On Two Reviews of Atheism, Meaning, and Morality, by Michael Martin

[Tom Wanchick]

In his "On Two Reviews Atheism, Meaning, and Morality", Dr. Michael Martin says that moral properties are *relational*. He draws an analogy:

"one might argue that aesthetic worth is neither in a work of art nor invented by the viewer, rather it is a relational property, the feeling of aesthetic satisfaction of a viewer who has certain properties such as sensitivity, knowledge of art, and so on in relation to viewing the work of art."

Here's my query: even if aesthetic value were relational in this sense, shouldn't we wonder why an Ideal Observer of art would find one work of art beautiful and another as mediocre?

Similarly with morality. An Ideal Observer would apparently disapprove of hunting humans, but not hunting deer (only the former seems morally wrong). But then aren't we left wondering why humans are privileged in this way in the eyes of the Ideal Observer? The special moral status of humans seems to go unexplained.

I know Dr. Martin is busy, so I'll leave my question at this without any further questions or replies.

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[Michael Martin]

The author wonders why the IO would apparently disapprove of hunting human beings but not hunting deer. Why, it is asked, are human privileged in the eyes of IO? The special moral status of human beings seems to go unexplained.

But who said human beings have a special moral status according to IO theory? I certainly did not. The IO theory is a metaethical theory: it tells us what moral terms mean and how one justifies moral statements. The theory itself does not entail normative conclusions. According to the IO what is morally wrong is what an IO would disapprove of under ideal condition: complete knowledge, complete empathy, complete unbiasedness etc. Whether a being with these properties would make the distinction between humans and animals suggested by the author is not obvious. Maybe yes, maybe no. Indeed, the IO may not make the distinction suggested by the author but one that cuts across the human-animal divide: the IO might not disapprove of killing some human beings, for example, severely brain damaged humans while it might disapprove of killing some animals, for example, dolphins and chimps.

Despite the author's confusion an interesting point is raised indirectly. According to the IO Theory the moral status of human and animals is not based directly on their properties but in the reaction of IO to these properties. Some critics, for example, Jeff Lowder, find this wrong and think the theory has things backwards. I have tried to answer this criticism in my article.



Regards

Michael Martin