Nihilism...

[Spleen]

If an "appeal to emotion" is a fallacy, what does anything matter? Please explain in depth...

[Skyfurnace]

I'm interested in nihism, so I would like to answer your question. However, could you possibly be a little more specific?

[Spleen]

Any emotional response is an "appeal to emotion" (fallacious), even if you bring emotion up, in a "off-hand" way.

When asking the question, "What does anything matter?" -- As far as I can see it is forcing an (emotional-and-therefore-fallacious) response.

I could be wrong though...;)

[Spleen]

Tic-Toc. Is time running out on "Western Logic"(outside of nihilism)?

Consider that a challenge.

[JB01]

Originally posted by Spleen
If an "appeal to emotion" is a fallacy, what does anything matter? Please explain in depth...

When one is reasoning from a set of observations about the world to a factual conclusion about it, an appeal to emotion is a fallacy because how one feels about something has no relevance to whether or not it is true. For example, "If there were no God, life would be unbearably bleak. Therefore there must be a God!" is an invalid argument because the emotional content is irrelevant in a determination of fact.

However, it is perfectly legitimate to appeal to your own emotions when trying to explain your own subjective judgments. There is no fallacy in the statement "The welfare of my family matters to me because I love them," (though it may amount to little more than a tautology). It is a fact that people's opinions are influenced by their emotions; therefore we can reasonably appeal to emotions to explain opinions.

It would be difficult, on the other hand, to argue that anything "matters" objectively; that is, that something could matter without there being a person it matters to, for precisely the reason you have stated. I conclude that things only matter to the people who care about them, while they care about them.

[Spleen]

Alright if you want to go there -- explain why any emotion carries any weight or matters at all in the slightest. For you and/or others. Then explain the differance.

Why does any emotion matter, and to which point does it matter?

[JB01]

Originally posted by Spleen
Alright if you want to go there -- explain why any emotion carries any weight or matters at all in the slightest. For you and/or others. Then explain the differance.

My emotions carry weight for me because that's simply the way my mind works. That's what an emotion is, if you like. Other people's emotions carry weight for them. If one of my emotions happens to be empathy for another person, then some of that person's emotions are likely to matter to me as well. None of this matters at all objectively. It simply happens to matter somewhat to certain people to varying degrees at particular times.

I don't know what you mean by "explain the difference."

[Spleen]

There is no fallacy in the statement "The welfare of my family matters to me because I love them," (though it may amount to little more than a tautology). It is a fact that people's opinions are influenced by their emotions; therefore we can reasonably appeal to emotions to explain opinions.

What's this the backdoor philosophy? How come you couldn't say "The welfare of my God matters to me because I love God."(Is this a tautology?)

[Spleen]

My text: WHY DOES EMOTION MATTER, AND WHY IS NOT A FALLACY?

Is that the ultimate question...

[JB01]

Originally posted by Spleen
How come you couldn't say "The welfare of my God matters to me because I love God."(Is this a tautology?)

You could say that, and it might even be true. But it would be a statement about your state of mind, not about the existence or non-existence of a deity. What you would not be justified in saying is, "God exists because I love God." Conclusions about the existence of actual entities outside the human mind must rest on physical evidence and argument, not emotion.

[Spleen]

[i]Originally posted by JB01
You could say that, and it might even be true. But it would be a statement about your state of mind, not about the existence or non-existence of a deity. What you would not be justified in saying is, "God exists because I love God." Conclusions about the existence of actual entities outside the human mind must rest on physical evidence and argument, not emotion

I have not appealed to emotion once, so where do think I'm coming from? I am not talking about deities once again -- I am talking about rationale and if it would be the death of western philospophy, which I think it is.

Signed,

The Buddhist Monk

[JB01]

Originally posted by Spleen
I am talking about rationale and if it would be the death of western philospophy, which I think it is.


I'm afraid I don't understand you. Rationale for what?

[Spleen]

Originally posted by JB01
I'm afraid I don't understand you. Rationale for what?

The rationale for emotion, without appealing to it, and the philosophy behind (emotion) -- if you are going that route?

Ask me again and I'm gonna go off, in a nice way. ;)

[Spleen]

This is the death of it.

[Spleen]

Conclusions about the existence of actual entities outside the human mind must rest on physical evidence and argument, not emotion.

Why does that matter than? Without an "appeal to emotion". Ya prolly right.

Where do the fallacious people come in with "theory"? When someone they care about becomes involved?

Screw "entities", even when emotionally attachted.

[Spleen]

While you're at it, explain to me, why an "appeal to emotion" is indeed, a fallacy.

[Spleen]

I'm starting to get slightly buzzed up -- give me your best shot, and I'll be back tommorow or the next day. If it's easy, I'll do my best to kill it today (with this healthy alcohol buzz).

[Philosoft]

Spleen, JB01 has answered your questions thoroughly and coherently. You don't appear to PWI very well. Thus, I'd much rather you restate your argument pursuant to JB01's latest post when you are coherent enough to do so than continue on in this haphazard fashion.

[Spleen]

Originally posted by Philosoft
Spleen, JB01 has answered your questions thoroughly and coherently. You don't appear to PWI very well. Thus, I'd much rather you restate your argument pursuant to JB01's latest post when you are coherent enough to do so than continue on in this haphazard fashion.

No I don't PWI very well, I don't even know what that means, explain if you would.

I will restate my arguement, and try to clarify what I was saying originally, though, when I am "coherant" enough to do so. I just really don't think he, or you, answered my question(s) either.

The best I can do at the time being -- better to ask than tell when in an "incoherant" mood, and basically what I was trying to get at:

Why do emotions matter? (without an appeal to any emotion what-so-ever -- a question for all)

[pmurray]

I like icecream!

[Spleen]

I am fond of potatos, but what are you talking about? Do you have an answer to my latest question, at 9/27/03 @ 1:50 am EDT?

[Spleen]

I don't think you do have an answer...

[premjan]

I think nihilism is true but not useful.

[Hugo Holbling]

I offer you all a chance to predict the future: can you guess what will happen if Philosoft's advice isn't taken and we don't see some more (or indeed any) argument with less one-liners? Answers on a postcard to ~Elsewhere~.

[Spleen]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
I offer you all a chance to predict the future: can you guess what will happen if Philosoft's advice isn't taken and we don't see some more (or indeed any) argument with less one-liners? Answers on a postcard to ~Elsewhere~.

That was a sweet one-liner in bold -- just for the record -- what's with the hostility?

I've refined my question, it is not about "one liners", do you Hugo, have an answer to it? If it was easy to refute I think you would have cut it to shreds before your little tirade, and implicit threat.

Here it is:

Why do emotions matter? (without an appeal to any emotion what-so-ever -- a question for all).

If this is not a truly philosphical question send this wherever you want, just explain why.

[Spleen]

Originally posted by premjan
I think nihilism is true but not useful.

I agree and the last thing it is, is "useful".

[Mikkel]

Originally posted by Spleen
Here it is:

Why do emotions matter? (without an appeal to any emotion what-so-ever -- a question for all).

If this is not a truly philosphical question send this wherever you want, just explain why.

Emotions matter to people! :)
Now as to whether "Why do emotions matter?" as a philosphical question that is another ballgame! :) The answer depends as to how you view philosophy, so I will answer back: :)
-What is your definition of philosophy?
-What is/are the subject matter(s) of philosophy?

There is your and yours truely own answer to why emotions matter or don't in philosophy.

Mikkel

[Hugo Holbling]

You have already been warned by one moderator, Spleen, so i am not threatening you. Bandwidth is not free and if you have an argument to make or a response to JB01 then we would all appreciate hearing it, i'm sure.

[spacer1]

Originally posted by Spleen:
Why do emotions matter? (without an appeal to any emotion what-so-ever -- a question for all).
What do you mean by "matter"? To whom are emotions supposed to matter? Doesn't the question of whether something "matters" implicitly assume an emotional affect? If so, then you already know why emotions "matter".

It's only by having emotions (and emotional attachments to people and things) that you can understand what it means for something to "matter". Otherwise, you wouldn't be able to ask the question you are asking.

[JB01]

Sorry, Spleen, et al., I was posting from work yesterday and went home after my last response.

Anyway, as you can see from my registration date and post count, I'm not one to continue to argue when I think a point has already been made. I set out why (and under what circumstances) I think an appeal to emotions is invalid in a logical argument in my first post in the thread.

To clarify my other point, I would say that what it means for someone to have emotions is that certain things matter to them in certain ways. Looked at this way, your question would be better restated as, "Why do people have emotions?" I think the only really satisfying answer to this question comes from evolutionary psychology (but then being a scientist, and not a philosopher, I would!). In brief, things matter to people because over the course of our evolutionary history, those individuals to whom the right things mattered were more likely to become ancestors, and our traits are inherited from them.

I realize that this answer seems orthogonal to the way you want to approach the problem, but I can't help that; it's just the way I see it.

[Spleen]

What is your definition of philosophy?

The search for truth, or something approximating the truth, or something like that. ;)

What is/are the subject matter(s) of philosophy?

Everything.

I'm not sure if those questions where meant to be rhetorical but I answered them anyway. Good answer though. :)

[Spleen]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
You have already been warned by one moderator, Spleen, so i am not threatening you. Bandwidth is not free and if you have an argument to make or a response to JB01 then we would all appreciate hearing it, i'm sure.

I am about to respond to JB01's latest post, right after I respond to Spacer1's post. The honest truth is I wish I had an arguement to make, it's a question that hit me right in the face during a serious depressive episode, and even though I am not that far down at this point in time, I still can not come up with an answer to it that is not a fallacy. I'm looking for an answer, or as many as possible, which is why I asked.

Just for the record I am not a nihilist, just somebody who saw it.

[Spleen]

What do you mean by "matter"?

f: something to be proved in law --courtesy of m-w.com

To whom are emotions supposed to matter?

To you, your neighbor, your cousin, the list goes on...

Doesn't the question of whether something "matters" implicitly assume an emotional affect?

I don't think so.

If so, then you already know why emotions "matter".

It's only by having emotions (and emotional attachments to people and things) that you can understand what it means for something to "matter". Otherwise, you wouldn't be able to ask the question you are asking.

I disagree, things can matter "logically" without any such attachments, can't they?

[Spleen]

Welcome back JB01, I went back in time to your opening post.

When one is reasoning from a set of observations about the world to a factual conclusion about it, an appeal to emotion is a fallacy because how one feels about something has no relevance to whether or not it is true.

This is basically my point.

However, it is perfectly legitimate to appeal to your own emotions when trying to explain your own subjective judgments...It is a fact that people's opinions are influenced by their emotions; therefore we can reasonably appeal to emotions to explain opinions.

True, you can appeal to emotions, to explain opinions, but one's opinion 'has no relevance as to whether or not it is true' either -- to borrow from your earlier paragraph. Hence where is the factual, or philosophical, relevance of emotion, or opinions for that matter? Is there one?

Sorry, Spleen, et al., I was posting from work yesterday and went home after my last response.

No need for apologies.:)

To clarify my other point, I would say that what it means for someone to have emotions is that certain things matter to them in certain ways. Looked at this way, your question would be better restated as, "Why do people have emotions". I think the only really satisfying answer to this question comes from evolutionary psychology (but then being a scientist, and not a philosopher, I would!). In brief, things matter to people because over the course of our evolutionary history, those individuals to whom the right things mattered were more likely to become ancestors, and our traits are inherited from them.

I realize that this answer seems orthogonal to the way you want to approach the problem, but I can't help that; it's just the way I see it.

Sorry, but that is really not what I was asking. I appreciate your effort though, in attempting to answer this question.

[JB01]

Originally posted by Spleen
...Hence where is the factual, or philosophical, relevance of emotion, or opinions for that matter? Is there one?


It seems to me that you're still struggling to formulate your question clearly. I could answer the question above by saying that philosophy has traditionally taken as one of its goals the explanation of how to achieve human happiness (an emotion), which makes emotions relevant to philosophy by definition. I could also point out that people's emotions and opinions influence their actions, which affect the state of the world and thus gain factual relevance.

But (and please correct me if I'm wrong) I don't think that's what you're really asking. You seem to be saying something like "If nothing really matters, then why does anything matter?" Phrased like that, of course, the question seems nonsensical, which may explain why I'm having trouble addressing it. On the other hand, "If nothing really matters [objectively/ultimately/to the universe as a whole], then why does anything matter [to individual people]?" has a number of meaningful, nontrivial answers.

Are you sure you wouldn't rather ask that? :)

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Spleen

.... The honest truth is I wish I had an arguement to make, it's a question that hit me right in the face during a serious depressive episode, and even though I am not that far down at this point in time, I still can not come up with an answer to it that is not a fallacy. I'm looking for an answer, or as many as possible, which is why I asked.

This is the crucial point, isn't it ?
When we're emotionally down, when nothing seems to matter, and nothing seems valuble, no amount of intellectual argument can provide any real answer.

The only real answer to clinical depression is chemical treatment; depression is an affliction, it is not the truth; and the deep black view one has of the world in a depressive mood is not the truth, it's merely the symptom of an affliction.

First off, one needs to make the arbitrary choice to go on living, and then after that to actually value parts of the enviroment around one, and oneself.

Values are arbitrary. That doesn't make them wrong or meaningless.

[Amos]

Originally posted by Gurdur

Values are arbitrary. That doesn't make them wrong or meaningless.

True, but values are attachements and since attachements are illusions Nihilism is looking for meaninglesness.

The quality of life sought in nihilism is abandonment as in "to be is not to be." In other words, our purpose in life is to become of no purpose.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Amos

attachements are illusions
Wrong.
Many, many children remember fondly their dead parents.
The love of parents for their children --- their childrens' meaningfulness to them --- was no and is no illusion.

Many a lover grieves for an absent lover. The attachment of the lover is no illusion.

our purpose in life is to become of no purpose. Not for me, it ain't.
:)

[spacer1]

spacer1: What do you mean by "matter"?

Spleen: f: something to be proved in law --courtesy of m-w.com
I took a look at the m-w definition and I think you quoted a different meaning of the word "matter" than that which is intended by the question: Why do emotions matter?

The definition you quoted was the noun form of the word, where other definitions such as "a subject under consideration" and "a subject of disagreement or litigation" are found. These are not the same "matter" which is intended by your question. The "matter" in your question refers to the intransitive verb form of the word, also courtesy of m-w.com: "to be of importance". An example of the word's use is given in the m-w thesaurus: "being your own self is what really matters".

If you actually did mean the noun form of the word, then your question could be restated as: Why are emotions the subject under consideration? The answer to this, of course, is because you raised a question regarding emotions... ..but I don't think that you did intend the noun form.
spacer1: To whom are emotions supposed to matter?

Spleen: To you, your neighbor, your cousin, the list goes on...
Yes, to people, people with emotions, who are able to value, or consider things important.
spacer1: Doesn't the question of whether something "matters" implicitly assume an emotional affect?

Spleen: I don't think so.
Think again.
Spleen: I disagree, things can matter "logically" without any such attachments, can't they?
No. Logic is independent of emotions. Logic doesn't value, and cannot place importance on, people and things. People (with emotions) do that.

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally posted by Amos
The quality of life sought in nihilism is abandonment as in "to be is not to be." In other words, our purpose in life is to become of no purpose.

That's a nice point, Amos. It seems the nihilist is attempting to manufacture a last-ditch contingent system out of the failure of contingent systems.

[Spleen]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
That's a nice point, Amos. It seems the nihilist is attempting to manufacture a last-ditch contingent system out of the failure of contingent systems.

Did you just refer to me as "the nihilist"? :D

[Hugo Holbling]

No; the point is a general one and refers to seeking meaning in the meaninglessness.

[Spleen]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
No; the point is a general one and refers to seeking meaning in the meaninglessness.

Thank you for the clarification :), but if I am not mistaken, that door swings both ways.

[Spleen]

I took a look at the m-w definition and I think you quoted a different meaning of the word "matter" than that which is intended by the question: Why do emotions matter?

The definition you quoted was the noun form of the word, where other definitions such as "a subject under consideration" and "a subject of disagreement or litigation" are found. These are not the same "matter" which is intended by your question.

I looked at the definitions and this is the closest representitive to what I meant, otherwise I would not have brought it up. Maybe I can rephrase it for you "Why are emotions a matter in philsophy".

No. Logic is independent of emotions. Logic doesn't value, and cannot place importance on, people and things. People (with emotions) do that.

Sure it can. As long as one makes one statement to oneself -- ie., "I do not wish to die" -- nearly anything can hold logical value. Is it illogical to not "wish to die"? One can not value things logically???

[Spleen]

woops. :D

[Spleen]

Originally posted by Gurdur
This is the crucial point, isn't it ?
When we're emotionally down, when nothing seems to matter, and nothing seems valuble, no amount of intellectual argument can provide any real answer.

The only real answer to clinical depression is chemical treatment; depression is an affliction, it is not the truth; and the deep black view one has of the world in a depressive mood is not the truth, it's merely the symptom of an affliction.

First off, one needs to make the arbitrary choice to go on living, and then after that to actually value parts of the enviroment around one, and oneself.

Values are arbitrary. That doesn't make them wrong or meaningless.

That is the closest answer to the best which I have come up with on my own. I was looking for a prettier philsophical explaination as to the "matter of emotion", though.

Quit reading my mind. ;)

[Spleen]

JB01: It seems to me that you're still struggling to formulate your question clearly.

I probably am, and if so I apoligize -- let me get back to you on the rest of your statement.

[Amos]

Originally posted by Gurdur
Wrong.
Many, many children remember fondly their dead parents.
The love of parents for their children --- their childrens' meaningfulness to them --- was no and is no illusion.

Many a lover grieves for an absent lover. The attachment of the lover is no illusion.

Not for me, it ain't.
:)

With all respect and I would never take this away from children but nostalgia and sentiments are illusions. They serve a purpose, for sure, but if liberation (nihilism) is sought they must be annihilated in the end. It may seem cruel to those who are in love but but the greatest love of all does not alter when it alteration finds.

[spacer1]

Originally posted by Spleen:
I looked at the definitions and this is the closest representitive to what I meant, otherwise I would not have brought it up. Maybe I can rephrase it for you "Why are emotions a matter in philsophy".
This is a completely different question and usage of the word "matter" than when you asked earlier: "things can matter "logically" without any such attachments, can't they?" You were clearly using "matter" here as a verb, not a noun.

Nevertheless, I will attempt a response to your new question, "Why are emotions a matter in philosophy?"

Again, there is an implicit assumption hidden in your question, which is that emotions are a matter in philosophy. How do you see emotions as being "a matter in philosophy"? To what part(s) of philosophy are they "a matter"?

Answers to the above would better enable me to answer your question, but I could give the simple response that humans have emotions and these same humans "do" philosophy.
As long as one makes one statement to oneself -- ie., "I do not wish to die" -- nearly anything can hold logical value.
But on what logic is the statement "I do not wish to die" founded?

The valuation is basic, and once a desired outcome is decided upon, then logic can be applied.
Is it illogical to not "wish to die"?
There is no logical way to determine whether an individual should desire to live or die.
One can not value things logically???
It would be logical to value your health if you value your life but, as I just said, you cannot logically determine whether to value your life. That choice is left up to each of us. Personally, I would prefer that life survives.

[Amos]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
That's a nice point, Amos. It seems the nihilist is attempting to manufacture a last-ditch contingent system out of the failure of contingent systems.

I am not sure Hugo, but I think it is an achievement that must be created out of the success of contingent systems. I don't think it is easy and especially not if it involves personal sacrifies . . . which is the whole point because sacrifices already suggest that we cling to attachements.

Would it be fair to say that the nihilist seeks to find meaning in the very core of his own existence and tries to bypass his conscious mind wherein our senses are perceived?

[Nowhere357]

Originally posted by Spleen:
Why do emotions matter? (without an appeal to any emotion what-so-ever -- a question for all).
The question is not explicit enough to have specific meaning. Whether something "matters" is a value judgement, which of course directly implies a valuer.

Thus an answer to "why do emotions matter" may be the questions "why do emotions matter TO WHOM and FOR WHAT?"

This is just another take on the same solution provided by spacer1 and JB01.

When asked concerning your original question "To whom are emotions supposed to matter?"
You replied "To you, your neighbor, your cousin, the list goes on..."

Doesn't your question then become "Why do emotions matter to people?"

If so, then next we might ask "why do people have emotions", just as JB01 said.

Maybe I can rephrase it for you "Why are emotions a matter in philsophy".
Science is the tool we use to investigate objective reality. Philosophy is the tool we use to investigate subjective reality.

That's my current take, but it's still under construction. :)

[Nowhere357]

Gurder
Values are arbitrary.
I agree with the points you have made, but I need to disagree with this terminology.

"Values are arbitrary" is an arguing point against atheistic morality. My defense is that "arbitrary" means random - but values are purposefully chosen, and so are not random. Values are subjective and relative, but that does not imply "arbitrary".

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally posted by Amos
Would it be fair to say that the nihilist seeks to find meaning in the very core of his own existence and tries to bypass his conscious mind wherein our senses are perceived?

No. The historical meaning of nihilism posits it as a starting point in the philosophical endeavour, not a conclusion. The post-existential usage (or existential nihilism) is what i was refering to, wherein Camus, for example, tries this last-ditch strategy to find meaning in the meaninglessness. Kirilov, of course, was not so fearful - as we would expect from a Russian master of that time.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Nowhere357
.....
I agree with the points you have made, but I need to disagree with this terminology.

"Values are arbitrary" is an arguing point against atheistic morality. My defense is that "arbitrary" means random - but values are purposefully chosen, and so are not random. Values are subjective and relative, but that does not imply "arbitrary".
heh.
You've made two arguments here:

1) When you speak of "values being purposefully chosen", you're missing out on the fact that there must be an arbitrarily-chosen basis at bottom; there is no infinite regress of dervation; and arbitrary does not mean random, but it does mean arbitrary --- that is, without further justification or derivation.


2) Your next argument is that it's an accusation flung against atheism.
Yes, and so what ? The accusation can be and often is flung back ---- as a connoisseur of irony, I'll note here that one of the favourite charges flung against non-literalist Christians on this board is that of "arbitrarily" choosing which parts of the whole Christian tradition or Bible to believe in.
heh.
If I was a cherry-picker Christian, the opportunities for boundless, scathing sarcasm that would present themselves to me in GRD and EoG would keep me in clover for the rest of my life.
:)

The next part is that when Christians accuse me of being arbitrary, I simply point out that they do the same. End of discussion (after a few sardonic witticisms).

The next part would be if some naïve evangelical atheist would accuse me of being too arbitrary --- then I would simply point out I am fulfilling Nietzsche's vision of the Free Man, and picking my morality as I will. And I choose to be moral and social.
;)
IOW, I can out-Nietzsche the most strident Nietzchean nihilist --- and I freely do not choose nihilism.
:D

The next part is a nastily tricky part.
What values actually are in practice is rather a different kettle of fish than it is in theory.
Values are a very core part of personality, and correspondingly are very hard to change ---- to really make a deep fundamental change in any one hard-held value demands great effort, and causes great emotional and existential ruckus for the while till the new vcalue is fully internalized, and the rest of the personality has made its adjustments to the new order.

[Nowhere357]

Gurdur
1) When you speak of "values being purposefully chosen", you're missing out on the fact that there must be an arbitrarily-chosen basis at bottom; there is no infinite regress of dervation; and arbitrary does not mean random, but it does mean arbitrary --- that is, without further justification or derivation.
Okay. But then everything is arbitrary, and the word does not serve to differentiate anything, and is useless. There would be no thing that exists which which is not arbitrary.

By definition, arbitrary means random. But values are not random, they are purposefully chosen.

Your next argument is that it's an accusation flung against atheism.
Yes, and so what ?
Well, I oppose the phrase when I oppose the conclusion - it seems a bit hypocritical for me to accept the phrase when I agree with the conclusion.

I'll note here that one of the favourite charges flung against non-literalist Christians on this board is that of "arbitrarily" choosing which parts of the whole Christian tradition or Bible to believe in.
If I were a Christian in that situation, I would provide the framework by which I determine the parts I choose to accept. This would elevate my opinion above mere arbitrariness.

Now if I choose passages at random, THAT would be arbitrary. If the passages are chosen by whim and follow no over-all pattern, that would be arbitrary also.

(Btw I like cherry-pickers. They make far better neighbors than those damn sour-grape pickers.)

Again, I agree with the points in your post, my objection is semantical only.

Of course, I like 3b. Note the reference to "meaningful context".

Merriam-Webster
Main Entry: ar·bi·trary
Function: adjective
1 : depending on individual discretion (as of a judge) and not fixed by law <the manner of punishment is arbitrary>
2 a : not restrained or limited in the exercise of power : ruling by absolute authority <an arbitrary government>
b : marked by or resulting from the unrestrained and often tyrannical exercise of power <protection from arbitrary arrest and detention>
3 a : based on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of something <an arbitrary standard> <take any arbitrary positive number> <arbitrary division of historical studies into watertight compartments -- A. J. Toynbee>
b : existing or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a capricious and unreasonable act of will <when a task is not seen in a meaningful context it is experienced as being arbitrary -- Nehemiah Jordan>
- ar·bi·trari·ly /"är-b&-'trer-&-lE/ adverb
- ar·bi·trar·i·ness /'är-b&-"trer-E-n&s/ noun

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Nowhere357

Okay. But then everything is arbitrary,
At base. See Gödel.
and the word does not serve to differentiate anything,
Illogical jump. Wrong.
and is useless.
Illogical jump. Subjective value judgment. I disagree.

By definition, arbitrary means random.
No.
IF I meant "random", I'ld say "random".
The dictionary definitions you yourself cite at end give more than one meaning for "arbitrary".
But values are not random, they are purposefully chosen. You've ignored the problem of infinite regress.
You need to address that.
__________


Excuse me for a while, I'm diving back into another thread to ...... refute... some neoPlatonian with a gripe against poets.
:)

[Nowhere357]

Gurdur
Illogical jump. Wrong.
You'll need to explain why.

If everything is arbitrary at base, then it follows that the word "arbitrary" does not serve to differentiate anything. Saying "that is arbitrary" tells us nothing!

Illogical jump. Subjective value judgment. I disagree.
"Useless" is a value judgement, yes. But why is it an illogical jump, and why do you disagree?

There may be a flaw in that jump - after all, everything is made of atoms yet still we can differentiate between things - but "arbitrary" is a judgement and not a substance. So I need to know why you think it doesn't follow.

IF I meant "random", I'ld say "random".
The dictionary definitions you yourself cite at end give more than one meaning for "arbitrary".
Of course you would, that's why I object to the terminology - it says something you don't mean to say!

Which definition do you see as supporting your view?

1, 2a, and 2b are technical defs for the legal/political world.

3a supports my position also, since it identifies that intrinsic nature is not arbitrary. It's in our nature to eat, and so valuing access to food is not arbitrary. That directly contradicts the statement "values are arbitrary".

3b identifies arbitrary as random. But values are not random, so this contradicts "values are arbitrary".

So the generic dictionary definitions support my view and contradict yours. What definition are you using?

You've ignored the problem of infinite regress.
You need to address that.
No, that's what led to my statement that therefore all things must be arbitrary. Afaik, there is no ultimate objective justification for anything. But I'll look again:

that there must be an arbitrarily-chosen basis at bottom; there is no infinite regress of dervation; and arbitrary does not mean random, but it does mean arbitrary --- that is, without further justification or derivation.
If I don't eat, I will die. I don't want to die yet. So my decision to eat is not arbitrary! It fulfills a desire, it is chosen purposefully. That the decision may make no difference to the universe does not make the decision arbitrary. That is the wrong word to use to capture the idea you're trying to share.

If "arbitrary" means "without further justification or derivation" that seems an unfair requirement. Providing justification is not good enough - we must justify the justification. Which itself requires further justification, and so on. You say "there is no infinite regress of deriviation", I assume you mean eventually we arrive at something that just "is", without justification. I agree.

That would then identify a basic concept, a fundamental, but those things are not synonomous with "arbitrary". You have chosen the wrong word to describe the situation.

[Amos]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
No. The historical meaning of nihilism posits it as a starting point in the philosophical endeavour, not a conclusion. The post-existential usage (or existential nihilism) is what i was refering to, wherein Camus, for example, tries this last-ditch strategy to find meaning in the meaninglessness. Kirilov, of course, was not so fearful - as we would expect from a Russian master of that time.

OK, you are leaning heavy on the -ism as a starting point and I look at the end as I remember it from Russian literature. It's not my thing but just sought to contribute something in this rather bizarre tread.

[Gurdur]

Well, I'm back for a short moment from my excursions into battle with Platonists over poetry.

Originally posted by Nowhere357
.....
If "arbitrary" means "without further justification or derivation" that seems an unfair requirement. Providing justification is not good enough - we must justify the justification. Which itself requires further justification, and so on. You say "there is no infinite regress of deriviation", I assume you mean eventually we arrive at something that just "is", without justification. I agree.

That would then identify a basic concept, a fundamental, but those things are not synonomous with "arbitrary". You have chosen the wrong word to describe the situation.

We've got a basic issue here of defintion:

if you want me to use a different word than "arbitrary" to denote "without further justification or derivation", then please suggest one.
Since you agree with me about the problem of infinite regress, then I assume you have nothing against my premise that it requires choice at basic level "without further justification or derivation".

[sweep]

If I don't eat, I will die. I don't want to die yet. So my decision to eat is not arbitrary! It fulfills a desire, it is chosen purposefully. That the decision may make no difference to the universe does not make the decision arbitrary. That is the wrong word to use to capture the idea you're trying to share.

yes. we do invent reasons for why we are doing 'such and such', and they are self justifying. what I mean is that we act with good reason- for 'some reason' we need to justify our actions- in my opinion this is to give our lives meaning. If our actions are meaningless, does that then make them arbitrary? In relation to ideas, or morals, I am not sure whether these are arbitrarily chosen, with regard to Gurdurs understanding, but I am suggesting here that they have meaning only to the extent that we believe in those ideas. We believe our ideas about what we do to be right and just, and in doing so, the ideas of our opposition must necessarily be wrong and unjust. Therefor, I do think that my actions are (mostly?) arbitrary. The conception arrived sometime after.

we must justify the justification. Which itself requires further justification, and so on

I have just prepared some popcorn. I would love for you to give me an example of this. This is highly interesting.

(ps. may I respectfully suggest that, due to something I have observed, that you check your assumptions of what others hold as defining qualities. I have noticed that you find contradictions but are they really to do with others, or your own ideas? Are you wrangling with yourself? This may be impeding your progress, so it might help you to read more carefully. Sorry If my observation is inaccurate, but I only intended to point this out for your own, gurdurs, and other posters benefit)

[Nowhere357]

Gurdur
if you want me to use a different word than "arbitrary" to denote "without further justification or derivation", then please suggest one.
I am unaware of any word which captures that meaning. Imo, the statement "morals are relative and subjective" is adequate to indicate the lack of objective basis, while allowing our morality to be elevated above mere opinion or arbitrariness. (It isn't sufficient to elevate on it's own, but it's a starting place.)

Since you agree with me about the problem of infinite regress, then I assume you have nothing against my premise that it requires choice at basic level "without further justification or derivation".
No problem. I wasn't trying to derail the thread, I apologize if I have.

[Nowhere357]

sweep
yes. we do invent reasons for why we are doing 'such and such', and they are self justifying. ... Therefor, I do think that my actions are (mostly?) arbitrary. The conception arrived sometime after.
I agree the meaning is provided by the mind. And that the meaning is relative and subjective.

Where I disagree - not with your post, but with the implication - is that this means for example that all moral systems are ultimately equal. But to make that claim requires a pov because "equal" is a judgement, yet the pov has not been provided.

I have just prepared some popcorn. I would love for you to give me an example of this. This is highly interesting.
Then rent a dvd, because that was just the infinte regress in action. :)

I have noticed that you find contradictions but are they really to do with others, or your own ideas?
Wouldn't that explain why I bring the subject up? If I see a contradiction or a fallacy, rather than assume, I ask. Well, I try. I try to use "seems" and "apparent" when appropriate. I admit, things are a lot simpler when I keep my mouth shut.

If you want more evidence that I'm an idiot, check out this (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1198373#post1198373) thread. It's a challenge to remain calm when people make unfounded charges against your character.

I'm not sure what you are referring to with the "read more carefully" comment. Provide examples if you like, but rather than ask for some - last time that made me "defensive" - I'll just thank you, and think about what you said.

Thank you, and I'll think about what you said. ;)

[sweep]

It's a challenge to remain calm when people make unfounded charges against your character

that's a very good attitude and one that I share. It is a shame when people walk out in real life. A personal indignation, even to provokation, must be taken lightly, otherwise we will doubt ourselves.

you have a reply in elsewhere too :)

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Nowhere357

I am unaware of any word which captures that meaning.
Yo, that's why I continue to use "arbitrary".
You're not the first person to challenge me on this, BTW: but even given the fact that my English is rusty and I occassionally misuse terms, I still have never found a better substitute.
No problem. I wasn't trying to derail the thread, I apologize if I have.
No need to apologize.
You're talking with Gurdur, Derailment Expert and Quibble Master.
SO why should I criticize you for doing something I do so often myself ?
;)

Originally posted by Nowhere357

......
If you want more evidence....., check out this (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1198373#post1198373) thread. It's a challenge to remain calm when people make unfounded charges against your character.

Welcome to SecWeb, Nowhere357. ;)
By way of rather apt comparison with your cited thread, perhaps you'ld like to look at this thread here (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?threadid=53831&perpage=25&pagenumber=9), and its previous pages; you and I have much in common.
;)

[Nowhere357]

Originally posted by Gurdur
By way of rather apt comparison
Beyond apt, really. :cool:

Thanks!

[Spleen]

Spacer1: But on what logic is the statement "I do not wish to die" founded?

The valuation is basic, and once a desired outcome is decided upon, then logic can be applied.

Ok, I didn't put that the best way I could have once again. ;)
I think a more appropiate statement would be "I choose to live." The logic for that statement could vary on a million different things, the most prominant being that "death" is an active choice, and "life" is the passive choice.

[Spleen]

Disclaimer: I apologize, to the mods and posters, for some of what I said on my first day of posting, I had a few beers in me and I was basically trying to spur on discussion through being an asshole (I guess that is the Bill O'Reilly school of philsophy, and I am personally not a big fan of it). I have not posted here much in the past, and I now realize this forum requires much more time-consuming, level headed, and thought out posts.

Though I can't promise to be perfectly level-headed, or perfectly well though-out, I can promise you I will not post here while intoxicated again. I also realize I can not rush my posts here as I have done in other forums, so if it takes me awhile to get back to a point you made bear with me, or call me on it, repeatedly if you must, if you think I am ignoring it.

[Spleen]

Spacer1: It would be logical to value your health if you value your life but, as I just said, you cannot logically determine whether to value your life.

I disagree, there is a distinct choice between "life" and "death", and when given a choice, one can draw logical value almost anywhere -- quality of life, degree of comfort, etc. etc.

Are you saying that one can not choose life, over death, without an "appeal to some emotion or another?"

[Hugo Holbling]

Originally posted by Spleen
I apologize, to the mods and posters, for some of what I said on my first day of posting

No need to worry about it, Spleen. I can't speak for anyone else but your words here have impressed me a good deal. Everyone is here to learn and i'm sure we'll all benefit from your honest approach.

[spacer1]

Originally posted by Spleen:
I think a more appropiate statement would be "I choose to live." The logic for that statement could vary on a million different things, the most prominant being that "death" is an active choice, and "life" is the passive choice.
A minor quibble over your use of the terms "active" and "passive", since being too passive (i.e., not eating or drinking) would soon enough lead to death.

However, I understand your point, in that we are "geared" to stay alive; it is our natural momentum. This was something nagging at the back of my mind during my last post, so you may be onto something here. However, since we've been speaking in terms of the first-person, then I think it shouldn't be too problematic.

As to your reconstitution of the statement, I don't think it makes much difference.
I disagree, there is a distinct choice between "life" and "death", and when given a choice, one can draw logical value almost anywhere -- quality of life, degree of comfort, etc. etc.
What do you mean by "logical value"? What does quality of life and degree of comfort have to do with the choice of life or death?
Are you saying that one can not choose life, over death, without an "appeal to some emotion or another?"
Yes.

[Spleen]

Spacer1: Nice post: I'll be back later, i promise. ;)

[Mrhat]

Originally posted by Nowhere357
I agree with the points you have made, but I need to disagree with this terminology.

"Values are arbitrary" is an arguing point against atheistic morality. My defense is that "arbitrary" means random - but values are purposefully chosen, and so are not random. Values are subjective and relative, but that does not imply "arbitrary".

Random doesn't exactly encompass arbitrary's meaning; while that is its use sometimes, it can also mean based on one's preference, which is very much true of values.

[Stormy]

Why do emotions matter? (without an appeal to any emotion what-so-ever -- a question for all).

Our emotions matter because they are what distinguishes thinking life from vegetation.

Without emotion, a human becomes nothing more than a computer.

[Nowhere357]

Originally posted by Mrhat
Random doesn't exactly encompass arbitrary's meaning; while that is its use sometimes, it can also mean based on one's preference, which is very much true of values.
You saw the definition provided? But I guess popular usage takes precedence. I've caught myself using it in the same fashion, actually.

So I retract the objection, and will just say that arbitrary does not mean without value.

"Values are arbitrary" does not mean "values are without value". Sounds stupid when I put it that way.

I do wonder why the phrase "values are relative" doesn't capture the same concept, without the implication of equal value.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Nowhere357

..... I've caught myself using it in the same fashion, actually.
.....

*snigger* *snicker*
Final victory of legitimization through psychic osmosis.

My plans to rule the world are advancing.
:cool:

[Spleen]

Spacer1: A minor quibble over your use of the terms "active" and "passive", since being too passive (i.e., not eating or drinking) would soon enough lead to death.

"To be or not to be, that is the question.", and a pungent one at that.

"The cost of self preservation, outweighs the painful cost of dying." This statement can be reversed to: "The cost of suicide outweighs, the the painful cost of living."

There a million factors involved, in both of these hypothetical questions, and I am pretty confident that logic rules over emotion in both of them, unless when one is speaking about pain, he is talking about the emotional form.

All in all, it is a really tough question that could and does swing both ways, given certain circumstances.

What do you mean by "logical value"? What does quality of life and degree of comfort have to do with the choice of life or death?

All that I was getting at with this, is that, when one makes any decision at all, he can draw logical value upon that decision, on any number of things, and at any point in time.

Spleen said: Are you saying that one can not choose life, over death, without an "appeal to some emotion or another?"

Spacer: Yes.

Is this strictly a limition of humans, or can I bring up other forms of relatively advanced life -- such as sharks?

[spacer1]

Originally posted by Spleen:
"The cost of self preservation, outweighs the painful cost of dying." This statement can be reversed to: "The cost of suicide outweighs, the the painful cost of living."
Wouldn't these "painful" costs suggest an emotional basis for the logic?
There a million factors involved, in both of these hypothetical questions, and I am pretty confident that logic rules over emotion in both of them, unless when one is speaking about pain, he is talking about the emotional form.
Why is pain the exception? I don't understand what you mean by "emotional form".
All that I was getting at with this, is that, when one makes any decision at all, he can draw logical value upon that decision, on any number of things, and at any point in time.
This still doesn't answer my question of what you mean by "logical value".
Is this strictly a limition of humans, or can I bring up other forms of relatively advanced life -- such as sharks?
Since we have been speaking of first-person, conscious experience, where choices are apparently made, then I wouldn't presume to know a shark's mindset in the same way that I can infer yours from my own. That said, I would imagine that it would be something similar for a shark, assuming evolution.

[Spleen]

Wouldn't these "painful" costs suggest an emotional basis for the logic?

I don't think so, why should it?

Why is pain the exception? I don't understand what you mean by "emotional form".

As far as I see it there are two types of pain: physical and emotional. I think where you are quoting me I was talking about the "emotional form."

This still doesn't answer my question of what you mean by "logical value".

+>-. Positive value over negative value.

Since we have been speaking of first-person, conscious experience, where choices are apparently made, then I wouldn't presume to know a shark's mindset in the same way that I can infer yours from my own. That said, I would imagine that it would be something similar for a shark, assuming evolution.

I think it is much easier to infer a shark's mindset than my own. Yet they choose to live.

[spacer1]

spacer1: Wouldn't these "painful" costs suggest an emotional basis for the logic?

Spleen: I don't think so, why should it?
Since pain is an internal, non-sensory, non-linguistic perception, like the other emotions, I would classify it as an emotion too.
As far as I see it there are two types of pain: physical and emotional. I think where you are quoting me I was talking about the "emotional form."
How do you distinguish between physical and emotional pain? What are the attributes of each?
spacer1: This still doesn't answer my question of what you mean by "logical value".

Spleen: +>-. Positive value over negative value.
What determines whether a value is positive or negative?
I think it is much easier to infer a shark's mindset than my own. Yet they choose to live.
You don't (hopefully) have to infer your own mindset. It's what you're using now to read this.

However, you could infer that my mindset is similar to your own, since we share a language to describe things like "pain".

[Spleen]

Since pain is an internal, non-sensory, non-linguistic perception, like the other emotions, I would classify it as an emotion too.

That's fine, but I wouldn't, unless one is referring to emotional pain.

How do you distinguish between physical and emotional pain? What are the attributes of each?

Physical pain is when a being feels pain based upon his nerves, emotional pain is when a being feels pain based upon his emotions.

What determines whether a value is positive or negative?

Give me an example. In short -- positive value rules over negative, and I'm not sure where your struggle is with this statement.

You don't (hopefully) have to infer your own mindset. It's what you're using now to read this.

I am positive I don't have to infer my own mindset -- buy YOU DO.

[Gurdur]

Speaking as an onlooker --- I have definite opinions on your topics, but I'm feeling lazy :cool: --- allow me a few questions:

Originally posted by Spleen
.....
How do you distinguish between physical and emotional pain? What are the attributes of each?

Physical pain is when a being feels pain based upon his nerves, emotional pain is when a being feels pain based upon his emotions.
uh huh ?
Now how would you categorize emotional pain that is felt and expressed physically ?

For example, somebody who crunches up like they've been gut-shot because they've just been informed somebody near to them has died ?
Or long-term worry and depression leading to a stomach ulcer ?
Or "heart-break", which is certainly felt physically ?
______

Those were serious questions to you:
but now a playful quibble.
:)
How would you categorize pain felt in a missing limb or appendage ?
The phenomenon of "phantom-limb pain" is very well-known in medical literature, and even the cause seems almost found, BTW.
What determines whether a value is positive or negative?

Give me an example. In short -- positive value rules over negative.
Really ?
How can you compare the two ?
You've just made a value judgment between "positive" and "negative" values.
Haven't you just then made a circular argument ?

[Spleen]

Speaking as an onlooker --- I have definite opinions on your topics, but I'm feeling lazy :cool: --- allow me a few questions:

Uh oh, Gurder has turned on me.;)

uh huh ?
Now how would you categorize emotional pain that is felt and expressed physically?

I don't think it matters at all, as the bystander that I am.

For example, somebody who crunches up like they've been gut-shot because they've just been informed somebody near to them has died ?

I was a witness in an (off-hand way) to my dad being shot with a high-caliber weapon. Does this matter?

Or long-term worry and depression leading to a stomach ulcer ?
Or "heart-break", which is certainly felt physically ?

That is not what I was getting at.

How would you categorize pain felt in a missing limb or appendage ?

I'd categorize it as someone who is suffering from an an illusion.

Really ?
How can you compare the two ?

Because, i can.

You've just made a value judgment between "positive" and "negative" values.
Haven't you just then made a circular argument ?

I really don't think so.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Spleen

Speaking as an onlooker --- I have definite opinions on your topics, but I'm feeling lazy :cool: --- allow me a few questions:

Uh oh, Gurder has turned on me.;)

uh huh ?
Now how would you categorize emotional pain that is felt and expressed physically?

I don't it matters at all, as the bystander that I am.

For example, somebody who crunches up like they've been gut-shot because they've just been informed somebody near to them has died ?

I was a witness in an (off-hand way) to my dad being shot with a high-caliber weapon. Does this matter?

Or long-term worry and depression leading to a stomach ulcer ?
Or "heart-break", which is certainly felt physically ?

That is not what I was getting at.

How would you categorize pain [i]felt in a missing limb or appendage[/b] ?

I'd categorize it as someone who is suffering from an an illusion.

Really ?
How can you compare the two ?

Because, i can.

You've just made a value judgment between "positive" and "negative" values.
Haven't you just then made a circular argument ?

I really don't think so. [/B]

*shrug*
If you're not interested in actual discussion, why the pretence ?
Why bother posting your topic in this forum at all ?
These are really crappy responses of yours, and not worth the time.

[Spleen]

I am interested in discussion. Bring your best.

[spacer1]

Originally posted by Spleen:
Physical pain is when a being feels pain based upon his nerves, emotional pain is when a being feels pain based upon his emotions.
I like your distinction. Would you agree that pleasure and pain would be "physical", while happiness and sadness would be "emotional"?

I'm pretty sure you would agree that happiness and sadness are emotions (or "feelings", if you want to get technical). However, I still wish to defend my assertion that physical pain is an emotion, or at least experienced as one. For, how can something physical be known by the conscious mind except in the form of an emotion, thought or sensation? While physical pain may be experienced as more immediate than other emotions (perhaps the nervous system sends an override signal to the brain, I dunno), it is still presented to the conscious mind as other emotions are.

Besides, I think this focus on physical pain may be taking us off track from your question of why emotions are a matter in philosophy.
Give me an example. In short -- positive value rules over negative.
Any example would probably come back to the question of valuing life anyway, so let's stick with that. Why should life be given a positive value (if at all)? (And be careful to note whether you are basing your answers on logic or emotion.)
I am positive I don't have to infer my own mindset -- buy YOU DO.
Okay, I see what you mean now. However, since I can't communicate in language with a shark, I think that I have a better idea of what your experience of your mind is like, than a shark's experience of its supposed mind.

[Nowhere357]

spacer1
Why should life be given a positive value (if at all)?
Positive value, to whom, and for what?

From the most ideal/objective veiwpoint I can imagine, looking at life in at of itself, it has no positive value. This makes sense - otherwise things like cancer and viruses - and Hitler - would be a priori positive.

But if the pov is from a given life form, for example "Why should my/our life be given a positive value?" I think it basically comes down to the fact that we naturally are attracted to life and health, and repulsed by sickness and death. We tend to avoid those things that hurt, and tend to approach those things that feel good. The evolutionary advantages of those tendancies should be obvious.

So life provides it's own value, so to speak. We find it worth fighting for, we struggle to live as a matter of course. This imo provides the ground for value. There is no objective source for the value of life - the source is entirely subjective, relative, and compelling nonetheless.
____________

I agree that it's reasonable to call the feeling of physical pain an "emotion". The feeling of pain is of the same nature to the mind as other feelings. (Technically, I think "emotion" is active, an emoting, an expressing of feeling, and not the feeling itself. "Crying" as opposed to "feeling very sad". But I think often it's used to mean the feeling itself, ie we "feel emotions".)

But whether we feel physical pain or emotional pain, the result is the same - our awareness becomes saturated with something that hurts.

[Tyler Durden]

An excerpt from the Wille Zur Macht, by the chief expert on nihilism, Fritz:

12 (Nov. 1887 - March 1888)
Decline of Cosmological Values

(A)
Nihilism as a psychological state will have to be reached, first, when we have sought a "meaning" in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discouraged. Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the agony of the "in vain," insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover and to regain composure--being ashamed in front of oneself, as if one had deceived oneself all too long.--This meaning could have been: the "fulfillment" of some highest ethical canon in all events, the moral world order; or the growth of love and harmony in the intercourse of beings; or the gradual approximation of a state of universal happiness; or even the development toward a state of universal annihilation--any goal at least constitutes some meaning. What all these notions have in common is that something is to be achieved through the process--and now one realizes that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing.-- Thus, disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming as a cause of nihilism: whether regarding a specific aim or, universalized, the realization that all previous hypotheses about aims that concern the whole "evolution" are inadequate (man no longer the collaborator, let alone the center, of becoming).

Nihilism as a psychological state is reached, secondly, when one has posited a totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all events, and underneath all events, and a soul that longs to admire and revere has wallowed in the idea of some supreme form of domination and administration (--if the soul be that of a logician, complete consistency and real dialectic are quite sufficient to reconcile it to everything). Some sort of unity, some form of "monism": this faith suffices to give man a deep feeling of standing in the context of, and being dependent on, some whole that is infinitely superior to him, and he sees himself as a mode of the deity.--"The well-being of the universal demands the devotion of the individual"--but behold, there is no such universal! At bottom, man has lost the faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him; i.e., he conceived such a whole in order to be able to believe in his own value.

Nihilism as psychological state has yet a third and last form.

Given these two insights, that becoming has no goal and that underneath all becoming there is no grand unity in which the individual could immerse himself completely as in an element of supreme value, an escape remains: to pass sentence on this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world. But as soon as man finds out how that world is fabricated solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a true world. Having reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities--but cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it.

What has happened, at bottom? The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the realization that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means of the concept of "aim," the concept of "unity," or the concept of "truth." Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is lacking: the character of existence is not "true," is false. One simply lacks any reason for convincing oneself that there is a true world. Briefly: the categories "aim," "unity," "being" which we used to project some value into the world--we pull out again; so the world looks valueless.

(B)
Suppose we realize how the world may no longer be interpreted in terms of these three categories, and that the world begins to become valueless for us after this insight: then we have to ask about the sources of our faith in these three categories. Let us try if it is not possible to give up our faith in them. Once we have devaluated these three categories, the demonstration that they cannot be applied to the universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the universe.

Conclusion: The faith in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to categories that refer to a purely fictitious world.

Final conclusion: All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore devaluated the world--all these values are, psychologically considered, the results of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human constructs of domination--and they have been falsely projected into the essence of things. What we find here is still the hyperbolic naivete of man: positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things.
What i gleaned off this unpublished note was three things:
The metaphysical state of existence, 'becoming' lacks a goal.
The drive for unity, harmony, simplicity, consistency is in search for illusions of psychological comfort.
If we pay attention to our projections of meaning, and realize our projections are value-laden utilities of human constructs, then the universe is valueless. Since this realization hasn't dawned on the rest of us, nihilism lies in the future.

[spacer1]

Originally posted by Nowhere357:
Positive value, to whom, and for what?
This is the question I have posed to Spleen. Your question here suggests that you have not been following the entire discussion.
From the most ideal/objective veiwpoint I can imagine, looking at life in at of itself, it has no positive value.
Agreed. Life has no intrinsic value from this viewpoint.
But if the pov is from a given life form...
Yes, this is the viewpoint that we have been speaking from. Again, I suggest you read over some earlier posts.
I think it basically comes down to the fact that we naturally are attracted to life and health, and repulsed by sickness and death. We tend to avoid those things that hurt, and tend to approach those things that feel good. The evolutionary advantages of those tendancies should be obvious.
I don't disagree with any of this, but now you have shifted the viewpoint to the third-person perspective.
So life provides it's own value, so to speak. We find it worth fighting for, we struggle to live as a matter of course. This imo provides the ground for value.
Third-person again. (Except for "We find it worth fighting for", which is stated in the first-person, but the overall gist of your comments here suggests that we find it worth fighting for as a "matter of course", where first-person apparent choices play no role.)
There is no objective source for the value of life - the source is entirely subjective, relative, and compelling nonetheless.
Well said, and I agree.

[Philosoft]

Originally posted by Spleen
I am interested in discussion. Bring your best.
May I ask, semi-officially, if you wish Gurdur to engage your points, that you extend him the same courtesy with his questions? Your one-liners are borderline non-responsive. We are tightening the leash on philosophically empty posts in here, just so you know.

[Nowhere357]

spacer1
Your question here suggests that you have not been following the entire discussion.
Sorry, I wasn't clear. I was offering my view, and didn't mean to imply it opposed your view.

I did want to stress that your question, as stated, wasn't answerable.

I don't disagree with any of this, but now you have shifted the viewpoint to the third-person perspective.
My point was that from the outside perspective, life strives to live; from the the individual perspective, that tendancy provides the ground for value. That's how I see it so far.

It is easy for me to switch between perspectives unintentionally.

[spacer1]

No problem Nowhere357, and please accept my apology for the tone of my rushed post. Reading back, I felt that your post deserved a better response than the one I gave.

[Spleen]

Originally posted by Philosoft
May I ask, semi-officially, if you wish Gurdur to engage your points, that you extend him the same courtesy with his questions? Your one-liners are borderline non-responsive. We are tightening the leash on philosophically empty posts in here, just so you know.

I apologize to Gurder for my "lazy" responses, he admitted he was feeling lazy when he posed them, and I was somewhat insulted by that, I thought, perhaps wrongly, there was a smug tone to it. I realize this forum is time consuming. I will give his previous questions a better answer when I have the time. Look at my numerous replies to Spacer1, I don't believe I am trying to duck anything.

[Spleen]

Spacer1: I like your distinction. Would you agree that pleasure and pain would be "physical", while happiness and sadness would be "emotional"?

In a nutshell, that is where I was drawing my earlier distinction, yes.

I'm pretty sure you would agree that happiness and sadness are emotions (or "feelings", if you want to get technical).

Yes.

However, I still wish to defend my assertion that physical pain is an emotion, or at least experienced as one. For, how can something physical be known by the conscious mind except in the form of an emotion, thought or sensation?

Perhaps you are right, though I'd classify physical pain as a sensation, rather than an emotion. I am the first to admit my education is suspect on this matter, so maybe you can explain further.

While physical pain may be experienced as more immediate than other emotions (perhaps the nervous system sends an override signal to the brain, I dunno), it is still presented to the conscious mind as other emotions are.

Ok, the reason I am playing Devil's advocate here, (I am not a nihilist and I personally do value things based upon emotion), is that at one point in time my emotions basically went into a coma, during a serious depressive episode -- they where null and void. Emotionally I felt nothing. OTOH physical pain was still very real to me. Maybe this is insanity, but I am not convinced. There can be, at times, evolutionary benefits to the suppresion of emotion, and this is why I draw the distinction upon the two.

Any example would probably come back to the question of valuing life anyway, so let's stick with that. Why should life be given a positive value (if at all)? (And be careful to note whether you are basing your answers on logic or emotion.)

Personally I value my life, because I value my existence over nothingness.

[kenaz]

Hi Tyler,

just some random thoughts:

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
If we pay attention to our projections of meaning, and realize our projections are value-laden utilities of human constructs, then the universe is valueless. Since this realization hasn't dawned on the rest of us, nihilism lies in the future.

From what I understood of the excerpt you chose, the claim of the "valueless" universe stems from the rejection of the categories "aim", "unity" and "being". I think that while the rejection is a much needed kickass response to the idealized search for Truth Spleen has described philosophy as, it does not necessarily follow that the univerese must be valueless in nihilistic expositions.

By callling the universe valueless, one would be subjecting one's notion of reality to the categorical imperative of the said categories to define one's existence, setting up a false dichotomy between value and valueless when values should be subjective.

"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster"- Nietzsche :p

Nihilism throws off the tyranny of fixed bearings to the term "value", but it does not render it into nothingness. You stare into the abyss, not plunge headlong into it. Not from the onset anyway :p

To me, nihilism comes from what Heidegger called das andenkende Denken, a thinking that recalls- to recall what has been thought, instead of thoughtlessly assuming that we know it all or that in view of modern progress the beginnings have long been surpassed and we have all the answers, or have managed to make some up along the way anyway. Hyperbolic naivete or deliberate naturalization to put man as the centre and master of the universe? In nihilism the difference is immaterial. Nihilism is a reaction, though I'm not sure if it is a last ditch effort like Hugo said, but the resultant action is the becomings of the present. Why then, does it lie in the future?

[Spleen]

Nice post, maybe I am not the 'perfect' nihilisit.

"When one stares too long in the abyss, the abyss also stares into him."--Nietzsche

[premjan]

nihilism can only be achieved by concerted artifice. human beings are seen to normally value their existence. such self-value creates morality.

[kenaz]

Originally posted by premjan
nihilism can only be achieved by concerted artifice. human beings are seen to normally value their existence. such self-value creates morality.

Imposition of normalcy creates morality. Valuing one's existence does not, at least in my opinion. Care to explain further?

[premjan]

well collective self-value creates morality. otherwise it is a very primitive morality. whatever best preserves the group gets called morality. if the group perceives homosexuality as endangering their reproductive potential, it will be perceived as immoral.

[kenaz]

Originally posted by premjan
well collective self-value creates morality. otherwise it is a very primitive morality. whatever best preserves the group gets called morality. if the group perceives homosexuality as endangering their reproductive potential, it will be perceived as immoral.

Collective self value is an oxymoron. I prefer to call it as I did- imposition of normalcy. By calling the alternative "primitive" I think you are rather erroneously & overly simplistically conflating evolution with societal judgments.

[premjan]

normalcy requires the existence of a norm. I don't think there is any norm. there is just collective survival of the community. by primitive I meant idi amin primitive. that's where one individual looks out for his self-preservation at the cost of all others. more of a predator ecology thing going on there.

since there is no norm, morality can keep changing. the rules change depending on what is needed to get by today. that's why attacking iraq and appropriating oil are both appropriate morality.

[Hugo Holbling]

Let's keep this on topic, please, or it's off to MF&P.

[Nowhere357]

Tyler Durden
An excerpt from the Wille Zur Macht, by the chief expert on nihilism, Fritz:
12 (Nov. 1887 - March 1888)
Decline of Cosmological Values
...

What i gleaned off this unpublished note was three things:
The metaphysical state of existence, 'becoming' lacks a goal.
Meaning the goal is undefined? If so, doesn't the same objection apply to for example science, which looks for knowledge, without knowing ahead of time what that may be?

The drive for unity, harmony, simplicity, consistency is in search for illusions of psychological comfort.
If something provides comfort, that comfort is real.

Whether the patterns we see are in the world or in our heads is a good question. But the ability to perceive patterns has proven useful (value judgement!). That is, given that life wants to live, the ability to see patterns has promoted that goal.

If we pay attention to our projections of meaning, and realize our projections are value-laden utilities of human constructs, then the universe is valueless. Since this realization hasn't dawned on the rest of us, nihilism lies in the future.
The statement "the universe is valueless" has no valid meaning, until you identify a point of view, a perspective.

If you mean that there is no value in the universe, that is false - people really do make value judgements, and people really do exist.

If you mean that the universe doesn't make value judgements, I think you're right. But requiring the universe to be sentient before life can have meaning seems arbitrary. What reason is there make such a requirement?

If you mean neither of those things, then I ask "the universe is valueless" to WHOM and FOR WHAT?

Nihilism does not make sense to me. It's seems to be a complaint that without God, there is no meaning.

[Spleen]

Thanks for the warning, can you explain where you believe this thead has gone wrong -- so we can make an attempt to keep it here.

[Hugo Holbling]

No need to fret, Spleen. If we can stay on the philosophical implications of the possible lack of meaning or value then there's no concern; if we move into morality then there may be a more relevant place for the thread. It doesn't mean there's a problem with your topic so i hope you'll continue your investigations.

[Tyler Durden]

Hi Kenaz :)

I am sorely tempted to continue this on my board instead – the noise-to-signal ratio over there isn’t as lopsided – but I’ll see how far this goes before doing anything drastic. :p

Kenaz: From what I understood of the excerpt you chose, the claim of the "valueless" universe stems from the rejection of the categories "aim", "unity" and "being". I think that while the rejection is a much needed kickass response to the idealized search for Truth Spleen has described philosophy as, it does not necessarily follow that the univerese must be valueless in nihilistic expositions.

Do you mean to disagree with my take or Nietzsche’s speculative philosophy?

Kenaz: By callling the universe valueless, one would be subjecting one's notion of reality to the categorical imperative of the said categories to define one's existence, setting up a false dichotomy between value and valueless when values should be subjective.

Why is this distinction between value and valueless a problem? If you remove the value-laden activity of projecting the aforementioned categories of meaning, then there’s no meaning left over. To value is to posit meaning, and to abstain from positing meaning is to locate valuelessness or meaninglessness. Could you elaborate on what you meant by false dichotomy? I don’t see it, for Nietzsche is not offering the argument ‘Either A or B. A is false, therefore B is true.’

He is only claiming that value is a human activity, and not something intrinsic. The Nietzschean scholars’ epistemological category, perspectivism plays a part in denying the legitimacy or validity of attributing any predicate to the “thing-in-itself.” If value is at least confined to human activities, that it is not independent of the meaning-positing homo sapiens, then the universe lacks any value in itself.

Perhaps Nietzsche means ‘teleology’ when he talks about meaning, not merely in the sense of syntactical understanding or cognitive import? Incidentally, a student in class attempted to reinterpret the act of locating valuelessness as a value itself.

Kenaz: "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster"- Nietzsche

Nihilism throws off the tyranny of fixed bearings to the term "value", but it does not render it into nothingness. You stare into the abyss, not plunge headlong into it. Not from the onset anyway

:D

The first part of the aphorism is a warning, perhaps one for Nietzsche himself as well. The 2nd part is a description of what happens when one encounters the “abyss.” The lack of a nadir in the abyss is so profound, the activity of the person is revealed to be entirely one’s own projections.

Kenaz: To me, nihilism comes from what Heidegger called das andenkende Denken, a thinking that recalls- to recall what has been thought, instead of thoughtlessly assuming that we know it all or that in view of modern progress the beginnings have long been surpassed and we have all the answers, or have managed to make some up along the way anyway.
If das andenkende Denken, or “reminiscent thought” is an active openness towards the revealing of the truth, while recognizing the “concealment” of truth, how does nihilism follow?

Kenaz: Hyperbolic naivete or deliberate naturalization to put man as the centre and master of the universe?

In Nietzsche’s passage he seemed to be casting suspicion on the classical maxim of the Sophists, even though he concludes the note with that cryptic and uneasy position.

Kenaz: In nihilism the difference is immaterial. Nihilism is a reaction, though I'm not sure if it is a last ditch effort like Hugo said, but the resultant action is the becomings of the present. Why then, does it lie in the future?

Because Nietzsche, as a philosopher of the future, is a culture diagnostician who analyzes the current state of humanity and proceeds to bold declarations about its future. And since the majority of us hasn’t realized the dawn of nihilism…

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
.....
Because Nietzsche, as a philosopher of the future, is a culture diagnostician who analyzes the current state of humanity and proceeds to bold declarations about its future. And since the majority of us hasn’t realized the dawn of nihilism… Pardon me, but isn't nihilism rather a marked phenomenon under certain circumstances throughout human history ?
I.e., where Nietzsche might have gove wrong would be in his reverse-Whiggish view of history as a continuum of development ?

Possibly atheism is simply a marked phenomenon in periods of God(dess)-change-over, and nihilism the result of social breakdown (occuring every now and then) and individual sociopathology ?

Reason why I'm asking is for my Plato thread, where I'm developing the thesis that Plato built his objectivism in answer to what he saw as nihilism. Sorry to be a wee bit off-topic, Tyler.

[Tyler Durden]

Gurdur: Pardon me, but isn't nihilism rather a marked phenomenon under certain circumstances throughout human history ?

No. At least not for Nietzsche, who thinks nihilism occurs only after the realization that the values of the Enlightenment are found wanting, empty. After the collapse of our traditional worldview, nihilism follows – but that isn’t the end. In the Die Wille zur Macht (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0394704371/qid=1065506373/sr=8-3/ref=sr_8_3/002-8289800-7308805?v=glance&s=books&n=507846) 7, Fritz writes: “The universe seems to have lost value, seems ‘meaningless’ – but that is only a transitional stage.”

That the world is intrinsically meaningless and incomprehensible is not the source of the coming nihilism, but the collapse of a false interpretation of the world.

“It is in one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral one, that nihilism is rooted.” (WZM 1) The realization that this interpretation is untenable “awakens the suspicion that all interpretations of the world are false.”

Nihilism is the philosophical diagnosis of the collapse of values. It is a safe bet to claim Nietzsche saw himself as “the philosopher as the physician of his culture… the vivisectionist of the values of the times..” (WZM 13)

Gurdur: I.e., where Nietzsche might have gove wrong would be in his reverse-Whiggish view of history as a continuum of development ?

Where he may have gone wrong is to assess the validity of his analysis of the genealogy of morality. Nietzsche is as far away as you can get from the Hegelian belief in the virtue of Enlightenment, progress. He thought that for every great empire or civilization, they rose to prominence with art but descended into decadence by doing philosophy, and used the Greek civilization as an example. I suspect he was referring only to the Hellenic Greek, not the Hellenistic ones.

Gurdur: Possibly atheism is simply a marked phenomenon in periods of God(dess)-change-over, and nihilism the result of social breakdown (occuring every now and then) and individual sociopathology ?

Yes, that is possible, but I must warn you - atheism is not nihilism. Nietzsche is too much of the philosopher of religion to be a typical atheist.

Gurdur: Reason why I'm asking is for my Plato thread, where I'm developing the thesis that Plato built his objectivism in answer to what he saw as nihilism. Sorry to be a wee bit off-topic, Tyler.

I appreciate it. :)

I don’t know if it’s appropriate to describe what Plato fought against as nihilism, but like Parmenides, he was convinced that permanence was superior to change.

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Tyler Durden

No. At least not for Nietzsche, who thinks nihilism occurs only after the realization that the values of the Enlightenment are found wanting, empty.
I think it's more than Nietzsche's view --- nihilism only seems to arise as a large phenomenon when society has broken down catastrophically --- in times of plague and/or war and/or famine.
Fritz writes: “The universe seems to have lost value, seems ‘meaningless’ – but that is only a transitional stage.” Yaarrr, point I was getting to.
That the world is intrinsically meaningless and incomprehensible is not the source of the coming nihilism, but the collapse of a false interpretation of the world.
Nihilism is not a transitional stage as such, IMHO; it's more of a rare occurance which humans on the whole tend to dislike greatly, and get out of as quickly as possible.

OTOH, mass atheism (loosely defined) seems to be a transitional stage --- such is Karen Armstrong's thesis in her A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0345384563/qid=1065528675/sr=2-1/ref=sr_2_1/002-6372825-1825627); I'm not sure if her thesis still would hold for the future, but it's an interesting point.

Nihilism is the philosophical diagnosis of the collapse of values.
To Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche maybe; but to others, I suspect it's simply times when sociopaths and near-sociopaths see an opportunity to really get going.
It is a safe bet to claim Nietzsche saw himself as “the philosopher as the physician of his culture… the vivisectionist of the values of the times..” (WZM 13)
Where he may have gone wrong is to assess the validity of his analysis of the genealogy of morality. Nietzsche is as far away as you can get from the Hegelian belief in the virtue of Enlightenment, progress.
Yes, but my point --- albeit poorly expressed --- was that Nietzsche saw cultural development in terms of cyclic and develping continuua; a mirror-image of the Whig view of history, therefore my comment.
Yes, that is possible, but I must warn you - atheism is not nihilism.
Understood already, and I never claimed as such; my previous post was poorly expressed on my part, and the consideration of two different things --- atheism and nihilism --- within a few short sentences was bound to cause confusion.
I plead pressure of time and laziness, not conflation.
I don’t know if it’s appropriate to describe what Plato fought against as nihilism,
The more I read up on him, the more I'm convinced that Plato was fighting against what he saw as proto-nihilism, or a potential for nihilism. But I'll develop that on the Plato threads.
but like Parmenides, he was convinced that permanence was superior to change. Um ? Pardon me if I disagree here; Plato certainly wanted change -- he wanted the system changed to something he liked more.

[Tyler Durden]

I will address your comments in good time, Gurdur, but allow me to buy time with a cut and paste job on the relevant background of Nietzsche & history:

From this link (http://www.lemmingland.com/untimely.html)

However, the meditation that specifically addresses the discipline of history was the second of his Untimely Meditations, "On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life", published in February of 1874. Although an early work written in the last half of 1873[13], it contained the seeds of much of his later philosophy. "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" is of significant merit for both an understanding of nineteenth-century historiography and for contemporary historians seeking to reconsider their discipline.

This second of Nietzsche's Untimely Mediations constituted a profound critique of nineteenth-century German historiography. It emitted a cry of protest from the midst of German historicism. As Laurence Lampert argued: "the major concern of this book is to direct an attack against the current state of historical studies in Germany."[14] The historical claims and methodology of German historicism emerged from a unique crossing of Rankean empiricism and Hegelian idealism. In the view of history derived from the Hegelian tradition, each historical epoch or entity emerged from a dialectical progression; each period included the necessary and sufficient conditions of its own completion as well as the seeds of its own destruction, and was, therefore, historically self-contained. Each cycle played its part in the larger world process of the dialectic. These self-contained historical entities participated in the creation of a "Jacob's ladder", or in the optimistic spirit of the nineteenth-century, an upward spiral (in contrast with the pessimistic downward spiral which fascinates our own age).

The first influential school of thought informing this historicism was that of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel, and his philosophical and historical descendents of the nineteenth-century, argued that reason incarnates itself in history, i.e. through a historical process. Hegel opposed a platonic understanding of reason as existing in a realm separated or above the physicality of the historical. Instead, he proposed that "reason is the substance of the Universe . . . [in] universal history . . . Spirit displays itself in its most concrete reality."[15] As Edith Wyschogrod explained, for Hegel, "the historical process is governed by this inner rational necessity, the gap between the actual and the ideal is breached."[16] However, reason (or the world spirit) does not express itself in a steady state utopia; it reveals itself in the embodiment of ideas in a dialectical dance of a historical world process.

The Hegelian perspective is historicist in that each age is self-contained as a component expression of the overall progress of incarnate ideas within a historical evolution. Indeed, Hegel has asserted that "were we to examine this truth [of a particular historical period] afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would have not meaning at all, for that would do away with the immediacy, which is of its essence."[17] As Habermas related, "this absolute subject should not precede the world process either as being or as intellectual intuition; rather, it constitutes itself only in the process of the relating of finite and infinite to one another and, hence, in the consuming activity of coming-to-itself."[18] Thus, each age in this nineteenth-century German Idealist perspective represented an idea -- an element of the rational world process representing itself as part of the necessary progress of the spirit. In consequence, the Hegelians did not conceive historical investigation as an accumulation of useless trivia. It was an examination of the content, indeed the very body, of reason.

In conjunction with this Hegelian perspective, historians of the nineteenth-century, marching under a Rankean banner, also claimed the power to understand history "as it really was", and, therefore, to understand the direction of its movement. They envisioned history as evolving towards the full development of the nation-state, a notion that became the primary focus of their historical attention. These Rankean historians claimed a power of prediction based on their assertion of an ability to hold the past at an objective distance. When Nietzsche's was composing his essay, the German historical profession experienced what Georg Iggers termed a "Rankean Renaissance" according to which "the historian was again to be a detached observer of the great forces operating in history."[19] From this position a scrupulous historian making careful use of his documents could come to an empirical understanding of each age’s particular zeitgeist or spirit; the historian could know the past "as it really was".

In addition, both the Hegelian and Rankean schools de-emphasized the examination of individuals, except for great political leaders, and concentrated instead on the processes of history embodied in the conglomerate notions of the nation.[20] Following the Hegelian trajectory, the historical process of reason tended toward a de-emphasis of the individual and toward greater manifestations of its expression. Again, as presented by Hegel, "Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective Will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements."[21] For Ranke, the proper subject of history was the development of the nation-state and its relations to other nations in an international state of nature.[22]

Certainly, such sketches do little justice to the subtlety found in the works of Hegel and Ranke. However, It does give a necessary understanding of how their disciples and descendents understood and applied their thought into the powerfully historical understanding of the nineteenth-century. These were the same schools of historical thought, along with their tremendous cultural influence, against which Nietzsche directed his second Untimely Meditation. Nietzsche both criticized the optimism and self-congratulatory nature -- or the upward spiral -- projected by the Hegelians, and annihilated the hopes of an objective, distanced, and empirical understanding of the historical object hoped for by the Rankeans.[23] In contrast, Nietzsche viewed history as a context for use in terms of personal development and identity.

Nietzsche's second Untimely Meditation emerged in opposition to the pride in German unification and military success, which German scholars translated into the victorious advancement of the historical world process. In his rejection of the dominant philosophies of history, Nietzsche earned for this essay the "untimely" label through his attack of what many considered to be Germany's cultural strength. Nietzsche made this notion of his untimely perspective explicit in his introduction to the essay where he argued that "this meditation too is untimely, because I am here attempting to look afresh at . . . [German culture's] cultivation of history -- as being injurious to it."[24]

In challenging the constructions of contemporary German historical awareness, Nietzsche produced his own phenomenology of the human relationship to history. At the heart of his analyses he placed three distinct, though not mutually exclusive, moods or stances of engagement with history: the unhistorical, the historical, and the suprahistorical. Then, as part of the historical mood, he proposed three stances toward history, the Monumental, the Antiquarian, and the Critical. Nietzsche's intent was to outline how humanity used these moods and stances in the service and maintenance of a vibrant culture and life. Furthermore, he sought to demonstrate how the modern German historical sense was destructive for life in that it had destroyed the proper use of these categories of historical understanding.[25]

According to Fritz, when a person realizes the 3rd historical attitude, a suprahistorical mood, he "would have recognized the essential condition of all happening - this blindness and injustice in the soul of him who acts; he would, indeed, be cured from ever taking history too seriously." The article describes history as a "dynamic agent" that produces a "vigorous culture," but German historicism murdered history as a "transformative agent" and restricted the ability of man to act.

[Tyler Durden]

I think it's more than Nietzsche's view --- nihilism only seems to arise as a large phenomenon when society has broken down catastrophically --- in times of plague and/or war and/or famine.

Feel free to correct me if I misread you, but I do not think nihilism is equivalent to anarchy. What you are describing is anarchy, which occurs only when there is no central authority to reckon with, or the central authority of the government lost power. For most armchair anarchists there is a presumption that people are self-governable. However, even in anarchy there are values worth having, worth establishing, worth defending. Not so for nihilism, which operates at a more fundamental level of philosophy. Anarchy occurs only when the people’s faith or sanction in the government’s authority erodes. Nihilism comes only if an entire worldview collapses due to inherent hypocrisy.

Yaarrr, point I was getting to.

:)
Arr!

Nihilism is not a transitional stage as such, IMHO; it's more of a rare occurance which humans on the whole tend to dislike greatly, and get out of as quickly as possible.
Do you have historical examples to describe as nihilistic?
OTOH, mass atheism (loosely defined) seems to be a transitional stage --- such is Karen Armstrong's thesis in her A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam; I'm not sure if her thesis still would hold for the future, but it's an interesting point.
Now that is worth checking out. My friend Junior has a copy of that book on his shelf, and one of these days, I shall put him on the spot and demand his take of that book.
To Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche maybe; but to others, I suspect it's simply times when sociopaths and near-sociopaths see an opportunity to really get going.

Ah maybe. But during the period of nihilism the values that used to describe sociopaths in the previous period wouldn’t survive. If values collapse, then you couldn’t use the older ones in the nihilistic period to judge who was what. And did you mean to refer to Ivan Turgenev instead of Dostoyevsky? I would stress the differences between Russian nihilism and philosophical nihilism, but that’s sort of irrelevant.

Yes, but my point --- albeit poorly expressed --- was that Nietzsche saw cultural development in terms of cyclic and develping continuua; a mirror-image of the Whig view of history, therefore my comment.

What is the Whig view of history? I am sure that tripped me up in my previous post. :)

Nietzsche view on history is grounded in a literal view, not a scientific one.

Understood already, and I never claimed as such; my previous post was poorly expressed on my part, and the consideration of two different things --- atheism and nihilism --- within a few short sentences was bound to cause confusion.
I plead pressure of time and laziness, not conflation.

If Nietzsche is correct in his diagnosis of nihilism, does this mean most atheists are theists in the closet?

The more I read up on him, the more I'm convinced that Plato was fighting against what he saw as proto-nihilism, or a potential for nihilism. But I'll develop that on the Plato threads.

I’ll take a peek myself.

Um ? Pardon me if I disagree here; Plato certainly wanted change -- he wanted the system changed to something he liked more.

Yes, Plato wanted change from the state of Athenian government to his Republic, but that wasn’t what I meant.

I meant that permanence in the metaphysical sense – Eternal Forms – was valued over the fluctuation of “becoming,” or of transitory state of existence (empirical information or representation of empirical data, art).

[Gurdur]

Originally posted by Tyler Durden

Feel free to correct me if I misread you, but I do not think nihilism is equivalent to anarchy.
I'm not saying nihilism is equivalent to anarchy; I'm saying that under certain conditions, nihilism as a large-scale phenomenon can arise. Anarchy is one of those conditions, but it is neither necessary nor does nihilism always arise in anarchy.
For nihilism arising without anarchy, please see just below;
For anarchy without nihilism, some of the very loosely organized cultures such as traditional Bushmen or whatever suffice as examples.
What you are describing is anarchy, which occurs only when there is no central authority to reckon with, or the central authority of the government lost power. For most armchair anarchists there is a presumption that people are self-governable. However, even in anarchy there are values worth having, worth establishing, worth defending. Not so for nihilism,
Correct, agreed, and an example of nihilism without anarchy would be the Third Reich, 1935 - 1945, say.
Government-sponsored nihilism; it happens.
which operates at a more fundamental level of philosophy. Anarchy occurs only when the people’s faith or sanction in the government’s authority erodes.
Or it occurs where there is no tradition of central government anyway.
Nihilism comes only if an entire worldview collapses due to inherent hypocrisy.
I don't think that's the only possible condition; other possible conditions are:
1) massive plague ( see Boccacio's description of social reactions to the plague of his time)
2) Massive, incoherent war (the Thirty Years' War, parts of the English Civil War, the Hutu proto-fascist genocide in Rwanda etc.)

Ah maybe. But during the period of nihilism the values that used to describe sociopaths in the previous period wouldn’t survive. If values collapse, then you couldn’t use the older ones in the nihilistic period to judge who was what.
Again, sorry, but I disagree.
Even in the most nihilistic periods, we often discover people speaking out against the nihilism --- that is, upholding certain basic values.
Whether the White Rose Group in the Third Reich, Bonhöffer, many writers in the Thirty Years' War, etc.

I'm going to pay special attention to this point later in a Plato spin-off thread; Robert O'Connell, a military historian, makes a large point of describing constantly recurrent anti-nihilistic tendencies, policies and voices in the most nihilistic periods in his book [i]Of Arms and Men: A Hi