, 01:08 PM

the_cave : I'm claiming that they scrabble around because determinism makes them feel less than human. In doing so, they're not trying to respond to any central question; they're just trying to feel better about thingsI agree.

Clutch

September 20, 2003, 02:07 PM

------------------------------------------------------------------------
If he�d wanted to do otherwise, he would have. His wanting to do otherwise, however, would have entailed a physical variation in the situation. Ted may not know this, of course. But this is no more relevant than that Ted may not know what percentage of his body is water.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

But that's not the same kind of "could have" that most people usually mean when they use the phrase.I don't know how to make it any clearer that you have to argue for such claims. Your contention, apparently, is that "most people" who say "I could have done x" really mean "holding every physical fact of the situation fixed, including my internal neurological states and the microphysical facts, my behaviour could have been different."

There is, simply, no reason to think "most people" believe this, and every reason to think they do not.

Remember,

(1) Like "most people", Ted is philosophically innocent. When he says that he could have done otherwise, he does not have any particular precisification of that phrase in mind.

(2) By any sane standard, Ted does not mean "I could have done otherwise, whether I intended to or not".

(3) There's no reason to expect Ted to know what different microphysical features of the situation his having different intentions would consist in. So there is no reason to expect his counterfactual conception of "the same situation" to explicitly reflect the differences that would have led to his doing otherwise.

Nowhere357

September 21, 2003, 06:38 AM

DigitalChicken
Free will is the experience of having free will.
I don't see how this helps. The experience of having what? How is this not begging the question?

Does this then mean that I won't then have the experience of free will where I am forced to make choices, illusions or not? Of course not. I will still have that experience and I will still have to deal with it.
Right. But what I notice is that "to deal with it" implies the that our minds have more than mere observer status.

Which of course they do. We have the ability to make decisions and to resist our urges. We have the ability to apply mental effort and control our thoughts. This is the practical definition of free will which works for me.

Why, I wonder, might we have the experience of will, if in fact we have no actual will? What observations and reasons lead one to that conclusion?

the_cave

September 21, 2003, 05:46 PM

Originally posted by Clutch
Your contention, apparently, is that "most people" who say "I could have done x" really mean "holding every physical fact of the situation fixed, including my internal neurological states and the microphysical facts, my behaviour could have been different."
I think they mean that more often than not, yes.

There is, simply, no reason to think "most people" believe this, and every reason to think they do not.
It's not what I usually mean by it, and others have not been confused when I describe to them the processes by which I have made decisions. In my experiences with both myself and others, this is the understanding that I have most often formed. I admit I could be wrong; if you think there's evidence for your position, that's new information for me which I will consider.

I think that "could have" most often means what I think it means in the context which we're discussing, based on my experience. I realize that words have more than one meaning, and that they mean different things in different contexts. I don't deny that people do sometimes use it to mean what you are arguing for; I apologize if there is any confusion on that.

(1) Like "most people", Ted is philosophically innocent. When he says that he could have done otherwise, he does not have any particular precisification of that phrase in mind.
But I don't take "philosophically innocent" to mean "one who uses phrases without any semantic content." Ted must mean something by the phrase. If one asked him to explain it in English, he could do so, or at least convey something of the meaning. And I argue, from my direct experience, that he would most often mean what I think he means.

(2) By any sane standard, Ted does not mean "I could have done otherwise, whether I intended to or not".
I agree. My understanding is when people are conflicted about something, it's most often because they intend two things--but they can only choose one.

(3) There's no reason to expect Ted to know what different microphysical features of the situation his having different intentions would consist in. So there is no reason to expect his counterfactual conception of "the same situation" to explicitly reflect the differences that would have led to his doing otherwise.
I also agree. But I also think that Ted believe he posesses libertarian free will, which is essentially the ability to make different decisions, even when confronted with the exact same situation. From what I have experienced with myself and others, this is what most people believe they posess.

(For that matter, I also believe that people think there is a certain amount of chaos in the world outside them--that if you reran the situation, entirely different results would have ensued. It seems to me that this is a separate but somewhat related issue.)

I of course admit I could be wrong about what people think. Without any objective evidence, my own subjective evidence is the best I have.

Clutch

September 21, 2003, 08:39 PM

Of course philosophical innocence does not amount to a lack of content. But why should it be thought to?

Famous example: "You can fool all of the people some of the time, and some of the people all of the time, but you can't fool all of the people all of the time." This contains a quantifier scope ambiguity; if you were going to specify its logical form, you'd have to precisify it to prefer one reading over another. But lots of people recite this saying, with no plausible grounds for attributing to them a knowledge of scope ambiguities nor a definite preference for one interpretation over the other. Of course, they don't mean nothing when they say it! There's just no reason to suppose they mean anything more precise than If you try to fool everyone you'll get caught.

Philosophical innocence in the case of "could have done otherwise" just means that people do not have to have views, or even very clear concepts, bearing on the counterfactual distinctions available in light of the complete fixity of neurological or physical facts in a situation. You seem to think that people do have such views, and that these views comprise the content of their "could have done otherwise" judgements. Perhaps everyone you know is a philosopher from Notre Dame or Calvin College; but whatever the explanation, somehow or other, we're meeting different people. ;)

The people I know don't seem to mean much more than this: They can entertain being in that situation again, but acting differently. Of course, I agree -- since their philosophical innocence (and common sense!) means they use "the same situation" as they use notions like "the same meal every day this week", or "the same mistakes our last government made", and so forth. In short, not to express identity from the sub-atomic level upwards, but to express relevant similarity.

So yes: In a relevantly similar situation, they could have acted differently, and perhaps will do so in the future. In a future situation subatomically identical to the last one? No -- just one relevantly similar.

the_cave

September 22, 2003, 05:50 PM

Originally posted by Clutch
Philosophical innocence in the case of "could have done otherwise" just means that people do not have to have views, or even very clear concepts, bearing on the counterfactual distinctions available in light of the complete fixity of neurological or physical facts in a situation. You seem to think that people do have such views, and that these views comprise the content of their "could have done otherwise" judgements.
Well, not exactly. Read on:

The people I know don't seem to mean much more than this: They can entertain being in that situation again, but acting differently. Of course, I agree -- since their philosophical innocence (and common sense!) means they use "the same situation" as they use notions like "the same meal every day this week", or "the same mistakes our last government made", and so forth. In short, not to express identity from the sub-atomic level upwards, but to express relevant similarity.

You're right. And I think this constitutes an identical situation, in every way we could imagine. They're not imagining an identical situation at the sub-atomic level, but they are imagining an identical situation at the everyday level, which to them represents an actually identical situation.

I mean, it works both ways, doesn't it? If they're not thinking about the subatomic constitution of the world, then they're likewise not thinking about how things could be arranged differently at the subatomic level--and therefore can't picture, and aren't picturing, a situation that might appear identical at some level, but at some deeper level isn't in fact identical. So they're not imagining different worlds with different possible futures; they're imagining identical worlds with different possible futures.

So yes: In a relevantly similar situation, they could have acted differently, and perhaps will do so in the future. In a future situation subatomically identical to the last one? No -- just one relevantly similar.
But for them, a relevantly similar situation is the same thing as an identical situation. Identical in every aspect. It's just that they're either unaware of the subatomic aspect or what have you, or they don't realize it matters. In either case, they are still picturing an actually identical situation, and we should treat it as such.

I mean, look, maybe you're still right; maybe when people ponder past possibilities, they're thinking about how the world would have had to have been different in order to have a different future. Although my friends aren't graduates of ND and Calvin, they could still be wrong ;) I'm just saying that these are my experiences, and I would find contrary experiences surprising.

Clutch

September 22, 2003, 07:28 PM

cave, I think you're missing (or I'm badly expressing!) the point that "identical" in the philosophers' sense is not an especially natural idea. That was the point of examples like the basketball shot. "Hey, it could have gone in," the shooter's teammates console him.

Do they mean that in a strictly physically identical situation that shot could have gone in? Of course not. They mean that they can easily envision a relevantly similar situation -- same teams, same time on the clock, same shooter, same crowd, same shooting form -- in which the shot actually goes in. And they right. It's just that, whether they know it or not, what makes them right is the prospect for physical differences between the two situations that are not represented explicitly in the "same" features they imagine.

Mutatis mutandis for "I could have done otherwise". The differences between the two situations that constitute the agent's wanting to act otherwise need not be explicitly represented in the counterfactual description of the situation as "the same".

Thanks very much for your remarks. I'll read with interest any further ones you make, but I suspect I've said my own piece in as many ways as I can find. If you don't buy it now, you ain't a-gonna!

paul30

September 24, 2003, 12:35 PM

Digital Chicken is right.

Free will is the SENSATION of or belief you have free will.

It probably does result from the complexity of causes.

By the way, "Digital" comes from the Latin "digitus" which means "finger." Does this mean DC is Finger Chicken? Chicken Finger(s)? What?

Most of that is rightly illegal in my state. (The Great State of Confusion--or Confucian as one of my students once wrote).

2human

September 24, 2003, 03:42 PM

But didn't Sophie point to a solution close to or identical to the one Daniel Dennett gives in his book "Freedom Evolves".

she set it up like this:

If I look at this from the perspective of

1. past - determined.
2. present - in the process of determination.
3. future - impending determination.

Now I know nothign about logical things or neuroscience but isn't it clear as sky that if time is an arrow and if we put enough time in the present. I mena the old advice. Sleep on a decisin or count to ten b4 you slap someones face. Practical experience show that there is some kind of leeway or loophole or "freedom worth fighting for" in the awareness of our present.

We are truly determined by that which determines our future but if we get ware of what those determinants are like fear, or lust or craving or vain or vain, mode, trends, likes, dependents, whims, circumstances or fates or whatever then by bulding over time a habit of allowing oneself to get aware of what is going to happen while it is in the moment of actualizing we have all tools to avoid it and could stear away by the predictability of the determinants.

My sense is that many of you love the fight more than finding a solution to the riddle. This debate has gone about for thousands of yeasrs so why chnage a winning horse. Lets beat teh dead corpse for thousands more. Dennett ahs given enough food for thought and sophie seems to ahve her good asnwers to ti too. So all power to these two. :)

Bernt

the_cave

September 24, 2003, 04:39 PM

Originally posted by Clutch
cave, I think you're missing (or I'm badly expressing!) the point that "identical" in the philosophers' sense is not an especially natural idea.
I don't think you're explaining it badly; I'm just stubbornly resisting the point.

That was the point of examples like the basketball shot. "Hey, it could have gone in," the shooter's teammates console him.
But I think I now see where we disagree. Here's the relevant quote from your basketball example:

Now are they saying that, holding every single physical fact fixed, the ball could have gone in anyhow? No. They are using "could have been otherwise" in a normal, philosophically innocent, way -- to mean, "Holding most things fixed, but changing some small but important things, the ball would have gone in".
Reading it over again carefully, I think I agree that they are not saying it would have gone in, "holding every single physical fact fixed."

However, I think that when they say "the ball could have gone in," they mean one of three things:

1. If only he had shot it at a slightly different angle, or jumped just a little higher, or something, it could have gone in.

I had been assuming that you thought this was what most people mean by "could have"; a slight change in initial conditions. I still think this is what you mostly mean. I had been disagreeing that this is what they meant, but I now admit that it's possible that they might sometimes mean this. And they might also mean:

2. If only if it had not been for forces beyond his control, it could have gone in.

For example, he may not have known that a breeze was gently blowing by the hoop. If he had known, he could have compensated for it, and so it could have gone in. In this example, forces are still determined, but we have imperfect knowledge of them, so we speak of "could have" to mean "could have if only we had known about such-and-such", in a sense. I now think this is the other half of what you think people mean by "could have". 1. and 2. are basically flip sides of the same situation; if only he had done something slightly different, there would have been a different outcome.

However, I think there's a third sense of the phrase, and I believe (however deluded I may be) that this is what most people mean by "could have":

3. If only it had not been for the Forces of Random Chaos, it could have gone in.

Don't laugh! I really think that most people believe in the Forces of Random Chaos. In other words, I think that many, if not most, people think, that if you rewound the world to the moment of the shot, there still could have been a different outcome, because that's just the way the world works--there is a certain amount of true randomness in the world, and it makes random things happen. So there's always a different way the shot could have turned out, even keeping all the initial conditions identical. A gust of random wind could have blown; the ball could have bounced randomly in some random direction; and so on.

Now I myself am skeptical of such a force--except when it comes to the brain! I think that a quantum mind would be affected by a Quantum Force of Random Chaos, and hence human actions are truly unpredictable (even by an omniscient being, for that matter.)

They mean that they can easily envision a relevantly similar situation -- same teams, same time on the clock, same shooter, same crowd, same shooting form -- in which the shot actually goes in. And they right. It's just that, whether they know it or not, what makes them right is the prospect for physical differences between the two situations that are not represented explicitly in the "same" features they imagine.
So you're imagining relevantly identical situations that are actually different in their actual initical conditions, and so subsequently diverge. I'm imagining relevantly identical situations that are actually identical in their initial conditions, but which subsequently diverge anyway. The difference is where we think the difference is, if you see what I mean. So that's how I think people think. For better or for worse--and if I'm wrong, no doubt I'll eventually figure it out.

Thanks very much for your remarks.
No problem--thank very much for yours.

I'll read with interest any further ones you make, but I suspect I've said my own piece in as many ways as I can find. If you don't buy it now, you ain't a-gonna!
Probably you're right: you have, and I'm not ;)

Nowhere357

September 24, 2003, 11:44 PM

Originally posted by paul30
Free will is the SENSATION of or belief you have free will.

According to both philosophical and standard dictionaries, "sensation" is passive, while "will" or "free will" is active. The former happens to us, the latter is something we do.

There is a sensation associated with the application of the will, this sensation arises due to the mental effort involved in making a decsion.

So I would say free will is the ability to apply mental effort to make decisions and resist urges. and not merely a passive sensation.
_________________

Philosophy Pages
sensation
Conscious experience or feeling that apparently conveys awareness of the external world. Empiricists commonly suppose that sensations are the basis for our a posteriori knowledge of the world.

will
The faculty of deciding, choosing, or acting.

Merriam-Webster
Main Entry: sen�sa�tion
Function: noun
1 a : a mental process (as seeing, hearing, or smelling) due to immediate bodily stimulation often as distinguished from awareness of the process -- compare PERCEPTION
b : awareness (as of heat or pain) due to stimulation of a sense organ
c : a state of consciousness of a kind usually due to physical objects or internal bodily changes <a burning sensation in his chest>
d : an indefinite bodily feeling <a sensation of buoyancy>
2 : something (as a physical object, sense-datum, pain, or afterimage) that causes or is the object of sensation
3 a : a state of excited interest or feeling <their elopement caused a sensation>
b : a cause of such excitement <the show was the musical sensation of the season>; especially : one (as a person) in some respect exceptional or outstanding <the rookie hitting sensation of the American League>

Main Entry: 2will
Function: noun
1 : DESIRE, WISH: as a : DISPOSITION, INCLINATION <where there's a will there's a way>
b : APPETITE, PASSION c : CHOICE, DETERMINATION
2 a : something desired; especially : a choice or determination of one having authority or power
b (1) archaic : REQUEST, COMMAND (2) [from the phrase our will is which introduces it] : the part of a summons expressing a royal command
3 : the act, process, or experience of willing : VOLITION
4 a : mental powers manifested as wishing, choosing, desiring, or intending
b : a disposition to act according to principles or ends
c : the collective desire of a group <the will of the people>
5 : the power of control over one's own actions or emotions <a man of iron will>
6 : a legal declaration of a person's wishes regarding the disposal of his or her property or estate after death; especially : a written instrument legally executed by which a person makes disposition of his or her estate to take effect after death
- at will : as one wishes : as or when it pleases or suits oneself

Main Entry: free will
Function: noun
1 : voluntary choice or decision <I do this of my own free will>
2 : freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

mosaic

May 13, 2004, 12:29 PM

Clutch:

So yes: In a relevantly similar situation, they could have acted differently, and perhaps will do so in the future. In a future situation subatomically identical to the last one? No -- just one relevantly similar.

The only problem I have with this is that it seems you smuggle 'subatomically identical' in. The relevant question here in terms of 'choosing' is it the 'physical facts' that determine what happens or some 'active' agency. You seem to presuppose that if the 'subatomic' facts change then the situation changes(i.e. they are determinative). Which is relatively uncontroversial since it can change due to other preceding subatomic facts or some 'active agency."

Briefly put: when a basketplayer says 'I could have made the shot if I did this" it seems, they literally mean, some 'willing' by them (say finding better position) would have changed the outcome. In this sense, the 'subatomic' facts would definitely change but the change would be relative to action on their part not simply a change in the subatomic facts. However, it seems this 'willing on his part' is being reintepreted as itself part of the subatomic facts, and the basketplayer, if philsophically inclined, could legitimately say the same thing by uttering ' if the situation was subatomically a little different, I would make the shot.' ( if this is strawman or missing the point, please inform me here). But do the se statements mean the same thing? And if so, shouldn't it be argued why? I'm willing to argue that they mean different things[ meaning I dont think the analysis( or destruction rather :( ) of that Bob Marley/Peter Tosh lyric can be carried over here] but I'll wait to see if I've misrepresented or misunderstood your position.