Objective & subjective reality inconsistent with theism? Koyaanisqatsi vs. seebs

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Ladies and gentlemen,

The following is a short debate between Koyaanisqatsi and seebs on the following topic:

Resolved: both an objective reality and a subjective reality are logically inconsistent with theism.

Koyaanisqatsi will go first, taking the affirmative while seebs will oppose. The debate will have 3 rounds as agreed to from the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=65387).

A peanut gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1227161#post1227161) is set up in EoG for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Gentlemen, best of luck! :)

Jason

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Well, the following is what started this, so I'll just repost it (with a few contextual modifications and one or two qualifications in bold, so don't mistake the bold for undue emphasis on a point; it is simply a way to cue you as to what I've redacted or addended that were not in the original, but should only prove to be trivial--i.e., redundant--qualifiers for clarification. You have my permission, of course, to challenge those addendum as unfairly loading my position, since you initiated this debate on what I had originally posted, in which case I will concede them and discard them in the interest of actually, mutually arriving at a compelling argument...or not).

Suffice it to say, however, that without them, I don't feel my position will be firmly established, so, it's a cunnundrum. Oh, and, as always, please forgive my dyslexia. It's a bitch to have a malfunctioning brain in a, therefore, objectively established universe ;).

With that out of the way, let the games begin and, once again, keep in mind that whatever is in bold is redaction or addendum and not for undue emphasis...

My argument: Positing that a god exists axiomatically establishes objective reality as an irrefutable fact. If that is true, then there can exist nothing subjectively "true" in anything other than a trivial manner. Everything would be objectively true, according to that standard.

Thus, the presupposition of the god concept axiomatically establishes an objective reality and, indirectly, negates the notion that any aspect of "reality" can be subjectively interpreted.

I realize that I may be taxing language here by using these common words, so let me be clear: Of course anything can be subjectively interpreted if the individual chooses to do so, but my argument assumes an honesty or integrity upon an indvidual; an honesty or integrity that compells them to seek the objective Truth, as both theists and non-theists purport to do, if such a beast exists. Thus, positing a god and thereby incontrivertably establishing objective reality compells the individual to investigate that objective reality according to this standard.

If that were the case, then there would be no effective purpose to positing a god to begin with, since, if the converse is true and everything is subjective, then the objective establishment of a god's existence is rendered ultimately pointless.

Argue subjectivity (or, perhaps, more specific to my above standards, "subjective primacy" to base a worldview upon) and you deny a god's existence, since the very existence of such a being axiomatically mandates objective reality. Argue objectivity (i.e., "objective primacy" to base a worldview upon), and you affirm rationales of logic and science, proving conclusively that the natural "world' exists without need of a god and therefore mandates what it is we learn from it.

Either way you slice it, you prove that a mystical fairy god-king like being, magically "willing" the universe and humanity into existence is not just absurd, but logically unsound.

I think that is the best I can do with my original argument without too much pedantry. Again, feel free to object to any bolded addendum as "loading my position" and I'll concede it.

Edited to correct punctuation - Koy

[seebs]

Originally posted by Koyaanisqatsi
Well, the following is what started this, so I'll just repost it (with a few contextual modifications and one or two qualifications.

Accepted. (I fixed a couple of typos without comment; typos are not flaws in your argument. If I botched, let me know.)

For the sake of this discussion, I'm assuming "god" in the sense of "creator of the universe", something fairly similar to traditional monotheist conceptions of god. I don't want to spend too much time haggling over questions of what we're allowed to apply the term to, so I'm going to try not to stretch the term much.

Positing that a god exists axiomatically establishes objective reality as an irrefutable fact. If that is true, then there can exist nothing subjectively "true" in anything other than a trivial manner. Everything would be objectively true, according to that standard.

Claims about reality would be objectively true or false, with these states presumably corresponding both to reality and the correct knowledge of the god. However, perceptions could vary widely from what the god knew to be true. Furthermore, it's entirely unclear to me that aesthetics wouldn't remain subjective. Perhaps the god has opinions, and perhaps they are objectively correct, but people will still form opinions, and we may have no way of knowing which of them is correct.

In effect, this seems to me to be a fallacy of the excluded middle. Objective reality may be irrefutable, but unknowable to some or all people, in whole or in part. Throughout, you seem to be assuming that objective reality is fully observable, measurable, comprehensible, and knowable. I'm not sure that's a safe bet.

Thus, the presupposition of the god concept axiomatically establishes an objective reality and, indirectly, negates the notion that any aspect of "reality" can be subjectively interpreted.

I think this is mostly, but not quite, true. It gives us the notion that subjective interpretation is likely to be wrong. However, I don't think it gives us any certainty that our observations are either correct or complete.

Certainly, it is conventionally accepted that the reality we exist in is an objective one, but it is very much subject to subjective interpretation. Furthermore, many people believe that the physical world is objective, but that morality is subjective; certainly, there is only minimal agreement on exactly what moral rules, if any, are universally applicable to human experience. We might argue that moral rules are not part of "reality", but this is rather contrary to conventional notions of a god, who generally establishes not just physical law, but also moral law. There are certainly claims about the world, such as aesthetic claims, which people debate as though they had meaning, but on which no one has shown much ability to identify the objective answers, if there are any.

I realize that I may be taxing language here by using these common words, so let me be clear: Of course anything can be subjectively interpreted if the individual chooses to do so, but my argument assumes an honesty or integrity upon an indvidual; an honesty or integrity that compells them to seek the objective Truth, as both theists and non-theists purport to do, if such a beast exists. Thus, positing a god and thereby incontrivertably establishing objective reality compells the individual to investigate that objective reality according to this standard.

It compels us to try. I don't think it necessarily guarantees that we can do so successfully. First, there's the problem of frailty; we may lack the capacity to make observations without biasing or filtering them in harmful ways. Secondly, there's the more general problem that we cannot speak with authority to the scope of our limitations. We may have the flatlander problem; we can't tell what parts of reality we're missing, except when they have direct and measurable effects. Some parts of reality may be totally opaque to us; imagine two flatlands, separated by a milimeter or so of vertical space.

This doesn't necessarily contradict what you've said, but I think it becomes relevant shortly.

I do think you're overlooking the very real possibility of honest inability; subjective interpretation arising, not out of dishonesty, but out of inability to perceive things fully or correctly. This has been a problem in our own, presumably-objective, physical reality; we have formed false theories about nearly every aspect of physics due to incomplete information. So, even with an objective reality, it may be difficult, or impossible, to observe it solely by objective standards; it may take a great deal of effort to verify objective claims, and some claims may be forever unverifiable.

If that were the case, then there would be no effective purpose to positing a god to begin with, since, if the converse is true and everything is subjective, then the objective establishment of a god's existence is rendered ultimately pointless.

I'm not wholly sure I understood this, so you may have to expand on it.

I tend to agree that a purely subjective world doesn't coexist well with a claim that there is objectively some sort of God. That said, in the purely subjective case, the claim is implicitly a purely subjective one, and it becomes impossible for us to judge it in any meaningful way. So, I think the "I want to believe" argument is good enough in the purely subjective case. I don't particularly accept subjectivism, so I'll gloss over it, but I do think it's a potential hole in the argument.

Argue objectivity (i.e., "objective primacy" to base a worldview upon), and you affirm rationales of logic and science, proving conclusively that the natural "world' exists without need of a god and therefore mandates what it is we learn from it.

This, I think, is a bit of a leap. It takes a bit of doing to get from "affirm rationales of logic and science" to "proving conclusively that the natural world exists without need of a god".

In the hypothetical case of a god-created objective world, the world's nature does in fact depend on the god. The mere fact that it can be studied within the system without knowing this doesn't change the underlying structure; it just means that the underlying structure is outside what you can see from inside the box. It doesn't tell us anything about that external world, and indeed, we could never learn such things. We don't need to posit the god to study the natural world created, but doing so may help us understand it in ways that aren't obvious from inside the box.

This could get us as far as an Occam's Razor argument against positing the existence of said god, but that's not an argument for truth or falsehood, but mere practicality. Furthermore, in at least one world with reasonably objective physics, people have been observed to find values that have little to do with explaining the observed natural world in positing a god.

Furthermore, affirming that logic and science work is not the same thing as affirming that *only* logic and science work. They may work only for some sorts of problems. They may have insufficient data from which to draw conclusions. There are certainly true conclusions they can't reach.

Logic doesn't necessarily answer certain questions. Godel has given us the convenient proof that, within a sufficiently strong formal system, there will be statements which are true, but which cannot be derived from our axioms. Thus, even if logic works beautifully, there will exist true statements we can never prove. We may never be able to find out what they are, but this doesn't mean they aren't out there. So, our knowledge is necessarily and permanently incomplete.

Science, likewise, doesn't answer certain questions. Science doesn't say there is, or isn't, a god; science is totally silent on all such questions, by its very nature. So, science remains silent, and doesn't rule out a god.

So, while science and logic may work, they are not necessarily going to give me any answer on the god question. Other tools might; they might also be wrong. However, we can't rule out the idea of a god from this; all we can do is say we haven't proven one.

Finally, the objective world need not be the one we perceive; we could be deluded, with the objective world being firm, consistent, and entirely outside our purely subjective experience. In such a hypothetical world, the objective truth might be "seebs perceives a cat, but there is in fact no cat". I can't tell, so my methods may fail even though there is an objective reality, since I can't be sure that what I experience is actually the objective reality.

I think the words "proving conclusively" here are a bit like the old cartoon of the chalkboard with "And then a miracle occurs" written between two equations; you need to be more explicit for me to follow the reasoning.

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Pardon my absence. I had a much shorter response that nightshade felt was too incomplete, so I'm expanding on it.

Let me start out by relating something from my own experience that hopefully will clarify the basis of my argument and goes to the meat of your aesthetics counter, before I address your response. As I mentioned, I have dyslexia; a mild form that causes me to transpose simple word order (e.g., "know now" comes out "now know") and, as you noticed and corrected for, spelling mistakes. The way it works (or doesn't) is that I can literally read what I've written five or six times and my brain thinks it sees "now know" every time until it finally sees it on the seventh time as "know now." I also have red/green color blindness, which means I have trouble discerning subtle shades of color. When I look at a navy coat, for example, I can't tell if it's navy or black. I can only make that distinction if I have a known black coat (e.g., a tuxedo) to compare the two.

So, this means I have two choices in regard to honestly examining the universe. I can either go through life believing that my sentence structure and spelling mistakes are correct to me and that my perception of color is correct to me (subjective primacy), or I can acknowledge that I have a malfunction in my brain and that my perceptions are, therefore, incorrect to "what is" (objective primacy).

In other words, I am wrong. The coat is not black, it is navy, according to the spectrograph and everyone else without a similar malfunction. Note the inclusion of the spectrograph as an example of the various tools we use outside of our own aesthetics.

This means, ultimately, if I reject the spectrograph in favor of my own aesthetics, then we never put a man on the moon and you aren't typing your response on a computer.

Spectrographs show me that I am incorrect. Comparing a known black coat to my navy coat shows me that I am incorrect. Other people who do not share my particular malfunction show me that my assessment that my coat is black is incorrect. All of these different sources and "tests" demonstrate that I am incorrect in my subjective experience.

Applying my standard of the "honest" seeker of truth, I am therefore compelled to accept, acknowledge, admit, whatever, that my subjective perceptions are an insufficient basis upon which to base my worldview. I have a sensory input malfunction in my brain, thus I must seek to compensate or overcome that malfunction in order to correctly examine the universe as an honest seeker of truth (HST from no own), not simply pretend that such a malfunction is irrelevant to an honest examination of the nature of the universe.

In short, it must be accounted for, not merely presumed sufficient.

Again, the HST is compelled to do everything possible to correctly examine the universe, which also includes self-reflection, which means that one is equally compelled to seek out any and all avenues available to overcome or compensate for one's own (as you put it) "frailties."

Originally posted by seebs : For the sake of this discussion, I'm assuming "god" in the sense of "creator of the universe", something fairly similar to traditional monotheist conceptions of god. I don't want to spend too much time haggling over questions of what we're allowed to apply the term to, so I'm going to try not to stretch the term much.

Well, granted, with the caveat that "creator of the universe" necessarily entails special properties, of course; properties that must be discernable through either a scientific means of investigation or a logical deconstruction, since, again, for such a creator to exist, it would axiomatically mandate objective reality as incontrovertible fact.

Again, that means the coat is actually navy no matter how many times my faulty brain perceives it as black and regardless of whether or not I exist to perceive it as such. The color wavelength emitted from the atoms that comprise the coat (or whatever the more technical process is) will always and forever be Navy, even if no humans or spectrographs were around to measure it and label it "Navy." That's what it means to accept an objectively existing universe; the totality of human discovery about that universe is established as objectively true and not solely subjectively experienced, so a tree falling in the forest, does indeed "make a sound" and all of the rules and regulations we've been able to discern, verify, repeat, etc., are to be considered facts of an objective universe. It is a fact that an understanding of physical laws of nature allow us to send rockets to the moon. It is a fact that an understanding of calculus allows us to correctly measure the area under a wave; etc.

It's not just about trivial things like my dyslexia. An objectively existing universe means that human perception is subordinate to it and at fault when it can't adequately figure it out, thus seeks to figure it out, as it were, as honestly as possible. It also means that there are ways to "figure it out," as the totality of human discovery demonstrates.

Subjective experience (or perception) alone is, therefore, not sufficient to base a worldview upon for the HST.

Seebs: Claims about reality would be objectively true or false, with these states presumably corresponding both to reality and the correct knowledge of the god.

Which, again, must mean that the "god" is discernable through objectively verifiable means. It is therefore insufficient for the HST to stop short at subjective experience as the only basis to "know" such an objectively existing entity.

I guess the whole thing hinges upon the "honesty" ideal.

Seebs: However, perceptions could vary widely from what the god knew to be true.

Precisely, which is, again, why subjective perceptions (subjective primacy) are an insufficient basis to base a worldview upon. The HST can not stop short and merely conclude "god" based upon purely subjective experiences and, therefore, can not base a worldview upon such an insufficient standard. The HST must always assume his/her perceptions are wrong and/or subject to being wrong against the standard of objective primacy if for no other reason than this has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout human experience.

If the HST thinks that a "god" (the "creator of the universe") has spoken to him or visited him in a vision, etc., then the HST is compelled to reject the idea of basing a worldview solely upon that subjective experience, if he/she is truly an HST.

When one posits such a being's existence, one must also establish that being's existence. Black holes are a good example. We theorized they needed to exist to account for anomalies we observed and we set about trying to prove it. Speculation about them was rampant from an aesthetic viewpoint as well as from a scientific one, but the only thing that was relevant to the HST was proving (or disproving) their existence.

Indeed, the terrible Disney movie, "The Black Hole" serves to illustrate my point. In it, a ship is poised on the brink of one and the mad scientist plans on going into it and "through" it, ending up in a ridiculous version of Christian hell, trapped inside his own mechanical creation atop a hill of flames straight out of a Bosch painting.

In reality, however, nothing of the kind would occur. The aesthetics are therefore not a sufficient basis to determine (honestly) what a black hole actually is and what its properties are.

Seebs: Furthermore, it's entirely unclear to me that aesthetics wouldn't remain subjective.

Irrelevant, since aesthetics are, by definition, subjective and have no bearing on contradicting (or establishing) natural phenomenon. The HST is compelled to examine "what is" in order to understand its properties from a physical standpoint first and foremost. Ancillary observations (such as the aesthetics of those properties) are therefore insufficient to stop at and therefore equally insufficient to base a worldview upon for the HST.

I could certainly just go around declaring that Navy is Black and that everyone else (including the spectrograph) is incorrect, but then that would contradict the standard of the HST.

Seebs: Perhaps the god has opinions, and perhaps they are objectively correct, but people will still form opinions, and we may have no way of knowing which of them is correct.

Not necessarily true. It depends on what the opinion is. For example, if it is your opinion that the moon is made out of cheese, then you are objectively incorrect. It is not made out of cheese. You may choose to deny this fact in favor of your own personal opinions, but that's all it would amount to.

You're straying from the standard of the HST.

Seebs: Objective reality may be irrefutable, but unknowable to some or all people, in whole or in part.

Then it is incumbent upon those people, like myself, to discover and compensate for their inability; to honestly self-reflect and find out what is preventing them from correctly examining the objective reality. This is precisely why the "scientific method" was established. Repetition, verification, comparative analysis, etc.

It seeks to compensate for the known insufficiency of subjective primacy.

Seebs: Throughout, you seem to be assuming that objective reality is fully observable, measurable, comprehensible, and knowable. I'm not sure that's a safe bet.

I am assuming the standard of the HST as well as that, which is inherent in positing an objectively existing universe. By stating it is objective, you are axiomatically stating that it is observable, measurable, comprehensible and knowable. The qualifier "fully" is unwarranted. The goal of the HST is to use every means possible to examine the universe as objectively as possible, including the abandonment of one's own subjective perceptions as insufficient in that cause when they are demonstrated in other areas to be faulty. It therefore requires (compels) one to vigorously and diligently self-reflect and honestly assess one's own shortcomings in order to fulfill that goal.

Seebs: I think this is mostly, but not quite, true. It gives us the notion that subjective interpretation is likely to be wrong. However, I don't think it gives us any certainty that our observations are either correct or complete.

"Complete" is not necessary. "Correct," however, is. How one, therefore, determines the "correctness" is the issue and one way to do that is to acknowledge from the outset that one's subjective interpretations are not only likely to be wrong, but have been demonstrated to be an insufficient standard to base "correctness" upon. Hence, the scientific method and the honesty part of the HST.

If I am a true HST, then I must concede that I have a malfunctioning brain that compels me to seek other means outside of my own perceptions to compensate for my dyslexia and/or color blindness. I have a choice. I can either state that Navy is Black (which isn't true, even to my malfunctioning brain; as I mentioned, eventually my brain is able to discern the correct color as well as see my spelling and syntax mistakes) or I can recognize (self-reflect) that my brain is, in fact, malfunctioning and account for it.

The standard of the HST, therefore, compels me toward the latter.

Seebs: Certainly, it is conventionally accepted that the reality we exist in is an objective one, but it is very much subject to subjective interpretation.

Which, in turn, is known, accepted and accounted for by the HST to be an insufficient basis for establishing a worldview.

Establishing a "worldview" is, of course, the key to all of this. Well, I should say, establishing an honest "worldview." If one is an HST, then one is axiomatically compelled to reject subjective primacy as a legitimate basis (in and of itself) for establishing a worldview upon.

Seebs: Furthermore, many people believe that the physical world is objective, but that morality is subjective; certainly, there is only minimal agreement on exactly what moral rules, if any, are universally applicable to human experience.

What has this to do with a "creator of the universe" factually existing? By the way, you're applying properties to the "creator."

Morality is always subjective, thus, again it has nothing to do with verifying or understanding or examining an objectively existing universe. You're raising questions that are inherently subjective that have no bearing on whether or not an objectively existing being factually exists. Aesthetics and personal opinion do not contravene what is, they merely (in the extremes) deny it.

That such a being may or may not be a "moral" being is irrelevant until and unless such a being's factual existence (i.e., objectively true state) can be established, yes? For example, you could tell me all about the immoral qualities of the Yeti, but would that have any bearing on whether or not the Yeti actually exists (i.e., is not just a figment of your imagination)?

No. It is, therefore, irrelevant information until and unless the Yeti's factual existence could be determined. If you were to claim that the Yeti is morality, then we are even further removed from anything substantive upon which to base a worldview upon.

Seebs: We might argue that moral rules are not part of "reality", but this is rather contrary to conventional notions of a god, who generally establishes not just physical law, but also moral law.

How? By simply mandating it? What is the mechanism in which the "creator of the universe" establishes such a law? Is masturbation, for a trivial example, objectively wrong?

No, it is not. Why? Because morality is subjectively interpreted. And why is that? Because morality is an abstraction having nothing to do (in any relevant sense) with establishing or discovering the parameters/properties of an objectively existing universe. I see Navy as Black. Does that mean I am "morally" incorrect?

No. Why? Because, it's not a moral issue.

An objectively existing universe has nothing to do with what is subjectively interpreted in any compelling sense. Subjective interpretation (as we both agree) is flawed and therefore insufficient to base a worldview upon for precisely these reasons.

Thus and again, the HST is compelled to set aside his or her own irrelevant opinions about the possible abstract properties in favor first and foremost of the concrete (for lack of a better term).

Seebs: There are certainly claims about the world, such as aesthetic claims, which people debate as though they had meaning, but on which no one has shown much ability to identify the objective answers, if there are any.

Is that a product of objective reality or subjective petulance? An aesthetic claim about the world would have no substantive bearing on the objective existence (or non-existence) of that world. One who is an HST should not concern themselves with such non-substantive claims. A claim of subjectivity has only one legitimate standard: Does one's subjective interpretation outweigh the objective truth?

From the standard of HST, it does not. You are free, of course, to argue against that standard, but you should provide reasons why it is not valid in relation to an objectively existing universe.

Seebs: It compels us to try. I don't think it necessarily guarantees that we can do so successfully.

Irrelevant.

Seebs: First, there's the problem of frailty; we may lack the capacity to make observations without biasing or filtering them in harmful ways.

All the more reason to conclude that our frailty is not sufficient on its own to base a worldview upon.

Seebs: Secondly, there's the more general problem that we cannot speak with authority to the scope of our limitations.

Why not? I can speak with absolute authority to my dyslexia and my color blindness, because it has been demonstrated again and again and again. Repetition and testing.

Beyond that, we don't need to "speak with authority to the scope of our limitations," we need only admit or accept that they exist. Again, all the more reason to not base a worldview solely upon subjective primacy.

Seebs: We may have the flatlander problem; we can't tell what parts of reality we're missing, except when they have direct and measurable effects. Some parts of reality may be totally opaque to us; imagine two flatlands, separated by a milimeter or so of vertical space.

Then basing a worldview upon our speculation regarding flatlander morality is completely irrelevant, wouldn't you agree? How would whether or not flatlanders on the "other" side are moral beings give us any substantive information to help us determine whether or not they exist?

Seebs: I do think you're overlooking the very real possibility of honest inability; subjective interpretation arising, not out of dishonesty, but out of inability to perceive things fully or correctly.

On the contrary. I am not only accounting for it, I am arguing it as the basis to my argument.

Seebs: This has been a problem in our own, presumably-objective, physical reality; we have formed false theories about nearly every aspect of physics due to incomplete information.

And compensated for that by recognizing such fallibility. You are affirming my argument.

Seebs: So, even with an objective reality, it may be difficult, or impossible, to observe it solely by objective standards; it may take a great deal of effort to verify objective claims, and some claims may be forever unverifiable.

And how would you propose to do so with subjective standards? The moon is actually made out of cheese because your subjective opinion is that the moon is made out of cheese?

Seebs: I tend to agree that a purely subjective world doesn't coexist well with a claim that there is objectively some sort of God. That said, in the purely subjective case, the claim is implicitly a purely subjective one, and it becomes impossible for us to judge it in any meaningful way. So, I think the "I want to believe" argument is good enough in the purely subjective case. I don't particularly accept subjectivism, so I'll gloss over it, but I do think it's a potential hole in the argument.

Forgive me, but, again, you are affirming my argument by granting the fact that subjective primacy is insufficient to base a worldview upon.

Seebs: This, I think, is a bit of a leap. It takes a bit of doing to get from "affirm rationales of logic and science" to "proving conclusively that the natural world exists without need of a god".

Objective primacy means that all of human discovery of that objectively existing world is to be "booted up," if you will. That means that rationales of logic and science, being derivative of human experience within that objectively existing universe, are affirmed as valid tools of cognition and verifiability; means of testing subjective claims, if you will, to determine their efficacy in an objective universe.

Thus, they can be legitimately employed to determine whether or not your hypothetical opinion that the moon is made of cheese should be discarded or affirmed. Remember, always, the standard of the HST that I am following here.

Yes, you could continue to subjectively (petulantly) state, "I don't care what logic or science has to say about my opinion/belief that the moon is made of cheese," but then you are merely denying the HST standard.

So, when I state that these rationales demonstrate that there is no need for a god (a "creator of the universe"), then I am "booting up" the totality of human understanding in regard to those rationales and how the efficacy of those rationales have been repeatedly demonstrated.

Seebs: In the hypothetical case of a god-created objective world, the world's nature does in fact depend on the god.

How so? I create a chair out of a tree. Does that mean the chair's "nature" is dependent upon me?

We're approaching crossed purposes here in regard to the word "nature," so perhaps I should clarify, again, that such abstractions as you appear to be using have little to nothing to do with figuring out physical properties of an objectively existing universe.

Human nature can be investigated quite easily through observation of the psychology involved; a psychology that is based upon a physical makeup that is objectively existing. It does not, however, have any relevant bearing on the physical existence (or non-physical existence) of that individual.

How we behave toward one another in a moral sense is, therefore, not at issue here.

Seebs: The mere fact that it can be studied within the system without knowing this doesn't change the underlying structure; it just means that the underlying structure is outside what you can see from inside the box.

Therefore, once again, affirming the insufficiency of subjective primacy.

Seebs: It doesn't tell us anything about that external world, and indeed, we could never learn such things. We don't need to posit the god to study the natural world created, but doing so may help us understand it in ways that aren't obvious from inside the box.

How? So far, all you've stated about this god is that it is the "creator of the universe" and that it somehow "mandates" our morality. As mentioned previously, the rationales of logic and science demonstrate that we have no need for a "creator of the universe." We can readily theorize and have ample evidence for a natural creation. So how does then contradicting that in favor of positing a supernatural being help us to understand the properties of our universe?

The other element you mentioned in regard to this god was morality, which we both agree is subjective. Morality is not a physical property, it is nothing more than mutually agreed upon rules and regulations for what we call "society;" the interaction between like species. If morality were, indeed, an objective phenomenon of some sort (comparable to say, gravity), then wouldn't all species be subject to it? Pretty much every other species on this planet eats their prey alive. Many of them are cannibals. Does the fact that we, by and large, are not cannibals and do not eat our prey alive have any substantive information regarding such a theoretically objective morality?

No. We are capable of eating our prey alive and certainly capable of cannibalism. That we choose to ascribe, however, socially conditioned rules and regulations regarding such actions is purely a result of human social interaction. If you were hungry enough, you might just resort to cannibalism. That you don't would be purely the result of your social conditioning.

We apply these rules and regulations just as we break them, but I defy you to establish a universally "true" morality that states cannibalism is wrong and further ask you to explain what relevancy that has to my argument.

Seebs: This could get us as far as an Occam's Razor argument against positing the existence of said god, but that's not an argument for truth or falsehood, but mere practicality.

If you can form an argument from morality that somehow establishes the objective existence of a god, then by all means, you're free to do so. Just don't do it on the basis of subjective primacy is all I'm saying.

Seebs: Furthermore, in at least one world with reasonably objective physics, people have been observed to find values that have little to do with explaining the observed natural world in positing a god.

Why? Because a god is little more than a projection of an idealized human in order to give weight to threats of non-compliance to the subjectively created rules and regulations (i.e., morality). In regard to morality, a god is nothing more than the arbiter of punishment for non-compliance.

All of which has nothing to do with my argument and everything to do with affirming it, since, once again, you are demonstrating the insufficiency of subjective primacy to base a worldview upon.

Seebs: Furthermore, affirming that logic and science work is not the same thing as affirming that *only* logic and science work.

You're leaving off the most important element; that they "work" to demonstrate that we have no need for a god to explain the properties of our universe.

Again, the standard of the HST. The HST is compelled to recognize that morality is a subjective quality of human interaction; rules and regulations of behavior toward one another within a society. It has nothing to do with honestly examining the objectively existing universe, beyond a footnote of human behavior mechanisms.

Seebs: They may work only for some sorts of problems. They may have insufficient data from which to draw conclusions. There are certainly true conclusions they can't reach.

All of which are, again, accepted and accounted for by the standards of the scientific method, which is, again, why subjective primacy is insufficient to base a worldview upon. We know what our subjective limitations are in regard to an honest examination of the objectively exiting universe and seek to compensate for those limitations.

Not to sound like a broken record, but, again, you are affirming the notion that subjective primacy is insufficient to base a worldview upon. If it weren't, then all of those problems you just listed wouldn't be problems.

Seebs: Logic doesn't necessarily answer certain questions. Godel has given us the convenient proof that, within a sufficiently strong formal system, there will be statements which are true, but which cannot be derived from our axioms. Thus, even if logic works beautifully, there will exist true statements we can never prove.

In a trivial, semantics way, yes. This sentence is false. Well, of what relevancy is pointing out such faulty elements of our language structure, other than to once again establish the insufficiency of subjective primacy?

The HST accounts for and acknowledges these limitations and therefore seeks always to discard or compensate for them by using the standard of honesty and objective primacy for comparison, concluding whenever applicable, that subjective primacy is an insufficient standard to base a worldview upon.

Seebs: We may never be able to find out what they are, but this doesn't mean they aren't out there. So, our knowledge is necessarily and permanently incomplete.

Correct. Proof that subjective primacy is insufficient and therefore the HST must employ other standards. I can not, as an HST, state that my brain's malfunction is not a malfunction and that everyone else is just incorrect. I must first acknowledge that I have such a malfunction and then seek every means available to compensate for it.

Seebs: Science, likewise, doesn't answer certain questions.

Then don't ask it "certain questions." The questions you're talking about so far have had nothing to do with the discipline of science we have implicitly been discussing.

If you want to find out about human morality, then you shouldn't ask a cosmologist, yes?

Seebs: Science doesn't say there is, or isn't, a god

But it certainly says there is no need of a "creator of the universe" god.

Seebs: science is totally silent on all such questions, by its very nature. So, science remains silent, and doesn't rule out a god.

Nor did I claim it did. Recall my argument:

Me: Argue subjectivity (or, perhaps, more specific to my above standards, "subjective primacy" to base a worldview upon) and you deny a god's existence, since the very existence of such a being axiomatically mandates objective reality. Argue objectivity (i.e., "objective primacy" to base a worldview upon), and you affirm rationales of logic and science, proving conclusively that the natural "world' exists without need of a god and therefore mandates what it is we learn from it.

Either way you slice it, you prove that a mystical fairy god-king like being, magically "willing" the universe and humanity into existence is not just absurd, but logically unsound.

A god could exist in the sense that anything could exist, but there is no need for one to exist to derive knowledge of the world around us. The rationales of logic and science prove that. Further, no matter how you posit such a god, those same rationales can and do demonstrate both its absurdity and that such an assertion is logically unsound.

Seebs: So, while science and logic may work, they are not necessarily going to give me any answer on the god question.

False. They will demonstrate (a) no need for a god to derive knowledge and (b) that such a being is logically unsound.

It is therefore up to you as an HST to discard such a notion in favor of objective primacy standards. The problem, as I see it, with what you're arguing is that you have strayed far a field from what we're discussing in order to offer up vagaries that you think aren't "answerable" by logic and science, but then, that's primarily because you're asking the wrong questions.

The only concrete example you have presented is the notion of morality, which, again, would be a question for anthropologists and/or sociologists. None of these musings have been assailing the insufficiency of subjective primacy as a basis of a worldview and have, in fact, affirmed it.

Seebs: Other tools might; they might also be wrong. However, we can't rule out the idea of a god from this; all we can do is say we haven't proven one.

Nor have we proven that the Yeti does not exist or that leprechauns do not exist or the IPU does not exist, etc., etc., etc., but then, that's not the standard of the HST, nor my argument nor possible due to the "proving a negative." What we can do, however, as HST's, is take the chronology of the god concept apart; deconstruct it and then apply HST standards to the creation of that myth to test it. A claim was made thousands of years ago that a god exists. Initially, those god concepts were used to explain the "why" of existence in very limited, simplistic terms. Why do the plants grow? Because the Sun God created them. Well, applying the standards of the HST (through such rationales as logic and science) we determined the efficacy of such a Sun God claim.

Shit. Out of memory, so this will have to suffice. I'll try to address the rest in my closing regarding your perceptions of a cat and whether or not you should (as an HST) stop short at your subjective perspective or not. I think you already know my answer.

Edited for objectively existing dyslexia, and my apologies for the length. I'm damned if I do and damned if I don't :D

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Koyaanisqatsi,

I wanted to point out that your recent statement length (5100 words) has far exceeded the limit of 1500 words as agreed to from the debate parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=65387).

We'll allow your recent statement to stay as is, but to be fair, I'll allow seebs to respond to your post this round up to a length of 5100 words.

For the third and final round, please keep the statements within the agreed length of 1500 words. Statements over this length will be declined and will have to be resubmitted to meet this parameter.

Thanks for your consideration.

Jason

[seebs]

Obviously, I cannot respond in detail to every point here, but I will try to focus on the core issues.

Throughout, the Honest Seeker of Truth seems suspiciously predisposed to accept and reject precisely those things Koy accepts and rejects. This seems a bit implausible to me; surely, the HST should emulate my personal preferences. :)

The coat is not black, it is navy, according to the spectrograph and everyone else without a similar malfunction. Note the inclusion of the spectrograph as an example of the various tools we use outside of our own aesthetics.

With the tools available to people a thousand years ago, you could not show that atoms could be split or joined, or that they had parts; indeed, they were assumed to be indivisible. Even granting that we believe objective reality to exist, we cannot necessarily observe it accurately. It is possible that, with tools available a thousand years from now, we will find it obvious that the coat is not navy, but rather, that it has properties for which there are no words in English, which look to a primitive spectrograph very much like being navy. This has been a consistent, central, theme of scientific discovery for as long as we've had written language. Our theories are always subject to change, and we know, with near certainty, that there are true things we have not yet discovered or comprehended.

Again, the HST is compelled to do everything possible to correctly examine the universe

Agreed. And to do so, HST must start by admitting these frailties. But, and this is where things fall apart, one of the frailties we must admit is that we have no way of verifying that our experience is *at all* real; we can compare notes, but the only way to do so is to rely on our perception of others and our perceptions of communication.

Well, granted, with the caveat that "creator of the universe" necessarily entails special properties, of course; properties that must be discernable through either a scientific means of investigation or a logical deconstruction

This is where I think youu first fall down. The Deist God is logically consistent, but wholly undetectable. Many versions of Christianity posit similarly elusive notions of God. God is not part of the created universe, but only that universe is testable by its denizens.

Once again, I refer you to Goedel (happier, Gurdur?). We know that there are true statements about arithmetic that we cannot prove from the axioms of arithmetic. We know that these mechanisms will not go far enough. Logic will not answer all logical questions. Science will not answer all scientific questions. The history of science is the history of improving our tools, and we have no reason to believe that we will ever be done doing so; this guarantees us truths about the universe that we cannot know by science within any given lifetime, and suggests an infinite supply of them yet to come in the future. Our present lack of knowledge doesn't dictate rejecting claims; it dictates withholding *scientific* acceptence of them. Some claims are useful anyway.

That's what it means to accept an objectively existing universe; the totality of human discovery about that universe is established as objectively true(...)

As you note, the objective truths must be true whether or not we observe them. This carries with it the crucial flaw in your argument: Our conception of objective truth is rooted in our awareness that we do not possess it.

It is a fact that an understanding of physical laws of nature allow us to send rockets to the moon.

Newtonian physics could get you to the moon, but it's still wrong.

Subjective experience (or perception) alone is, therefore, not sufficient to base a worldview upon for the HST.

This is presupposing an objective reality. While I share this presupposition, it is a crucial weakness in your argument not to address the case of a totally subjective reality. In such a reality, it is meaningless to claim that someone is "wrong" to posit a god; the claim "but there isn't really a god" presupposes objective reality, which is meaningless in this hypothetical.

(...) the HST is compelled to reject the idea of basing a worldview solely upon that subjective experience, if he/she is truly an HST.

It seems to me that the HST is merely obliged to try to find confirmation. For instance, finding that a number of other people share the experience, and that no refutation of their interpretation has been offered, might be enough to make it the best plausible assumption.

By stating it is objective, you are axiomatically stating that it is observable, measurable, comprehensible and knowable.

And here, once again, you have gotten it precisely wrong; you are arguing that it is knowable, when the claim is actually that certain things are the case even though we don't know them.

"Complete" is not necessary.

It is, if you wish to say that you can rule out a claim simply because you haven't shown it to be true yet. This is where the whole thing falls down the hardest, I think. The keystone of your argument is the leap from "I have not found God yet" to "there is no God". This depends on completeness. Without completeness, the argument is hopeless; there is no way to get from Point A to Point B.

Morality is always subjective, (...)

This is a broad assertion, and totally unsupported. How exactly do we establish that morality is purely subjective? Until we had spectrographs, we couldn't show color to be anything but subjective. We could show that many people agreed, but people agree on whether teal is blue or green about as well as they agree on abortion.

All the more reason to conclude that our frailty is not sufficient on its own to base a worldview upon.

In the end, it's all we have, because everything else we have comes to us through those frail senses. You have yet to address the impossibility of getting over this hump.

Why not? I can speak with absolute authority to my dyslexia and my color blindness, because it has been demonstrated again and again and again.

Once again, demonstration depends on the availability of tools. New tools may be available in the future, demonstrating frailties we don't have words for today.

On the contrary. I am not only accounting for it, I am arguing it as the basis to my argument.

Not really. You're assuming that "we", as a group, are capable of perfect testing. You assert time and time again that we can reliably detect all frailties, and yet, many of the shortcomings we see now were unknown, and indeed unknowable, in the past. What grounds can we have to believe there are not similar shortcomings in our understanding today?

Forgive me, but, again, you are affirming my argument by granting the fact that subjective primacy is insufficient to base a worldview upon.

No, I'm pointing out that the subjective case is totally unlike the objective case. I don't think you've come close to handling that horn of the dilemma, except by waving it away and trying to judge, objectively, a hypothetical subjective world.

How? So far, all you've stated about this god is that it is the "creator of the universe" and that it somehow "mandates" our morality.

That was a hypothetical, not a statement. Many people hold to that claim, although you've represented it poorly.

As mentioned previously, the rationales of logic and science demonstrate that we have no need for a "creator of the universe."

And here, finally, we run into Occam's Razor. It doesn't help you. Newton had no need for special relativity, and the ancient Greeks no need for a theory of valence, but these things were true nonetheless. Occam's Razor is a tool for limiting the scope of a search, not a tool for finding truth.

We can readily theorize and have ample evidence for a natural creation.

We have no evidence for or against a "natural" creation; the question is meaningless. The claim that creation is "natural" is unfalsifiable, and in practice irrelevant to science.

False. They will demonstrate (a) no need for a god to derive knowledge and (b) that such a being is logically unsound.

The former doesn't answer the question. The second is, as of yet, unproven. Certainly, this argument hasn't proven it. This argument depends on substantial misunderstandings of objectivity, fails entirely in the hypothetical case of subjective truth, and seems to depend a fair bit on the assumption that what we know now is everything true. Even assuming we ignore the wide variety of reasons people have found to believe in gods, you are no closer to showing that they would be wrong to do so, only that they may not have strong support for doing so. However, that doesn't make them wrong; it merely leaves the question unanswered.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

We are now entering the third and final round of the debate. The debate participants will next submit their concluding statements.

Jason

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Well, I think we've reached stalemate (and I've enjoyed it). We're clearly at crossed purposes regarding how we apply the terms "objective" and "subjective," but at least we both agree that the objective world most likely exists.

Your argument, as I see it, is that no matter what, we subjectively interpret the world around us. We can't escape it. Further, that what we see about this world is forever open to that interpretation and that interpretation is subject to fallibility, which I grant as well.

So, we have only a most likely, objectively existing universe in which we subjectively interpret its properties, often incorrectly (or, at least, incompletely). Further, there are some things we might not be able to "fully" know or ever know, kind of thing.

So, let's bring this back around to a "god." How can I grant, much less verify, the existence of a theoretically existing entity? God is a theoretically existing entity, just as you are, technically, a theoretically existing entity, so far as I have any absolute proof of. In that sense, "you" and a "god" are, therefore, equivalent to me, as an HST. You are both equally asserted. So, how can I differentiate, if at all?

You raised Democritus (indirectly); the one attributed with the theory of atoms and pointed out that his subjective assumption was not demonstrable in his time and, further, that he was incorrect in his initial assumption, even though thousands of years later his basic assumption (that there is a fundamental building block to reality) was demonstrated correct, at least partially. We're still searching for that fundamental quality, to the best of my knowledge, and think we've found it several times, but theories being what they are and all, it's ever changing.

Life is ever changing.

This is what we experience, but, as we both grant, experience can be and is, more often than not, faulty. It does not always present us with sufficient ways to examine the universe (again, my dyslexia and color-blindness).

So, again, how does that separate out the god concept?

Well, I would argue (and do) that it ultimately must come down to why Democritus believed his theory was true. Did he believe it to be true for aesthetic reasons? Mathematical reasons? Logical reasons? Because it was carefully deconstructed by his peers? Probably a combination of all of those.

The only salient thing that seems to be missing is whether or not he believed because he experienced atomic structure in the same manner that theists claim they experience a god.

Honestly, that's the only core difference I can see between anything you or I have presented. Theists have (what they think) are logical reasons for believing in a god and certainly aesthetic reasons and even mathematical ones (if the Antrhopic Principle nonsense can be called "mathematical") and, of course, peer affirmation.

So it seems to boil finally down to the efficacy of personal experience as a determining factor for a worldview as well as, to whom is that efficacy important? Let's go to Democritus.

Democritus didn't ultimately form his theory just for himself; he argued it objectively (i.e., to others), in order to test its veracity. Not just to declare what it was he believed, but to offer his theory up for critical analysis by others for the purpose of falsification. What are the flaws? What are the missing components? Does this theory fail in some way and, therefore, should it be discarded?

In other words, he "offered it up" to the world in general to evaluate and ruminate and consider and, most importantly, to demonstrate it to be false, if it could be.

All of us (if I can use those terms) are subject to personal interpretation, of course. Accordingly, we can believe any damn thing we want to believe, but are those beliefs subject to falsification? Do we allow for that (honestly) or do we, instead, deny that as a possibility as part and parcel to the concept of religious belief?

We can either assume objective primacy or we can deny it in favor of subjective interpretation (the efficacy of personal experience), but if we do, then we must also do it solely for personal, self-reflection, because there is no way to gauge it outside of that personal, self-reflection. It isn't offered up for the purposes of falsification, because no method of falsification has been structured into it. It is, at best, offered up for the purposes of evaluation and rumination and to consider, just like with Democritus, but denies falsification a priori.

Granted that the scientific method (assumed objective primacy) is flawed and does not always answer every question, but it does answer, directly, a tremendous amount of questions, primarily through this method of falsification; questions that personal experience alone can not answer, because there are no ways to verify them, outside of mere declaration of belief.

If I say, "I believe a god exists," then that's, ultimately, the beginning and end of the discussion, since no matter how specifically I try to define such a concept, it is rarely if ever honestly subject to dismissal as an inherent possibility of my personal declaration. Democritus stating, "I believe fundamental particles make up existence," however, is subject to dismissal as an inherent possibility of his personal declaration. Indeed, that's the main reason why he presented it and didn't just keep it to himself. It can be shown to be objectively "true" or "false," but only through the assumption of objective primacy; i.e., the assumption that other humans experience the same objectively existing universe and therefore can test or verify his personal declaration in an objectively "true" manner (however assumed it may be).

Inherent in theism, however, is the notion of "faith;" believing even if it means in spite of evidence to the contrary. It therefore necessarily denies "falsification through an assumption of objective primacy," stating, almost directly, this concept is not subject to falsification through assumed objective means, because it is purely subjective.

So, you're quite right, seebs; I agree. Concepts like religious beliefs are purely subjective, and therefore not subject to falsification or affirmation, for that matter, by the assumption of an objectively existing universe.

The problems is, this contradicts the very parameters positing a god concept mandates; namely, an absolutely, objectively existing and therefore unquestionably, objectively verifiable universe. If a god exists, then there is a mechanism for "absolute" knowledge; there is a mechanism for "absolute" morality; there is a way to "absolutely" (objectively) know "right" from "wrong" and "this" from "that" outside of our subjective interpretation.

Thus, subjectively experienced concepts like "love" would not just be an abstract concept open to personal interpretation; they would be absolute, concrete concepts, whose parameters are absolutely, objectively established by god's existence, with the only conceit being that god, for some reason, does not allow us to absolutely know those parameters.

As I see it, we're once again caught in a logical paradox. That which can only be subjectively experienced can not therefore result in an incontrovertibly objective universe, or there would never be any experiences that can only be subjectively experienced. All experience would be objectively grounded in an absolute and therefore absolutely verifiable, if only we are "allowed" to verify them. Thus, stating, "I believe in a god," would be instantly translated as, "A god factually exists for me to experience this feeling."

So, that seems to leave us with two insolvable problems. (1) We both agree that subjective interpretation is fallible and does exist as a problem in objectively verifying the universe, thus never affording us any absolute standard of objectivity, merely a "most likely" (aka, assumed) one (that nonetheless works 99% of the time for us to explain the majority of the parameters of our lives and our universe) and, (2) subjective interpretation should not be fallible, if a god exists, unless that god is just deliberately screwing with us by preventing us from absolutely, objectively verifying some thing or feeling.

We know that most religious dogmas point out the notion that we are fallible, but do they do this (a) as an observation of the human dilemma (brains in boxes), or, do they do this (b) in order to avoid the paradox (i.e., objective reality absolutely exists as a result of god's existence and therefore is knowable, were it not for god screwing with us so that we can't ever objectively verify this as an inherent design element)?

Well, I subjectively believe (in my assumed objectivity), that the HST should conclude number "(1)" in the above and "(b)" below.

It's too bad there isn't an objectively, verifiably existing god that would allow for us all (pun intended) to absolutely, objectively know this, but, again, if that were the case, then whether or not we subjectively experienced him or her (or it) would be moot.

[seebs]

We're clearly at crossed purposes regarding how we apply the terms "objective" and "subjective," but at least we both agree that the objective world most likely exists.

This agreement doesn't have logical force; the subjective case still needs to be proven, I think. It's a harder case to argue, because our intuition about what truth claims mean doesn't work there.

So, let's bring this back around to a "god." How can I grant, much less verify, the existence of a theoretically existing entity?

I don't know. The question is how you can prove conclusively that belief in such an entity is logically inconsistent. We grant lots of things which are theoretical based on varying degrees of evidence, especially when we're talking about philosophy.

In other words, he "offered it up" to the world in general to evaluate and ruminate and consider and, most importantly, to demonstrate it to be false, if it could be.

That is generally the case with scientific claims. Claims about religion are not a subset of scientific claims.

Accordingly, we can believe any damn thing we want to believe, but are those beliefs subject to falsification? Do we allow for that (honestly) or do we, instead, deny that as a possibility as part and parcel to the concept of religious belief?

You seem to be going towards verificationism here. However, I don't think you've made the case that things which cannot be verified should be rejected. Verificationism ultimately fails; our verifications depend on untestable claims. Verificationism itself is unverifiable.

There is a useful distinction to be drawn between beliefs merely unsupported by evidence, and beliefs contradicted by it.

We can either assume objective primacy or we can deny it in favor of subjective interpretation (the efficacy of personal experience), but if we do, then we must also do it solely for personal, self-reflection, because there is no way to gauge it outside of that personal, self-reflection.

There is no scientific way to do so. However, there are ways to explore such issues and come to a sense of which outcomes we think are most likely. This is useful. For instance, it appears that discussion of moral issues leads people to what everyone seems to agree is a better sense of these issues, even though they're not subject to strict verification. Nonetheless, consideration seems to help. The same thing is reported about religious experience.

It is, at best, offered up for the purposes of evaluation and rumination and to consider, just like with Democritus, but denies falsification a priori.

It denies empirical falsification using scientific methods. It allows for a number of other methods for suggesting which beliefs are true or false, as does any branch of philosophy.

If I say, "I believe a god exists," then that's, ultimately, the beginning and end of the discussion, since no matter how specifically I try to define such a concept, it is rarely if ever honestly subject to dismissal as an inherent possibility of my personal declaration.

I think the number of people whose philosophical or religious beliefs change over time suggests that many such claims are subject to evaluation and dismissal. It may not be inherent in every such claim, but many do get evaluated, and some dismissed.

It therefore necessarily denies "falsification through an assumption of objective primacy," stating, almost directly, this concept is not subject to falsification through assumed objective means, because it is purely subjective.

Many people simply affirm things in the absence of any evidence at all, or given only weak evidence; not in opposition to evidence. However, the claim is not that the belief is subjective, but that it is unverifiable. These are different claims!

The problem is, this contradicts the very parameters positing a god concept mandates; namely, an absolutely, objectively existing and therefore unquestionably, objectively verifiable universe.

It's not unquestionable; I question it. Indeed, you have granted earlier that what we both believe is probably an objective universe is not entirely verifiable. Once again, I point out issues such as Goedel's work, and the understood limits of scientific practice as we understand it; we know there are things we cannot verify.

If a god exists, then there is a mechanism for "absolute" knowledge; there is a mechanism for "absolute" morality; there is a way to "absolutely" (objectively) know "right" from "wrong" and "this" from "that" outside of our subjective interpretation.

There is a way for such things to be known; there may not be a way for us to know them. At this point, you're conflating "objective truth" with "certain knowledge". Truth and knowledge are separate concepts; it is possible for something to be objectively true, but for us to only have speculation about it.

All experience would be objectively grounded in an absolute and therefore absolutely verifiable, if only we are "allowed" to verify them. Thus, stating, "I believe in a god," would be instantly translated as, "A god factually exists for me to experience this feeling."

That's what people generally mean by it. What we can't do is verify it. It's not obvious to me that "grounded in an absolute" leads to "absolutely verifiable".

(1) We both agree that subjective interpretation is fallible and does exist as a problem in objectively verifying the universe, thus never affording us any absolute standard of objectivity, merely a "most likely" (aka, assumed) one (that nonetheless works 99% of the time for us to explain the majority of the parameters of our lives and our universe)

It is indeed a problem in objective verification, which makes that makes a poor standard for some claims.

and, (2) subjective interpretation should not be fallible, if a god exists, unless that god is just deliberately screwing with us by preventing us from absolutely, objectively verifying some thing or feeling.

Certain things may be unverifiable by our nature; we are finite, and not omniscient. This isn't really a problem; all it disproves is a god with the additional attribute "always ensures that everyone has access to perfect knowledge and verification." I don't even know that such a concept is logically consistent, let alone practical.

We know that most religious dogmas point out the notion that we are fallible, but do they do this (a) as an observation of the human dilemma (brains in boxes), or, do they do this (b) in order to avoid the paradox (i.e., objective reality absolutely exists as a result of god's existence and therefore is knowable, were it not for god screwing with us so that we can't ever objectively verify this as an inherent design element)?

I think they do it for the much more obvious reason, (c), that it is empirically obvious to everyone that our experiences and observations are fallible and inaccurate. Furthermore, human fallibility in religion is more about moral standards than epistemology; it refers to the observation that most people have moral standards which they find themselves falling short of.

Well, I subjectively believe (in my assumed objectivity), that the HST should conclude number "(1)" in the above and "(b)" below.

Human fallibility is a pragmatic observation made by many people, in many different philosophical traditions. I can imagine that an HST might conclude (b), but it seems to me that this is most likely rooted more in a misunderstanding of the methods and practices of theology. (1) and (2) aren't even necessarily in conflict, if I've understood them correctly.

It's too bad there isn't an objectively, verifiably existing god that would allow for us all (pun intended) to absolutely, objectively know this, but, again, if that were the case, then whether or not we subjectively experienced him or her (or it) would be moot.

Once again, you seem to be conflating objective existence with verifiable existence. Theologians have put some thought into the question of why a god might be unverifiable; the first answer they mostly end up with is that, since nothing is really verifiable, why should God be any different?

There are various arguments to be had about why God might or might not be verifiable. However, the lack of verifiability is not a barrier to accepting the claim for many people, and no objective reason has been provided for which it should be.

In short, assuming that the world we are in is an objective reality, this provides no logical barrier to religious belief. Belief in God is not logically incompatible with the belief that the world we experience is objectively real; it may not be mandated, but it is not contradicted.

Thanks for the debate!

[Silent Dave]

This concludes the debate. Thanks to Koyaanisqatsi and Seebs for their participation.


Dave