Is it Rational to Believe in Induction?

[Thomas Ash]

Is it Rational to Believe in Induction? (http://www.bigissueground.com/philosophy/ash-induction.shtml)

Here's an essay by me on Big Issue Ground (http://www.bigissueground.com/), my website, on the age-old (well, Hume-old, at least) riddle of induction (which is described in the essay - I won't try to describe it here!) Does anyone have any comments, or just thoughts on this topic which arise from reading the essay? Induction seems to be little discussed here.

[theophilus]

It's always worked up til now.

[Hugo Holbling]

I discussed induction in a thread (http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewtopic.php?t=17) of my own, Thomas, but your treatment is very interesting. I thought you were unfair in your comparison with faith, though.

I also wanted to tell theo that i very much enjoyed that remark. :notworthy

[Mullibok]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
I also wanted to tell theo that i very much enjoyed that remark. :notworthy

Ditto.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
I discussed induction in a thread (http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewtopic.php?t=17) of my own, Thomas, but your treatment is very interesting. I thought you were unfair in your comparison with faith, though.

I also wanted to tell theo that i very much enjoyed that remark. :notworthy

I felt sorry for Thomas because no one had responded to his post, but it's nice to know I'm good for something (even if it is only comic relief).

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by theophilus
I felt sorry for Thomas because no one had responded to his post, but it's nice to know I'm good for something (even if it is only comic relief).

No need to feel sorry for me! Even after I toiled away for hours and hours reading for that essay and writing it, only to get no recognition...

:boohoo:

( ;) - actually I write these essays for my philosophy degree, so I'd do them anyway. And induction is a subject that it's hard to get any headway with, so I wasn't expecting a great response to this one. But I appreciate the sentiment anyway... :D )

By the way, you do get why your statement was considered amusing, don't you? It was because the very problem of induction is tahat we can't justify thinking that some principle that has always worked up till now will carry on working, apart from by saying that it's always carried on work... up till now. Which is obviously circular. :eek: Hence the riddle that what we consider some of our most rational inferences (including a lot of science) seem to completely lack rational justification. The question is: is belief in induction still rational, then? If not, does that mean it's irrational? This all depends on what you mean by 'rational' and 'irrational.' I'd be curious to know what anyone thinks of this.

[paul30]

No, it is not rational to believe in induction.

But all living creatures do so.

Sometimes it works; sometimes it doesn't.

Also, what else is there?

[theophilus]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by paul30
No, it is not rational to believe in induction.

But all living creatures do so.

ALL living creatures? Turtles?

Sometimes it works; sometimes it doesn't.

How do you know which is which?

Also, what else is there?

How about total skepticism?

[theophilus]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Thomas Ash
By the way, you do get why your statement was considered amusing, don't you?


Yeah, I kinda had that in mind.

[John Page]

Nice topic. I've spewed forth on this one before, but here goes again..... quoting from Hugo's link.
Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
To look at this further, let’s lay out the information we have in a logical form using what we learned in the last thread from Clutch:

Premise 1: The first sheep was white.
P2: The second sheep was white.
…
P501: The five hundredth and first sheep was white.
(And so on.)

Conclusion: All sheep are white.

The problem is that none of the premises contain the conclusion and all of them are moreover the same in form, so we’re relying on a kind of brute force of numbers. Suppose we saw another thousand sheep, all of which were also white. Are we justified then? Again, apparently we aren’t because in fact some sheep aren’t white? Is there any way around this difficulty?

My views is as follows:

1. There are no absolute truths, a truth is in relation to the truth telling system employed.
2. Minds contain archetypes of objects and may update or modify these archetypes.
3. An archetype emerges in the mind inductively when a sufficient number of instances of a form are encountered. (The sufficient number can vary).
4. A person whose only direct experience and other knowledge of all (real) sheep is of white sheep may include the property "white" in the archetype. That is, white is included in the working definition of a sheep.
5. Once the mind has developed its concept of a sheep to stage 4 above, deductive truths can appear because we now have a definition upon which to base "coherent" statements about the world. IOW, we start to assert our definition of a sheep upon the world.
5. Of course, subsequent experience can bring us to a realization that our mental archetypes of the world may be flawed, and there are black sheep. When we learn this, by further induction based on observation we modify our category definition for sheep to include the exceptional case of real black sheep.

In this manner, I see deduction as subsequent to induction. Through induction we observe and modify our conceptions of the world and through deduction we assert our presuppositions upon the same world.

This is intersubjectivity in motion. I believe this approach explains the nature of truths - truths can only arise once we have entered into the deductive stage (5 above) of "concretizing" our concepts in order that we may say things like "(It is true that) a sheep is a four legged mammal that goes bleat and is white, although exceptionally may be black".

Comments welcome.

Cheers, John

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by John Page
1. There are no absolute truths...
Are you absolutely sure this is true? :D

[theophilus]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by John Page
Nice topic. I've spewed forth on this one before, but here goes again..... quoting from Hugo's link.

My views is as follows:

1. There are no absolute truths, a truth is in relation to the truth telling system employed.
2. Minds contain archetypes of objects and may update or modify these archetypes.
3. An archetype emerges in the mind inductively when a sufficient number of instances of a form are encountered. (The sufficient number can vary).
4. A person whose only direct experience and other knowledge of all (real) sheep is of white sheep may include the property "white" in the archetype. That is, white is included in the working definition of a sheep.
5. Once the mind has developed its concept of a sheep to stage 4 above, deductive truths can appear because we now have a definition upon which to base "coherent" statements about the world. IOW, we start to assert our definition of a sheep upon the world.
5. Of course, subsequent experience can bring us to a realization that our mental archetypes of the world may be flawed, and there are black sheep. When we learn this, by further induction based on observation we modify our category definition for sheep to include the exceptional case of real black sheep.

In this manner, I see deduction as subsequent to induction. Through induction we observe and modify our conceptions of the world and through deduction we assert our presuppositions upon the same world.

This is intersubjectivity in motion. I believe this approach explains the nature of truths - truths can only arise once we have entered into the deductive stage (5 above) of "concretizing" our concepts in order that we may say things like "(It is true that) a sheep is a four legged mammal that goes bleat and is white, although exceptionally may be black".

Comments welcome.

Cheers, John

Apart from the obvious problem of incoherence pointed out by ex-xians above (it is the self-destructive foundation of PostModernism), it seems that what your argument boils down to is "there is no absolute truth because there is no premanent reality," or more accurately, there is no reality at all.
"Reality" is only/merely the current state of experience.
The problem with basing "truth" (even truth within a system) on experience is that there is no such thing as common or shared experience, i.e., your experience is not my experience even though we may have the same object in view.
Thus, truth becomes completely personal and, therefore, meaningless (a tautology), knowledge becomes impossible as does meaningful communication.

So, this theory of truth as inductive flux makes this discussion inexplicable.

[theophilus]

I know I'll get slammed for trying to "derail" the discussion but I don't want to give the impression that I am a skeptic.

Based on the foundation of the character and purpose of God revealed in scripture, it is rational to assume the general validity of induction.

[John Page]

Originally posted by ex-xian
Are you absolutely sure this is true? :D
Pretty darned sure, but others are not, so its false for them.....

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
Apart from the obvious problem of incoherence pointed out by ex-xians above (it is the self-destructive foundation of PostModernism)...
There is no problem, and I've responded separately to ex-xian's post - the usual rejoinder to a relativistic stance. The fact that you oppose my view strengthens it rather than weakens it - I am merely stating my view and not claiming it is universal.

Your view, which is presumably that absolute truths do exist, is lacking in any examples. Any claim for it to be the rightful or true view is therefore unsupportable.
Originally posted by theophilus
....it seems that what your argument boils down to is "there is no absolute truth because there is no premanent reality," or more accurately, there is no reality at all.
Sorry, you misunderstand my position. There is no fixed reality as far as I'm aware. We only know things in relation to other things. Some of the relations between things seem to be more persistent than others but they are, nevertheless, observed relations.
Originally posted by theophilus
The problem with basing "truth" (even truth within a system) on experience is that there is no such thing as common or shared experience, i.e., your experience is not my experience even though we may have the same object in view.
We do share experience IMO as described in the post of mine that you quote!!! wherein I describe a process by which concepts are share intersubjectively and thence experience.

I think my view can be shown to be valid experimentally. Our minds develop concepts as a result of experience (i.e. they can be taught and learned). Because our concepts differ slightly it then becomes possible for miscommunication to occur. If, however, we know truth about objects through direct experience then a strict objectivist appraoch has no explanation for the difference in understandings.
Originally posted by theophilus
Thus, truth becomes completely personal and, therefore, meaningless (a tautology), knowledge becomes impossible as does meaningful communication.
If there were no communication then yes, we would be trapped inside our personal reality and one's truth would be meaningless to another. IOW your statement supports my view.

Deductive truths are tautologies, self-fulfilling definitions. I don't see how you reach your assertion that knowledge becomes impossible under my schema. Maybe that's to do with a mistaken belief that I don't subscribe to a common external reality (which we refer to as "reality :)) - its only the term objective reality that I reject.
Originally posted by theophilus
So, this theory of truth as inductive flux makes this discussion inexplicable.
Hmmmm. One's inductions are one's own subjective view driven by one's own experience, and not necessarily conscious experience at that. The absolute truth assertion is inexplicable to me - one ends up in a regression or having to believe its "turtles all the way down." Demonstrably truth does differ between us as this debate is witness.

Cheers, John

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by John Page
Pretty darned sure, but others are not, so its false for them.....
This isn't what you asserted, but then my question wasn't a good one. Here's your statement

1. There are no absolute truths, a truth is in relation to the truth telling system employed.
A better question for me to have asked would have been, "Is this statement absolutely true?"

If it is, then it's self-contradictory. If it is not, then the truth value of this statement can change. Thus, there would be situations in which there are absolute truths. Once again, a contradiction. Your "out"...
There is no problem, and I've responded separately to ex-xian's post - the usual rejoinder to a relativistic stance. The fact that you oppose my view strengthens it rather than weakens it - I am merely stating my view and not claiming it is universal.

Doesn't help you. The initial statement is not an assertion of an opinion. It is a statement of fact. If you had said, "It's my opinon that no absolute truths exist" you could have replied with
Pretty darned sure, but others are not, so its false for them.....and it would have been a defensible position.

[davidm]

I'm having a hard time seeing exactly why the problem of induction is such a big problem. I understand that it is a problem philosophically, in the effort to account for how we acquire knowledge and whether our knowledge can be said to be reliable. I'm just wondering how it is a problem in the real world.

If I see a hundred sheep and all of them are white, I might provisionally conclude that all sheep are white. If I encounter a black sheep, I must modify my conclusion. If I am trying to devleop a theory of sheep, I could develop a theory that explains "all white sheep." Encountering a black sheep, however, will falsify the theory; and in that case, I would have to develop a theory of sheep that explains both white and black sheep. I think this is just science.

Moving from sheep to the laws of physics, it seems as if the universe is 13.6 billion years old and that the laws of physics have been the same since t=0. I expect that they will continue to be the same; am I justified in that inference? I think that I am; certainly more so than I would be justified in encountering 100 white sheep, and thinking therefore that all sheep everywhere are white.

I think it is just more reasonable to conclude that the laws of physics will continue as they are, than it is to think that tomorrow morning, for example, the sun will fail to rise, and all objects bigger than a boulder will slowly levitate into the air, eventually disappearing into space. It seems that for the latter to happen would require some special mechanism to suddenly appear that has never appeared before in 13.6 billion years. Couldn't we invoke Occham's Razor and say it is a priori unlikely that such a mechanism will suddenly descend into the world to rearrange physics?

Or am I must misunderstanding the whole problem? :confused:

[John Page]

Originally posted by ex-xian
This isn't what you asserted, but then my question wasn't a good one. Here's your statement
:confused: I thought I was being consistent - asserting there are no absolute truths but being pretty darned sure about it....
Originally posted by ex-xian
A better question for me to have asked would have been, "Is this statement absolutely true?"

If it is, then it's self-contradictory. If it is not, then the truth value of this statement can change. Thus, there would be situations in which there are absolute truths. Once again, a contradiction.
An absolute truth must apply in all situations and the answer to your question is not always yes. I fail to see the contradiction.

I suspect you may think there is a contradiction because of a belief in truth having a "universal" appearance. To the contrary, truths are "local" to the thinker and intersubjective with like-minded folk. Example, if all humans believed that the King of France is bald (or x, whatever) then this typifies the human condition, it does not make x true for bats, aliens.
Originally posted by ex-xian
Doesn't help you. The initial statement is not an assertion of an opinion. It is a statement of fact. If you had said, "It's my opinon that no absolute truths exist" you could have replied with.....
Its all opinion. Facts may have the appearance of universal truths but a claim to know a fact remains a subjective view. Everything that anybody says can be taken as implicitly prefaced by "I think that..." or "I believe that..."

[Amos]

Originally posted by John Page

Your view, which is presumably that absolute truths do exist, is lacking in any examples. Any claim for it to be the rightful or true view is therefore unsupportable.



In science the hypothesis always exists before the experiment is made and this alone proves that an absolute truth exists. The absolute truth is truth in itself and beauty is what maintains this truth wherefore science is beautiful when we can cristalize our concept of truth that existed already before the test was made . . . or science could not be rewarding and beautiful.

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by John Page
:confused: I thought I was being consistent - asserting there are no absolute truths but being pretty darned sure about it....

An absolute truth must apply in all situations and the answer to your question is not always yes. I fail to see the contradiction.
You said, "There are no absolute truths."
I asked, "Is this statement absolutely true?"

If you answer yes, then your statement becomes an absolute.
If you answer no, then the statement "There are no absolute truths" is sometimes not true. Therefore, there would be times when there would be absolute truths. Then if there are sometimes absolute truths, this contradicts your initial position that there are no absolute truths.

I suspect you may think there is a contradiction because of a belief in truth having a "universal" appearance. To the contrary, truths are "local" to the thinker and intersubjective with like-minded folk. Example, if all humans believed that the King of France is bald (or x, whatever) then this typifies the human condition, it does not make x true for bats, aliens.
Are you saying that x is "all humans believe that the King of France is bald" or is x "the King of France is bald?" If the former, then the position of the bats is irrelevent, if the latter, the positon of the bats is likewise irrelevent. Furthermore, as it stands, the statement "the King of France is bald" seems to be undecidable in terms of its truth value for the statement is not well defined.

If you had phrased in the classic way, "The present King of France is bald" then I would agree that this statment has no absolute truth value as the adjective "present" would cause the statement to be in a constant state of flux.

Its all opinion. Facts may have the appearance of universal truths but a claim to know a fact remains a subjective view. Everything that anybody says can be taken as implicitly prefaced by "I think that..." or "I believe that..."
Of course it's all opinion, but you made what was a statement of fact, then equivocated by implying that it was a statement of preference.

[Thomas Ash]

Hi John, or should I say King ToiletPaper III of Wipeout? ;)

The problem with your account as it applies to induction (I'm not going itno the problems with your no-absolute-truth view for fear of derailing this thread... but maybe another time :p ) is that it provides no good reason, even from the private, subjective point of view, for someone to believe in induction, and stake something (say a wager of $500) on it. Even with your account in hand a shepherd (or, better, a physicist - as I point out in my essay, the colour of animals is a poor topic for induction, as our experience shows us that this often varies, and you often get mutants like albinos) would never risk a dollar of his on the truth of induction. He still has no reason even for thinking that it's more likely that the natural law will hold up tomorrow than that it won't. And we want some such reason.

Best wishes,

Thomas

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by davidm
Moving from sheep to the laws of physics, it seems as if the universe is 13.6 billion years old and that the laws of physics have been the same since t=0. I expect that they will continue to be the same; am I justified in that inference? I think that I am; certainly more so than I would be justified in encountering 100 white sheep, and thinking therefore that all sheep everywhere are white.

I think it is just more reasonable to conclude that the laws of physics will continue as they are, than it is to think that tomorrow morning, for example, the sun will fail to rise, and all objects bigger than a boulder will slowly levitate into the air, eventually disappearing into space. It seems that for the latter to happen would require some special mechanism to suddenly appear that has never appeared before in 13.6 billion years. Couldn't we invoke Occham's Razor and say it is a priori unlikely that such a mechanism will suddenly descend into the world to rearrange physics?

Hi David,

I'm glad you moved from the sheep! (see above for why...)

The problem is, you've still given us no reason for thinking that the laws of nature not changing is any more likely than them changing. The problem of induction is important because no one has ever managed to do so, and there's very good philosophical reason for thinking that giving any such reason is simpossible (because it would have to be circular, unless you believe in Cartesian a priori jiggerypokery - see my essay.)

You kind of misunderstand the problem when you say "It seems that for the latter to happen would require some special mechanism to suddenly appear that has never appeared before in 13.6 billion years." Firstly, it doesn't require a special mechanism - remember that we're no longer taking the baic laws of nature as constant, so things could just change without any mechanism, and that would be that. When you say this event "has never appeared before in 13.6 billion years", you're obviously being circular and assuming that induction is acceptable to justify induction. As for Occam's razor, see my thread on why it's not justifiable. (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=72166&perpage=25&pagenumber=1) Why is a universe with the kind of straightjacketing, non time-dependent (eg. no grues) natural laws we think there are objectively 'simpler' than one where there are no such laws, anyway?

Best, Thomas

[ex-xian]

I've copied the discussion regarding absolute truth to this thread, http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=72545. The discussion was going far afield from the OP, and I didn't want to derail it any further.

Please post comments re: absoute truth in the thread at the above link.

[John Page]

Hi Moshat:
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
He still has no reason even for thinking that it's more likely that the natural law will hold up tomorrow than that it won't. And we want some such reason.
Two points:

1. Belief need not be rational. How do you determine whether soemthing is rational - and is that the same as reasonable?
2. What do you mean by "natural law"?

Cheers, John

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
Hi Moshat:

:D (actually, Moshat sounds as though it might be a genuine name, possibly Jewish...)

1. Belief need not be rational. How do you determine whether soemthing is rational - and is that the same as reasonable?

Isn't this opening a pit of slithery things for you to fall into? Once you open this up, don't you fall into the anything goes nightmare you evil relativists are always accused of creating ;) . Honestly, isn't this a gift you're handing to Christians, etc. in debates?

2. What do you mean by "natural law"?

Nothing dodgy or Catholic ;) . I just mean the same thing as 'laws of nature' - the physical laws like thermodynamics, etc. that people assume exist, but induction makes us sceptical about.

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
(actually, Moshat sounds as though it might be a genuine name, possibly Jewish...)
:), yes, like Abendygo.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Isn't this opening a pit of slithery things for you to fall into? Once you open this up, don't you fall into the anything goes nightmare you evil relativists are always accused of creating ;) . Honestly, isn't this a gift you're handing to Christians, etc. in debates?
No, because then the respondent has to explain why (they believe) their belief is rational. Of course, what anyone thinks is rational is their subjective decision however if the proponent's "rationality" can be shown to be inconsistent there is an opening. IOW, if I can get them to question their own reasoning half the battle is won - and the trojan horse for that is to throw up my own beliefs for ridicule, but when they ridicule the thereby expose their own thought processes.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Nothing dodgy or Catholic ;) . I just mean the same thing as 'laws of nature' - the physical laws like thermodynamics, etc. that people assume exist, but induction makes us sceptical about.
I'm being picky, but do you think it better to consider them as "laws of the human mind about nature, nature being defined as what the human mind cannot change."?

It is in this context that I believe induction to be a manifestation of brain processes, deduction being a process that structures information learned inductively into assertoric truths about the world. I cannot for the life of me see how it is irrational to believe in induction.

Cheers, John

[davidm]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash


You kind of misunderstand the problem when you say "It seems that for the latter to happen would require some special mechanism to suddenly appear that has never appeared before in 13.6 billion years." Firstly, it doesn't require a special mechanism - remember that we're no longer taking the baic laws of nature as constant, so things could just change without any mechanism, and that would be that.

We're not taking the basic laws of nature as constant because we can't justify them inductively? If scientists discovered Principle X, which says that that laws of physics can never change, does that mean we just push the problem back one level, to ask, How can we know that Principle X will never change?

When you say this event "has never appeared before in 13.6 billion years", you're obviously being circular and assuming that induction is acceptable to justify induction.

Yes, I see that it is circular. I think in your essay you also say we can't justify deductive reasoning with a deductive proof, and anyway, deductive reasoning may itself rest on unjustifiable induction. What are you trying to do, ruin knowledge? :eek:

I have a few questions: Don't we already know for sure that it's impossible to justify induction? That is, there is no reason to expect that one day a philosopher will point to some new discovery and say, ah, ha! There is the justification!

If we can't justify inductive reasoning, or deductive for that matter, what follows from that? Are there any explicit implications in the real world? Mightn't be that we've just found that knowledge can never justify its own processes? Speaking for myself, I don't go to bed at night worrying about whether the sun will come up tomorrow.

As for your take on Occham's Razor, I haven't had a chance to read that thread yet, so I'll defer comment.

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
No, because then the respondent has to explain why (they believe) their belief is rational. Of course, what anyone thinks is rational is their subjective decision however if the proponent's "rationality" can be shown to be inconsistent there is an opening. IOW, if I can get them to question their own reasoning half the battle is won - and the trojan horse for that is to throw up my own beliefs for ridicule, but when they ridicule the thereby expose their own thought processes.

Yes, this is fair enough. It does assume that, though you say no beliefs are absolutely true (IIRC), some (at least the inconsistent, incoherent ones) are absolutely false. Or maybe it doesn't... perhaps all you're saying is tht they are psychologically unholdable and that you can persaude people on these lines to give them up. Hmm... intriguing.

Of course, one problem I can see with this is that you could esily come up with some set of theist beliefs which are perfectly self-consistent. There'd have to be some heavy modification of the way they looked at the world, and they probably couldn't hold onto all the standard Christian doctrine, but it should be quite possible. In this case, you have no line of attack to a genuinely mistaken belief, while more objectively-minded atheists can still appeal to lack of evidence, etc.

I'm being picky, but do you think it better to consider them as "laws of the human mind about nature, nature being defined as what the human mind cannot change."?

It is in this context that I believe induction to be a manifestation of brain processes, deduction being a process that structures information learned inductively into assertoric truths about the world. I cannot for the life of me see how it is irrational to believe in induction.

Cheers, John

Well, you can see them as such, and in this case the problem of induction loses its sting. However, it is not "laws of the human mind about nature, nature being defined as what the human mind cannot change", but "genuine laws of nature, a part of the universe" that induction (and science, surely?) claims to reveal, and this is where the problem comes in. Anyway, if you just believe in "laws of the human mind about nature, nature being defined as what the human mind cannot change" then you've lost the security of having a good reason to think that the sun will come up tomorrow, so are in the same (problematic) position as someone who refuses to believe in (conventionally defined) induction.

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by davidm
We're not taking the basic laws of nature as constant because we can't justify them inductively? If scientists discovered Principle X, which says that that laws of physics can never change, does that mean we just push the problem back one level, to ask, How can we know that Principle X will never change?

The only way to discover or infer general principles like X is induction. But we can't seem to justify induction, so can't give a rational reason for believing in these principles in the first place. That's the problem. As for Principle X not changing, it's better to phrase it as: How can we know that Principle X, which involves the sun always rising, is true, rather than Principle Y, which involves it rising until June 2004 and then suddenly zipping off to Orion, or Principle Z, or...?

Yes, I see that it is circular. I think in your essay you also say we can't justify deductive reasoning with a deductive proof, and anyway, deductive reasoning may itself rest on unjustifiable induction. What are you trying to do, ruin knowledge? :eek:

Yep - bwahahahah! :p (damn, where is that devil smiley when you need it? ;) ) Though my comments in the essay on deduction are mainly intended to show that its a mistake to think that we can justify these basic 'ductions', so we have to find a reason for choosing to adopt deduction and induction without leaving the doors open to a host of crazies. I'm sceptical about how well I succeeded, which is not to say that I'm sure I failed. See the latter half of my essay...

I have a few questions: Don't we already know for sure that it's impossible to justify induction? That is, there is no reason to expect that one day a philosopher will point to some new discovery and say, ah, ha! There is the justification!

Yes, we do know almost for sure that it's in principle impossible to justify it, unless you have a high opinion of what we can accomplish a priori, a la Descartes (which I don't...)

If we can't justify inductive reasoning, or deductive for that matter, what follows from that? Are there any explicit implications in the real world? Mightn't be that we've just found that knowledge can never justify its own processes? Speaking for myself, I don't go to bed at night worrying about whether the sun will come up tomorrow.

Me neither. It's just a little worrying (especially to people who respect reason and want to reject theism and faith on those grounds - that's why infidels should be worried by this) that reason can't give us any reeason to prefer X AT ALL over the obviously (well, seemingly) crazy Y.

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Yes, this is fair enough. It does assume that, though you say no beliefs are absolutely true (IIRC), some (at least the inconsistent, incoherent ones) are absolutely false.
They could still be held true somewhere else in the universe, so not absoluetly false.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Of course, one problem I can see with this is that you could esily come up with some set of theist beliefs which are perfectly self-consistent.
And easily some non-theist set of beliefs that are self-consistent... so I don't see this as an issue only concerning EoG, hence relativism.Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Anyway, if you just believe in "laws of the human mind about nature, nature being defined as what the human mind cannot change" then you've lost the security of having a good reason to think that the sun will come up tomorrow, so are in the same (problematic) position as someone who refuses to believe in (conventionally defined) induction.
Not really, I think the sun will come up tomorrow because it is one of the things that imagination alone cannot change. Of course, the sun will not come up tomorrow if the earth is obliterated..... deductive truths only hold if nothing else changes, they only apply to the domain for which they are axioms... so they are no absolute.

Cheers, John

[davidm]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash



Me neither. It's just a little worrying (especially to people who respect reason and want to reject theism and faith on those grounds - that's why infidels should be worried by this) that reason can't give us any reeason to prefer X AT ALL over the obviously (well, seemingly) crazy Y.

I don't see how theism resolves this problem. To paraphrase your example above:

The only way to discover or infer general principles like God is induction. But we can't seem to justify induction, so can't give a rational reason for believing in these principles in the first place. That's the problem. As for God not changing, it's better to phrase it as: How can we know that God, which involves the sun always rising, is true, rather than No God, which involves it rising until June 2004 and then suddenly zipping off to Orion, or No God 2, or...?

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by John Page
They could still be held true somewhere else in the universe, so not absoluetly false.

And easily some non-theist set of beliefs that are self-consistent... so I don't see this as an issue only concerning EoG, hence relativism.

But suppose that someone starts preaching to people a set of doctrines called X, and winning converts among everyone you know. The doctrines in X are completely barmy, and involve things like the fossil record being an elaborate hoax, there being a Loch Ness monster, there being malevolent pixies attacking people who buy toothpaste made by brands other than those who sponsor this guy, etc. It is quite possible for a sceptic to argue convincingly against these beliefs, and show how he's just defrauding people. However, because the doctrines are at least self-consistent, you have no way to argue against them. Don't you want some way of doing so?

Not really, I think the sun will come up tomorrow because it is one of the things that imagination alone cannot change. Of course, the sun will not come up tomorrow if the earth is obliterated..... deductive truths only hold if nothing else changes, they only apply to the domain for which they are axioms... so they are no absolute.

Cheers, John

But you still lack any good reason for thinking the sun will rise. Your closing the curtains at night so it doesn't wake you up is then irrational - so why do you do it? And maybe imagination can change the sun coming up - after all, it's only from induction that you 'know' that you don't have psychic control over it...

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by davidm
I don't see how theism resolves this problem. To paraphrase your example above:

The only way to discover or infer general principles like God is induction. But we can't seem to justify induction, so can't give a rational reason for believing in these principles in the first place. That's the problem. As for God not changing, it's better to phrase it as: How can we know that God, which involves the sun always rising, is true, rather than No God, which involves it rising until June 2004 and then suddenly zipping off to Orion, or No God 2, or...?

No, theism can't resolve this problem. What I meant by saying this was a particular problem for atheists and rationalists is that we typically set so much store by the use of reason and reason alone for defending opinions. We tend to dismiss any opinion or methodolgy that doesn't have a rational foundation, like faith. But induction seems to lack a rational foundation, yet it something that we all use at a very basic level. So we need some reason to distinguish induction and faith, which I attempt (that being the operative word) to do in my essay.

[John Page]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
It is quite possible for a sceptic to argue convincingly against these beliefs, and show how he's just defrauding people. However, because the doctrines are at least self-consistent, you have no way to argue against them.
I would argue by "appeal to reality".
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Don't you want some way of doing so?
Just because "I want" doesn't make it so - same as if anyone else "wants"
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
But you still lack any good reason for thinking the sun will rise.
Whether a reason is "good" or not is a subjective judgement.
Originally posted by Thomas Ash
Your closing the curtains at night so it doesn't wake you up is then irrational - so why do you do it? And maybe imagination can change the sun coming up - after all, it's only from induction that you 'know' that you don't have psychic control over it...
Empiricism rules, OK! But this could be my delusion......

[theophilus]

Originally posted by davidm
I don't see how theism resolves this problem. To paraphrase your example above:

The only way to discover or infer general principles like God is induction. But we can't seem to justify induction, so can't give a rational reason for believing in these principles in the first place. That's the problem. As for God not changing, it's better to phrase it as: How can we know that God, which involves the sun always rising, is true, rather than No God, which involves it rising until June 2004 and then suddenly zipping off to Orion, or No God 2, or...?

You are absolutely correct: theism cannot escape this dilema if it is dependent on induction, e.g., the cosmological argument. However, Christian theism, based on revelation, is immune to this problem.

This is just an observation.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by davidm
Yes, I see that it is circular. I think in your essay you also say we can't justify deductive reasoning with a deductive proof, and anyway, deductive reasoning may itself rest on unjustifiable induction. What are you trying to do, ruin knowledge? :eek:

Already been done.

If we can't justify inductive reasoning, or deductive for that matter, what follows from that? Are there any explicit implications in the real world?

Knowledge is impossible; skepticism is unavoidable.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
No, theism can't resolve this problem. What I meant by saying this was a particular problem for atheists and rationalists is that we typically set so much store by the use of reason and reason alone for defending opinions. We tend to dismiss any opinion or methodolgy that doesn't have a rational foundation, like faith. But induction seems to lack a rational foundation, yet it something that we all use at a very basic level. So we need some reason to distinguish induction and faith, which I attempt (that being the operative word) to do in my essay.

I appreciate your candor concerning the problem of knowledge. Would it be helpful to differentiate between Rationalism (as a system of knowledge) and reason (as a foundaiton for a particular belief)?

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by theophilus
Knowledge is impossible; skepticism is unavoidable.
Can this statement be known to be true?
Universal doubt cancels itself.

Edmund Husserl

[fakie]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
No need to feel sorry for me! Even after I toiled away for hours and hours reading for that essay and writing it, only to get no recognition...

:boohoo:

( ;) - actually I write these essays for my philosophy degree, so I'd do them anyway. And induction is a subject that it's hard to get any headway with, so I wasn't expecting a great response to this one. But I appreciate the sentiment anyway... :D )

By the way, you do get why your statement was considered amusing, don't you? It was because the very problem of induction is tahat we can't justify thinking that some principle that has always worked up till now will carry on working, apart from by saying that it's always carried on work... up till now. Which is obviously circular. :eek: Hence the riddle that what we consider some of our most rational inferences (including a lot of science) seem to completely lack rational justification. The question is: is belief in induction still rational, then? If not, does that mean it's irrational? This all depends on what you mean by 'rational' and 'irrational.' I'd be curious to know what anyone thinks of this.

Thomas,

I realize that this is a hypotetical, so hypotheticly speaking "think you are overlooking the obvious". Induction is basicly the formalization of experiential learning. It can be used to prove something to within an arbitrary degee of certainty. In otherwords thing can be proved to within an infinitesimal degree of complete certainty, if we wish to wait forever. Induction assumes that all things being equal (IOW, as long as blue = blue) induction holds. It is there for understood that for induction to hold such things as blue --> grue are impossible. When blue --> grue, there is no reason to belive that induction will hold through that change. However, after blue --> grue we have the case that grue = grue, induction will hold once again untill the next inconsistancy. So even if a blue change did occur we would be able to figgure out a new system of natural philosophy based on our new grue experiences.

Further to set aside induction because it is circular and therefore irrational is a fairly problematic circumstance. First of all we do not use induction because it is rational, we use it because it works based on our experiences. As such there can be no rational defense and also no rational attack on induction.

From the point of view of a noninductor, belief in induction can be seens as no more or less arbitrary than belief in anything else. As such it must stand or fall on its applicability to the real world and how well it delivers on the promises it makes, rather than on the basis of the analysis of an overarching mental framework that it is in its self an indispenible part of. Indeed the very act of writing words on your keyboard and expecting them to say what you worte is an act of induction. Ergo without induction, any action into the "real world", will be completely, unpredictable, unsenseable, and uninteligable.

[fakie]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
No, theism can't resolve this problem. What I meant by saying this was a particular problem for atheists and rationalists is that we typically set so much store by the use of reason and reason alone for defending opinions. We tend to dismiss any opinion or methodolgy that doesn't have a rational foundation, like faith. But induction seems to lack a rational foundation, yet it something that we all use at a very basic level. So we need some reason to distinguish induction and faith, which I attempt (that being the operative word) to do in my essay.

Thomas,

The obvious difference between induction and faith is: While God is always praised when a person has some amazing accomplisment. "Thank God your made it possible for me to win the godl medal."

God is never blamed when something goes badly, the team who looses a big game never says, well our guys really played better but that stupid miracle for the other team in the last 2 minutes. We should have prayed harder. In that sense god is never used to explain, in a practial sense the concept of God can not explain, everything that happens in the real world.

Where as someone with a more deterministic view of the contest would see that either careful strategy, higher skill, corrupt official, cheating, unfair rules, etc... or some combination fo the like decided the contest.

I think that the main differenec between induction and faith is that induction applies to things that we can control, while faith relies on a God, who if he/she exists, must then do things for us. Induction is more direct and more basic in that sense.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by ex-xian
Can this statement be known to be true?

No, nothing can be known to be true because knowledge of ANYTHING is impossible, including the statement that "knowledge is impossible."
It is meaningless to speak of knowledge. Not only is skepticism unavoidable, but desair is the only "reasonable" alternative.

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by theophilus
No, nothing can be known to be true because knowledge of ANYTHING is impossible, including the statement that "knowledge is impossible."
It is meaningless to speak of knowledge. Not only is skepticism unavoidable, but desair is the only "reasonable" alternative.
If nothing can be known to be true, doesn't "Nothing can be known to be true" fall victim to self-contradiction?

[theophilus]

Originally posted by ex-xian
Can this statement be known to be true?

The statement that "knowledge (based on induction) is impossible is not an empirical statement," i.e., it is not experienced.

It is a deductive statement in which the premises are not inductively derived.

The question is "how do we know that induction is false?" If it is possible to know such things, then knowledge cannot be exclluded because it is not empirically falsifiable.

I'm just making this up, but I think it's correct.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
The question is "how do we know that induction is false?" If it is possible to know such things, then knowledge cannot be exclluded because it is not empirically falsifiable.
Not "false", "rational".

Having knowledge is rational, if we could not know things then everything would be meaningless and I wouldn't be able to understand your message let alone respond to it. Truth or falsity of knowledge is a different thing....

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Not "false", "rational".

Having knowledge is rational, if we could not know things then everything would be meaningless and I wouldn't be able to understand your message let alone respond to it. Truth or falsity of knowledge is a different thing....

No, the entire epistemic enterprise is an attempt to determine
1. If knowledge is possible
2. How we know what we know.

Saying that "knowledge is rational" ignores centuries of philosophical debate.

I stand by my statement.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
No, the entire epistemic enterprise is an attempt to determine
1. If knowledge is possible
2. How we know what we know.

Saying that "knowledge is rational" ignores centuries of philosophical debate.

I stand by my statement.
:D
If knowledge is not possible, how could you know?

Knowledge is demonstrably possible, I beleive what is under debate is the epistemic status of such knowledge - ranging from absolute certainty to not really knowledge at all.

Cognitive science is hopefully providing a complete and coherent picture of how we come to possess the knowledge that we do have.

Again, (I am sure that) knowledge is possible, it is rational to me that I have knowledge. I can understand that some (mistaken?) knowledge is irrational. How would you suggest we tell the difference?

Cheers, John

[davidm]

Originally posted by theophilus
Already been done.



Knowledge is impossible; skepticism is unavoidable.

But clearly knowledge is possible; otherwise we could not be exchanging messages over a computer network. What is not possible, evidently, is to provide a rational justificaton for the use of induction. That's very different from saying "knowledge is impossible."

It really doesn't bother me that induction can't be rationally justified. Pragmatically, I use it, and it works. Should it ever fail in some big way -- should the sun fail to come up, for example -- I'd be dead, as would we all, and the subject would be moot.

[Vorkosigan]

You are absolutely correct: theism cannot escape this dilema if it is dependent on induction, e.g., the cosmological argument. However, Christian theism, based on revelation, is immune to this problem.

I don't agree, Theo. Without induction, how would you know you'd had a revelation? Even if you want to say "by faith" or some such, at some point, induction enters into it.

Besides, revelation actually falsifies the possibility of induction by arguing that at any moment, God might re-arrange everything. Unlike the metaphysical naturalist, who knows of no reason why the universe shouldn't go on pretty much the same as it always has, the theist lives in a universe whose rules might at any moment dissolve in an anarchy of miracles. It seems to me that the theist cannot believe induction works without obviating the possibility of miracles.

Vorkosigan

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by theophilus
I appreciate your candor concerning the problem of knowledge. Would it be helpful to differentiate between Rationalism (as a system of knowledge) and reason (as a foundaiton for a particular belief)?

Yes, I suppose it would. I assume that by Rationalism you're referring to the much more specific (and surprisingly unwidely held) 'ideology', as opposed t just plain vanilla reason (as in having reasons for a particular belief)?

I don't want to give the impression that I'm conceding too much to theists here, BTW. I still think there are considerable problems with non-rational faith, not the least of which is that as it stands (without any additions) it gives no basis for preferring Christianity to Islam, or even to Nazism if someone wants to claim that that 'feels right' and is a matter of faith. But I suppose what I said does give some credence to basic beleif apologetics, like Plantinga's? Are you familiar with that line of apologetic, theophilus?

[Thomas Ash]

Originally posted by Vorkosigan
I don't agree, Theo. Without induction, how would you know you'd had a revelation? Even if you want to say "by faith" or some such, at some point, induction enters into it.

Besides, revelation actually falsifies the possibility of induction by arguing that at any moment, God might re-arrange everything. Unlike the metaphysical naturalist, who knows of no reason why the universe shouldn't go on pretty much the same as it always has, the theist lives in a universe whose rules might at any moment dissolve in an anarchy of miracles. It seems to me that the theist cannot believe induction works without obviating the possibility of miracles.

Vorkosigan

Presumable the theist would like to say that miracles don't happen very often, and so while we are aware because of this that induction may not hold, it probably will in most cases. He or she'd also say that we know the types of cases where miracles happen (eg. a pious prayer in a moment of dire need) and those where they don't.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
:D
If knowledge is not possible, how could you know?

Knowledge is demonstrably possible, I beleive what is under debate is the epistemic status of such knowledge - ranging from absolute certainty to not really knowledge at all.

Cognitive science is hopefully providing a complete and coherent picture of how we come to possess the knowledge that we do have.

Again, (I am sure that) knowledge is possible, it is rational to me that I have knowledge. I can understand that some (mistaken?) knowledge is irrational. How would you suggest we tell the difference?

Cheers, John

This is the quandry of the naturalist, how to "explain" that knowledge is possible.

I believe the epistemic challenge is more than simply to qualify or categorize knowledge. It is to explain/understand "how" we know what we know, i.e., what is the nature of the knowledge that we (individually) seem to possess.

There is, of course, an inter-relatedness between epistemology and the other areas of philosophical inquiry. A theory of knowledge inescapably entails both a metaphysical and ethical component (is there a moral "obligation" to know and tell the "truth?")

The question is, can you claim to have knowledge if you cannot explain how that is possible? Skepticism is the result of this failure.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by Thomas Ash
The only way to discover or infer general principles like X is induction. But we can't seem to justify induction, so can't give a rational reason for believing in these principles in the first place. That's the problem. As for Principle X not changing, it's better to phrase it as: How can we know that Principle X, which involves the sun always rising, is true, rather than Principle Y, which involves it rising until June 2004 and then suddenly zipping off to Orion, or Principle Z, or...?

The answer is, of course, that the natural order is not "ruled" by "natural laws" as ontological realities, but by the invariant purpose of its creator as revealed in scripture.

Thus, induction (our expectation that the natural order will behave predictably) is established on a rational, objective foundation.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
I believe the epistemic challenge is more than simply to qualify or categorize knowledge. It is to explain/understand "how" we know what we know, i.e., what is the nature of the knowledge that we (individually) seem to possess.
.
.
.
The question is, can you claim to have knowledge if you cannot explain how that is possible? Skepticism is the result of this failure.
I agree, epistemology alone cannot help - any epistemology needs to hand together through an ontology.

I think there is deep irony here, the "thing-that-knows" is trying to verify that "what-it-knows" is accurate according to "how-it-knows-it".....but its knowledge of "how-it-knows-it" becomes "what-it-knows".....all of which is theory about some the basis of mind(s). IMHO proof will only come when we have the ability to manipulate the "how-it-knows-it" through mind probes of some kind and abserve how it changes "what-it-knows". One exception though, if the experiement changes that "how-it-knows" dealing with "what-it-knows" then the subject will be unable to verify the result.

Cheers, John

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
I agree, epistemology alone cannot help - any epistemology needs to hand together through an ontology.

I think there is deep irony here, the "thing-that-knows" is trying to verify that "what-it-knows" is accurate according to "how-it-knows-it".....but its knowledge of "how-it-knows-it" becomes "what-it-knows".....all of which is theory about some the basis of mind(s). IMHO proof will only come when we have the ability to manipulate the "how-it-knows-it" through mind probes of some kind and abserve how it changes "what-it-knows". One exception though, if the experiement changes that "how-it-knows" dealing with "what-it-knows" then the subject will be unable to verify the result.

Cheers, John

I don't see how you can escape the problem of the "examiner" as a "knower."

It's like using instruments to verify our senses; instruments with which we must interact THROUGH our senses.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
I don't see how you can escape the problem of the "examiner" as a "knower."
Pinch yourself. (This is a repeatable experiment).
Originally posted by theophilus
It's like using instruments to verify our senses; instruments with which we must interact THROUGH our senses.
Yes, so if we can alter our senses under controlled conditions....

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Pinch yourself. (This is a repeatable experiment).

Yes, so if we can alter our senses under controlled conditions....

Solipsism

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
Solipsism
:)

Yes, but at least it admits of one comprising serveral parts, the part that pinches and the part that feels. Only, then, a short step to something that pinches that does nto appear to under one's control.

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by theophilus
I don't see how you can escape the problem of the "examiner" as a "knower."

It's like using instruments to verify our senses; instruments with which we must interact THROUGH our senses.
It seems to me that at one thing is indubitable, and that is the fact of perception. When I see a tree, I may be able to surely say that I see a tree, but I can say "I am having the perception of a tree right now."

So you can generalize to something (that I call myself) percieves properties that I label x,y,z. Furthermore, I notice that I have I percieve the tree and then I do not. Note that I'm not presupposing that space or time or properties or even myself exist, only that I can say that the perceptions exist.

Also, since my definitions of "tree" and "right now" are communally obtained (and since I'm convinced by Witt. private language argument), it seems rational to assume that other "selves" are experiencing similar perceptions.

So I can claim to have something called knowledge, my perceptions, and others perceptions, without specifically identifying the object of that knowlegde.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by ex-xian
It seems to me that at one thing is indubitable, and that is the fact of perception. When I see a tree, I may be able to surely say that I see a tree, but I can say "I am having the perception of a tree right now."

I hate to keep repeating this but I must insist. Perceptions contain no cognitive information. Without prior existing categories, your mind receiving the external stimulus of light waves would be like a camera recording impressions on film. The camera/film knows nothing of the "thing" which it records.

You do not "perceive" a tree. "Tree-ness" is imposed by your mind on the sensory data. You have no way of differentiating between the category which your mind imposes on the data as illusion and the 'ding an sich' which you can never know.

So you can generalize to something (that I call myself) percieves properties that I label x,y,z. Furthermore, I notice that I have I percieve the tree and then I do not. Note that I'm not presupposing that space or time or properties or even myself exist, only that I can say that the perceptions exist.

Also, since my definitions of "tree" and "right now" are communally obtained (and since I'm convinced by Witt. private language argument), it seems rational to assume that other "selves" are experiencing similar perceptions.

Certainly, this is circularity of the worst kind. You know others "selves" exist and your categories are "communally" obtained because you have "experienced" this to be so. IOW, you have had a perception of mentally categories being communally derived (who started the chain?) by other selves whose existence you also perceived and this validates your belief that your perceptions are valid.

If mental categories are communally/externally communicated, what equipment did you possess which permitted you to interpret/receive those categories?

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
:)

Yes, but at least it admits of one comprising serveral parts, the part that pinches and the part that feels. Only, then, a short step to something that pinches that does nto appear to under one's control.

Rank illusion.

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
Rank illusion.
Now pinch yourself. :p

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by theophilus
I hate to keep repeating this but I must insist. Perceptions contain no cognitive information. Without prior existing categories, your mind receiving the external stimulus of light waves would be like a camera recording impressions on film. The camera/film knows nothing of the "thing" which it records.

You do not "perceive" a tree. "Tree-ness" is imposed by your mind on the sensory data. You have no way of differentiating between the category which your mind imposes on the data as illusion and the 'ding an sich' which you can never know.
I thought I made it clear that the reality is the perception, not what is being percieved. I never said that the perception guaranteed that the thing being percieved actually existed (although, I believe that an argument form materialsm makes a good case that it does...nevermind...another thread).

Certainly, this is circularity of the worst kind. You know others "selves" exist and your categories are "communally" obtained because you have "experienced" this to be so. IOW, you have had a perception of mentally categories being communally derived (who started the chain?) by other selves whose existence you also perceived and this validates your belief that your perceptions are valid.
No, the categories are not experienced, the categories are defined by the community of inquirers with whom I share a common language. The fact that I have a coherent language is proof that the community exists (again, no private language). I do not begin by saying that the community exists because I experience, but because I have a coherent language.

If mental categories are communally/externally communicated, what equipment did you possess which permitted you to interpret/receive those categories?
I don't have to provide a method of obtaining the perceptions. The fact that I am perceiving them is proof that I'm percieving them. I make no claim about an "outside" world.

[Jack the Bodiless]

The answer is, of course, that the natural order is not "ruled" by "natural laws" as ontological realities, but by the invariant purpose of its creator as revealed in scripture.

Thus, induction (our expectation that the natural order will behave predictably) is established on a rational, objective foundation.
That is AN answer, not THE answer.

Here's another answer: the Universe is indeed ruled by universal and invariant natural laws, and we evolved to function within that Universe. And this is why induction works for us.
I hate to keep repeating this but I must insist. Perceptions contain no cognitive information. Without prior existing categories, your mind receiving the external stimulus of light waves would be like a camera recording impressions on film. The camera/film knows nothing of the "thing" which it records.

You do not "perceive" a tree. "Tree-ness" is imposed by your mind on the sensory data. You have no way of differentiating between the category which your mind imposes on the data as illusion and the 'ding an sich' which you can never know.
"Perception" is not merely a function of the eye: it is also a function of the brain. When we "perceive" a tree, the term includes the mental processing which identifies the "tree-ness" of the image. Even those who have never seen an image of a tree before, and therefore have no idea what the image represents, will be able to "perceive" the characteristics of a central trunk, branches, little green things attached to the branches, and so forth.

[Jack the Bodiless]

As for whether it's "rational" to believe in induction: I guess it depends on the definition of "rational" that you're using.

Here's the definition of "reason" from www.mirriamwebster.com :
Main Entry: 1rea·son
Pronunciation: 'rE-z&n
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English resoun, from Old French raison, from Latin ration-, ratio reason, computation, from reri to calculate, think; probably akin to Gothic rathjo account, explanation
Date: 13th century
1 a : a statement offered in explanation or justification <gave reasons that were quite satisfactory> b : a rational ground or motive <a good reason to act soon> c : a sufficient ground of explanation or of logical defense; especially : something (as a principle or law) that supports a conclusion or explains a fact <the reasons behind her client's action> d : the thing that makes some fact intelligible : CAUSE <the reason for earthquakes> <the real reason why he wanted me to stay -- Graham Greene>
2 a (1) : the power of comprehending, inferring, or thinking especially in orderly rational ways : INTELLIGENCE (2) : proper exercise of the mind (3) : SANITY b : the sum of the intellectual powers
3 archaic : treatment that affords satisfaction
- in reason : RIGHTLY, JUSTIFIABLY
- within reason : within reasonable limits
- with reason : with good cause
Induction is a comprehension and inference tool, and a proper exercise of the mind. "Reason" is not synonymous with "logic", rather logic is a subset of reason (and a subset of somewhat limited usefulness, as it deals only with true/false, yes/no issues, whereas the real world includes information that is "known" with varying degrees of probability). IMO, the use of induction is also a part of "reason".

[John Page]

Originally posted by Jack the Bodiless
"Reason" is not synonymous with "logic", rather logic is a subset of reason....
:notworthy

[ex-xian]

Originally posted by Jack the Bodiless
"Reason" is not synonymous with "logic", rather logic is a subset of reason (and a subset of somewhat limited usefulness, as it deals only with true/false, yes/no issues, whereas the real world includes information that is "known" with varying degrees of probability). IMO, the use of induction is also a part of "reason".
If you're talking about logic as it relates to formal systems, yes. However, I would say that logical thinking is synonomous with reason.

Also, there are logics that deal with issues on a continuum (modal logic and probability logic), so it's not fair to that the only part of the "real world" that logic can apply to are those which are bivalent.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by ex-xian
I thought I made it clear that the reality is the perception, not what is being percieved. I never said that the perception guaranteed that the thing being percieved actually existed (although, I believe that an argument form materialsm makes a good case that it does...nevermind...another thread).

I'm sorry for not making myself clear. I was not arguing for or against the "reality" of the perception. I was denying that the perception (real or imagined) contains no cognitive content in and of itself. To "perceive" a tree, requires that a category exist prior to the perception which contains the elements of "tree-ness;" other categories such as identity, individuality, color, texture, etc., must also exist a priori if the experience/perception is to be intelligible.

No, the categories are not experienced, the categories are defined by the community of inquirers with whom I share a common language.

Surely you must see that a "common language" cannot develop or exist without a priori concepts around which to organize language. If one caveman pointed at a rock and said "ugh," this would mean nothing to another unless he understood a priori that pointing at an object and uttering a sound was the act of naming the object. Of course, the concept of naming would also have to pre-exist the event. Otherwise, there would be no reason to interpret the pointing and utterance as connected events with any meaning.

The fact that I have a coherent language is proof that the community exists (again, no private language). I do not begin by saying that the community exists because I experience, but because I have a coherent language.

The fact that you have a coherent language is completely inexplicable from a naturalistic worldview. Language and thought are interrelated and must have existed simultaneously and prior to social development.

I don't have to provide a method of obtaining the perceptions. The fact that I am perceiving them is proof that I'm percieving them. I make no claim about an "outside" world.

Unfortunately, your experience of perception does not establish the "you" who are the percipient. All that can be said is that something is having the experience of having a perception.

[theophilus]

Originally posted by John Page
Now pinch yourself. :p

Okay, I did and I saw a blue humvee floating on a cloud of orange happiness. What does that prove?

[John Page]

Originally posted by theophilus
Okay, I did and I saw a blue humvee floating on a cloud of orange happiness. What does that prove?
Lack of correlation.

[Jack the Bodiless]

I thought I made it clear that the reality is the perception, not what is being percieved. I never said that the perception guaranteed that the thing being percieved actually existed (although, I believe that an argument form materialsm makes a good case that it does...nevermind...another thread).

I'm sorry for not making myself clear. I was not arguing for or against the "reality" of the perception. I was denying that the perception (real or imagined) contains no cognitive content in and of itself. To "perceive" a tree, requires that a category exist prior to the perception which contains the elements of "tree-ness;" other categories such as identity, individuality, color, texture, etc., must also exist a priori if the experience/perception is to be intelligible.
Even if you'd never seen a tree before, the act of perceiving a tree allows you to create a "tree-concept" to store the information about "trees" that you've just gained. Yes, you'd need some prior experience to interpret details such as the curvature of the trunk from the pattern of light you're actually seeing, but the result is still a gain of knowledge from perception: you've just added a tree to your concept-bank.

You could now begin to identify other objects as "tree-like", for instance.
No, the categories are not experienced, the categories are defined by the community of inquirers with whom I share a common language.

Surely you must see that a "common language" cannot develop or exist without a priori concepts around which to organize language. If one caveman pointed at a rock and said "ugh," this would mean nothing to another unless he understood a priori that pointing at an object and uttering a sound was the act of naming the object. Of course, the concept of naming would also have to pre-exist the event. Otherwise, there would be no reason to interpret the pointing and utterance as connected events with any meaning.
Agreed. But this sort of communication can be built up in a straightforward fashion from the foundation of our shared humanity. We have an instinctive, pre-programmed talent for vocal communication (even newborn babies cry for attention), and it soon becomes natural to indicate a special interest in something by getting someone's attention and then extending your prime manipulatory organ towards it. Then it's a short step from "what would I do?" to "what is HE doing... Aha!"
The fact that you have a coherent language is completely inexplicable from a naturalistic worldview. Language and thought are interrelated and must have existed simultaneously and prior to social development.
Of course it isn't "inexplicable"! Animals without what we'd call "language" can still think. Thought, language and social development can all evolve together. None needs to reach human-equivalent levels first: there is no "irreducible complexity" here.
I don't have to provide a method of obtaining the perceptions. The fact that I am perceiving them is proof that I'm percieving them. I make no claim about an "outside" world.

Unfortunately, your experience of perception does not establish the "you" who are the percipient. All that can be said is that something is having the experience of having a perception.
Our "sense of self" is inherent, pre-programmed by evolution. And it's trivially true that we can perceive our own existence, by perceiving our own thoughts and sensations: "cogito ergo sum".