Does the Christian deity exist? -- Chris McHugh vs. Ted Drange

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Ladies and gentlemen,

The following is a formal debate between two noted scholars on philosophical arguments for and against the existence of the Christian deity.

Chris McHugh is an independent scholar and Christian apologist. He has written articles in PHILO (of the Society of Humanist Philosophers), offering scholarly critiques of nontheists' arguments. Chris McHugh is also a referee for that journal. He has engaged in debates with such philosophers as Graham Oppy, George H. Smith, Richard Gale as well as Ted Drange. Chris McHugh has also debated here on IIDB previously (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=47897) against Doug Krueger on the topic of theism vs. atheism.

Ted Drange is a Professor Emeritus of philosophy, having served at West Virginia University with specialties in philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, and theory of knowledge. He earned his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1963. He has written articles in PHILO, Religious Studies, Free Inquiry, and other publications. Ted Drange has submitted several articles (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/index.shtml) to the Secular Web library.

The topic of this debate deals with the existence vs. the nonexistence of God (in particular, that of evangelical Christian theism) with two components. Both will take an affirmative position and a negative one:

(1) Ted Drange will attempt to show that the Argument from Nonbelief provides good objective evidence for the nonexistence of the God of evangelical Christianity and Chris McHugh will attempt to show that it fails to make the case.

(2) Chris McHugh will attempt to make a case for the existence of the God of Christianity and Ted Drange will attempt to show that it fails to do so.

The format of this debate will not take the standard course. The debaters' posts will be shown concurrently (i.e. simultaneously) after both statements from each debater have been submitted according to an agreed deadline (see the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=63096) of the debate). The debate will go for 6 rounds (with an additional 2 rounds to be decided later on if desired).

A peanut gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=69141) is set up in the Existence of God(s) forum for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Enjoy the debate!

- Nightshade, FD Moderator

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Chris McHugh has requested that the formal debate be postponed for another month. I have granted his request.

Here is the revised schedule for concurrent statements:

Nov. 30: the opening statements
Dec. 31: the first rebuttals (i.e., rebuttals to the other's opening
statement, attacking the other's arguments)
Jan. 31: the second rebuttals (i.e., rebuttals to the other's first
rebuttal, each debater defending his own arguments)
Feb. 29: the third rebuttals (i.e., rebuttals to the other's second
rebuttal, again attacking the other's arguments)
Mar. 31: the fourth rebuttals (i.e., rebuttals to the other's third
rebuttal, each debater again defending his own arguments).

At this point a decision is made whether or not to go to fifth + sixth rebuttals. If so, then the continuing format would be:

April 30: the fifth rebuttals (i.e., rebuttals to the other's fourth rebuttal, again attacking the other's arguments)
May 31: the sixth rebuttals (i.e., rebuttals to the other's fifth
rebuttal, each debater again defending his own arguments)
June 30: deadline for the closing statements (which combines attack and defense).

If it is decided not to have the fifth & sixth rebuttals, then the deadline for the closing statements would be April 30.

Jason

ADDENDUM:

The schedule has been slightly modified for the 4th rebuttals and closing statements (there will be no 5th and 6th rebuttals).

The 4th rebuttals have been scheduled for April 15th and the closing statements are due May 15th.

- NS, Mar. 16th

[Ted Drange]

ANB as Evidence for the Nonexistence of the God of Evangelical Christianity

Opening Statement

Although Chris McHugh and I have discussed the Argument from Nonbelief (abbreviated ANB) in the past,[1] and although he took it up recently as part of his Internet debate with Doug Krueger,[2] I shall not presuppose any of that in this debate, but will present the argument from scratch. My position is that ANB provides good objective evidence for the nonexistence of the God of evangelical Christianity.
To formulate ANB, I first provide two definitions:

The gospel message = the proposition that the universe is governed by a single, supreme deity who sent his only son to be the savior of humans by making eternal life possible for them.

Situation S = the situation of all, or almost all, humans from the time of Jesus of Nazareth (to the present) coming to believe the gospel message prior to their physical death.

Using this definition, ANB may be expressed as follows

(A) If the God of evangelical Christianity (GC) were to exist, then he would possess all of the following four properties (among others):
(1) being able to bring about situation S, all things considered;
(2) wanting to bring about S, i.e., having it among his desires;
(3) not wanting anything else, that conflicts with his desire to bring about S, as strongly as it;
(4) being rational (which implies always acting in accord with his own highest purposes).
(B) If there were to exist a being who has all four properties listed above, then situation S would have to obtain.
(C) But situation S does not obtain. It is not the case that all, or almost all, humans since the time of Jesus have come to believe the gospel message prior to their physical death.
(D) Therefore [from B & C], there does not exist a being who has all four properties listed in premise (A).
(E) Hence [from A & D], GC does not exist.

Comments
GC can be understood to be "the God of the Bible as interpreted by evangelical Christianity." Evangelical Christianity is that orientation towards the religion which emphasizes at least the following four things: God's unrestricted love for humanity, God's desire that all humans be saved, God's desire that his love for humanity be reciprocated, and the importance of missionary work in spreading the gospel message worldwide. I take GC, thus understood, to be the dominant and most prevalent concept of deity among Christians, at least in the U.S.
Dividing ANB's premise (A) into four subpremises, we should inquire of each of them whether it receives biblical support. Premise (A1) is supported by the Bible's repeated claim that God is all-powerful (Gen.17:1, 35:11; Jer. 32:17,27; Matt. 19:26; Mark 10:27; Luke 1:37; Rev. 1:8, 19:6.) It is clear that he could have brought about situation S, even all things considered.
One way for God to reveal himself to people and thereby bring about situation S would be through religious experiences. But it is unclear just what form the experiences might take. Would people hear inner voices or see visions (like Paul on the road to Damascus)? Or would it be just a kind of feeling that overcomes them? One problem with a feeling is that it seems incapable of delivering thoughts with as much specific content as the gospel message. Hearing inner voices seems more effective in that regard.
A more promising way for God to have gotten the message across might have been by the performance of spectacular miracles. He could have spoken to people in a thunderous voice or used skywriting to proclaim the gospel message worldwide. If there is concern that the use of such miracles would be too intimidating, we need only note that God, being all-powerful, could tailor them so that they have just the right degree of force. For example, back in the days of Jesus, events could have occurred differently. Instead of appearing only to his followers, the resurrected Christ could have appeared to millions of people, including Pontius Pilate and even Emperor Tiberius and others in Rome. He could thereby have made such a definite place for himself in history that it would have enlightened billions of people coming later about the truth of the gospel message. Such a chain of events would not have intimidated people.
God could also have brought about situation S without resort to spectacular miracles. He could have done it through behind-the-scenes actions. For example, he could have sent out millions of angels, disguised as humans (like the ones at the empty tomb), to preach to people in such a persuasive manner as to get them to believe the gospel message. Another useful action would have been to protect the Bible itself from defects. The writing, copying, and translating of Scripture could have been so carefully guided that it would today contain no unclarity or errors of any sort. Also, it could have contained a large number of very precise prophecies that then become amazingly fulfilled, with that information noted by neutral observers and widely disseminated. People reading it would have been much more likely to infer that everything in it is true, including the gospel message. If all that had been done, then situation S would probably have come to obtain.
Furthermore, God could have postponed the sending of his son to, say, (what we call) the year 2000 A.D. He could then have made use of the Internet to advertise the event both before and after its occurrence. People who browse the Web could regularly receive the gospel message, perhaps even if they try to avoid it with "pop-up blockers." God could also "flame" all and only nonbelievers who are sitting at their computers by warning them of future judgment. There could fall from the sky millions of CDS containing the gospel message, delivered in spectacular colors and sounds. (Of course all this could also take place even if the saving of the world by God's son had occurred when it was supposed to have occurred, long ago, but in that case other methods would have been needed to enlighten those who lived before the Information Age.) Modern technology has made it relatively easy for God to get his message out to the world, so much so that we can declare ANB's premise (A1) to be obviously true. There is no limit to the number of different ways that God could have brought about situation S.
Premise (A2) states that if God were to exist then he would want to bring about situation S, where that is to be understood in a minimal way, meaning only that doing so is among God's desires. Thus, it is a desire that might be overridden by some other desire, which creates a need for premise (A3). The question might be raised whether God might want situation S without wanting to bring it about himself. Certainly if there is some desire on God's part that overrides a desire to bring about situation S, then ANB's premise (A3), and ANB along with it, could be thereby refuted. In that case, the issue would be moot: it would not matter whether we declare ANB's premise (A2) also false. On the other hand, if there is no such overriding desire, then one might very well say that God wanting situation S would be essentially the same as God wanting to bring about the situation himself. Since God is not lazy and is highly motivated, there would in that case be no reason for him not to want to do it. In other words, if there is no counter-example to refute premise (A3), then there is no reason for God to want situation S but not want to bring it about himself.
I shall proceed for the time being on the assumption that there is no overriding desire on God's part that would refute ANB's premise (A3). All that would be needed, then, in order to support premise (A2) would be arguments to the effect that GC (as described above) has situation S among his desires. There are at least four different arguments to show that.[3] Let us label them "arguments (1)-(4)."

Argument (1). According to the Great Commission, God (via his son) directed missionaries to preach the gospel message to all nations (Matt. 28:19-20) and to all creation (Mark 16:15-16 NIV). Presumably God wanted everyone to believe the gospel message. And he not only wanted the message preached worldwide, but expected that to happen (as shown by such verses as Mark 13:10; Luke 24:47; Acts 1:8, 13:47, 28:28). Furthermore, according to the Book of Acts, God went so far as to empower some of the apostles to perform miracles which would help convince listeners of the truth of the message.[4] Since miracles are works of God, we could say that, in effect, God himself was indirectly starting to bring about situation S. We may infer that getting people to believe the gospel message must have been a high priority for him. This is very strong support for ANB's premise (A2).

Argument (2). According to St. Paul, God "wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. 2:4 NIV). It is clear that the "truth" includes the gospel message, and certainly evangelical Christianity takes it that way. The verse is in effect telling the reader very directly that God wants (among other things) all humans to come to believe the gospel message, which makes ANB's premise (A2) true.

Argument (3). According to the Bible and evangelical Christianity, God wants all humans to be saved. There are indeed verses, like the one quoted in argument (2), above, that either state it directly or else point in that direction. (See Matt. 18:12-14; John 12:32; Rom. 5:18, 11:32; 1 Cor. 15:22; Col. 1:20; 1 Tim. 2:4,6; 2 Peter 3:9.) But the Bible says that in order for people to be saved they must believe in God's son (Mark 16:15-16; John 3:18,36, 8:21-25, 14:6; Acts 4:10-12; 1 John 5:12), which is usually taken to include accepting him as the savior of the world. Hence, God must want people to believe in his son as the savior of the world, which entails believing the gospel message. Hence, (A2) must be true.

Argument (4). Quite aside from the Bible, evangelical Christians regard God as a being who loves humanity, who wants that love to be reciprocated, and who thereby wants people to be aware of the gospel message, since people's awareness of the message would help them to reciprocate God's love for them. In the case of some, it might incline them towards greater morality, which God also desires. Certainly it would provide people with comfort and hope for the future, and since God loves people, he must want them to attain such a benefit. It might be argued, then, that the proposition that God wants humanity to be aware of the truth of the gospel message fits in well with evangelical Christianity's overall worldview and would therefore be affirmed by evangelical Christians. On that basis, we may infer that God, conceived of in the given way, wants situation S, which makes ANB's premise (A2) true.

It is important that we now see how ANB's premise (A3) might be supported. There are three arguments that I would like to consider. Let us label them "arguments (5)-(7)."

Argument (5). As pointed out in argument (1), above, according to the book of Acts, God not only sent out missionaries to spread the gospel worldwide, but also provided some of them with miraculous powers in order to help get their listeners to accept the message. That suggests that situation S must have been such a high priority in God's mind as not to be overridden by anything else. Furthermore, part of the mission of God's son to the planet earth was to transmit the truth, which includes the gospel message, to the whole world (John 18:37). It is hard to see how God could have any purpose regarding humanity that might override his son's mission to the planet earth. Evangelical Christians regard Jesus' mission as the key to human existence and the meaning of life, so it does not seem they could view it as overridden by something else. All this supports ANB's premise (A3).

Argument (6). Argument (3), above, which is sound, appeals to the matter of people's eternal destiny. Since there can be nothing regarding humanity of a "weightier" nature than that (Matt. 10:28, 16:26; Mark 8:36-37; Luke 12:15-21), it follows that God can have no wants regarding humans that outweigh his desire for their redemption and eventual salvation, which (on the exclusivist assumptions of evangelical Christians) calls for situation S. And since God wants everyone to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth, as shown in argument (2), we may infer that there is no want on God's part that would override his desire for situation S. This, then, also provides support for ANB's premise (A3).

Argument (7). God is commonly regarded to be a perfect being who always wants nothing but the best. It follows that he cannot have a conflict of desires, since there is only one situation that can be the best. This makes ANB's premise (A3) tautologically true. Whoever rejects that premise is obliged to explain how it is, exactly, that God could have a conflict of desires.

Premise (A4), the last of (A)'s subpremises, claims that God is rational. The point here is that God would not simply abandon one of his goals for no reason. Rather, he would perform whatever actions are called for by a goal that is not overridden by any other goal. The idea that God is rational in this sense is implied throughout Scripture. It is implied by those biblical verses that declare him to have infinite understanding (Ps. 147:5) and to have created the universe through his wisdom and understanding (Prov. 3:19). It is also implied by verses that say of God that he does what he wants and nothing ever prevents from happening those things that he wants to happen (Isa. 46:9-11; Eph. 1:11). The Bible is largely the story of a ruler of the universe who is eminently rational in having goals and performing actions to bring them about. ANB's premise (A4) therefore receives excellent biblical support.
Consider now the other steps of ANB. Premise (B) should not be controversial and is here being taken to be a definitional truth. Anyone who doubts it is not understanding it properly. (B) is based on the idea that if there is no way whatever for situation S not to obtain then S must obtain. And, given that there exists a being who possesses all four properties listed in premise (A), every possible way for situation S not to obtain has been ruled out, so situation S would have to obtain. Another way to view the matter is in terms of the definition of "rational" as it appears in premise (A4). Part of what that term means is that if X is rational and X is able to do Y, all things considered, and X wants to do Y without that desire being overridden by any other desire, then X does Y. Thus, it is impossible for a being who has all four properties cited in premise (A) not to bring about situation S, since that would exhibit irrationality on his part, which would contradict (A4). It seems, then, that, given a full explication of the concept of rationality, premise (B) becomes true by definition.
ANB's premise (C), which is the proposition from which ANB derives its name, is an empirical fact about our world. Christianity may be the most widespread religion, but it still claims only a minority of the earth's people (33.5 percent according to the latest World Almanac), which easily suffices to make (C) true.
Step (D), the first conclusion in the argument, follows logically from premises (B) and (C). And the final conclusion, step (E), follows logically from steps (A) and (D).[5] Since the conclusions follow logically, the only way to attack ANB would be at one or more of its premises. Of those, I hope to have shown above that only premises (A2) and (A3) leave any room for debate. It is to those two that attention needs to be devoted. If they could be adequately defended, then ANB would pose a most formidable threat to rational belief in the God of evangelical Christianity. I shall proceed to consider two objections to ANB which may be brought in to try to defend God's existence.

The Expectations Defense (ED)
The argument (ED) goes as follows:

(1) God, as described in the Bible, permitted there to exist much nonbelief in the gospel message.
(2) God is even described as causing people to be nonbelievers.[6]
(3) God could have brought about situation S soon after the Resurrection, but didn't.
(4) Hence, if the God of the Bible, were to exist, then his desires and motivations would be such that his bringing about of situation S would not be expected.
(5) Hence, premise (A2) or (A3) of ANB can be reasonably doubted.[7]

My main objection to this argument, ED, is that it is invalid. The conclusion, (5), does not follow from intermediate step (4). It is true that there are parts of the Bible that suggest the (Calvinist) idea that God has predestined certain people for salvation and others for damnation. And for that reason, among others, ED's step (4) can be supported. However, evangelical Christians reject that "double predestination" idea and reinterpret or downplay the verses that support it. They would reject the "uncaring" conception of God that is implied in premises (1)-(3) of ED. On the contrary, they regard God as a loving and merciful being who wants all to be saved, at least in the minimal sense of having that as one of his desires. As the eminent Christian philosopher John Hick put it, the Calvinist idea that God created beings whom he does not want to attain salvation is "diametrically at variance with the dominant spirit of the gospels" (Evil and the Love of God, NY: Harper & Row, 1966, p. 379). It is part of my working definition of "evangelical Christians" that they conceive of God as desiring that there be universal salvation. In addition, most of them are exclusivists and accept the doctrine that belief in God's son in the relevant sense is an absolute requirement for salvation, which makes it all the more imperative that situation S obtain, so far as God's motivation and overall plan are concerned. Thus, GC (the conception of God that is addressed in ANB and in step 5 of ED) is a quite different deity from the one described in steps 1-4 of ED, and for that reason, step 5 of the argument does not follow from its step 4. ED is a failure.
It is important to understand that there is not a single, consistent conception of God presented in the Bible. For example, God is described in some places as wanting all humans to be saved and in other places as not wanting that. I am not trying to prove the nonexistence of the biblical God where the Bible is taken in any way other than that of evangelical Christians. They emphasize God's unrestricted love for humanity and his strong desire that everyone be saved, which is incompatible with Calvinism. They emphasize God's desire for humanity to love him in return, which calls for an awareness of the gospel message on humanity's part. They emphasize the importance of missionary work to bring about such awareness, which is in perfect harmony with ANB's description of GC as greatly desiring situation S. It may be that other conceptions of God can be attacked by other atheological arguments, but the version of ANB that is under discussion here is aimed specifically at a deity with the given sorts of motivation. The first four steps of ED, though perhaps in themselves unobjectionable,[8] are aimed at some other conception of deity, and are thus irrelevant to ANB. In other words, even if we were to grant the claim in ED that if God as described in the Bible (interpreted in some way) were to exist, then there would be no reason to expect situation S to obtain, that would certainly not be granting that if GC, as described above, were to exist, then there would be no reason to expect situation S to obtain. On the contrary, there very definitely would be excellent reason to expect situation S to obtain. For that reason, ED's conclusion does not follow.

The Unknown-purpose Defense (UPD)
This argument (UPD) claims that God has some purpose for permitting all the nonbelief in the gospel message, but it is an unknown purpose so far as humanity is concerned. God wants to prevent or eliminate the nonbelief, i.e., to bring about situation S, but there is something else which conflicts with that desire, something which he wants even more than to bring about situation S. If we were to learn what that "something else" is, then we would fully understand why God has permitted so many people to live their earthly lives ignorant of the truth of the gospel message.[9]
As can be seen, UPD is a direct attack on ANB's premise (A3) and is, in fact, nothing more than a flat-out denial of it. However, premise (A3) was supported, above, by arguments (5)-(7). Those arguments, then, could be taken to be objections to UPD. Let us see how UPD might be further attacked.
In addition to the usual divine attributes, evangelical Christians ascribe to God the further property of wanting people to love him maximally, or at least greatly. This idea can be used in support of ANB against UPD, and could be called "the Further-properties Objection." Such a deity must want people to believe the gospel message, since that would increase their awareness of what he has done for humanity and thereby help them to love him. Even if a person unaware of the gospel message were to already love God, he would come to love God still more if he were to become aware of it; so God must want people to be aware of that message. Furthermore, the fact that, according to Scripture, God actually commanded people to love him maximally and called that his greatest commandment can also be used to support ANB's premise (A3). What can advocates of UPD say in opposition? If God really does have the sort of overriding purpose that they say he has, then why did he issue the "maximal love" commandment and call it his "greatest" one? It would make no sense for him to do that.
Another further property of God is that of having done the following three things: (1) he sent his son to "testify to the truth" (of the gospel message); (2) he directed missionaries (by way of his son) to spread the gospel message to all nations; and (3) he even empowered some of the missionaries with the ability to perform miracles in order to help them get the message across.[10] The question is: why would God do those things if he had some purpose which overrides his desire to bring about situation S? The advocate of UPD owes us an answer here. It might be suggested that there is an answer but God has not revealed it. Nor has he revealed the purpose for all the secrecy surrounding the matter or even that there exist such purposes. But this makes God appear irrational. Scripture says that God really does want "all men to come to a knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. 2:4) and that Jesus came to earth to "testify to the truth" (John 18:37). So it would be irrational for God to be so secretive and to withhold the truth from humanity. But it is contrary to God's nature to be irrational. Hence, UPD is shown to be quite weak. It becomes utterly implausible when confronted by these further divine properties.[11]
Another objection to UPD is that the idea of God on which it is based makes an appeal to mystery. But hypotheses which appeal to mystery are incompatible with explanation. And it is important to evangelical Christianity's missionary effort to be able to put forward explanations for phenomena. The missionaries need to show their listeners that Christianity can explain things better than rival worldviews. So the appeal to divine mystery and "unknown purposes" would be counter-productive and out of place there. This could be called "the Explanation Objection."
So much, then, for UPD. Many other objections to it, as well as to other defenses against ANB, can be raised. The best presentation of all that appears in the book Nonbelief & Evil.[12] More will emerge on these issues as the debate unfolds. I trust that I have given Mr. McHugh enough to work on. My claim, again, is that ANB is a powerful argument for the nonexistence of that specific deity which may be called the God of evangelical Christianity. If McHugh wants to defend ED, what he needs to show is not how situation S would be unexpected given the existence of the biblical God conceived in some way or other, but rather, how situation S would be unexpected given the existence of a deity who has unrestricted love for humanity, a desire that all humans be saved, a desire that his love for humanity be reciprocated, and who regards it of vital importance that missionaries spread the gospel message worldwide. And if McHugh wants to defend UPD, what he needs to do is first to refute arguments (5)-(7), which aim to support ANB's premise (A3), and then to refute the many other objections to UPD, including the Further-properties and Explanation Objections, which are mentioned above. I look forward to seeing his response.

NOTES
[1] In response to my book Nonbelief & Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), Mr. McHugh wrote a critique, "A Refutation of Drange's Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief," Philo 5, no. 1(Spring-Summer 2002), 94-102, to which I wrote a reply, "McHugh's Expectations Dashed," Philo 5, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2002), 242-248.

[2] The debate appears at:
http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=47897 .

[3] In my book Nonbelief & Evil, chapter 2, I present seven such arguments. I here shorten it to four for space considerations.

[4] Acts 3:6-18, 5:12-16, 9:33-42, 13:7-12, 14:1-11, 28:3-6.

[5] When all the support for all the premises is included, ANB needs to be classified as an inductive argument. If a distinction were drawn between a "deductive problem of nonbelief" and an "inductive problem of nonbelief," then ANB would be addressing the latter, not the former. It is an evidential argument, not intended to be conclusive, since the support for its premises is of an inductive or evidential sort. However, ANB itself, as presented here and disregarding the support for its premises, is a deductive argument, and (as I argue) one that is sound.

[6] Prov. 16:4; John 12:40; Rom. 9:18; 2 Thess. 2:11-12. Also, Jesus spoke in parables so that not everyone would understand him and thereby get saved (Matt. 13:10-15; Mark 4:11-12; Luke 8:10).

[7] In past discussions of ANB (see notes 1 & 2, above), Mr. McHugh put forward an argument very similar to this one.

[8] I think that there is also some room for debate regarding the first four steps of ED, but it is not necessary to quibble over such details. The main point is that those steps aim at one conception of deity, whereas ANB is directed at a quite different conception of deity.

[9] McHugh suggested UPD in the First Rebuttal of his debate with Doug Krueger. (See note 2.) He said, "there must be some unknown overriding reason why [God] has chosen to allow [unbelief]." Thus, both of the defenses that I discuss here, ED and UPD, are related to McHugh's past work on the subject.

[10] Some say that having human missionaries do the job was more important to God than the result itself. But that is very peculiar and makes God appear irrational. Christians normally say that God issued the Great Commission because he wanted the gospel message spread to all nations. They regard the final result to be most important. To claim that it wasn't the result but the process itself that was most important to God would leave the question "Why?" How could worldwide awareness of the gospel message be secondary to the missionaries' activity, seeing that such awareness helps bring about both people's love towards God and their own salvation, the very things that God presumably most wants.

[11] As a further point that is related to both ANB and UPD, certainly if GC were to exist, then it would not be expected that a new religion (Islam) would come along that would overtake Christianity in its convert-winning rate. And it would be expected that the God of the Bible would have thoroughly enlightened his own chosen people (the Jews) that their awaited Messiah had arrived. Evangelical Christianity cannot adequately explain either the existence of Islam or why so many Jews in the first century did not convert to Christianity. The most plausible hypothesis appears to be that its deity simply does not exist.

[12] Another place where several of those objections are presented is in my Internet article "The Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief" at:
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/aeanb.html
but the book contains a much fuller treatment of them.

[Chris McHugh]

Opening Statement

This opening statement will defend two theses; the first of these is that it is more reasonable to be a theist than a non-theist, and the second is that it is more reasonable to be a Christian than it is to reject Jesus Christ. In order to show that theism is more reasonable than unbelief, I will present a series of arguments that demonstrate that the belief that God exists is more plausible than the belief that God does not exist. I will then argue that all reasonable people who are presented with the evidence for the existence of God and the reality of their sin, should accept Jesus Christ as their savior. I will not be debating the finer points of Christian doctrine, but only arguing for the essential aspects of Christian belief, namely that Jesus has redeemed humanity from sin through his suffering, death and resurrection.

The debate between atheists and theists is essentially an attempt to define the nature of the most basic reality. Theists believe that the ultimate reality is something like a creative mind that brings all dependent things into being, whereas atheists believe that the most fundamental reality is some substance acting according to blind natural processes.

Here is the first argument pointing towards the existence of God:

The Argument from Simplicity

1) The ultimate reality (i.e., that which does not depend on anything else for its being) is either complex or it is non-complex. [Something will be considered complex if and only if it has parts.]

2) It is not the case that the ultimate reality is complex. [This follows from the fact that anything that is complex always depends on something simpler for its being. For example, in the case of a complex entity like a chair, it is dependent on the existence of simpler things, like individual molecules. These complex molecules are, in turn, dependent on simpler things, like atoms. It would be absurd to say that a chair is the ultimate reality, for it is obvious that the chair is dependent on more basic substances for its being.]

3) The ultimate reality is non-complex. [From 1 and 2]

Whatever is the most fundamental reality must be totally independent of simpler things, and therefore cannot be complex at all. This non-complexity entails the absence of spatial dimension, for if something has spatial dimension, then it is divisible into parts, and therefore is complex because it depends on those parts. Non-spatiality, in turn, entails non-materiality, for whatever is material must also have spatial dimension.

Since all complex substances ultimately depend on that which is not complex, we can formulate the next argument:

1) The ultimate reality grounds the existence of complex things either by composing them with its own substance, or by creating them out of nothing. [There is simply no alternative.]

2) It is not the case that the ultimate reality grounds the existence of complex things by composing them with its own substance. [If the ultimate reality were to compose things out of its own substance, then it would need to be something that has at least some spatial dimensions, for something with no size at all cannot contribute to the composition of an object. For example, it would be absurd to say that a pen is made up entirely of objects that have absolutely no size.]

3) The ultimate reality grounds the existence of complex things by creating them out of nothing. [From 1 and 2]

Since it is inconceivable that the ultimate reality composes other things with its own substance, the only option remaining is that it creates from nothing.

Quentin Smith, who is probably the most broadly educated and technically advanced atheist philosopher of our time, agrees that the ultimate reality is something that is absolutely simple, and transcends space and time. Smith writes:

“I agree that there is a cause of spacetime’s beginning to exist. Further, I agree with many theists that a simple being caused space-time, where “simple” means here “has no parts.”…I also agree with some theists, such as Brian Leftow, that the cause of spacetime exists timelessly. And I agree with theists that the cause of spacetime is essentially uncaused and exists a se (i.e., is not dependent upon any concrete object).”1

Even though it must be concluded that the ultimate reality is something simple that transcends the physical realm, it has not yet been shown that God exists. This next argument fills in the gap:

1) In order to attempt to understand the means by which the ultimate reality creates from nothing, one can use either mechanistic (i.e. process-based) or personal (i.e. mind-like) models for the explanation. [There are simply no other available explanatory concepts.]

2) It is not the case that mechanistic models can be used. [Mechanistic models necessarily involve objects interacting in space and time, and therefore always involve at least some level of complexity. Mechanism necessarily implies one object interacting with some other object in a process that is not absolutely simple. Consequently, attempts to explain how the creation takes place in terms of a mechanistic process are incoherent, and should be rejected.]

3) Personal models of explanation must be used. [From 1 and 2]

In answer to the question of “How does the ultimate reality create from nothing?” there are two competing modes of explanation: mechanistic and personal. The contest is decided rather quickly, for mechanistic explanations are logically incompatible with the notion of simplicity. By contrast, there is no problem in positing that the ultimate reality is something like an immaterial mind, with no parts, that wills other things into being in one simple changeless act. There is nothing in the concept of a timeless mind that entails complexity. Since mechanism can be ruled out as the means of creation, and since there is no other explanatory model available other than the use of personal concepts, it follows that personal concepts should be used as the only available means to attempt to explain how the ultimate reality creates from nothing.

The following argument offers further support that the nature of the ultimate reality can best be likened to a mind:

The Argument from Freedom

1) The ultimate reality is either: (a) an impersonal set of blindly interacting deterministic or probabilistic causes (this is the non-theistic view), (b) is a personal, free will (this is the common theistic view), or (c) is something transcendent to the positive concept of a personal free will, but is not something less than that notion (this is the mystical theistic view). [So, either the ultimate reality is limited to acting deterministically (like a machine), probabilistically (as in quantum mechanics), or it is something that can best be likened to a free will.]

2) Given the existence of human free will, option (a) can be ruled out since there is no way that free-willed beings can be caused to exist by the blind interactions of deterministic or probabilistic causes. [Consider, for example, the possibility that humans are made of nothing but chemicals, and chemicals are limited to acting in a deterministic way. If the entirety of human substance is such that it can only act deterministically, then free-willed actions are impossible. It does not matter how complex the non-free process that constitutes human beings becomes, for it is still just a deterministic or probabilistic process. Similarly, if the ultimate reality is something that acts only deterministically or probabilistically, then it can never produce any results contrary to this mode of action.]

3) Therefore either (b) or (c) must be the case. [From 1 and 2]]

This argument shows that if anyone has ever made even one free decision in all of history, then the ultimate reality is something like what has been traditionally called “God.” It can justifiably be concluded that human free will is a reality, for people can directly experience their freedom through introspection. Reflection on one’s inner life reveals a decision-making process that operates on the assumption of a multiplicity of available options. The choice between these options is presented to the human mind as an immediate reality. There is a direct experience that at least some decisions are not the result of either compulsion or probability. It seems very unnatural and counterintuitive to reject this immediate experience in favor of a view that says that nobody has ever made any real decisions at all. Belief in freedom of the will, however, entails that the ultimate reality must be an adequate cause for the existence of free willed beings. Such a cause cannot be something that is limited to deterministic or probabilistic action, but can only be something like a free will.

One can know more about the nature of the ultimate reality through the recognition that there is such a thing as moral obligation:

The Argument from Morality

1) If God does not exist, then real moral obligations do not exist. [If there is no God, then there is no objective basis whatsoever for believing that a given act, such as torturing children for fun, is morally wrong in every circumstance. Without a creator who gives ultimate meaning and value to life, it follows that there is nothing special about human beings; they are just elaborate chemical reactions. Consequently, on the atheistic hypothesis, the notion of moral obligation is illusory.]

2) Moral obligations do exist. [This is intuitively obvious. No reasonable person would believe that it is ever morally right to torture children for fun.]

3) God exists. [From 1 and 2]

Atheists insist that humans are the chance products of the motion of matter, and that people are ultimately reducible to the mere interactions of chemicals. In the same way that this makes free will impossible, it also makes moral obligation impossible. Given that moral obligation is a fact, it is clear that the atheist position is false. Theists believe that moral values are rooted in the nature of the ultimate reality; God creates humans for the sake of their good, so human life is objectively valuable, and should be respected. The existence of God gives objective meaning and purpose to life. On the theistic view, the existence of moral obligations can be explained, but without God, moral obligation, much like free will, is an illusion.

At this point, anyone who wants to maintain atheism must undertake the full-time job of denying the basic intuitions that people have free will and moral obligation. Since there is no reason to think that these intuitions are illusory, it must be concluded that theism is more plausible than atheism.

The next line of argument proves the existence of God in a logically compelling way, and does not require an appeal to any intuitions about the nature of the human person:

The Argument from Negative Properties

Richard Gale, an atheist philosopher, has established criteria for deciding whether a given property is positive or negative. Gale writes:

“A property P is negative if and only if it specifies no property which is not of the same quality.... Positive properties, in addition to specifying other positive properties, also specify negative properties, i.e., properties of different quality. E.g., blue specifies, in addition to color, non-red, but non-red, as the wide complement to red, specifies no positive property, i.e., property differing in quality from it...”2

By this criterion, a property such as "being material" is positive because it entails properties of differing quality, like "being spatial" and "being non-angelic." By contrast, a negative property, such as "being non-colored," entails only properties of the same quality as itself, like "being non-red." Gale also offers a second criterion based on the fact that negative properties are always compatible with each other:

“Another difference between positive and negative properties in respect to their logical relations, which can also serve as a criterion, is the following: A property P is negative if and only if there is no property of the same quality as it with which it is incompatible. To say that two properties are incompatible means that it is logically impossible for them to be coinstantiated. Red is incompatible with blue, which is of the same quality as it, but there is no property of the same quality as non-red with which it is incompatible.”3

The qualifications to these criteria are addressed in the notes. 4, 5, 6 These qualifications will apply throughout this debate. There is presently no counterexample to either of these criteria.

From Gale’s logic, it follows that there is a possible world in which there is something that exemplifies all of the negative properties together. This is a direct consequence of the notion that any conjunction of negative properties is coinstantiable. Whatever being possesses all of the negative properties has an essence that is entirely negative, and also possesses an infinite number of non-essential negative properties, such as “not being worshipped by Christians,” and “not being creator of the universe.”7 While, given Gale’s criteria, such a being must exist in some possible world, it seems clear that there cannot be something that exemplifies all of the negative properties in the actual world, for any actual being must have at least some positive relational properties just by the fact of coexisting with other beings in contingent situations. Despite this, there is nothing that prevents the negative essence of such a being from being exemplified in the actual world. This essence would be the maximal conjunction of negative properties that can be possessed essentially by one being. Such a conjunction of properties will be called the “divine essence,” since a being with this essence corresponds to the mystical notion of God in the apophatic theological tradition. Consider the following quote from the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

“God transcends all creatures. We must therefore continually purify our language of everything in it that is limited, imagebound or imperfect, if we are not to confuse our image of God--'the inexpressible, the incomprehensible, the invisible, the ungraspable'--with our human representations. Our human words always fall short of the mystery of God. Admittedly, in speaking about God like this [using the positive religious terms and analogies within Christianity] our language is using human modes of expression; nevertheless it really does attain to God himself, though unable to express him in his infinite simplicity. [This means that positive analogical language can help elevate our thoughts towards divinity, but can never be literally true of God.] Likewise, we must recall that 'between Creator and creature no similitude can be expressed without implying an even greater dissimilitude'; and that 'concerning God, we cannot grasp what he is, but only what he is not, and how other beings stand in relation to him.”8

The mystical tradition within Christianity affirms that the essential attributes of God can only be conceptualized negatively. The question to be faced now is whether this divine essence is exemplified in the actual world. The answer to this question can be found through an analysis of the property of “being contingent.”

Something is contingent if and only if its existence and non-existence are both logically possible. That is, a contingent thing exists in some possible worlds, but fails to exist in others. Something is non-contingent if and only if it exists in all possible worlds, or none at all. According to Gale’s criteria, “being contingent” is positive because it entails properties of differing quality, such as “being dependent,” and “not being a proposition.” “Non-contingency,” or “necessity,” is such that it does not meet any of the entailment criteria for being positive, and is therefore negative.9 The negativity of non-contingency is also shown by the fact that it is the complement of the positive term “contingency,” and the complement of a positive property is always a negative property.

Whatever is contingent or non-contingent is that way essentially; it is that way in every possible world in which it exists. So, given that the divine essence is the maximal conjunction of negative properties that can be held essentially, it must be concluded that one of the negative properties that characterizes the divine essence is the property of non-contingency.

In light of the foregoing considerations, a sound ontological argument can be constructed in the following way:

1) Either the exemplification of the divine essence is logically necessary or logically impossible. [The divine essence entails the negative property of non-contingency, and whatever is non-contingent is either logically necessary or logically impossible.]

2) It is not the case that the exemplification of the divine essence is logically impossible. [This follows from Gale’s principle that all negative terms are coinstantiable, and therefore it must be possible that there is something that exemplifies the strictly negative divine essence.]

3) The exemplification of the divine essence is logically necessary. [From 1 and 2]

If the exemplification of the divine essence is logically necessary (i.e. if it is exemplified in every possible world), then it is exemplified in the actual world. Therefore, God (as conceived by the mystics) exists.

One could attack this argument by attempting to show that the property of non-contingency fails to be negative, or that Gale’s conclusion about the coinstantiability of negative properties is incorrect. But both of these positions seem quite secure, so it is best to conclude that this is a sound ontological argument for the existence of God.

What is the Nature of God’s Relationship to Creation?

One of the negative properties that must be included in the divine essence is the property of “not being deficient in any sense.” This property is the denial of all qualitative inferiority, privation and evil. For example, the property of “being bad at sports” is a deficiency, so something that has the property of “not being deficient in any sense” cannot also have such a property. This is not the same as saying that something non-deficient must be proficient at playing sports, for a truly non-deficient being would be such that it transcended sports entirely. Being good at sports entails deficiencies of its own, such as being dependent on space and time.

Even though one cannot have positive knowledge about God’s essential nature, it is possible to deduce many positive non-essential properties concerning the relationship of God to creation. The following is a series of conclusions that follow from the non-deficiency of God:

· God must be that on which the created universe depends. If this were not so, then a greater being could be conceived, namely one who is the source and sustainer of all created things.

· It is not the case that God created the world for the sake of leaving people in a state of want and dissatisfaction, but for the greatest possible good they can receive according to their natures. If God did not create for the sake of the greatest good of people, then one could ascribe all kinds of deficiencies to God, such as selfishness, malice, arbitrariness of action, recklessness, stinginess etc.

· The greatest good that humans can experience is love, and the greatest possible object of love is God. If there were something that could surpass God in this aspect, then God would be deficient in some sense, and would not be the God shown to exist by the foregoing arguments. Therefore, it must be concluded that humans were created for the sake of being in a love relationship with God.

· Given that God creates for the sake of the greatest possible good of persons, and since an infinite lifespan in a perfect love relationship with God is a greater good than a finite lifespan in such a situation, it follows that the human soul is immortal.

Why Christianity?

Considering that humans have free will, it follows that people can accept or reject the ultimate good for which they were created. To reject this good in favor of a lesser one is what is called “sin.” Here are some basic ways in which sin is committed:

1) People put other things ahead of their love relationship with God, and therefore imply that these other things are more important than the ultimate good for which they were created.

2) People act in ways contrary to their own dignity as persons created by God, and thereby imply that they do not care that God created them for the sake of their ultimate good.

3) People treat others as if they had less worth than themselves. Consequently, they imply that they do not care that God created others for the sake of their ultimate good.

Any of these modes of action, when done deliberately, involves a transgression of the created order, because people were made to live in perfect relationship with God. Free will allows humans to participate in a love relationship with God, but it also makes it possible for them to violate God’s order of things. Whenever a free-willed being chooses to do something contrary to the purpose for which he or she was created, some event that should never have happened in God’s creation is brought into being. As a result, the individual sinner becomes something that should never have existed.

When people commit sin, they are no longer that which they were created to be, and so are evicted from the joy that would result from being exactly what they ought to be, namely persons in a perfect love relationship with God. Furthermore, since sin never should have existed in the first place, all subsequent actions that the individual sinner performs belong to the class of events that should never have happened. This is because these actions occur in the context of the person having sinned, and are therefore also outside of the created order. As a result, sinners get progressively further into the mire as time goes on, and become less and less like what they were created to be. Consequently, their unhappiness increases over time.

There is now a choice to be made: a person can be satisfied with despair, knowing that the joy for which he or she is created is forever out of reach, or that person can search for a solution to the problem of sin. It is clearly irrational to be satisfied with despair, for rational action should always correspond to one’s best interests. So, the rational choice is to search for a solution. In order to qualify as a real solution, however, whatever is proposed must have at least the following essential characteristics:

1) The solution cannot be the result of the efforts of sinful beings. Since sin should never have occurred, the efforts of sinners to make amends for sin are also events that should never have occurred. This is not to say that acts of repentance are bad in themselves, but these acts do contain elements of disorder (for the reason given above). Such imperfect acts are therefore inadequate to solve the problem that sin creates, viz. the deviation of creatures from the order of creation.

2) The solution cannot simply be that God forgives us. This would not solve the problem of the consequences of sin, namely that sinners have (ontologically) become that which should never have existed. The problem is not that God holds sins against people, but that sinners are in an objectively disordered state of being, and cannot return to harmony with God by dint of their own actions.

One proposed solution to the problem of sin that meets the above criteria is that which is offered by Christianity: Jesus Christ, who is God incarnated as man, took all of the effects of human sin onto himself by his death on the cross. Christianity states that Jesus has taken the burden of our sins, so that humans do not have to be alienated from God, but can have eternal life with God through the saving work of Christ. After dying on the cross, Jesus rose from the dead, and offers people the opportunity to be grafted into his perfect and sinless nature. Those who accept this opportunity are then dead to their former selves, and newly created in him. God has established a new order of creation in Christ; the old order is ruined by sin, and is passing away, but in Christ, all things are made new.

The purpose of this brief exposition is not to attempt to explain the mystery of exactly how Christ’s act of atonement saves the human race. The point is to show that Christianity is merely a proposed solution to the problem of sin that meets both of the necessary criteria set out above. Sinful humans do not achieve salvation by their own efforts; they simply turn from sin and accept what Jesus has done. Christianity also deals directly with the consequences of sin, in that all of the disorder caused by sin is directed at Jesus, who voluntarily suffers it for the sake of the human race.

The reader may be under the impression that Christianity is simply one of many available solutions to the problem of sin. In truth, it is the only plausible solution. The reasons why Christianity is the only real option in response to the problem of sin are as follows:

1) There is simply no competing solution that meets the necessary criteria. Consider that every other extant philosophy or religion either fails to recognize the problem of sin in its full reality, or fails to meet at least one of the criteria for what would constitute a real solution. For example, all non-Christian religions that acknowledge the reality of sin teach that humans can amend their relationship to God by their own efforts.

2) Christianity is historically sound. The Church can be historically traced back to the time of Jesus himself.

3) There are countless miracles that occur in the name of Jesus Christ even in modern times. Although there are many fraudulent claims, it remains that many miracles within Christianity have been investigated by science without any signs of fraud being found. These miracles occur all over the world today, and can be witnessed firsthand by those who search for them.

4) There are no good reasons to think that Christianity is false. (Drange’s arguments against Christianity will be considered after they are presented.)

Obviously, the above line of reasoning does not count as a proof that Christianity is true, but it does show that it is more reasonable to be a Christian than not. Since God exists, and the problem of sin is real, and since there is no known solution that even begins to address the problem other than the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, it follows that reasonable people should accept Jesus Christ as their savior.

Consider this analogy: There is a man who has a terminal disease, and there is only one medicine available that is purported to be able to cure the disease. The dying man either needs to take this medicine, or reject it. It seems that (assuming he is rational, and wants to live) he would need to have very good reason to reject the medicine before being justified in the choice to abstain. Given that there is no good reason to abstain, it follows that he would be irrational in refusing the medicine. The same is true of the choice to accept Jesus Christ. People are doomed to the consequences of their sins without a savior. Jesus is the one solution available, and there is no good reason to think that Christianity is false. Indeed, there are many good reasons to think that Christianity is true. Hence, acceptance of Jesus Christ is more rational that the refusal to believe.


Notes

1) Quentin Smith, “Time was Created by a Timeless Point,” God and Time, New York. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
2) Richard M. Gale, "Negative Statements," American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 7, Number 3, 1970, p.215.
3) Ibid.
4) Gale writes: "[This criterion] must be restricted to qualitatively homogenous properties; for non-red color, an obviously negative property, is incompatible with some other property of the same quality--non-colored." (Ibid.)
5) Gale writes: "It might be contended that there are properties not of the same quality as non-red which it specifies, viz., being an entity, being something, being self-identical with itself, etc. These 'properties' will not be counted as properties, since they logically must have a universal extension. We shall also not countenance as properties any property that must have a null extension. (Ibid.)"
6) Properties that do not entail any other properties at all must have a different criterion for being considered positive or negative. This criterion is as follows: A non-entailing property is positive if and only if it is entailed by every other property of the same quality. An example would be the property of “possessing at least some positive properties.” This property is entailed by every positive property, and by no negative properties. A non-entailing property is negative if and only if it fails to meet the criterion for being positive.
7) The essential properties of something are those properties that are possessed in every possible world in which that thing exists. For example, an essential property of an apple is “being a type of fruit,” while a non-essential property of an apple is “being eaten by Eve.”
8) Catechism of the Catholic Church (New York: Doubleday, 1995), p.22.
9) At this point, I want to address an error that occurred in my debate with Doug Krueger. I used the same ontological argument in that debate, and I wrote in several places that the property of “being necessary” was a positive property. After discussing the argument with Graham Oppy for several months, I realized that this is a mistake, and that “being necessary” actually fails to meet any of the entailment criteria that would make it positive, so it is really a negative property. This does not affect the soundness of the argument used in the debate with Krueger, but I thought that this mistake should be made known.

[Ted Drange]

First Rebuttal

In his Opening Statement, Chris McHugh (hereafter CM) declared that he would defend two theses, that it is more reasonable to be a theist than a non-theist and that it is more reasonable to be a Christian than it is to reject Jesus Christ. That stated aim is different from CM's originally stated aim. As indicated by our Moderator at the opening of this debate, what CM said he would do is to "attempt to make a case for the existence of the God of Christianity." I do not see any such case attempted in CM's Opening Statement. Nowhere is there any definition of "the God of Christianity" or any argument leading to the conclusion that that deity exists.

CM divides his essay into six sections, the first four presenting what he calls "arguments for the existence of God," the fifth on "God's relationship to creation," and the last aiming to support Christianity. I shall divide my rebuttal into six corresponding sections, attacking what CM has written.

I: CM's Argument from Simplicity (AS)
CM divides AS into three sub-arguments, each with three steps. I shall deal only with the first of those. Premise 1 reads "The ultimate reality (that which does not depend on anything else for its being) is either complex (having parts) or non-complex (not having parts)."

Objections
(A) What does CM means by "depend on"? Is it a causal relation or ontological relation or what? CM supplies no definition and his only example is "a chair depends on molecules." What molecules? The ones of which the chair is composed? Those are not something other than the chair, whereas premise 1 talks of "depending on something else for its being." A definition and suitable example are needed here.

(B) The use of "the" at the beginning of premise 1 presupposes that there exists something which does not depend on something else. No argument is given for that. Why couldn't everything that exists depend on something else for its being? Maybe there is a chain of "dependence" that extends back in time indefinitely. More is needed here.

(C) The use of "the" also presupposes that there is not more than one "ultimate reality." No argument is given for that either. Why couldn't there be several things which do not depend on anything else for their being? If numbers exist as abstract entities, it is unclear what, if anything, they might depend on for their being. How about particles which some quantum theorists say pop into existence uncaused? Are they "ultimate realities"? Space and time (and matter and energy) may have originated uncaused. Some recent cosmological theories take them as having done that. Would that make them "ultimate realities"? It is unclear what we are to say here because of the obscurity surrounding CM's use of the verb "depend on."

(D) The distinction between having parts and having no parts is also unclear. CM provides no examples of things without parts, so it is hard to comprehend what he is talking about. Because of the utter obscurity surrounding CM's use of words, there is no point in discussing the rest of AS. It is supposed to be a theistic argument, but, instead, seems to be just a jumble of words without any clear meaning.

II: CM's Argument from Freedom (AF)
(1) The ultimate reality is either: (a) a set of blindly interacting deterministic or probabilistic causes, or (b) a free will, or (c) something that transcends a free will.
(2) Option (a) can be ruled out since there is no way that free-willed beings can be caused to exist by the blind interactions of deterministic or probabilistic causes.
(3) Hence, either (b) or (c) must be the case.

Objections
(A) All the objections pertaining to the phrase "the ultimate reality" that were raised above in connection with AC also apply here.

(B) With regard to option (a) in premise 1, nowhere does CM explain how a "reality" might [i]be a "set of causes." Is that supposed to be a set of events? It would make more sense to say that the (main) non-theistic view is that reality consists just of space, time, matter, and energy. Also, what are "deterministic causes" and "probabilistic causes" supposed to be? How do they relate to determinism (the view that all events are causally determined) and indeterminism (the view that some events are not causally determined)? All of this is utterly obscure.

(C) What does "free will" mean in option (b) of premise 1? In ordinary language, it means "voluntary choice," as when one says, "You did it of your own free will." How could it be some sort of "ultimate reality"? CM seems to be using it in some special sense. He calls his option (b) "the common theistic view," but theists don't describe their view as "a belief in a free will," but rather, "a belief in a being who possesses certain extraordinary properties." It would help if CM would clearly define "free will," and provide examples of actions not done by free will (so we can know what it excludes).

(D) CM formulates option (c) of premise 1 as the view that "the ultimate reality is something transcendent to the positive concept of a personal free will, but is not something less than that notion." He does not explain what a "positive concept" is supposed to be or what it is for something to "transcend a positive concept" or what it is for something to be "less than a positive concept." None of that makes sense to me.

(E) CM concludes that either (b) or (c) is true and then restates that as "the ultimate reality is something like what has traditionally been called 'God'." I see no way to extract the "traditional God" from option (b), let alone from the obscure option (c). AF is supposed to be an argument for God's existence, but it seems not to be that.

(F) AF's premise 2 is itself an inference. I shall focus just on the "premise" part of it. There is a whole philosophical tradition, known as "compatibilism," which goes back through the centuries and which aims to define "free will" in a way which makes its existence compatible with determinism. I make a case for it in appendix A of my book (Nonbelief & Evil). CM does not show that he has ever even heard of it. Combined with compatibilism, the theory of evolution would refute AF's premise 2. As it stands, that premise is unsupported and undefended.

(G) CM talks of reflecting upon one's inner life and directly apprehending that one's act of will is neither causally determined nor something that just occurs spontaneously. But how can anyone directly apprehend that one's act of will was not causally determined? That is impossible, since the causal determinants are presumably events that occur within the brain, which is hidden from us. And CM's claim that the only alternative to his view is that "nobody has ever made any real decisions at all" is sheer balderdash. Compatibilism shows that "real decisions" can be made even if determinism is true.

(H) If a person, X, is making a "free choice," in CM's sense, what is the connection between that choice and X's nature and deliberations? Do the nature and deliberations completely determine the choice? If not, then what is the connection, and is "free will," in that case, something undesirable? What could the explanation be for the choice? It is really unclear just what such "free will" might be and whether it exists.

(I) CM seems to think that the existence of human "free will" (whatever that might be in his sense) would be more likely than not if God were to exist, but that is not at all clear. Would God be able to see into the future? (The Bible seems to assume that, with all of its emphasis on divine prophecy.) If God could foresee that you will choose A rather than B, then you could not choose B, for you can't do something that God knows for sure you will not do. But then what might it mean to say that your choice of A over B was a "free will choice"? CM owes us some solution to this problem. As given, AF seems to be a total failure.

III: CM's Argument from Morality (AM)
(1) If God does not exist, then real moral obligations do not exist.
(2) Moral obligations do exist.
(3) So, God exists.

Objections
(A) This is the first argument put forward by CM that explicitly mentions "God." He owes us a definition of that term.

(B) There are many theories of moral obligation that would refute AM's premise 1. According to consequentialism, for example, at each moment of choice our moral obligation is to perform that act that is likely to have the best overall consequences (in terms of reducing suffering in the long run, etc.). Certainly we could have moral obligations in that sense even if God does not exist. To make a case for premise 1, CM needs to refute all the various secular theories of moral obligation, but, in fact, he has not refuted any of them!

(C) How is God supposed to create moral obligations? By issuing commands for humans to obey? The Euthyphro problem would then come in when we ask why it is moral to obey God's commands. The answer is either that morality just is, by definition, whatever God may command, no matter what it may be, or else God, by his nature, always commands that which is morally obligatory by other criteria. By the first alternative, God could command people to torture children for fun and that would make it morally obligatory for them to do so, which seems a bit unpalatable. However, by the second alternative, God is not the arbiter of morality. Rather, morality is determined by other criteria, which leaves open the possibility that moral obligation is ultimately a secular concept. CM needs to enlighten us as to which of these ways he goes with regard to the Euthyphro problem.

(D) CM has failed to explain how God is supposed to "give ultimate meaning and value (or objective meaning and purpose) to life," as he puts it. If indeed life's meaning, value, and purpose are supposed to be objective features of it, then there should be some way to observe or measure one or more of them. But CM has not suggested any way whatsoever to go about doing that. All of his talk of objective value ends up as mere assertion and totally unsupported.

IV: CM's Argument from Negative Properties (ANP)
I shall not even try to formulate this argument.

Objections
(A) The only definition of "God" provided in ANP is "that being which possesses the maximal conjunction of negative properties that can be possessed essentially by one being." What is that supposed to mean? In note 7, CM says "The essential properties of something are those properties that are possessed in every possible world in which that thing exists. For example, an essential property of an apple is 'being a type of fruit'." Essential properties are apparently defining properties. The properties listed in the dictionary for the word "apple" would be the essential properties of an apple. But what could it mean to talk of a certain set of properties that are "possessed essentially by one being"? Here, we do not have any word to look up in the dictionary to get a list of essential properties, so the reference to "properties possessed essentially" can make no sense in this context.

(B) Presumably God is supposed to possess the properties of "not possessing one leg," "not possessing two legs," etc. There are an infinite number of those. What, then, would God be? There could be many such infinite sets of properties and we have no way to decide which of them is "the maximal" one, whatever that might mean.

(C) CM (following Richard Gale) says "A property P is negative if and only if it specifies no property which is not of the same quality." I guess "specify" here means "imply" and "same quality" refers to sameness with regard to positive/negative. But this would make the definition circular. "Negative" is defined in terms of "same quality," and "quality" is defined as "positive or negative," so the word "negative" ends up being used to define "negative." Maybe there is some way to get around this, but it is not made clear in CM's essay. The obscurity surrounding the definition of "negative" is brought out in note 9, where CM admits that he himself made a mistake with regard to the property of "being necessary," at one time classifying it as "positive," but now classifying it as "negative."

(D) Another definition is this: "A property P is negative if and only if there is no property of the same quality as it with which it is incompatible." Here again there is the same circularity as above, but even aside from that, it is unclear just how the criterion is to be applied. Consider the terms "non-abstract" and "non-concrete." They seem to be of the "same quality" yet are incompatible with each other. By the given criterion, that would make them both express positive properties, which seems absurd. Consider, also, "being necessary" and "being contingent." Those properties, too, seem to be of the "same quality" yet incompatible with each other, and so, they should both be classified as "positive properties." Yet, in his note 9, CM calls "being necessary" a negative property. So far as I can make out here, confusion abounds.

(E) What about the properties "being the sort of entity that is worshiped in some possible world" and "being the sort of entity that creates things in some possible world"?[1] (Each of these needs to be possessed in every possible world or in no possible world, since they are clearly not contingent properties.) CM should tell us whether or not his deity has them and whether they are positive properties or negative ones.

(F) As for CM's actual formulation of ANP, I would say that all the steps in it are meaningless or obscure, since they all contain the expression "the divine essence," which has not been given any clear definition. CM's attempt to define it (in terms of "negative properties possessed essentially") is a dismal failure.

(G) CM also needs to explain how ANP relates to the existence of the God of Christianity. He says that the relevant deity here is God "as conceived by the mystics," and he quotes the Catholic Catechism in an attempt to clarify what that is supposed to be. However, I did not find the quotation to be intelligible, nor do I see any similarity between the deity of ANP and the deity referred to as "God" by almost all Christians in the English-speaking world. In effect, ANP is irrelevant to this debate.

V: CM on God and Creation
Because of CM's failure to define "God" in an intelligible way, nothing that he says about "God" in the section called "What is the Nature of God's Relationship to Creation?" makes any sense. But CM compounds the absurdity when he introduces the so-called property of "not being deficient in any sense." What exactly does he mean here by "deficient"? Deficiency is a value concept and relative to the evaluator. It is "in the eye of the beholder." This may be brought out by considering which of the following beings is deficient:

(1) one which has a desire to create something or one which doesn't?
(2) one which can change or one which can't?
(3) one which exists in space & time or one which doesn't?
(4) one which is like a person (e.g., having emotions) or one which isn't?
(5) one which has desires and hopes regarding humanity or one which doesn't?
(6) one which is pleased and/or displeased by various human actions or one which isn't?
(7) one which feels compassion for humans when they suffer or one which doesn't?
(8) one which sacrifices himself/itself for others or one which doesn't?
(9) one which knows for sure what he/it will do in the future (and so can't do anything else) or one which doesn't?

Different people can give different answers to each of these questions, expressing different values or preferences, and I see no way to prove, for any of them, that one of the answers is the "objectively correct" one and the other is mistaken. This shows that the concept of "deficient" is not one that can be used in objective argumentation.

VI: CM on Christianity
Here, CM's discussion centers around the concept of "sin," which he defines as "people rejecting the ultimate good for which they were created." But CM has not shown that people were created (as opposed to having evolved), nor has he shown that they have exactly one "ultimate good" of which they are aware. (Note that they would need to be aware of the good in order to reject it.) So, all of his talk of sin is without any support.[2]

Since CM's discussion of Christianity is totally unsupported, there is no need to critique it further. It makes no effort towards formulating an argument for the existence of the God of Christianity, and so it is not relevant to this debate. If CM could formulate an argument (preferably with labeled steps) leading to the conclusion that that deity exists, and preceded by a clear definition of "the God of Christianity," then he would have something genuinely worthwhile for us to consider, something that goes beyond mere recitation of theological slogans.[3]


NOTES
[1] I owe these examples to Nick Tattersall.

[2] The biblical definition of "sin," which is different from CM's definition, is given in I John 3:4 (KJV) as "the transgression of God's law." In order to make a case for sin in that sense, one would need to show that God exists, that God has given humans laws, and that the humans are aware of them. Needless to say, CM has not shown any of these things.

[3] Unfortunately, the space restrictions of this debate prevent me from presenting my objections in greater detail and from presenting additional objections (of which there are many!).

[Chris McHugh]

First Rebuttal

In this first rebuttal, I argue that Drange’s ANB provides no evidence against the existence of the God of Christianity.

Premise A of ANB states that if the God of Christianity (abbreviated GC) were to exist, then He would possess at least the following properties:

(1) being able to bring about situation S, all things considered
(2) wanting to bring about situation S, i.e. having it among His desires
(3) not wanting anything else that conflicts with His desire to bring about S, as strongly as it;
(4) being rational (which implies always acting in accord with His own highest purposes)

The refutation of ANB is based on a denial of premise A. It is as follows:

The Expectations Defense against ANB

1) If premise A of Drange’s ANB were true, then GC, if He were to exist, would not hold back in His efforts to bring about situation S. [There is no way for a being with the four properties in premise A of ANB to fail to bring about situation S, or to adopt a less than maximally effective method for causing situation S to obtain. If GC were to fail to bring about S or choose a less than maximally effective means of doing so, then it would follow that at least one of the properties listed in premise A is inapplicable to GC.]
2) If GC were to exist, He would hold back in His efforts to bring about situation S. [An essential aspect of Christian belief is that God chose to spread the gospel message through human missionaries, and allowed them to meet with much resistance and suffering at the hands of unbelievers. This is described throughout the New Testament, particularly in the book of Acts. God could have brought about situation S in a more effective way than this, so it follows that if GC exists, then He has opted for a less than maximally effective method for causing S to obtain. Furthermore, at many points throughout the New Testament, it is promised that there will be many unbelievers in the world up until the return of Christ.]
3) It is not the case that premise A of Drange’s ANB is true. [From 1 and 2 by modus tollens]

Since ANB’s premise A is a false premise, ANB is an unsound argument. Therefore, it provides no evidence against the existence of the God of Christianity.

Contrary to what Drange asserts, the Expectations Defense (abbreviated ED) is obviously a logically valid argument. In his opening statement, Drange critiqued a version of ED that I have never presented or defended. Drange deliberately chose to present a logically invalid version of the argument, when he could have easily quoted a valid version from my published work. In light of this, I conclude that Drange either badly misunderstands ED, or is intentionally trying to misrepresent my position.

If Drange is to deny that ED refutes ANB, he must deny one of the premises of ED. It is unclear exactly how he could plausibly argue for a denial of either premise.

Consider that premise 1 of ED is simply an extension of premise B of ANB, which states “If there were to exist a being who has all four properties listed above [in premise A of ANB], then situation S would have to obtain.” Premise 1 of ED is merely the acknowledgement that if GC were a being who has all of the properties given in premise A of ANB, then not only would situation S have to obtain, but GC could not opt for a less than maximally effective method for causing S to obtain. If GC were to hold back or slack off in bringing S about, then that would entail that He was irrational, or that He lacked the power to use better means, or that He has no desire to bring about S, or that His desire to bring about S is overridden by some higher priority. Consequently, in the same way in which premise B of ANB is necessarily true, premise 1 of ED is also necessarily true.

The truth of premise 2 of ED is obvious to anyone who has a basic familiarity with Christianity. Christians universally believe that God chose fallible human missionaries to evangelize the world. God certainly could have gotten the message out in a more effective way than this, but He did not attempt to do so. Consider that the New Testament describes some of the difficulties (including martyrdom) faced by the first missionaries at the hands of unbelievers. If God’s desire to bring about S were not overridden by a higher priority, then He clearly would not have allowed the apostles to have such difficulties, and would have intervened to prevent any hindrance that they would face. Consider also that Jesus Christ, before ascending to the Father, could have done much more to convince the world of the truth of the gospel message, but chose not to do so. This shows (in support of premise 2 of ED) that if GC were to exist, then He would have held back in his efforts to cause S to obtain. Amazingly, premise 2 of ED is proven by Drange’s own words. Drange writes:

“Back in the days of Jesus, events could have occurred differently. Instead of appearing only to His followers, the resurrected Christ could have appeared to millions of people, including Pontius Pilate and even the emperor Tiberius and others in Rome. He could thereby have made such a definite place for Himself in history that it would have enlightened billions of people coming later about the truth of the Gospel message…”

Instead of overwhelming the world with ineluctable supernatural evidence, GC chose to spread the gospel through human missionaries. God allowed this slow and perilous dissemination of the gospel message despite having the ability to convince the entire world without difficulty. If the desire to bring about S were not overridden by some higher priority, then GC would not have adopted such a method, but would simply have brought about S directly, and would have done so in a maximally effective way.

The particular area of failure for ANB is premise (A3). The best explanation for why GC chose a less than maximally effective means to spread the gospel message is that the desire to bring about S is overridden by some higher concern. The other properties given in premise A receive strong scriptural support, but (A3) not only receives no support from the Bible, but is incompatible with the notion that God chose human missionaries to preach the gospel.

Drange, in his opening statement, makes a very poor case for the truth of premise (A3). He writes:

“God not only sent out missionaries to spread the gospel worldwide, but also provided some of them with miraculous powers in order to help get their listeners to accept the message. That suggests that situation S must have been such a high priority in God’s mind as not to be overridden by anything else.”

Drange neglects to mention that, even with their miraculous gifts, the apostles met with much resistance on the part of unbelievers, and were rejected often. Contrary to Drange’s assertions, this shows that God did less than He was able to do in order to bring about S, and thereby proves premise 2 of ED. If God’s desire to bring about situation S were not overridden, then God would not have allowed the missionaries to encounter difficulty. Indeed, He simply would have caused S Himself, without relying on human missionaries.

Curiously, Drange agrees that if (A3) were true of God, then God would simply bring about S Himself. He writes:

“The question might be raised whether God might want situation S without wanting to bring it about himself. Certainly if there is some desire on God’s part that overrides a desire to bring about situation S, then ANB’s premise (A3), and ANB along with it, could be thereby refuted… On the other hand, if there is no such overriding desire, then one might very well say that God wanting situation S would be essentially the same as God wanting to bring about the situation himself. Since God is not lazy and is highly motivated, there would in that case be no reason for him not to want to do it. In other words, if there is no counterexample to refute premise (A3), then there is no reason for God to want situation S but not want to bring it about himself.”

Drange admits that if (A3) is true of God, then God would simply bring about situation S directly. Consequently, the following argument against (A3) can be formed with each premise being derived from Drange’s own words:

1) If (A3) is true of GC, then if GC were to exist, He would have brought about situation S Himself. [Drange’s words: “If there is no counterexample to refute premise (A3), then there is no reason for God to want situation S but not want to bring it about himself.”]
2) It is not the case that GC, if He were to exist, would have brought about situation S Himself. [Drange’s words: “God not only sent out missionaries to spread the gospel worldwide, but also provided some of them with miraculous powers in order to help get their listeners to accept the message.” So, if GC exists, then He would not have brought about S Himself, but would have used missionaries, who were then permitted to encounter all kinds of hardships.]
3) It is not the case that (A3) is true of GC. [From 1 and 2 by modus tollens]

Drange may argue that since miracles are acts of God, then the miracles performed through the apostles are instances of GC attempting to bring about S Himself. This is clearly an untenable position, for there are many instances of the first missionaries meeting with dangerous resistance from unbelievers even though they are able to perform some limited miracles. If God were simply acting directly, and had no higher priority than to cause S to obtain, then He would have acted in a more decisive way than this; He would not have allowed the missionaries to be frustrated in their efforts. The miracles that God worked through the apostles were not of the type that would be consistent with God acting directly to bring about situation S in an unreserved way, for they were not sufficient to convert the Jews of first-century Palestine. Consider that Drange agrees when he writes:

“…damaging, to my mind, is the fact that the Christians never even succeeded in converting the Jews of first-century Palestine. Those Jews were the people most knowledgeable about the alleged resurrection of Jesus and other events appealed to in support of the Gospel message. If they wouldn’t accept it, then the whole idea of selling it to all nations on earth by means of human missionaries is clearly hopeless and destined for failure.” [1]

It is clear that if the God of Christianity exists, then His desire to bring about S is overridden by some higher concern.

Drange tries to offer more support of (A3). He writes:

“…God can have no wants regarding humans that outweigh His desire for their redemption and eventual salvation, which (on the exclusivist assumptions of evangelical Christians) calls for situation S. And since God wants everyone to be saved and come to knowledge of the truth… we may infer that there is no want on God’s part that would override His desire for situation S. This then also provides support for ANB’s premise (A3).”

Contra Drange, there is no basis for the inference given above. Christians do not need to believe that people are damned because of ignorance. It may be that God gives unbelievers all the information they need at or after the time of their physical death. While Christians must believe that all salvation comes by the blood of Jesus, they do not need to believe that those who are simply ignorant of Christ are necessarily damned. Consequently, Drange’s inference is invalid.

Drange goes on to offer another argument for (A3):

“God is commonly regarded to be a perfect being who always wants nothing but the best. It follows that he cannot have a conflict of desires, since there is only one situation that can be the best. This makes ANB’s premise (A3) tautologically true. Whoever rejects that premise is obliged to explain how it is, exactly, that God could have a conflict of desires.”

Drange is under the mistaken impression that (A3) can be false only if God is somehow at war with Himself concerning situation S. Pace Drange, having a hierarchy of desires does not entail internal conflict. Consider, for example, a man who desires to win a debate, but he does not desire to win the debate if his position is false. Such a situation does not imply that the man is conflicted about the issue. The desire of such a person can be put in the following way: “I desire to win the debate only if my position is true.” God’s attitude concerning situation S could be similar. God may desire situation S only if some other more important condition is first satisfied. [2]

Drange, in his opening statement, tries to show how a defender of ED must conceive of GC as being less than maximally loving. He asserts that an advocate of ED must adopt a Calvinist view of salvation in which God does not have an unrestricted love for humanity, and does not desire that everyone be saved. Rather than implying that God is unloving, His reluctance to adopt a maximally effective means for causing situation S to obtain may simply be the result of the desire to bring about S being overridden by a higher concern. Having a higher priority than bringing about S is not incompatible with God desiring salvation for everyone, or with God having an unrestricted love for humanity. Consider that those who never heard of Jesus before their physical death may have a chance to accept or reject Christ at or after the time of their death. Consequently, God can have unrestricted love for humanity with a desire for universal salvation, but still hold back in bringing about situation S on the earth. There is simply no problem of the sort that Drange alleges.

I conclude that Drange’s version of ANB provides no evidence against the existence of the God of Christianity. At best, ANB merely forces Christians to examine and refine their concept of God so as to reject premise (A3) of ANB. Of course, this is not something that threatens the rationality of Christian belief. The question of why a maximally loving being like GC would allow unbelief in the gospel message is a matter of further theological discussion, but it is clear that (at least with regard to Drange’s formulation of ANB) the phenomenon of unbelief cannot be used as philosophical evidence against the existence of the Christian God.

Notes

1) Theodore M. Drange, Nonbelief and Evil (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), p.139.

2) In dealing with Drange’s opening statement, I use much positive language about God. I want to make it clear that while positive language is useful in elevating the mind towards God, it is not the case that positive properties can be literally predicated of God’s essential nature. Rather, the essence of God is transcendent to positive, empirically derived concepts. God’s essence can be experienced mystically, but not directly conceptualized. My purpose in speaking of God in positive terms is to show that Drange’s ANB fails at its own level. That is, even if one were to conclude that the mystical view of God is incorrect, Drange’s ANB would still fail to provide evidence against the anthropomorphic conception of God that is the target of his argument.

[Ted Drange]

SECOND REBUTTAL

My opponent in this debate, Chris McHugh (CM), apparently has three main objections to the Argument from Nonbelief (ANB), which is the argument that I presented in my opening statement. They are: (1) the Expectations Defense, (2) his claim that ANB's premise (A3) is unsupported, and (3) a version of what I have called "the Afterlife Defense." I shall take up all three objections and show that they are complete failures.

I: The Expectations Defense (ED)
The argument goes as follows:

(1) If ANB's premise A were true, then, if GC were to exist, he would not hold back in his efforts to bring about situation S.
(2) If GC were to exist, then he would hold back in his efforts to bring about situation S.
(3) Hence, ANB's premise A is not true.

CM makes several false claims about this argument. He says it is essentially different from the version of ED that I discussed in my opening statement, but I do not find that to be so. He says that it has the form of a modus tollens, but in fact it does not.[1] Finally, he says the argument is valid, but I claim that it is invalid, and for the very same reason that the version of ED that I had discussed is invalid. Let me say more about that.

The term "GC" appears in each premise of ED, but does not mean the same thing in both premises. The argument is invalid because it commits the Fallacy of Equivocation. In the first premise, "GC" must refer to the same deity as does ANB. But what is that deity? As spelled out in my opening statement, "GC" is to be taken to refer to the God of evangelical Christianity, where "evangelical Christianity" is defined as "that orientation which emphasizes: God's unrestricted love for humanity, God's desire that all humans be saved, God's desire that his love for humanity be reciprocated, and the importance of missionary work in spreading the gospel message worldwide." ED's first premise, taking "GC" in that way, is true.

In ED's second premise, however, the term "GC" is not taken in the given way. It refers, instead, to the God of the Bible, interpreted in a way different from the way evangelical Christians interpret it. CM seems not to have grasped the point that I made in my opening statement: that God is described in different places in the Bible in quite different ways. In some verses it is said or implied that God wants all humans to be saved, whereas in other verses it is implied that he does not want that. Also, in some verses the apostles' work in converting their listeners to Christianity is implied to be a very high priority with God, whereas in other verses that work is implied not to be such a high priority. Evangelical Christians have a concept of God that emphasizes the first set of verses in each case and downplays the second set. That is the concept of God appealed to in premise 1 of ED and referred to in ANB as "GC." However, the concept of God that is appealed to in premise 2 of ED emphasizes the second set of verses in each case and downplays the first set. There are thus two quite different concepts of deity involved. The premise-1 deity is totally caring and very much concerned about the evangelization of humans, i.e., getting them to be aware of the truth of the gospel message. In contrast, the premise-2 deity seems uncaring and has little or no concern about the evangelization of humans. Evangelical Christians would not embrace premise 2 or the concept of a God who holds back in his efforts to get people to be aware of the "good news," i.e., the truth of the gospel message. So, the use of the term "GC" in premise 2 is incorrect. That term was introduced in ANB specifically to stand for the God of evangelical Christianity, and it is clear that in ED's premise 2 it is not being used in that way. Perhaps what premise 2 says is true of some deity, described somewhere in the Bible, but it is not true of the God of evangelical Christianity. Because of the equivocation that occurs in ED, the argument is invalid.[2]

II: Support for ANB's Premise (A3)
CM says, "The other properties given in premise A receive strong scriptural support, but (A3) not only receives no support from the Bible, but is incompatible with the notion that God chose human missionaries to preach the gospel." He is mistaken on both scores. (A3) does receive some support from the Bible and also is quite compatible with the notion that God chose human missionaries to preach the gospel. Taking the latter point first, we need only note that God could have empowered missionaries to perform miracles in order to get their listeners to believe the gospel message.[3] Such a methodology on God's part would have been quite effective and could easily have brought about situation S.[4]

CM's first point, about "no support," is also mistaken. In my opening statement, I presented two biblical arguments for (A3). My argument (5) points out that the truth of (A3) is suggested by biblical verses according to which God actually empowered apostles to perform miracles in order to get their listeners to accept the gospel message. CM claims that such verses are offset by other verses which indicate that God permitted the apostles to encounter grave difficulties. But he does not give a single biblical reference to support this claim. Perhaps the reason is that even where the apostles were harassed or arrested, God sometimes intervened and led them to safety, which tends to defeat the point. (See, e.g., Acts 5:18-20 and 12:6-17.) Furthermore, none of the thousands of people who actually witnessed the apostles' miracles were among those who persecuted them. That, too, counteracts CM's point. Where the miracles were performed, they were efficacious.

One group of verses point to God's great desire that the apostles succeed in their efforts at evangelization, whereas other verses possibly suggest God's lack of concern regarding the matter. The fact that there exists the second group of verses certainly does not entail that there is not also the first group! As an analogy, there could be both eyewitness testimony that X shot Y and other eyewitness testimony that X did not shoot Y. Each side in the case is supported by good evidence. The first set of testimony definitely exists and the fact that there is also the other testimony does not negate that fact. Analogously, despite the verses cited by CM, my argument (5) is quite correct in its presentation of biblical support for ANB's premise (A3).

My argument (6) also shows biblical support for ANB's premise (A3). There are many verses which imply the Christian exclusivist principle that knowledge and acceptance of the gospel message are necessary for salvation.[5] Thus, since GC strongly desires that everyone be saved, he must also strongly desire that everyone accept the gospel message, which calls for situation S. According to scripture, there is nothing more important to a person than salvation. That implies that there is nothing which overrides GC's desire for people's acceptance of the gospel, which in turn supports (A3). CM has not put forth anything to get around this argument. Although he indicates that he himself does not accept the evangelicals' principle of Christian exclusivism, that is irrelevant. ANB pertains to GC, the God of evangelical Christians. It is only their view of the requirements for salvation that matters here.[6]

My argument (7), which makes no overt appeal to the Bible, also supports (A3). (A3) says that if GC were to exist then he would not have a desire which conflicts with and overrides his desire to bring about situation S. Obviously, that can be false only if GC does have a desire which conflicts with his desire for S, hence only if he has conflicting desires. The argument is that it is impossible for GC, a perfect being who wants only the best, to have conflicting desires, and so (A3) can't be false. CM claims that, for (A3) to be false, GC need only have a "hierarchy of desires," not necessarily a conflict in desires. It is clear that he needs to go back and read (A3) again, for he seems to have lost sight of what it says.

CM suggests the analogy of a man who desires to win a debate only if his position is true, claiming that the situation is similar with GC, who desires to bring about situation S only if some condition were to obtain. Well, does that condition, whatever it might be, obtain? Presumably not. So, by CM's own reasoning, GC does not desire to bring about situation S. But that would contradict ANB's (well-supported) premise (A2), which CM has already indicated he accepts. Thus, CM's reasoning here leads to inconsistency on his part. Furthermore, although CM's analogy is put forward as an example where a person has only a "hierarchy of desires," there is a way to represent the situation as a conflict of desires. The man in question desires both: (1) to win the debate, and (2) to state a truth to the audience. If his position were true, there would be no conflict between these desires. However, if his position were false, there definitely would be a conflict. And if the man were to become aware of that situation, he would need to choose between: (a) still trying to win the debate despite his false position and (b) giving up the debate by confessing the truth to the audience. Choice (a) would put desire (1) ahead of desire (2), and choice (b) would put (2) ahead of (1). In the given situation, there would clearly be a conflict of desires there. Clearly, CM has not come to grips with my argument (7).

It turns out that CM has not adequately dealt with any of my three arguments that support ANB's premise (A3). He says, "if the God of Christianity exists, then His desire to bring about S is overridden by some higher concern." We want to know what that concern might possibly be. CM, please tell us! He also writes: "The question of why a maximally loving being like GC would allow unbelief in the gospel message is a matter of further theological discussion." How might such discussion go? What options are there apart from simply concluding that GC does not exist? Thus, far, CM has not provided a single one! If he were to maintain that no human knows why GC permits so much nonbelief, then he would be falling back on the Unknown-purpose Defense (UPD), which is refuted in my opening statement. But CM does not try to defend UPD against any of the objections raised there. In the end, his declaration that ANB's premise (A3) is false is mere empty assertion, totally unsupported by anything whatsoever.

III: The Afterlife Defense (AD)
CM says, "It may be that God gives unbelievers all the information they need ... after the time of their physical death." In another place he says, "Those who never heard of Jesus before their physical death may have a chance to accept or reject Christ ... after the time of their death."[7] I call this "the Afterlife Defense" (AD).

I deal with AD in chapter 9 of my book.[8] At least two objections can be raised against it. First, AD seems to be in conflict with scripture. The Bible says, "Now is the day of salvation" (2 Cor. 6:2) and "It is appointed for men to die once, and after that comes judgment" (Heb. 9:27). Evangelical Christians usually interpret these verses to mean that there is no chance to accept or reject Christ after the time of one's physical death. As the biblical scholar John Sanders says, "In Roman Catholic theology and in most Protestant thought, it is assumed that death ends our period of probation and seals our destinies."[9] Such an assumption is made by Thomas Aquinas, among other noted theologians. It is surprising that CM, a staunch Catholic, would appeal to AD. Another point is that, arguably, AD implies that most people will eventually be saved, since the unevangelized would be given a chance in the afterlife to accept Christ. However, that conflicts with Jesus's own teaching that very few people will be saved (Matt. 7:13-14, Luke 13:23-24). CM needs to try to reconcile AD with the Bible and with Christian theology.

Second, there is the problem of explaining why God would set up the world in such a way that most people go through their earthly lives ignorant of him and the gospel message. What would be the meaning of such lives? They seem to serve no purpose so far as the Bible and Christian theology are concerned. CM owes us an answer here. He also needs to explain how the work of missionaries around the world could still be of vital importance (as evangelical Christians maintain) even though the people whom the missionaries fail to reach will be enlightened (and given the chance to be saved) after they die.

Finally, it should be pointed out that AD is an attack on ANB's premise (A2), not (A3). As such, it is inconsistent with CM's earlier claim that ANB's premise A is correct except for (A3). In effect, CM is contradicting himself, first granting that (A2) is correct and well supported by the Bible, but then advocating an argument (AD) which attacks it. If CM is to go all the way with AD, then he will need to deal with all the alleged support for ANB's premise (A2) and show how, in the end, none of it is genuine.

My overall conclusion is that all three objections to ANB put forward by CM in his first rebuttal are total failures. ANB does indeed present strong evidence for the nonexistence of the God of evangelical Christianity.

NOTES
[1] Modus tollens is the form "P->Q, ~Q, so ~P." For ED to have that form, its second premise would need to read "It is not the case that if GC were to exist then he would not hold back in his efforts to bring about situation S." If the "if-then" in ED's premise 2 were interpreted as material implication, then the premise would definitely not be equivalent to that statement. Furthermore, on that interpretation, logic would declare the whole argument invalid, as seen by the fact (demonstrable by truth tables) that if ANB's premise A were true and GC does not exist, then both premises of ED would be true while its conclusion would be false. CM presumably intends to take the "if-then" in some way other than material implication, but neglected to inform us of that.

[2] If CM were to insist that he does indeed intend the term "GC" in ED's premise 2 to refer to the God of evangelical Christianity, then I would simply argue that the premise is false. That deity does not have the hypothetical property ascribed to it in that premise. This would be an alternate way of attacking ED.

[3] As pointed out in my opening statement, that was supposed to have actually been done in the case of some of the early apostles. Note 4 supplied these biblical references: Acts 3:6-18, 5:12-16, 9:33-42, 13:7-12, 14:1-11, 28:3-6. As indicated there, the apostles got their listeners to accept their message through the performance of miracles.

[4] Part of CM's difficulty is that he confuses "God will bring about S himself" with "God will bring about S directly." ANB only advocates the former, not the latter. When God empowered missionaries to perform miracles, he was, in effect, starting to bring about S himself, but he was not doing it directly, but by means of the missionaries.

[5] Some of the verses are cited in my argument (3): Mark 16:15-16; John 3:18,36, 8:21-25, 14:6; Acts 4:10-12; 1 John 5:12. Such biblical teaching has led most evangelical Christians to maintain that people who fail to accept Jesus Christ as their Lord and Savior cannot be saved, and that is the main reason why worldwide evangelization by Christian missionaries is so important. (Why else might it be important?) CM fails to discuss any of the relevant verses. He also fails to explain how the work of missionaries might still be important even on the assumption that belief in Jesus is not needed for salvation.

[6] CM is more of an exclusivist in his opening statement, where he claims (at the end) that people must accept Jesus Christ as their savior or else be "doomed to the consequences of their sins." Evangelical Christianity would applaud that claim.

[7] In the same two places where CM suggests AD, he also suggests what might be called the "At-death Defense," which is the idea that unbelievers find out the truth and are given the chance to accept Christ at the moment of death.
What could this possibly mean? How might the dying person accept or reject Christ without being observed doing so? Does he do so just in his mind? Also, how much time is involved in the process of the dying person: (1) receiving the relevant information (such as "The religion or belief system by which you lived your entire life is erroneous and the truth of the matter is as follows ....."), (2) being given the choice to "accept Christ" or "reject Christ" (whatever that is supposed to mean), (3) mulling it over in his mind, and then (4) making his decision, one way or the other? Normally, such a series of events would require at least months to be at all feasible. How could they all occur within a few seconds? What if the death is very sudden, as in a crash or explosion? How might that work? What if the person is a child or mentally retarded or in excruciating pain at the time of death? Without answers to such questions, the "At-death Defense" makes no sense whatever.

[8] Nonbelief & Evil (Prometheus Books, 1998).

[9] John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1992), p. 46.

[Chris McHugh]

Second Rebuttal


This second rebuttal will show that Drange’s critique of my opening statement offers no sound refutation of any of the arguments presented there. Drange’s debate tactic appears to be relegated to pleading a lack of understanding of my opening arguments. This is surprising, for most of the points made in my opening statement are not subtle, and should be understood easily. I will proceed to answer each of Drange’s objections as space permits.



The Argument from Simplicity

I argued that the most fundamental reality must be something that is not complex at all. Every complex thing depends on something simpler than itself (i.e. its individual parts). So, whatever happens to be the most basic substance of reality cannot depend on simpler parts, otherwise it would not be the most basic substance of reality. This is not hard to grasp, but Drange tries to make it as obscure as possible. The dependency of which I write is an ontological relationship in which a whole depends on its individual parts. I gave the example of a chair depending on the existence of the individual molecules that compose the chair. Any composite thing, like a chair, depends on the existence of its parts (which are simpler than the whole, and are not identical to the whole).

Drange claims that we should prefer the hypothesis that there is no most basic substance of reality. He writes:

“Why couldn't everything that exists depend on something else for its being?”

There are at least two reasons why this “infinite regress of dependent substances” hypothesis should be rejected:

1) To prefer such a hypothesis over the view that there is an ultimate reality is a violation of the principle of parsimony, which is commonly known as Ockham’s Razor. In explaining a given phenomenon, one should not multiply entities unnecessarily. Drange’s view requires that there be an infinite number of entities that get simpler and simpler. To posit an infinite number of progressively simpler entities in order to explain the existence of any given composite entity is a total abdication of parsimonious thinking. Drange’s alternative is infinitely more complex than the hypothesis that I proposed. If it comes down to a choice between the two views, then the conservative hypothesis should be preferred unless there is good independent reason to adopt the more complex view.

2) Current scientific research shows that space and time began to exist a finite time ago. Whatever caused space and time to begin to exist could not have been something dependent on simpler parts. This follows from the fact that having parts necessitates that the parts are spatially separated from each other to at least some degree. If there is no space, then there is no possibility of there being a multiplicity of components to something. Hence, whatever caused space and time to begin to exist is perfectly simple. Drange’s view that everything is dependent on an infinite number of progressively simpler parts entails either that space did not begin to exist, or that it began to exist without any cause at all. Neither of these options is plausible. Drange seems either unaware of the current state of cosmological theories, or is committed to a faith-based belief in their falsity.

Both of the points made above also serve to counter the assertion that there may be more than one ultimate reality. Such a hypothesis is less parsimonious than the view that there is only one ultimate reality, and it is inconsistent with the notion that space had an absolute beginning.

Drange proceeds to offer the alternative hypothesis that space and time may have originated uncaused. He writes:

“Space and time (and matter and energy) may have originated uncaused. Some recent cosmological theories take them as having done that.”

Pace Drange, things do not begin to exist uncaused. Most people know that much intuitively. Despite Drange’s belief, there is absolutely no scientific support for the notion that something can come into being without a cause. Drange is either lying, or is confused about the scientific theories to which he refers. I challenge Drange to describe any hypothetical experiment that could (even in principle) be used to support the notion that something can come into being uncaused. Supposedly, he is familiar with such experiments already. How does one test to confirm that something began to exist with no cause? What kind of experiment could potentially support a speculation like that? The mere absence of the discovery of a cause does not support the belief that there is none. Moreover, the whole scientific endeavor is a search for causes and explanations. Scientific method presupposes causality.

Drange’s alternatives to the theistic view that I have proposed in the Argument from Simplicity consist in arbitrarily preferring a complicated hypothesis to a simpler one, going against current cosmological theory, and asserting that things can begin to exist without a cause. It is not difficult to see which position is more plausible.



The Argument from Freedom

Drange’s main substantive criticism of AF is that there is a third option (compatibilism) between genuinely free actions and those that are compulsory. A position of the sort that Drange espouses is necessarily false, for a given action is either compelled or it is not. An action cannot be both compulsory and non-compulsory at the same time. When I use the term “free will,” I am merely referring to a type of action that is non-compelled by internal or external factors. We all have the intuition that at least some of our actions are non-compulsory. Drange makes no effort to argue for, or even explain, his apparently impossible third option, so it does not deserve serious consideration until he does so.

Drange suggests that we are unjustified in the belief that we have free will. He writes:

“But how can anyone directly apprehend that one's act of will was not causally determined? That is impossible, since the causal determinants are presumably events that occur within the brain, which is hidden from us.”

Quite simply, there is an overwhelming intuition that some of our actions are not compulsory, and there is no good reason to deny this intuition. Why do we believe that the physical world is real, and not just an illusion? It may very well be illusory (and we would never know if it were), but it is reasonable to believe that it is real because of our direct intuition of its reality. The same is true of free will. Drange attempts to introduce doubt in areas for which there is no good reason to doubt. Since he appears to dismiss direct intuitions as being worthy of belief, it is puzzling as to why he does not also doubt the reality of the physical world. Indeed, all knowledge ultimately reduces to direct intuition of some form or another, so why should we deny our experience of our own freedom? All things considered, I would rather bet on the experience of my freedom being correct than to believe anyone’s assertion that my personal experience is illusory. Of course, as I argued in my opening statement, if we have genuine freedom, then that entails that God exists.



The Argument from Moral Obligation

Drange asserts that there may be moral obligations even if God does not exist. This makes no sense. On the atheistic worldview, human beings are merely chemical reactions. Chemicals just do what they do; one chemical reaction is no more or less moral than another. At best, the atheist may say that certain types of human actions are socially disadvantageous, but that says nothing about whether a given action (such as rape, for example) is objectively morally wrong. Consider that the Nazi ethic of killing Jews was entirely consistent and well accepted within the context of German society. If one wants to argue that killing Jews is objectively wrong (i.e. wrong independently of what anyone thinks, and in every possible world), then one must appeal to some standard that transcends cultural and individual opinion. There is no plausible basis for such a standard other than the belief that morality is grounded in God.

Drange raises the Euthyphro problem in an attempt to show that morality cannot be based on God. In this purported “problem” lies a false dilemma. One is led to believe that morality is either arbitrarily and capriciously legislated by God, or it must be the result of something other than God. What about the view that moral absolutes proceed necessarily from our relationship to God’s perfect nature? This obvious and plausible alternative is simply disregarded in Drange’s analysis.

Drange then makes the following curious statement:

“CM has failed to explain how God is supposed to ‘give ultimate meaning and value (or objective meaning and purpose) to life,’ as he puts it. If indeed life's meaning, value, and purpose are supposed to be objective features of it, then there should be some way to observe or measure one or more of them