Philosophy of philosophy: the foundations of knowledge

[Thomas Ash]

Mikkel, a new IIDB user (give him a big friendly IIDB-style welcome, folks :D ), posted this statement of Agrippa's trilemma in another thread. As I'm very interested in the general question of the foundationm of knowledge, I Though I'd start an offshoot thread here.

How do you know that which you know? When you have that(1), then ask yourself how do you know that that(1) is so? Then repeat over and over….
What you will find is some times called Agrippa's trilemma, the answers will either be
1 - an infinite regression,
2 - a dogmatic claim that it is so and/or
3 - a circular argument.

I've devoted a good deal of thought to that question myself. It's more or less the fundamental question in the 'philosophy of philosophy', so to speak. However, I think the way in which Mikkel phrased it is a false trifurcation, as option 2 is too narrowly stated. I'd offer a couple of other answers:

4 - something that is recognized to be self-evident
5 - something that is taken as axiomatic simply because it is found to be necessary to deal with the question

Personally, I'd favour option 4, but this raises the question of just how it is recognized to be so, and what 'self-evident' means. In my philosophically-doubtful moments, I wonder whether an axiom (5) really is just a dogmatic claim, though Russell and other great philosophers clearly though not.

Does anyone have any takes on this question? Which option, if any of the above, do you favour?

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash


__________
Check out my website for all :cool: infidels, Atheist Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/atheistground/) - and my broader website on politics, philosophy, science and history - Big Issue Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/)!

[Mikkel]

Thanks Thomas Ash :)

How do you know that which you know? When you have that(1), then ask yourself how do you know that that(1) is so? Then repeat over and over….
What you will find is some times called Agrippa's trilemma, the answers will either be
1 - an infinite regression,
2 - a dogmatic claim that it is so and/or
3 - a circular argument. 4 - something that is recognized to be self-evident
5 - something that is taken as axiomatic simply because it is found to be necessary to deal with the question


4 are a variant of 2, isn't it? Not that isn't so that dogma and self-evident are the same, but they are brothers in arms, because they share the same foundation; to some people it doesn't make sense to deny claim x = "that is so/self-evident", while to others that is not so self-evident. It all depends on where you start your assumptions, doesn't it :D
By the same token 5 appears to be a variant of both 2 and 3 :) If the conclusion follows the assumptions, then you have to shown that the assumptions are sufficient and necessary and how do you do that? By 2 or 3 ;)

Now you are on to something in 5 though, because “how do you know that…” assumes something! There are an I, you, something to ask about and a way to know otherwise why ask - “how do you know that…” or maybe it doesn’t have to be so, that it has to make the same sense to both you and I? That would lead to relativism, but that is at least the conclusion some people draw from Agrippa's trilemma! :)

Mikkel

[Thomas Ash]

I'd like to defend the concept of self-evidence. Saying something is self-evident is meant to be reflective of the fact that it is self-evident, and can be (empirically, after a fashion) recognized to be so. For instance, the existence of ourselves ('cogito ergo sum') isn't an axiom, or necessary working assumption, as Mikkel suggestsm but something we recognize through the very act of thinking. Of course, as Mikkel rightly points out, the problem with self-evidence in many other situations is that some people can say "it's not self-evident to me". It's very hard to prove that something is self-evident if it's not instantly self-evident to everyone. In some cases, however, the refusal to see self-evidence can be a result of simple (relativist, postmodernist, etc.) dogma. But in most cases, if someone, anywhere, doesn't find something self-evident it isn't. I would agree that working axioms can fill a useful role, but I think that self-evidence is an important foundation of knowledge... well, that's my (philosophical) two cents anyway. :)

[premjan]

I think that thought is a bootstrap process, hence the philosophy of philosophies has to be simpler than other philosophies. So I consider the philosophy of philosophies to be religion (or a hypothetical pan-world religion).

[Mikkel]

Of course "I think, therefore I am" is self-evident, but it is empty in terms of what we can know about the outside world. Now if you can shown something that is self-evident and gives "secure" knowledge about the outside world and/or parts of it without runing in to Agrippa's trilemma, then you will earn a place in history :)

Mikkel

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Mikkel
Of course "I think, therefore I am" is self-evident, but it is empty in terms of what we can know about the outside world. Now if you can shown something that is self-evident and gives "secure" knowledge about the outside world and/or parts of it without runing in to Agrippa's trilemma, then you will earn a place in history Doesn't this distinction between Inside World / Outside World itself contain assumptions that could require epistemological grounding?

best,
Peter Kirby

[Volker.Doormann]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
"How do you know that which you know?" This question is theme of dialogs from Socrates written down by Plato. He has said, that knowledge is a remembering of knowledge we have had forgotten since we was born, and has demonstrated this, with an uneducated slave who was able to remember - to re_cognize - the (quadratic) relation of a square and its sides, for different side lengths as true.

No one can generate knowledge out of nothing.

BTW. Knowledge is not a thing like a car or a house. It is an immaterial state of the immaterial consciousness of a being, that is not to be measured. This is different to the mind, that has a physical written readable memory.

Volker

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
Doesn't this distinction between Inside World / Outside World itself contain assumptions that could require epistemological grounding?

best,
Peter Kirby

Yes, you're right! What can be said without (to much) grounding is that there is something different from you.

Mikkel

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Volker.Doormann
This question is theme of dialogs from Socrates written down by Plato. He has said, that knowledge is a remembering of knowledge we have had forgotten since we was born, and has demonstrated this, with an uneducated slave who was able to remember - to re_cognize - the (quadratic) relation of a square and its sides, for different side lengths as true.

No one can generate knowledge out of nothing.

BTW. Knowledge is not a thing like a car or a house. It is an immaterial state of the immaterial consciousness of a being, that is not to be measured. This is different to the mind, that has a physical written readable memory.

Volker [/QUOTE]

Okay :)

Mikkel

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Mikkel
Yes, you're right! What can be said without (to much) grounding is that there is something different from you. What I would suggest is that there is no context-free way to ask "how do I know this?" The question makes sense only when there is some shared expectation of how the question could be answered.

For example, if it were strangely possible for a human being to reason exclusively on the basis of set theory, then there would be total ignorance regarding anything physical--not even "Cogito ergo sum" would cut the mustard.

I would affirm my own existence on the basis of a scientific or folk-scientific understanding of myself as having two arms, two legs, a trunk, and a head; eyes that occasionally blink, ears with which to hear, a mouth with which to speak, and a brain that ponderously thinks. I find the dictum of Descartes to be nearly useless for establishing that I exist, for it tells me nothing about what I am, and an affirmation of the existence of a thing without describing that thing is rather empty. To modify Boswell's Johnson, to prove my existence all I have to do is kick my foot against a rock; I have proven that I have a foot that smarts, if a mind that's not too smart.

best,
Peter Kirby

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
4 - something that is recognized to be self-evident

...I go for this one, so the puzzle is how do things become self-evident. IMO its wrapped up in how the brain reates an identity for something and the way that is presented to our conscious mind. Here's a link to research on how the brain visually fixes on a part of reality so we can know it further... (http://www.cnbc.cmu.edu/Research/highlights-carol-colby.shtml)

[Volker.Doormann]

Originally posted by Mikkel

[ ... ]

Okay :) Is that a Koan?

"Without opening your door,
you can open your heart to the world.
Without looking out your window,
you can see the essence of the Tao.

The more you know,
the less you understand.

The Master arrives without leaving,
sees the light without looking,
achieves without doing a thing."
(Lao=Tsu)

hilsen

Volker

[Frotiw]

A couple of remarks.

First of there is no philosophy of philosophy but only plain philosophy. This may be trivial and you may all already know this I just mention it to be sure. In case there where where a "philosophy of philosophy" there would also be a philosophy of "philosophy of philosphy" and so forth infinite. Actually on a sidenote the entire formula of british/american naming of the varius branches of philosophy is somewhat problematic as, e.g. contrary to german, the branch is named after it's subject-matter:

Philosophy of
-Knowledge
-art
-religion

or Theory of
-x
-x

Problem is that this hint that there always is theory, philosophy or other explanation behind every branch. Epistemology is a better word than "theory of knowledge" as less assumptions on relations between theory and subject matter is implied. More precisely that there is a relation at all. -Very difficult to explain but I have heard a longer lecture on this specific subject some time ago. It's difficult to explain because it has to do with the limits of the language which are obviosly hard to avoid speaking and explaining in the language in question.

As for the problems of knowledge(the trilemma mentioned) I think it all depends on what kind of knowledge is in question. Not only mathematical and logical knowledge(analytical knowledge) but also the axioms necessary for this knowledge can be very well justified. I have such axioms or priniciples in mind as the principel of contradiction. This principles can be doubted yes, but no argument or meaningfull expression can be made without accepting this axiom. As soon as a meaningfull expression or argument is made, the principle is presumed. This does not mean it is necessarily true it just mean that it's atleast a pragmatical principle necessary for any rational debate. Rejections of this principle will be mystical meaningless expression with to comprehensible truthvalue.

As for the knowledge of the external world I think the tradition(s) inspired by Kant, Husserl and perhaps also Wittgenstein will have better explanations than those of emperical philosophy. I personaly see some parts of Kant's "Kritik der reinen Vernuft" as a very valuable explanation to the problem of knowledge of the external world. Contrary to such, far less plausible, emperical theories(Lock, Berkeley, Hume etc.) I find it reasonable that the nature of the "Vernuft"* is indeed preventing secure knowledge of the external world. However the reasons for this lack of ability is due to relations between the "Vernuft" and that of which the "vernuft" is concerned with(the matter of experience). The relations I believe in English are known as the "forms of experience"**. These, prerequisitions or relations however are necessary conditions by nature.
To sum up a little too simplified, one could say that we may not have secure knowledge of the external world(the emperical in Kant's terminology) but the reasons for this insecurity of knowledge is quite well explained and according to Kant necessary.

*Which many(even very famous well known) empirists typically are very quick to brutally deform(or they don't understand?) to an emperical concept, as something Kant obviosly has never held.

**Please correct me, if I'm wrong.


Cheers frotiw

[Dominus Paradoxum]

"I think, therefore I am"

This arguement is visciously circular. Of course it follows that I am if I think, but it does not follow from the existence of thoughts that they have a thinker.

And Frotiw, please explain how I presume the principle of non-contradiction in denying it. Of course I assume that it is false rather than true, but it does not follow that its truth and falsity necessarily exclude each other. Just because the principle of noncontradiction is false that does not mean it is universally violated.

[Volker.Doormann]

Originally posted by Frotiw
A couple of remarks. [ ... ] Frotiw, Thank you for your helpful remarks. I do not agree with all your thoughts, but on some. You wrote: Not only mathematical and logical knowledge(analytical knowledge) but also the axioms necessary for this knowledge can be very well justified. I have such axioms or priniciples in mind as the principel of contradiction. This principles can be doubted yes, but no argument or meaningfull expression can be made without accepting this axiom. I do not think, that to hold on an unknown, philosophically unsolved 'thing' like an 'axiom' while philosophizing on knowledge and its nature is really in common with the philosophy of knowledge. It should be clear, that a contradiction itself is abstract, without any substance; it comes only in a physical mind of real thoughts and ideas, from which at least one, or more are not to be recognized as true by a consciousness to it's own immaterial reference of truth. A contradiction is not to be recognized as contradiction without a comparison of a real (online) insight to the own - inner - 'eigene' reference of truth, and not through an abstract axiom. If this is true, then there is no principle of contradiction called axiom as law of nature actually, but a principle of (recognizable by a consciousness) truth.

Best and hilsen

Volker

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
What I would suggest is that there is no context-free way to ask "how do I know this?" The question makes sense only when there is some shared expectation of how the question could be answered.

For example, if it were strangely possible for a human being to reason exclusively on the basis of set theory, then there would be total ignorance regarding anything physical--not even "Cogito ergo sum" would cut the mustard.

I would affirm my own existence on the basis of a scientific or folk-scientific understanding of myself as having two arms, two legs, a trunk, and a head; eyes that occasionally blink, ears with which to hear, a mouth with which to speak, and a brain that ponderously thinks. I find the dictum of Descartes to be nearly useless for establishing that I exist, for it tells me nothing about what I am, and an affirmation of the existence of a thing without describing that thing is rather empty. To modify Boswell's Johnson, to prove my existence all I have to do is kick my foot against a rock; I have proven that I have a foot that smarts, if a mind that's not too smart.

best,
Peter Kirby

Well, as you point out existence of one's self in itself is empty, but the moment we claim something about that which is not oneself as far as I can tell Agrippa's trilemma kicks in.
Of course we all rely on something, which we normally don't doubt, but take for granted. The fun part is that varies from person to person and when asked to justify the answers can be view through Agrippa's and as you point out that, which is implied by the person asking can also be view through Agrippa's. This doesn't solve Agrippa's though!

Could you explain more about set theory in so far as would Agrippa's still apply?

Mikkel

[Frotiw]

Dominus Paradoxum & Volker:

My point is that it the principles of logic(not only the contradiction principle but also the prinicple of identity A=A) are neccesary conditions(presumptions) in rational debate. It does not mean I necessarily express the view that the principles of logic are universal truth.
My point is that the way the "mind"(or brain or whatever) is designed we can only understand propotitions with truthvalues. If Dominus express the view that the contradiction priniciple is false I still can only understand this as a propotition with a truth value, that as the principle is still active. The rejection of the principle result in a incomprehensible view, the only possibily is to say the principle is false but you can not think it so. The person expressing the view may want to intend to disobey the principle but still the other person in the debate still will have to "force the principle" on to the expression.

Originally posted by Dominus Paradoxum

Of course I assume that it is false rather than true, but it does not follow that its truth and falsity necessarily exclude each other.

I reject this. Saying that a propotition is false just the same as the negation of the propotiion being truth. It is precisely so that that one of the propotitions exlude the other and if not well there is no way I can understand the propotion. If it is not either true or false how should should take a stand against this view? Should I agree with or disagree with, if you reject the divalence of truthvalues and you say the propotion is both truth and false at the same time, you I might as well understand you agreeing with me as you don't.

[Volker.Doormann]

Originally posted by Frotiw
My point is that it the principles of logic(not only the contradiction principle but also the prinicple of identity A=A) are neccesary conditions(presumptions) in rational debate. Rationality is not a closed world; rationality is an open world with no limits in rationality. Rationality is the ratio of at least two as true recognized related truths (with possibly resulting effect of rejecting the false - or better unrelated {true} 'things'). Neither an abstract axiom nor any presumption fulfills the demands of rationality; it’s a believe only. Sure, not in any case rationality must discussed in any discussion in deep, but as far as I have understand the kernel of this thread here it is asked for exact the truth beyond axioms or presumptions, regarding to the world knowledge comes from.

Volker

[Dominus Paradoxum]

Frotiw, you should see my thread, "Is dialetheism rational".

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by premjan
I think that thought is a bootstrap process, hence the philosophy of philosophies has to be simpler than other philosophies. So I consider the philosophy of philosophies to be religion (or a hypothetical pan-world religion).

How so? :confused: Best, confusedly, Thomas

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Mikkel
Of course "I think, therefore I am" is self-evident, but it is empty in terms of what we can know about the outside world. Now if you can shown something that is self-evident and gives "secure" knowledge about the outside world and/or parts of it without runing in to Agrippa's trilemma, then you will earn a place in history :)

Mikkel

Well, that's a challenge I can't turn down :) !

I'd say (though a chap named Russell may have beaten me to this point - that or he ripped me off ;) ) that certain kinds of 'direct' knowledge, where we are directly acquanting things, show these things to be 'self-evidently' existent and reveal some properties of them. For instance, we can say we know 100% that sense data exist. Now, you may say sense data are wholly internal, but if you think about it they're not - they are the result of our minds becoming acquainted with something outside themselves (ie. we wouldn't have ever known of them through mere imagination without seeing/sensing something like them before.) We might be able to become acquainted with certain properties (perhaps the moral properties of pain and pleasure?), and they would thus be self-evident.

I hope this has earned me my place in history! :)

Thomas Ash


__________
Check out my website for all :cool: infidels, Atheist Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/atheistground/) - and my broader website on politics, philosophy, science and history - Big Issue Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/)!

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
What I would suggest is that there is no context-free way to ask "how do I know this?" The question makes sense only when there is some shared expectation of how the question could be answered.

For example, if it were strangely possible for a human being to reason exclusively on the basis of set theory, then there would be total ignorance regarding anything physical--not even "Cogito ergo sum" would cut the mustard.

I would affirm my own existence on the basis of a scientific or folk-scientific understanding of myself as having two arms, two legs, a trunk, and a head; eyes that occasionally blink, ears with which to hear, a mouth with which to speak, and a brain that ponderously thinks. I find the dictum of Descartes to be nearly useless for establishing that I exist, for it tells me nothing about what I am, and an affirmation of the existence of a thing without describing that thing is rather empty. To modify Boswell's Johnson, to prove my existence all I have to do is kick my foot against a rock; I have proven that I have a foot that smarts, if a mind that's not too smart.

best,
Peter Kirby

Hi Peter,

I absolutely agree with your first statement, and it's worth going into this question without any unjustified presuppositions as to how to answer it (for instance, scientistic, or theistic, or 34th faction True Neo-Trotskyistic Marxist ;) .)

As for 'Cogito Ergo Sum' not establishing anything concrete, just some formless thing we call 'I', a lot of philosophers have held that view. But now that I've answered Mikkel's challenge with a bit of hand-me-down Russell, and so claimed my mantle as a 'Visionary Philosopher' ( :D - an internet IQ test said I was this, too, and they don't lie! ;) ), I'd like to disagree! I think we can identify something concrete in the self-evident entity of an 'I' For instance, it's subjective as opposed to non-subjective, personal, not non-personal, and can have thoughts and perceptions. That's something relatively substantive to call self-evident, isn't it?

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
I think we can identify something concrete in the self-evident entity of an 'I' For instance, it's subjective as opposed to non-subjective, personal, not non-personal, and can have thoughts and perceptions. That's something relatively substantive to call self-evident, isn't it?
Sorry, Thomas, I missed the "something concrete". (Perhaps its just about to hit me. :D)

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
...I go for this one, so the puzzle is how do things become self-evident. IMO its wrapped up in how the brain reates an identity for something and the way that is presented to our conscious mind. Here's a link to research on how the brain visually fixes on a part of reality so we can know it further... (http://www.cnbc.cmu.edu/Research/highlights-carol-colby.shtml)

Of course, John, things aren't quite this simple. When we perceive something in our vision, as in the article you linked to, what we see isn't quite 100% self-evident, and still open to a skeptical attack.

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Frotiw
A couple of remarks.

First of there is no philosophy of philosophy but only plain philosophy. This may be trivial and you may all already know this I just mention it to be sure. In case there where where a "philosophy of philosophy" there would also be a philosophy of "philosophy of philosphy" and so forth infinite. Actually on a sidenote the entire formula of british/american naming of the varius branches of philosophy is somewhat problematic as, e.g. contrary to german, the branch is named after it's subject-matter:

Philosophy of
-Knowledge
-art
-religion

or Theory of
-x
-x

Problem is that this hint that there always is theory, philosophy or other explanation behind every branch. Epistemology is a better word than "theory of knowledge" as less assumptions on relations between theory and subject matter is implied. More precisely that there is a relation at all. -Very difficult to explain but I have heard a longer lecture on this specific subject some time ago. It's difficult to explain because it has to do with the limits of the language which are obviosly hard to avoid speaking and explaining in the language in question.

That's very interesting. But as the one who came up with it, I'd like to defend the name 'philosophy of philosophy', as it conveys the central question and concern very clearly (that is, how to justify the methodology of philosophy, and what philosophy can know.) What would be the German (or Danish) (or other) equivalent? Metaphilosophy? Isn't that pretty much the same thing

As for the problems of knowledge(the trilemma mentioned) I think it all depends on what kind of knowledge is in question. Not only mathematical and logical knowledge(analytical knowledge) but also the axioms necessary for this knowledge can be very well justified. I have such axioms or priniciples in mind as the principel of contradiction. This principles can be doubted yes, but no argument or meaningfull expression can be made without accepting this axiom. As soon as a meaningfull expression or argument is made, the principle is presumed. This does not mean it is necessarily true it just mean that it's at least a pragmatical principle necessary for any rational debate. Rejections of this principle will be mystical meaningless expression with to comprehensible truthvalue.

But can all the axioms be well justified? Are you taking axiom to mean what I meant by it in 5 ("something that is taken as axiomatic simply because it is found to be necessary to deal with the question") ? If so, that seems pretty unjustified to me, except in a purely pragmatic sense. How do you justify the principle of non-contradiction, to take a concrete example (;) - whatever King ToiletPaper III of Wipeout (I think that's his formal name) says - :p )? I can make an argument without it:

1. Some people think God exists, some disagree.
2. Therefore, God both exists and doesn't exist.

Sure, it's a crap argument (though one people do make), but to 100% prove it's crap, you have to justify the principle of non-contradiction.

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Of course, John, things aren't quite this simple. When we perceive something in our vision, as in the article you linked to, what we see isn't quite 100% self-evident, and still open to a skeptical attack.
I agree your last point, and that's exactly why I linked to some research into how we see what we see (neurologically). Let's see what progress is made, I'm sure there were skeptics of the atom bomb before Hiroshima - a good demonstration does wonders!

Cheers, John

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
How do you justify the principle of non-contradiction, to take a concrete example (;) - whatever King ToiletPaper III of Wipeout (I think that's his formal name) says - :p )?
:D , but I speak from the royal sphincter (which the Egyptians copied by inventing the sphinx), whose word is effluent and absolute.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
1. Some people think God exists, some disagree.
2. Therefore, God both exists and doesn't exist.

Sigh. But its not the same god, Thomas, god is a word that refers to a concept that exists within one's mind.
1. Some people think their god exists, some people disagree that there is any god.
2. Therefore, (the concept of god) exists in all the minds describe in (1) above.
3. Thereby, some people think there is a real god and some don't.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Sure, it's a crap argument (though one people do make), but to 100% prove it's crap, you have to justify the principle of non-contradiction.
Didn't one of the Greeks propose that the basic fundamental stuff was crap? :) . Sphincter says, select your system of argumentation and in doing so you will automatically be conceding that I can adopt a contradictory position.

Don't worry, I've anticipated your saying "No I can't" by responding "Well you just did"....

Whatever your system of argumentation, my opening proposition is "Is black white?"

Cheers, John

[Peter Kirby]

Usually this is called simply epistemology, as the philosophical enterprise of understanding knowledge in all its forms, or lack thereof for the skeptics.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
I agree your last point, and that's exactly why I linked to some research into how we see what we see (neurologically). Let's see what progress is made, I'm sure there were skeptics of the atom bomb before Hiroshima - a good demonstration does wonders!

Cheers, John

Yep, but that doesn't alter the fact that as it as seen through the medium of sense perception ("through a glass darkly", to quote Ozzy Osbourne ;) ), the things were seeing aren't self evident. We don't know what kind of things they are, and the research you linked to doesn't totally rule out the conspiracy theory that it's all an evil demon planting senses. It does show that this is highly unlikely, with which I agree, though to know this requires knowledge of some other principle like Occam's razor.

[Thomas Ash]

Your Royal Highness King ToiletPaper III of WipeOut, who speaks through the royal sphincter :notworthy ,

I confused matters somewhat by putting my contradiction into an argument, but it was only to show how this contradictory belief arises in most people. And yes, I am aware that it's a result of a non sequitur from belief to existence. My point was that people are quite capable of doubting the principle of contradiction, and thinking something is 'in a mystical sense' bot black and white, both existent and non-existent. Of course, you may well be right in saying non-contradiction is an entirely necessary axiom for thought/self-evident (which of these was it that you were arguing again?), and that everyone would see this with just a bit of rigorous thought. If they wouldn't, though, itd be hard to argue it's self-evident.

Best wishes,

Thomas

PS: I didn't know about the ancient Greek who said crap was the fundamental stuff. Was it Lavatorius? Are there surviving fragments of Greek philosophy which go something like: "We are full of crap" ?

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Well, that's a challenge I can't turn down :) !

I'd say (though a chap named Russell may have beaten me to this point - that or he ripped me off ;) ) that certain kinds of 'direct' knowledge, where we are directly acquanting things, show these things to be 'self-evidently' existent and reveal some properties of them. For instance, we can say we know 100% that sense data exist. Now, you may say sense data are wholly internal, but if you think about it they're not - they are the result of our minds becoming acquainted with something outside themselves (ie. we wouldn't have ever known of them through mere imagination without seeing/sensing something like them before.) We might be able to become acquainted with certain properties (perhaps the moral properties of pain and pleasure?), and they would thus be self-evident.

I hope this has earned me my place in history! :)

Thomas Ash


Not quite, but then that is just me :)

"...we can say we know 100% that sense data exist..." - if you by that mean that there is something different from you, then yes! It is self-evident, but still empty.
"We might be able to become acquainted with certain properties...” - yes by repeated experience of reality combined with concepts learned prior to evaluate reality we establish certain properties about reality. That is also self-evident, but also still empty, because then the concepts must be self-evident.

What I am getting at that is that while it is self-evident, that there is a reality and that we all say something about reality; it is not self-evident what to say about reality.

Mikkel

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Mikkel
if you by that mean that there is something different from you, then yes! It is self-evident, but still empty. Some believe that there is no "me" for the "outside" world to be different from; the distinction is an illusion. So perhaps it is not self-evident, at least not to them?

In my opinion, the only thing that is self-evident, or "known to be true by virtue of understanding it," is an analytic statement. My own existence is not self-evident to me. I know it by science and not pure math.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
Some believe that there is no "me" for the "outside" world to be different from; the distinction is an illusion. So perhaps it is not self-evident, at least not to them?

In my opinion, the only thing that is self-evident, or "known to be true by virtue of understanding it," is an analytic statement. My own existence is not self-evident to me. I know it by science and not pure math.

best,
Peter Kirby

How do you that "known to be true by virtue of understanding it" is self-evident?

What Agrippa's points to is relativism, but again relativism is to me self-evident, while not to others.

Mikkel

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Mikkel
How do you that "known to be true by virtue of understanding it" is self-evident? That is the way that I have defined the term for my post. Other people may or may not define the term differently. Really, other people should also have defined the term "self-evident" before they brought it up, as the definition is critical. What is your definition?

best,
Peter Kirby

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
That is the way that I have defined the term for my post. Other people may or may not define the term differently. Really, other people should also have defined the term "self-evident" before they brought it up, as the definition is critical. What is your definition?

best,
Peter Kirby

I played with "true in itself", but that was without much reflection. Now and not that it can't change I hold it to be a variant of "a dogmatic claim that it is so". Of course it turns out that this was also what I wrote at the begining of this thread.

4 are a variant of 2, isn't it? Not that isn't so that dogma and self-evident are the same, but they are brothers in arms, because they share the same foundation; to some people it doesn't make sense to deny claim x = "that is so/self-evident", while to others that is not so self-evident. It all depends on where you start your assumptions, doesn't it

I am not always that firm with my own definition, but sort of play around to see what comes up :)

Mikkel

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Of course, you may well be right in saying non-contradiction is an entirely necessary axiom for thought/self-evident (which of these was it that you were arguing again?), and that everyone would see this with just a bit of rigorous thought. If they wouldn't, though, itd be hard to argue it's self-evident.
Hi Thomas:

That's my point, how do things become self-evident?

[Mikkel]

No, the non-contradiction-principle is not in itself just so, because it is dependant on a metaphysical position. What is to be understood by A=A and A can’t at the same time be and not be the same is a metaphysical problem.

While it could be claimed that a person can’t hold that A is true and both false for her/him at the same time that again depends on how true and false is viewed by that person. Of course a person that holds that A is true and both false for her/him at the same time will properly by others be viewed as not being quite sane, but then again who is sane or not is just so.

What pops up is Agrippa’s trilemma – How do you know that the non-contradiction-principle is just so?

Mikkel

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by John Page
Hi Thomas:

That's my point, how do things become self-evident?

They don't in themself, we hold them to be so.

Mikkel

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Mikkel
I played with "true in itself", but that was without much reflection. Now and not that it can't change I hold it to be a variant of "a dogmatic claim that it is so". Of course it turns out that this was also what I wrote at the begining of this thread.

I am not always that firm with my own definition, but sort of play around to see what comes up :)


I agree that many people use (I would say abuse) the term "self-evident" so that they can make any random "dogmatic claim" without having to explain it. Saying "the falsity of evolution is self-evident" would be an example. However, I don't think a term should be defined by its connotation. Does a person using the word accurately mean by saying that "X is self-evident" simply that they hold X with dogmatic-type certainty? There is the phrase "X convinces me utterly" or "X seems obvious to me" for that, some phrase that rightly indicates the role of the speaker. I think that those who use "self-evident" as a proper term are attempting to characterize the statement itself, not their belief in it but something about the statement that makes them believe it, and rationally so. If so, how is the statement being described?

best,
Peter Kirby

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
....what we see isn't quite 100% self-evident, and still open to a skeptical attack.
Or, what is self-evident is not necessarily accurate from other points of view.

In case I'm not being clear, what I'm trying to home into one might call a "phenomenology of self-evidence". e.g. how does the mind create identity, the appearance of things-in-themselves.

In terms of the OP, perhaps I'm seeking a philosophy of philosophy in the manner of an ontology of thought, a conceptualization of concepts if you will.

Cheers, John

[John Page]

Hi Mikkel!
Originally posted by Mikkel
They don't in themself, we hold them to be so.
Yes, better phrased the question is "How does one hold things as self-evident to oneself?"

If each of us finds our "self" undeniable, why do we have such a hard time understanding what the "self" is?

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Mikkel
Not quite, but then that is just me :)

I think it's just you ;) .

"...we can say we know 100% that sense data exist..." - if you by that mean that there is something different from you, then yes! It is self-evident, but still empty.

No, I mean that there is something different from you and one of those things is sense data, which we know exist. How is that empty? Saying sense-data exist is quite concrete (er... so to speak ;) ), and distinct from saying 'hippotomauses exist' or 'the meaning of life (tm) exists.'

"We might be able to become acquainted with certain properties...” - yes by repeated experience of reality combined with concepts learned prior to evaluate reality we establish certain properties about reality. That is also self-evident, but also still empty, because then the concepts must be self-evident.

Nope, we learn the concepts from our experience - we couldn't just come up with concepts like 'colour' or 'space' without seeing or sensing them, could we? I fail to see how all this is 'empty', and frankly I'm starting to get a bit insulted. :mad: ;)

What I am getting at that is that while it is self-evident, that there is a reality and that we all say something about reality; it is not self-evident what to say about reality.

Mikkel

What do you mean? It's not self-evident what to say about reality in all specific details, but some things (eg. the exitence of sense data, colour and space entering in their somewhere) are self-evident. That's something, I think.

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash


__________
Check out my website for all :cool: infidels, Atheist Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/atheistground/) - and my broader website on politics, philosophy, science and history - Big Issue Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/)!

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
In my opinion, the only thing that is self-evident, or "known to be true by virtue of understanding it," is an analytic statement. My own existence is not self-evident to me. I know it by science and not pure math.

best,
Peter Kirby

Hi Peter,

Aren't you saying that you learnt that you exist in physics class? I think I can say that's not how it works for most of us :p .

Best wishes,

Thomas Ash

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
Hi Thomas:

That's my point, how do things become self-evident?

Hi King Toi... John,

I'm not sure they become self-evident, I think they're meant to be self-evident. But I'm sure you know that, and I guess I oughtn't to avoid your question. I think things are self-evident either through being analytically true (all bachelors are men - this is the obvious way) or through a direct acquantance with them (like sense data, as opposed to matter which clearly isn't self-evident - though this is the more controversial type of self-evident.)

Best wishes,

Thomas

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Mikkel
I played with "true in itself", but that was without much reflection. Now and not that it can't change I hold it to be a variant of "a dogmatic claim that it is so". Of course it turns out that this was also what I wrote at the begining of this thread.

4 are a variant of 2, isn't it? Not that isn't so that dogma and self-evident are the same, but they are brothers in arms, because they share the same foundation; to some people it doesn't make sense to deny claim x = "that is so/self-evident", while to others that is not so self-evident. It all depends on where you start your assumptions, doesn't it.

Hi Mikkel,

I think I said this already, but I think if someone anywhere doesn't see something as self-evident with the same information we have and once any confusions about terms or dogmas, etc. have been cleared up, it doesn't hold up to call that thing self-evident anymore. But I doubt you can find anyone who, with all these provisos, doubt they exist, for instance.

Best, Thomas

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Hi King Toi... John,
:D
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
I'm not sure they become self-evident, I think they're meant to be self-evident.
:confused: By what or whom?
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
I think things are self-evident either through being analytically true (all bachelors are men - this is the obvious way)
IMO this only becomes an instance of a self-evident truth when a mind reaches a determination that all bachelors (single males) are men (males). Of course, in certain cases the Olympic Committee gender tests might produce disagreement....
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
.....or through a direct acquantance with them (like sense data, as opposed to matter which clearly isn't self-evident - though this is the more controversial type of self-evident.)
Like with this self-evident stationary sense data? (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=63841)

Cheers, John

[Dominus Paradoxum]

In my opinion, the only thing that is self-evident, or "known to be true by virtue of understanding it," is an analytic statement. My own existence is not self-evident to me. I know it by science and not pure math.

Personally, I don't believe in analytic statements, or "truth in virtue of meaning".

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Aren't you saying that you learnt that you exist in physics class? I think I can say that's not how it works for most of us. I'm saying that I did not learn it in math class, nor reading Meditations. My rational justification for accepting my existence is based on the same methods used to investigate the natural world. The cause of my accepting my existence is strongly biological, as is the cause of my accepting the existence of the food I eat and the air I breathe.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Peter Kirby]

Originally posted by Dominus Paradoxum
Personally, I don't believe in analytic statements, or "truth in virtue of meaning". What is your understanding of an "analytic" statement such that it does not exist?

best,
Peter Kirby

[Mikkel]

I think I will start anew!

Scepticism at least in connection with knowledge (and truth) holds the middle position in the fallacy of the excluded middle. It pops up as the claim that for knowledge to be knowledge it must be true knowledge or else it isn’t knowledge. Implied is the objective part. This goes back to at least old Aristotle and his A=A, A can’t be A and non-A at the same time and A must be either A or non-A in so far as philosophy goes.
While we all more or less abide by these “rules”, it must be remembered that they are “rules” and maybe not set in stone as a part of “reality”. It may be that they on the ontological level are true, but that is in dispute. If a view of detached 3’rd person is used, then it is clear that the idea of true, objective knowledge doesn’t hold up. People through all of history have held and is holding views of “reality” that contradict each other, though only if one view is being true, objective knowledge and the rest false. The problem is what we mean with true and objective and not with knowledge, knowledge is what we each individually hold to be knowledge by our view of what knowledge is, as there is no problem in showing that knowledge is subjective or intersubjective.

The fun starts with the words true and objective because what we each individually hold to be true and objective is namely subjective and intersubjective. There is no doubt that there is knowledge, we as humans couldn’t live as humans without knowledge about the “reality”, it just doesn’t follow that this knowledge is any more that subjective or intersubjective. As to the status of “reality” it is again a question of what you personally hold to be “reality”, which decides how you view the problem of knowledge.

Agrippa’s trilemma points to this problem of knowledge, because it shows that knowledge can’t be shown to be truly true and objective. The same applies to Agrippa’s trilemma itself, to some it is true and to others it is false, while is still knowledge? Or is it?

Mikkel

[Peter Kirby]

Introducing the matter of different opinions on the question of whether any knowledge can be justified, in light of the problem of infinite regress of proofs (where justification is conceived as deductive proof I suppose), is at the least a change of subject. Besides, it could be that there exists some loony toe-stubbing realist who professes to believe that there are no differences of opinion. But then the basis for justifying subjectivism is thus a subjective belief that there are differences of opinion (even if the conclusion of "subjectivism" followed), and if we are rationally skeptical of "subjective" claims (which seems to be the undercurrent of introducing subjectivism into a discussion of skepticism), then we are rationally skeptical of subjectivism, by the canons of rationality proposed.

If I seem to be playing word games, then I think you ought to define the terms "subjectivism" and "skepticism" as positions that you suppose others would want to argue against. Are you saying that they are equivalent? If so, what is the fundamental statement being made by this skepticism-subjectivism idea? Does that statement have some kind of justification? If so, what is the justification? And to what method of establishing rationality does this justification appeal?

best,
Peter Kirby

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
If I seem to be playing word games, then I think you ought to define the terms "subjectivism" and "skepticism" as positions that you suppose others would want to argue against. Are you saying that they are equivalent? If so, what is the fundamental statement being made by this skepticism-subjectivism idea? Does that statement have some kind of justification? If so, what is the justification? And to what method of establishing rationality does this justification appeal?


"subjectivism" is a way to state that different people hold different views of the world whether subjective or intersubjective.

"skepticism" is the view as Agrippa's trilemma points to that there is no way to show a certain view of the world to be true and objective.

I am playing as much a word game as you, but that is also a point :) We can play with words and views because they are subjective. If there where no problem of knowledge, then words and knowledge would be objective and we couldn't play with them :D

As to justification and rationality that is again a problem of what knowledge lies behind justification and rationality.

Now don't get me wrong, I personally hold the objective view, rationality, science, human rights and a lot of other things, which are parts of the western, secular humanism in high regard. I just don't hold them to be true or objective, because I hold them to be just another view of the world or if you like a belief.
On the other hand I don't hold beliefs to be equally good, because that would be an absolute claim, which would have to be shown to be true and objective.

Introducing the matter of different opinions on the question of whether any knowledge can be justified, in light of the problem of infinite regress of proofs (where justification is conceived as deductive proof I suppose), is at the least a change of subject. Besides, it could be that there exists some loony toe-stubbing realist who professes to believe that there are no differences of opinion. But then the basis for justifying subjectivism is thus a subjective belief that there are differences of opinion (even if the conclusion of "subjectivism" followed), and if we are rationally skeptical of "subjective" claims (which seems to be the undercurrent of introducing subjectivism into a discussion of skepticism), then we are rationally skeptical of subjectivism, by the canons of rationality proposed.

If I understand you right then you are saying that I have made a contradiction. Correct, I do know it is a contradiction, but that is the point. If we look objectively at all the views of the world, then how can we know which view is the "best". Well, of course the objective view is the best, but how do we know that? By way of an subjective view that the objective view is the best :D

Mikkel

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
:confused: By what or whom?

I'm not sure I get you there. It's not self-evident by anything or anyone, it's (supposedly at least) self evident to everyone.

IMO this only becomes an instance of a self-evident truth when a mind reaches a determination that all bachelors (single males) are men (males). Of course, in certain cases the Olympic Committee gender tests might produce disagreement....

No, no, no. The word bachelor has a meaning which implies males in itself, and if it didn't there wouldn't be any point in having the word.

Like with this self-evident stationary sense data? (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=63841)

Cheers, John

I'm not quite sure what that's meant to prove, apart from totally confusing my head :D . It is cool, though!

Best, Thomas

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Peter Kirby
I'm saying that I did not learn it in math class, nor reading Meditations. My rational justification for accepting my existence is based on the same methods used to investigate the natural world. The cause of my accepting my existence is strongly biological, as is the cause of my accepting the existence of the food I eat and the air I breathe.

best,
Peter Kirby

Oh, that's not fair :( . If you read what I was saying, I wasn't claiming I learnt it from reading 'Meditations', but that it was self-evident. Here's a thought experiment, or even a memory experiment if your memory goes back that far: aren't babies, from pretty much after the first second of their awareness, aware that they exist, self-evidently? (If that's not too glorified a word to put into the mouth of a baby!)

They, like we, precisely don't accept it "based on the same methods used to investigate the natural world." And it's much more possible to argue about the "the existence of the food I eat and the air I breathe" (if existence is taken to mean 'matter' or some such concept.) At least the self-evidence of that existence is open to question, and even if it is the case, it would be self-evident and known in a different way that we know that since we're thinking and aware, we exist.

Best wishes, Thomas

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
It's not self-evident by anything or anyone, it's (supposedly at least) self evident to everyone.
Just thought I saw some anthropomorphism creeping in. I was looking for a process by which they (things) become self-evident. IMO things can be evident to the self but extension over all "selves" is unwarranted.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
No, no, no. The word bachelor has a meaning which implies males in itself, and if it didn't there wouldn't be any point in having the word. But it seems the human mind can cope very well with exceptions. With your bahelor example, one ends up having to define "bachelor" and "male" in such a way that the statement is true - less a fact and more a definitional statement.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
I'm not quite sure what that's meant to prove, apart from totally confusing my head :D . It is cool, though!
I wanted to show that something could appear self-evidently to be moving when in fact it was stationary.

Cheers, John

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
But it seems the human mind can cope very well with exceptions. With your bahelor example, one ends up having to define "bachelor" and "male" in such a way that the statement is true - less a fact and more a definitional statement.

It's true that bachelor has to have a defintion of "unmarried male" to make the statement "all bachelors are men" true. But it already does, and the point is that from that simple definition, without any other knowledge, it becomes self-evident that all bachelors are male. You don't have to define "male" at all, though, so long as it has a consistent meaning.

I wanted to show that something could appear self-evidently to be moving when in fact it was stationary.

Cheers, John

But remember that's not what I meant by self-evident as I defined it at the start of the thread, and later I explicitly said that 'matter' out there in the world like the supposedly moving circles couldn't be self-evident. What is self-evident is the existence of sense-datum for that optical illusion, and that sense-datum can move even when the actual pixels on your screen don't.

Best wishes,

Thomas

[Darth Dane]

For instance, we can say we know 100% that sense data exist. Now, you may say sense data are wholly internal, but if you think about it they're not - they are the result of our minds becoming acquainted with something outside themselves (ie. we wouldn't have ever known of them through mere imagination without seeing/sensing something like them before.)

Isn't this based on the assumption that there is something "outside"?

How do we "know" if we don't experience something outside ourselves?

What if the tree we "sense" is part of ourself, which we can see from the "inside"?

Your sense example, is under the assumption that there is an "inner and and outer" of our existance yes?





DD - Love & Laughter

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
You don't have to define "male" at all, though, so long as it has a consistent meaning.[/B]
I disagree. Meanings are not universal.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
What is self-evident is the existence of sense-datum for that optical illusion, and that sense-datum can move even when the actual pixels on your screen don't.[/B]
Yes, but you are saying this after you understand that the movement is "illusion". What about people who thought there were large lakes on the moon? People that have travelled toward mirges in the desert? All I wanted to do was demonstrate that self-evidence is not (objective?) proof.

Cheers, John

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Darth Dane
For instance, we can say we know 100% that sense data exist. Now, you may say sense data are wholly internal, but if you think about it they're not - they are the result of our minds becoming acquainted with something outside themselves (ie. we wouldn't have ever known of them through mere imagination without seeing/sensing something like them before.)

Isn't this based on the assumption that there is something "outside"?

How do we "know" if we don't experience something outside ourselves?

What if the tree we "sense" is part of ourself, which we can see from the "inside"?

Your sense example, is under the assumption that there is an "inner and and outer" of our existance yes?

Well, remember my distinction between sense data (which I claim self-evidently exist) and matter and the outside world (which, though maybe probable, are not.) As to whether sense data come from outside the mind, my point is that they seem to pop up without our mind conciously creating them (for instance you could see an elephat without ever knowing about one before.) I suppose you could say they come from the 'subconcious' or somesuch, but this seems unlikely if not impossible.

Best, Thomas

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
I disagree. Meanings are not universal.

Why do you think this? How are we even frogging if so? ;)

Yes, but you are saying this after you understand that the movement is "illusion". What about people who thought there were large lakes on the moon? People that have travelled toward mirges in the desert? All I wanted to do was demonstrate that self-evidence is not (objective?) proof.

Cheers, John

But my point was always that it was sense-data which evidently exist, and matter which may not. You didn't take this point.

Best wishes,

Thomas

[John Page]

Originally posted by John Page
I disagree. Meanings are not universal.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Why do you think this? How are we even frogging if so? ;)

Son wogga boodif woblay. :)
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
But my point was always that it was sense-data which evidently exist, and matter which may not. You didn't take this point.
No matter. I agree.

[coreyfh]

if Jesus was not the son of God then nothing matters, but if he is, then nothing else matters

[Philosoft]

coreyfh, please be advised that this forum is called Philosophy, not Quaint Christian Proverbs. Please confine your responses thusly. Thanks.

Regards,
Philosoft

[Darth Dane]

Well, remember my distinction between sense data (which I claim self-evidently exist) and matter and the outside world (which, though maybe probable, are not.) As to whether sense data come from outside the mind, my point is that they seem to pop up without our mind conciously creating them (for instance you could see an elephat without ever knowing about one before.) I suppose you could say they come from the 'subconcious' or somesuch, but this seems unlikely if not impossible.



The key word being 'seem'.

If we can't know this for a fact, we cannot say if our mind(conciousness) creates wildly out of the blue can we?

We have no way to know if an elephant was "an experiment" that fell out "succesfully".

We cannot "know" if we create everything we experience yes?










DD - Love & Laughter