Could a Materialist Believe in Heaven and Hell? by Clifford Greenblatt

[seantellis]

The author of this article is on shaky ground here - the existence of a "multiverse" (let alone an infinite multiverse) of universes has not been proven, although it is an attractive idea in many ways.

Then, even if we do assume an infinite multiverse, it does not follow that this system is "sufficiently random".

Finally, even if this is sufficiently random, we run up against a problem with orders of infinity. In other words, although the set of beings in the multiverse will be a countably infinite set, the number of arrangements of life segments will be an uncountably infinite set. (At each point, we have 2 choices, good or bad. Therefore, for N points, there are 2^N combinations. There are a countably infinite set of points. Cantor's famous diagonalization proof shows that this is an uncountably infinite number.)

The practical upshot of this is that the probability of actually experiencing an all-good or all-bad set of life segments is zero.

The moral of this is that reasoning with infinities is riddled with odd results.

Aside:

For those of you who read SF, the suggestion that the order of reconstruction of the life segments is irrelevant may seem familiar. It is very similar to Greg Egan's "dust" hypothesis, which is the central theme for his excellent book "Permutation City".

Here is a quick quote:

"But when his subjective time was scrambled, the flow of cause and effect within the computer bore no relationship whatsoever to the flow of his experience -- so how could it be an essential part of it? When the program spelt out his life DBCEA, but it still felt exactly like ABCDE ... then surely the pattern was all, and cause and effect were irrelevant. The whole experience might just as well have arisen by chance.

"Was that fatuous? ... As ludicrous as claiming that ... every warehouse full of paint and canvas contained the complete works of Rembrandt and Picasso ... solely by virtue of the potential redefinition of the coordinates of space-time?"

See also: http://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/~susan/sf/books/_misc/pcity.htm

[Clifford Greenblatt]

The author of this article is on shaky ground here - the existence of a "multiverse" (let alone an infinite multiverse) of universes has not been proven, although it is an attractive idea in many ways.

Then, even if we do assume an infinite multiverse, it does not follow that this system is "sufficiently random".


I agree with this, but lack of "sufficient randomness" means that there is at least one special place in reality in which something special happens that cannot happen anywhere else or which can happen only a finite number of times. This is a very good Biblical view but some noteable materialists, such as Dr. Victor Stenger and many opponents of the Kalam cosmological principle seem to have a problem with the idea of reality having some special place. I think the idea of a special place in reality violates their sense of global simplicity.


Finally, even if this is sufficiently random, we run up against a problem with orders of infinity. In other words, although the set of beings in the multiverse will be a countably infinite set, the number of arrangements of life segments will be an uncountably infinite set. (At each point, we have 2 choices, good or bad. Therefore, for N points, there are 2^N combinations. There are a countably infinite set of points. Cantor's famous diagonalization proof shows that this is an uncountably infinite number.)

The practical upshot of this is that the probability of actually experiencing an all-good or all-bad set of life segments is zero.

The moral of this is that reasoning with infinities is riddled with odd results.


The number of different arrangements of life segments would be finite as infinite resolution of life arrangement detail would not be allowed. Quantum uncertainty prohibits infinite resolution of physical detail. Besides, there is much about a person's physical state which has a negligable effect on conscious experience; e.g., the exact number of protein molecules in a particular hair. The person's life can therefore be described by a Hilbert space in which the number of data values is finite and the precision of every data value is finite. Due to quantum uncertainty, the essential identity of a real entity is not transitive. Entity A being essentially identical to entity B and entity B being essentially identical to entity C is not a sufficient premise to conclude that entity A is essentially identical to entity C. For any given entity in a "sufficiently random" system there are an infinite number of entities in the system that are essentially identical to it. This does not neccesitate an uncountable infinity.


Aside:

For those of you who read SF, the suggestion that the order of reconstruction of the life segments is irrelevant may seem familiar. It is very similar to Greg Egan's "dust" hypothesis, which is the central theme for his excellent book "Permutation City".

Here is a quick quote:

"But when his subjective time was scrambled, the flow of cause and effect within the computer bore no relationship whatsoever to the flow of his experience -- so how could it be an essential part of it? When the program spelt out his life DBCEA, but it still felt exactly like ABCDE ... then surely the pattern was all, and cause and effect were irrelevant. The whole experience might just as well have arisen by chance.

"Was that fatuous? ... As ludicrous as claiming that ... every warehouse full of paint and canvas contained the complete works of Rembrandt and Picasso ... solely by virtue of the potential redefinition of the coordinates of space-time?"

This idea of coordinate redefinition is not applicable to the idea of life segment rearrangement. First, the person must be properly arranged within each segment. Misplacement of arms and legs would have a drastic effect on conscious experience. Also, the duration of each life segment in my illustration is not infinitesimal but is a period of ten seconds. It may be argued that consciousness cannot be turned on instantly. If so, it would be necessary for the conscious experience of the discontinuous person in my example to include something similar to a petit mal seizure every ten seconds. If the life segments are broken only at points of deep sleep, then the conscious experience of the discontinuous person could be totally normal.

[seantellis]

Originally posted by Clifford Greenblatt

The number of different arrangements of life segments would be finite as infinite resolution of life arrangement detail would not be allowed.

Surely, then, this undermines your initial assumption. For an entity to experience an inifinite amount of good/bad life segments, there must be an infinite number of them to begin with.

Otherwise, there is no infinite continuity of experience. Assuming that we allow rearrangement in time, then there is no sense of a particular life state being a causal successor to any other - they just "feel" that way.

In this case, the relationships between them are dictated by a match between the final state of one segment and the initial state of another. (This is true regardless of the lengths of the life segments.)

If there are a finite number of possible life segments, then there are also a finite number of ways of connecting them according to this matching rule. The web of connections would be enormous, but finite.

This leads to two conclusions - either a sequence of life states is finite and bounded (resulting in a "death" state), or it will be finite but unbounded (cyclic). Neither of these will "feel" like an infinite lifetime.

This idea of coordinate redefinition is not applicable to the idea of life segment rearrangement.

In this particular case, the coordinate rearrangement in space is not applicable, but as you said in your original article, the life segments may themselves be arranged in time in any order, without affecting the subjective experience of the entity that they compose. This is a central point of Egan's "Dust" hypothesis.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

Surely, then, this undermines your initial assumption. For an entity to experience an infinite amount of good/bad life segments, there must be an infinite number of them to begin with.

In a Biblical Heaven or Hell a supernatural entity experiences consciousness of endless duration. In a materialist view there are no supernatural spirits but consciousness is the result of purely natural processes. Without any supernatural component, the definition of a person becomes very fuzzy. Are you the same person that you were one picosecond ago? Are you the same person you were when you were one day old? Are you the same person you were nine months before you were born? Every atom that composes you today existed a thousand years ago. Does that mean that you existed a thousand years ago? In a "sufficiently random" reality, there would be an infinite number of replicas of you that better approximate what you were one minute ago than what you are this very minute. The same could be said about you in the past picosecond, but it will take you much more than a picosecond to read this sentence. Anyone who has ever had a single heaven or hell moment consequently has an infinite number of them in a "sufficiently random" reality.

Looking at things from a different materialist perspective we can forget about continuity. All that is really needed to make a heaven and hell is an infinity of segments of conscious heaven or hell experiences. No personal identity needs to be associated with instances of consciousness. The fact that something conscious is experiencing a heaven or hell and the fact that there are an infinite number of segments of those experiences is all that is required. In a purely material reality, the identity of personal consciousness could change based on conscious experience. From the perspective of consciousness, Alf experiencing extreme heaven could be regarded as the same person as Beth experiencing extreme heaven. The peculiarities of their physical details and their enormous banks of standby memories would be of little relevance to their present conscious experience. They are so intensely focused that the fact that their conscious minds somehow entered into a state of extreme heaven is nearly all that is relevant to their present conscious experience. Also, with respect to consciousness, Alf experiencing extreme hell one day could be regarded as a different person from Alf experiencing extreme heaven another day. This is a material view. In a supernatural view, the identity of Alf and Beth are invariant with respect to their physical states, their memories, and the things that their conscious minds are experiencing.


This leads to two conclusions - either a sequence of life states is finite and bounded (resulting in a "death" state), or it will be finite but unbounded (cyclic). Neither of these will "feel" like an infinite lifetime.

Consciousness at any particular moment is affected by past events only by means of stored data and not by means of actually reaching into the past. A person may also anticipate future events but the act of anticipation does not stretch the consciousness of the person into the future. A person in Biblical Heaven or Hell does not experience the whole thing all at once but experiences it one moment at a time. If your alarm clock wakes you up from a deep and dreamless sleep, it is by faith that you believe that you existed the day before. You have been awakened from a state of nonconsciousness. Your conscious stream was broken during the night, although subconscious thoughts continued. You wake up with memories of the past and it is these memories that make you "feel" that you have lived in the past. All that is required to make your life "feel" infinite is for you to lack an anticipation of death. If you have an infinite life span but have a continual sense of impending death then you will never "feel" that your life is infinite.

[Clifford Greenblatt]

This additional note should address some crucial points raised by seantellis. It is similar to my previous comments but avoids vague and inappropriate use of the concept of quantum uncertainty.

The value of mathematical constants, such as pi, can be resolved to infinite precision. Dynamic relationships between elementary particles cannot be resolved to infinite precision. However entities in a real system can be essentially identical. Some entities of interest here include a day in the life of a person or ten seconds in the life of a person. Any segment of any person's life has a countably infinite number of essentially identical replicas in a "sufficiently random" reality. Essential identity is not transitive. If A is essentially identical to B and B is essentially identical to C this does not mean necessarily that A is essentially identical to C. Essential identity can sometimes be as subjective a dimple on a Florida ballot. Does the identity of a person change if the position of a single protein molecule in a single strand of the person's hair is varied by a distance of one electron radius? Given the insignificance of a variation like this, it should be quite safe to make the following claim. All the physical details of a person could be varied by some definite nonzero and noninfinitesimal amount without having any significant effect on the conscious experience of the person. This will safely eliminate any problem of uncountable infinities or zero probabilities in the countably infinite replication of the essential identity of any person in a "sufficiently random" reality.