Objectivist ethics: Atlas51184 vs. xorbie

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

This thread has been set up for a formal debate between Atlas51184 and xorbie on the following resolution:

Resolved: Objectivist ethics successfully bridge the is/ought gap.

Atlas51184 will go first, taking the affirmative and xorbie will oppose. The debate is tentatively scheduled for 5 rounds with the option of permitting more rounds later, as agreed to from the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=77525).

A Peanut Gallery (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&postid=1492235#post1492235) is set up in the Moral Foundations & Principles forum for the rest of us to comment on the debate.

Good luck to both participants!

Jason

[Atlas51184]

Much discussion has been given to Ayn Rand’s philosophy, Objectivism, on this forum, and it is my hope that this debate and discussion will work to clear up misunderstanding and misrepresentations that surround this relatively new and unknown philosophy.

What we are discussing here is Objectivism’s meta-ethics, namely its solution to the fact/value distinction. What follows is my summary explanation of Rand’s theory. As Xorbie raises question and objections, I will flush out all relevant detail. I like to keep things short, but I won’t shy away from long extrapolations if necessary.

Ayn Rand’s Solution to the “is/ought� gap

As humans, we have the power to choose between alternatives. This gives rise to our need of morality; the realm of morality is the realm of choice. The whole discussion becomes more complicated by the fact that our choices are guided by our values, which are chosen. Since human values are chosen, it is inevitable that some people will have different values then others.

Hitler likes genocide, this is his chosen value. A doctor likes healing sick people, this is a chosen value. So this is the root of the problem. How do we know which choice of values is good and which is bad? How do we objectively say that Hitler’s values are evil, and the doctor’s are good? What is the standard by which we judge their choices?

This is where Rand comes in with her solution. “What are values? Why do we need them?� This is how she begins her investigation. “A value,� Rand observes, “is that which one acts to gain and/or keep.� Plants, animals, people, we all act to gain and keep things. Rock, dirt, and the moon do not. So, seeing this, she observes that all living organisms take self-generated, goal-directed actions.

The basic idea behind Ayn Rand’s solution to Hume’s “is/ought� gap is that ethics is teleological, not deontological. She argues that the needs of survival are the basis of teleological concepts, such as “goal� or “value.

While Hume makes the assumption that a connection of fact to value would need to be formed deductively, Rand’s takes an inductive approach. She looks for the roots of the concept “value,� and finds the steps required to form teleological concepts.

Rand says: “The concept ‘value’ is not a primary, it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative.�

A living thing acts to keep its values, which answers the “to whom?� question.

So, what difference does it make to an organism whether or not it achieves its goals? What if it succeeds, what if it fails? What is the ultimate thing at stake?

Ayn Rand’s insight into the questions is as follows:
�There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or non-existence - and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. It is only living organisms that face a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies. It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.�

The answer to the question “for what?� is: life.

Here, “acting in the face of an alternative� means that the outcome of the action will have an effect on the agent, either beneficial or detrimental. Rand uses the science-fiction example of an indestructible robot to illustrate the point:

“Imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured, or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or lose; it could not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no goals.�

Rand identifies the possibility of destruction in living organisms as the root of the concept value. The alternative of life and death is what gives meaning to such concepts as “goal� and “value.� Life and death is the fundamental alternative. It is what makes goals and values necessary and possible. This is what Rand means when she says that life is the standard of value. In her own words:

�In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do.�

If a person chooses to continue living, reality (what is) dictates what he ought to do: he ought to pursue the values necessary to sustain and further his life.

With life as the standard, the good is that which promotes one’s life, the bad is that which diminishes one’s life. As human beings we have needs, and only certain courses of actions will satisfy those needs. Because of this, claims that certain things are valuable are either true or false; either they promote life, or they don’t. This means that value is objective. To quote Tara Smith: “Factual judgments and value judgments are not radically different in kind, as if pertaining to different universes; the notorious gap between fact and value is artificial.�

The remainder of Rand’s ethics deals with drawing the logical implications of her identification of life as the standard of value. This is where Objectivism’s egoism differs from stereotypical egoism. The simple command of “act to promote your self-interest,� is not enough. Rand advocates “rational self-interest,� or: the pursuit of “values required for man’s survival qua man.� Rand further identifies man’s nature as a rational being as crucial to normative ethics. What I have given has been an outline to Rand’s theory. As objections and questions are raised, I will flush out more detail and implications.

[xorbie]

Consider the following statements:

The bus ought to arrive at the bus stop around 11:15.
If Bill wants to make money he ought to get a job.
Joe ought to give some money to the starving orphan.

When considering the “is/ought gap� we need to be extremely careful about what exactly we mean by “ought.� For example, the following set of statements cleverly bridges the gap:

Debra is walking at 2 miles per hour towards her house.
Debra’s house is half a mile away from where she is.
Debra ought to be home in 15 minutes.

Although the preceding example certainly uses a definition of “ought� and “is� that is found in the dictionary, and although it certainly arrives at an ought only from is statements, it completely misses the point that Hume raised long ago. This shows us that we should be wary of a derivation of an ought from an is to make sure it really provides an answer to the problem Hume posed. In order to really understand the problem involved with jumping the bridge, we need to closely examine what we mean when we say “morality.�

As we all know, this is an age-old question. Although I have my own opinions and theories on the matter, I wouldn’t think of presenting them as hard fact and so I think it will suffice to say that morality is, by its nature, prescriptive. Morality is a code of values that tells us what is “right� and what is “wrong.� The most important part is that morality is fundamentally different from natural law. Take for example gravity; we can say that objects dropped near the surface of the earth will accelerate at roughly 9.81 meters per second squared. The object will do this no matter how it feels, no matter what it wants and no matter what it chooses. But when people speak of morality, this is not what they speak of. Morality requires an element of choice, and its purpose is to tell us which choice is superior.

So which of the three statements I began with qualify? The first one clearly does not – it simply states what we would expect to happen given certain circumstances. The third clearly does, and is a prime example of what most people would consider to be a statement that falls in the realm of morality. But what of statements such as the second one I gave? If the statement where made to imply that Joe should get a job as opposed to stealing the money, a case could be made. However, it is statements such as these that are problematic; they somehow don’t feel as if they belong in the same category as my third statement. The reason is that the statement, although it may sound proscriptive, is actually descriptive. The expanded version is of the form:

Agent wants B.
A leads to B.
Agent should do A.

This is just common sense – we don’t need morality to say this for us! It would seem rather presumptuous of me to say that I have one-upped thousands of years of the philosophy of morality by stating that if one is thirsty, one should take a drink of water! The problem here is that the statement hasn’t actually prescribed a certain course of action over another, but rather has said that there exists a certain method of achieving something. What has happened here is that a practical ought – as opposed to a moral ought – has been derived from an is.

In his opening statement, Atlas said:

The basic idea behind Ayn Rand’s solution to Hume’s “is/ought� gap is that ethics is teleological, not deontological. She argues that the needs of survival are the basis of teleological concepts, such as “goal� or “value.

But how does this solve the problem of deriving an ought from an is? Rand’s answer is:

In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do.

Atlas adds:

If a person chooses to continue living, reality (what is) dictates what he ought to do: he ought to pursue the values necessary to sustain and further his life.

What Atlas has done (and what Rand did) was to make the very claim I stated above – that if one is thirsty one ought to drink some water. To pass this off as morality and a solution to the is/ought problem is to rather arrogantly disregard what Hume and other philosophers actually said. (Note: Rand’s claim that somehow there must be just one Ultimate Value as opposed to 2, 3 or even 0 has not yet been backed up, but this will be dealt with later).

It is clear that the statement “If one wants to live, one ought to act to maintain life� is true – in fact it is quite trivially true. The problem is this is not the right type of ought statement. What Rand tries to do is to take this type of ought statement and turn it into a moral ought, of the form “If one wants to be moral, one ought to act to maintain life.�

According to Rand and Atlas, values, and the choices associated with them, can be judged as right or wrong with Rand’s objectivist morality. The problem is that it has not been demonstrated that one can derive a moral ought from a simple observation about reality (an “is�). In an attempt to bridge the gap, Atlas says:

With life as the standard, the good is that which promotes one’s life, the bad is that which diminishes one’s life. As human beings we have needs, and only certain courses of actions will satisfy those needs. Because of this, claims that certain things are valuable are either true or false; either they promote life, or they don’t. This means that value is objective.

The problem is that it has not been demonstrated that life is the standard. Just because Agent chooses to continue his (or her) life, does not mean that life is the only value (or standard) that Agent has. In fact, the claim is demonstrably false, as many people in history have put various things about their life. Essentially, to say that something is “good� because it serves to elongate life and something else is “bad� because it serves to shorten life is to run contrary to how these words are used. If one is to demonstrate that these things are good and bad according to morality, and not as judged by one amongst many values, it would be necessary to define morality and show how it can be derived. Atlas has not done this, and neither did Rand.

Thus far though, I have only analyzed the problem in going from an is to an ought for any moral system that claims to be objective. However, there are certainly many problems that are specific to objectivism, and it is because of this that it has so much resentment towards it. Rand’s assertion that life is the ultimate value is defended neither through deduction or induction. However, unless Atlas can show that there is a way to derive an ought from an is, the question of whether the “is� is correct is of lesser importance.

[Atlas51184]

Morality is a code of values that tells us what is “right� and what is “wrong.� The most important part is that morality is fundamentally different from natural law. Take for example gravity; we can say that objects dropped near the surface of the earth will accelerate at roughly 9.81 meters per second squared. The object will do this no matter how it feels, no matter what it wants and no matter what it chooses. But when people speak of morality, this is not what they speak of. Morality requires an element of choice, and its purpose is to tell us which choice is superior.

In this quote, xorbie has presented an accurate account of Objectivism’s view of morality, although this most likely was not his intention. As he says, morality is a code of values that guides chosen action. Furthermore, he is right to say that morality is different from natural law. If morality were not, it would be the task of the ethicist to discover how we already function, instead of how we should function. Objectivism does not assume that every person automatically knows what is the proper course of action in every situation.

As was implicit in my first post, Objectivism begins its investigation of what one ought to do (morality) with the following three questions: What should I strive for? How should I do this? and Who should benefit from my actions? The answers, in brief, are life, by following reason, and myself.

As I pointed out, the first question of morality is not “what values should I accept?� but “do I need to select values at all?� “Is morality necessary at all, and if so, why?� To answer this, we must first understand the concept value, and that is what I sought to do in my opening statement. In short, we need values because we are alive (life makes value possible).

As the first passage I quoted would seem to suggest, xorbie sees morality as a code of values to guide chosen action. He then offers the following as the ‘fallacy’ that Rand, and Objectivists in general, engage in:

The problem here is that the statement hasn’t actually prescribed a certain course of action over another, but rather has said that there exists a certain method of achieving something. What has happened here is that a practical ought – as opposed to a moral ought – has been derived from an is.

If, as xorbie claimed (and as I agree) morality is a code of values to guide a person’s actions, then Rand most definitely has provided a moral ought, as well as a practical ought. The prescriptive instructions to take actions that maintain life is a code that (when fully extrapolated into a normative system) provides guidance for action. It is not clear as to why the view I am defending does not provide moral guidance if, in fact, morality is a set of values to guide action. A set of values that instructs one to take survival as his purpose is still a set of values, and is a moral code.

What Atlas has done (and what Rand did) was to make the very claim I stated above – that if one is thirsty one ought to drink some water.

Where morality should guide man, in the Objectivist view, is not range of the moment issues like satisfying thirst or hunger needs. This is the kind of moral advice one would make to an animal (not to imply that morality has any meaning for animals, just as an example). Men survive on a long range scale. They need to look at the ramifications of their current actions for their entire life. The crucial issue here is that, while life is the standard of value, human life is the standard of moral value. Actions are right and wrong for man. Perhaps xorbie’s misunderstanding of this point was my fault, because I did not make that last point explicit.

To give normative advice to humans, we need to look at human nature and its relationship to human survival. Objectivism holds reason to be man’s basic means of survival. This is not to say reason is the only means of survival, but the basic means. While a tiger may have claws and teeth to hunt with, his basic means of survival is consciousness. And while a human may be able to survive by non-rational means, his basic means is still reason. Objectivism holds rationality as its primary virtue. If one wants to live, he should follow reason. Morality is necessary because the functioning of reason is not guaranteed, it is volitional. It is morality’s purpose to tell us how to best use our means of survival and, ultimately therefore, how to maintain life.

What of the derivation of value from life?

The problem is that it has not been demonstrated that life is the standard. Just because Agent chooses to continue his (or her) life, does not mean that life is the only value (or standard) that Agent has.

As I argued, life is not the only value, but the standard that makes all other values possible. Outside of the context of life, value is senseless. On what basis would something be valuable?

Rand writes:
Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goal or means… Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value� is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.� To speak of “value� as apart from “life� is worse than a contradiction in terms.�

Peikoff offers further illumination of the point: “…the viewpoint here… is not that life is a precondition of other values-not that one must remain alive in order to act. This idea is a truism, not a philosophy. Objectivism says that remaining alive is the goal of values and of all proper action.�

As I have argued, morality is a code of values accepted by choice. One needs a set of values for one reason: to survive. Thus, in the Objectivist view, moral laws are principles that define how to further human life. No more, no less. This view is entirely consistent with xorbie’s characterization of morality as a whole, although it is most definitely unconventional.

The issue throughout much of the criticism seems to be one of equivocation. In the beginning of his reply, xorbie characterizes morality as “a code of values that tells us what is “right� and what is “wrong.� Later, he then characterizes my position (which is entirely consistent with that initial definition) as being contrary to morality, as not providing a “moral ought.� What I have proposed does indeed provide a code of values and does indeed tell us what is the right and wrong course of action. What one should do has its basis in the nature of man and the context of the current situation in relationship to the furtherance of his own life. Unless xorbie is claiming egoism is necessarily anti-morality (as some philsophers have claimed) then his main objection doesn't apply. He characterizes morality a certain way, and then claims that a theory that fits this characterizes is not a morality.

[xorbie]

Before I get into any of the arguments, I just want to define some terms so we can set them straight. If Atlas has problems with any of my definitions, he is free to bring them up in his response.

Morality – A code of values which tells us what is good (in accordance with our values) and what is bad (in violation of our values)

Rational - Acting based on sufficient information and reason/logic in such a way as to maximize fulfillment of desires.

Now, using these definitions, I will proceed to analyze the Objectivist argument.

Morality: Objective/subjective

Atlas says:

As the first passage I quoted would seem to suggest, xorbie sees morality as a code of values to guide chosen action. He then offers the following as the ‘fallacy’ that Rand, and Objectivists in general, engage in:

The problem here is that the statement hasn’t actually prescribed a certain course of action over another, but rather has said that there exists a certain method of achieving something. What has happened here is that a practical ought – as opposed to a moral ought – has been derived from an is.

If, as xorbie claimed (and as I agree) morality is a code of values to guide a person’s actions, then Rand most definitely has provided a moral ought, as well as a practical ought. The prescriptive instructions to take actions that maintain life is a code that (when fully extrapolated into a normative system) provides guidance for action. It is not clear as to why the view I am defending does not provide moral guidance if, in fact, morality is a set of values to guide action. A set of values that instructs one to take survival as his purpose is still a set of values, and is a moral code.

What Atlas has said so far is indeed true, but misses the point entirely. Rand has provided a code of values that certainly do provide guidance for action. However, there are many such codes, and Rand has also claimed that this is the code that should be followed. After all, this is objective Objectivism, not subjective drivel, correct? Consider the following two ought-statements:

If I want to maintain life, I ought to act to maintain life or If I accept Rand’s morality, I ought to act to maintain life.
If I want to be moral, I ought to act to maintain life or If I want to be moral, I ought to accept Rand’s morality.

As I’ve said before, #1 is above is trivially true. Once I accept Rand’s morality, and therefore choose life as my ultimate value, it is certainly clear that I cannot be rational unless I act to maintain life (see my definition of “rational� above). However, #2 is far from trivially true. What Hume said is that it is not provable – one can never derive such an ought from an is. Obviously, taking life as your ultimate value constitutes a moral system – what needs to be proved moral system is objectively correct.

Rand’s Argument

In order to prove that a moral system is objective, one must prove that the associated code of values is objective. Of course, it is inductively clear that there is no one accepted code of values. Thus, it must somehow be proven that certain values that people have are fundamentally irreconcilable with other, more desired values. If this is true, it would be irrational to accept any moral system other than the proposed one with its associated desirable values.

Rand’s feeble (and failed!) attempt at proving that Objectivism is, indeed, objective is demonstrated throughout Atlas’s posts. One such example is:

And while a human may be able to survive by non-rational means, his basic means is still reason. Objectivism holds rationality as its primary virtue. If one wants to live, he should follow reason. Morality is necessary because the functioning of reason is not guaranteed, it is volitional. It is morality’s purpose to tell us how to best use our means of survival and, ultimately therefore, how to maintain life.

Ironically, the first sentence here contradicts the third, and this is extremely important. Rand has not proved that life qua existence can only be maintained through rational action, and thus defers to life as man qua man. In fact, even if it could be demonstrated that morality could be objective, Objectivism would be a poor candidate indeed for this reason. However, it is more important to this debate that no morality can be objective because the statement “One ought to have X value(s)� cannot be derived from an is.

Atlas attempts to do so in the last two sentences of the quoted segment. However, the use of morality in the last sentence is questionable: morality is a set of values – it is not a set of instructions on how to achieve those values! Thus the argument presented here is useless.

Just after this, Atlas says:

What of the derivation of value from life?

The problem is that it has not been demonstrated that life is the standard. Just because Agent chooses to continue his (or her) life, does not mean that life is the only value (or standard) that Agent has.

As I argued, life is not the only value, but the standard that makes all other values possible. Outside of the context of life, value is senseless. On what basis would something be valuable?

Rand writes:

Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goal or means… Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value� is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.� To speak of “value� as apart from “life� is worse than a contradiction in terms.�

Peikoff offers further illumination of the point: “…the viewpoint here… is not that life is a precondition of other values-not that one must remain alive in order to act. This idea is a truism, not a philosophy. Objectivism says that remaining alive is the goal of values and of all proper action.�

My counter arguments are:

Atlas: Life does indeed make values possible. However, this is not an argument to the effect that it is irrational not to accept life as an ultimate value. In fact, it is an argument for the opposite side: because life is necessary for the fulfillment of desires, the desire to maintain life would naturally flow from other values, even if these values were more fundamental. So, I can just as well say that my desire for X makes my lesser desire for life possible.

Rand: Rand is conflating the terms “goal� and “end� even though they are not the same. A goal is a desired outcome, an end is simply whatever the outcome is. Thus, it is true that, up until our final action, life is the end of all actions. It is not, however, true that life is the goal of all our actions. One obvious example is an attempted suicide, wherein the goal and end state are diametrically opposed.

Moreover, I disagree (and I suspect most philosophers would) that “metaphysically life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself.� What this means is that life is desirable in and of itself, and not for the achievement of some other thing. This, to me, seems manifestly false. That depression leads to suicide more often than euphoria leads to suicide seems to back up my point – life is desirable only insofar as it leads to other things (happiness, for example).

Peikoff: I don’t understand what the point here is, truthfully. To say that values are dependent on life is to make essentially the same argument as saying that the fulfillment of values (i.e. acts) is dependent on life. Neither, as I showed above, does either prove that life should be the most fundamental of all values.

Atlas follows this with:

As I have argued, morality is a code of values accepted by choice. One needs a set of values for one reason: to survive. Thus, in the Objectivist view, moral laws are principles that define how to further human life. No more, no less. This view is entirely consistent with xorbie’s characterization of morality as a whole, although it is most definitely unconventional.

The statement “One needs a set of values for a reason: X� is true almost regardless of what X is. More specifically, if X is something that takes effort and goal-driven actions to be achieved, the above statement is true and trivially so. Thus, to say that survival is the one thing that can complete that sentence is untrue. That survival is necessary for the achievement of X doesn’t change this.

Atlas closes with:

The issue throughout much of the criticism seems to be one of equivocation. In the beginning of his reply, xorbie characterizes morality as “a code of values that tells us what is “right� and what is “wrong.� Later, he then characterizes my position (which is entirely consistent with that initial definition) as being contrary to morality, as not providing a “moral ought.� What I have proposed does indeed provide a code of values and does indeed tell us what is the right and wrong course of action. What one should do has its basis in the nature of man and the context of the current situation in relationship to the furtherance of his own life. Unless xorbie is claiming egoism is necessarily anti-morality (as some philosophers have claimed) then his main objection doesn't apply. He characterizes morality a certain way, and then claims that a theory that fits this characterizes is not a morality.

I never claimed that Objectivism is not a morality. Of course it is. My claim is that morality is subjective in that no one morality (Objectivism included) can lay claim that their morality is the one true morality. This “moral ought� as opposed to a practical ought that exists once one has already accepted a system of morality has not been derived from an is. My apologies for not defining these terms well earlier, I will do so now:

Moral ought: That one ought to follow a certain system of morality.

Practical ought: Given that one has accepted a morality (and thus certain values), one ought to act to achieve these values.

Again, the second of these is trivially true, and any morality can lay claim to it. The problem is in the former.

Ultimate Value

As I’ve stated earlier, life cannot be simply claimed to be an ultimate value. In fact, I would claim that life can not be such an ultimate value, in the sense that no other value comes from it. The problem lies in Objectivists’ poor understanding of a chain of values or desires. My proof is as follows:

Premise #1: If I desire X and X iff A, I will desire A in order to achieve X unless I have some greater desire Y such that Y iff ~A. (Naturally, there life doesn’t work exactly like this, but it should suffice for my argument).

Premise #2: X is an ultimate desire (UD) iff X is desire only for its own sake and not for some other desire and iff nothing is desired more than X.

Life is the only UD.
Nothing but life is desire for it’s own sake.
All desires X that are not life are desired in order to achieve something else.
Thus, all desires X are desired ultimately for the continuation of life.
If the completion of Y does not ultimately lead to the continuation of life, Y is not desirable.

At this point, we have achieved a clearly false statement. People desire many things which do not necessarily contribute to the continuation of life and which may in fact lead to the shortening of life (any dangerous activity). However, the fundamental flaw here is that unless it can he shown that happiness necessarily leads to the continuation of life, happiness is somehow not desirable.

In short, the above is supposed to demonstrate that it is impossible to derive things which many people would consider quite fundamental simply from a desire for life. On the other hand, the desire of almost anything but life necessarily implies a desire for life. Because in real life people have desires which do not lead to the continuation of life, we must conclude that life is not in fact the ultimate value.

[Atlas51184]

Sorry for the delay, school is a bitch.

Atlas51184:
“And while a human may be able to survive by non-rational means, his basic means is still reason. Objectivism holds rationality as its primary virtue. If one wants to live, he should follow reason. Morality is necessary because the functioning of reason is not guaranteed, it is volitional. It is morality’s purpose to tell us how to best use our means of survival and, ultimately therefore, how to maintain life.�

Xorbie:
Ironically, the first sentence here contradicts the third, and this is extremely important. Rand has not proved that life qua existence can, and thus defers to life as man qua man. In fact, even if it could be demonstrated that morality could be objective, Objectivism would be a poor candidate indeed for this reason. However, it is more important to this debate that no morality can be objective because the statement “One ought to have X value(s)� cannot be derived from an is.

The first sentence does not contradict the third. The non-rational means one would survive by depend on there being other people who are living rationally and producing surplus value to give him. Rand’s analysis of the concept “value� as such doesn’t yet delve into morality, at this point she is discussing the concept “value� in all contexts, as part of life qua life, she later applies this analysis to man, which is the basis of her ethics, and is what is explained by the sentences following.

Atlas attempts to do so in the last two sentences of the quoted segment. However, the use of morality in the last sentence is questionable: morality is a set of values – it is not a set of instructions on how to achieve those values! Thus the argument presented here is useless.

Objectivism aside, morality has always been not just a code of values, but a guide for action. What is the point of any action if not to achieve some value?

Life does indeed make values possible. However, this is not an argument to the effect that it is irrational not to accept life as an ultimate value. In fact, it is an argument for the opposite side: because life is necessary for the fulfillment of desires, the desire to maintain life would naturally flow from other values, even if these values were more fundamental. So, I can just as well say that my desire for X makes my lesser desire for life possible.

Life is the only thing that makes value possible; it is not one of possible ultimate values, but THE ultimate value. You have my position backwards; values are what promote and maintain life. And what, besides “life,� is a more fundamental value? Provide me an alternative to life as the ultimate value. Xorbie keeps implying that there are other possible candidates for an ultimate value, but this is not so. Life is the only thing that is an end in itself, thus, it can be the only ultimate value.

Rand is conflating the terms “goal� and “end� even though they are not the same. A goal is a desired outcome; an end is simply whatever the outcome is. Thus, it is true that, up until our final action, life is the end of all actions. It is not, however, true that life is the goal of all our actions. One obvious example is an attempted suicide, wherein the goal and end state are diametrically opposed.

The goal/end discrepancy is totally trivial and inessential to Rand’s argument. It is a minor issue of semantics. Simply remove the one time where she uses “end,� and the argument is unchanged. Furthermore, most of what we do is not preceded by the thought “I am doing this to further my life,� but I am not arguing that it is this way, or that everyone should think this way. I am arguing that all goals should, ultimately, be based on the furtherance of one’s own life.

Moreover, I disagree (and I suspect most philosophers would) that “metaphysically life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself.� What this means is that life is desirable in and of itself, and not for the achievement of some other thing. This, to me, seems manifestly false. That depression leads to suicide more often than euphoria leads to suicide seems to back up my point – life is desirable only insofar as it leads to other things (happiness, for example)

Again, since this keeps coming up, give one example of something else that is an end in itself. Observe all other living things; what are their actions aimed towards? As to happiness, life can only be maintained by a healthy individual, mentally and physically. Happiness is a requirement for human life; a happy person has is better equipped to survive.

Moral ought: That one ought to follow a certain system of morality.

Practical ought: Given that one has accepted a morality (and thus certain values), one ought to act to achieve these values.

Again, the second of these is trivially true, and any morality can lay claim to it. The problem is in the former.

The moral and the practical become one in the same when morality is designed for a practical purpose; maintaining life. Xorbie’s argument seems to presuppose that morality cannot serve a practical end. He seems to be saying something like, “survival is fine, but it is only a practical matter, but what about what is moral?� He is taking it as given that morality cannot be practical.

As I’ve stated earlier, life cannot be simply claimed to be an ultimate value. In fact, I would claim that life can not be such an ultimate value, in the sense that no other value comes from it.

I’m confused, haven’t I been saying that all values should be aimed at maintaining life? My argument is that life’s place is a dual role as both the base and goal of morality.

The problem lies in Objectivists’ poor understanding of a chain of values or desires. My proof is as follows:

Premise #1: If I desire X and X iff A, I will desire A in order to achieve X unless I have some greater desire Y such that Y iff ~A. (Naturally, there life doesn’t work exactly like this, but it should suffice for my argument).

Premise #2: X is an ultimate desire (UD) iff X is desire only for its own sake and not for some other desire and iff nothing is desired more than X.
1. Life is the only UD.
2. Nothing but life is desired for its own sake.
3. All desires X that are not life are desired in order to achieve something else.
4. Thus, all desires X are desired ultimately for the continuation of life.

If the completion of Y does not ultimately lead to the continuation of life, Y is not desirable.

To interject in the middle this argument: What one desires can be based on something irrational. “Desire� is an emotion. A drug addict desires drugs, but drugs do not promote life, and thus the desire is based on irrational ideas. This has nothing to do with the Objectivist argument. Objectivism does not speak at all of desires. Objectivism speaks of what one SHOULD do and what one’s goals SHOULD be.

At this point, we have achieved a clearly false statement. People desire many things which do not necessarily contribute to the continuation of life and which may in fact lead to the shortening of life (any dangerous activity). However, the fundamental flaw here is that unless it can he shown that happiness necessarily leads to the continuation of life, happiness is somehow not desirable.

This totally has nothing to do with my argument. Please quote from where you think I imply that every person’s actions automatically are aimed at maintaining life. (In fact I have said the opposite, morality being volitional). I am offering a prescription for action, not a description of the current state of human moral beliefs or the psychology of every person alive. Happiness does, as I said before, lead to the continuation of life. A man with full use of all his limbs can more easily survive than a paraplegic, just as a happy man is better equipped to survive than one who is severely depressed. Happiness is a means to life, for sure. Remember, I (and Rand) say that the basis of morality is mans life AS A MAN. To pursue one’s survival means one needs to have health, energy, and motivation (happiness), all of these greatly increase one’s ability to survive, happiness just as much as the others.

[xorbie]

Objectivism aside, morality has always been not just a code of values, but a guide for action. What is the point of any action if not to achieve some value?

If you wish to say this is true, you need to offer a definition of morality. I gave mine – a code of values. To me, it seems clear that a morality can only tell us what a desired end is, it is up to us to use whatever means we posses to achieve those ends. As an analogy, if I am playing a game of basketball, the rules dictate that in order to win I must successfully throw a ball into a basket and present my opponent from doing same. The rules themselves don’t tell me how to accomplish this – but they do guide my actions in that I will perform only those actions which tend to make me win.

Life is the only thing that makes value possible; it is not one of possible ultimate values, but THE ultimate value. You have my position backwards; values are what promote and maintain life. And what, besides “life,� is a more fundamental value? Provide me an alternative to life as the ultimate value. Xorbie keeps implying that there are other possible candidates for an ultimate value, but this is not so. Life is the only thing that is an end in itself, thus, it can be the only ultimate value.

You have to understand that just because life makes value possible does not in and of itself ensure that life is an ultimate value. For example, consider the following scenario. Adam and Bob are in the desert, and there is only water enough for one of them, and Adam has all of the water. However, Adam falls very sick one day and dies, and this enables Bob to get the water. Now without Adam dying, Bob would have gone without water, and thus perished himself. But does this mean that Bob values Adam’s death? Surely, he would say he is better off with Adam dead because he now has the water. However, it would certainly be absurd to say that Adam’s death is the ultimate value in this scenario, even though Adam’s death enables Bob’s life, it is Bob’s life which is the ultimate value.

In short, the fact that life itself enables all values (and value fulfillment) does not ensure that life is the ultimate value. In certainly can be a value in and of itself, and it certainly can be the ultimate value for some – but this does not mean it is objectively the ultimate value.

The goal/end discrepancy is totally trivial and inessential to Rand’s argument. It is a minor issue of semantics. Simply remove the one time where she uses “end,� and the argument is unchanged. Furthermore, most of what we do is not preceded by the thought “I am doing this to further my life,� but I am not arguing that it is this way, or that everyone should think this way. I am arguing that all goals should, ultimately, be based on the furtherance of one’s own life.

No, this does not address my argument at all, which was not one of meaningless semantics. See again the quoted segment from Rand:

Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goal or means… Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value� is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.� To speak of “value� as apart from “life� is worse than a contradiction in terms.�

To replace “end� with “goal� is useless, my previous objection is still true: just because life is gained and kept until the last moment of our life does not mean it is a goal in itself. People occasionally attempt to kill themselves, and end up alive despite having their goal be death.


Again, since this keeps coming up, give one example of something else that is an end in itself. Observe all other living things; what are their actions aimed towards? As to happiness, life can only be maintained by a healthy individual, mentally and physically. Happiness is a requirement for human life; a happy person has is better equipped to survive.

Other living things act to reproduce, not to stay alive. Many organisms reproduce in a way which means certain or near certain death. True, they act to stay alive, but faced with the option of reproducing and dying, they choose it. And happiness is not a requirement for human life, you have to understand that there are grey areas. Nothing is a requirement for human life except for some very minimal bodily activity, people who are in a coma are still alive. Life is maintained on a daily basis by mentally and physically sick individuals – through the care of others. What you are saying is simply false.

The moral and the practical become one in the same when morality is designed for a practical purpose; maintaining life. Xorbie’s argument seems to presuppose that morality cannot serve a practical end. He seems to be saying something like, “survival is fine, but it is only a practical matter, but what about what is moral?� He is taking it as given that morality cannot be practical.

Now, I have taken nothing as a given. I believe that morality, to the extent that it exists, is subjective. You believe that morality is objective, and have failed to demonstrate that Objectivism is this objective morality and that it is, in fact, objective. I don’t care that it is practical, what you have to understand is that if I said that “keeping your shoes clean is the one ultimate value from which everything stems� that would certainly not be an objective morality in the sense that you want Objectivism to be. However, keeping your shoes clean is often quite practical. So what?

I’m confused, haven’t I been saying that all values should be aimed at maintaining life? My argument is that life’s place is a dual role as both the base and goal of morality.

I know you’ve been saying that. My point was that values are not all aimed at maintaining life, and thus must come from a different “ultimate value� than life. Note of course that this whole discussion presupposes the absurd Objectivist notion that all our values are chosen directly by us. Even assuming that arguendo, your point is useless.

To interject in the middle this argument: What one desires can be based on something irrational. “Desire� is an emotion. A drug addict desires drugs, but drugs do not promote life, and thus the desire is based on irrational ideas. This has nothing to do with the Objectivist argument. Objectivism does not speak at all of desires. Objectivism speaks of what one SHOULD do and what one’s goals SHOULD be.

Now this is an example of semantic quibbles. You can simply replace all occurrences of “desire� with “value� or “goal.�

This totally has nothing to do with my argument. Please quote from where you think I imply that every person’s actions automatically are aimed at maintaining life. (In fact I have said the opposite, morality being volitional). I am offering a prescription for action, not a description of the current state of human moral beliefs or the psychology of every person alive. Happiness does, as I said before, lead to the continuation of life. A man with full use of all his limbs can more easily survive than a paraplegic, just as a happy man is better equipped to survive than one who is severely depressed. Happiness is a means to life, for sure. Remember, I (and Rand) say that the basis of morality is mans life AS A MAN. To pursue one’s survival means one needs to have health, energy, and motivation (happiness), all of these greatly increase one’s ability to survive, happiness just as much as the others.

I believe you rather missed the essence of the argument. Objectivists claim that people choose their own values. Thus, any value people have was chosen, either rationally or irrationally. If we say that people choose all their values irrationally, then what we have is six billion people world wide surviving on a daily basis despite the fact that they are being irrational! I simply don’t understand how Objectivism can pretend to have an argument in the face of this fact.

Now, if you were to say that values are chosen rationally, then what we have is values which don’t necessarily contribute to life necessary (or may even risk shortening it), but which we still have. Now, if these values were chosen rationally, then we can deduce (from the definition of rational), that they must serve some other greater value. However, if they don’t serve life, life is not the ultimate value (or at least not the only ultimate value). QED.

[Atlas51184]

Xorbie: “To me, it seems clear that a morality can only tell us what a desired end is, it is up to us to use whatever means we posses to achieve those ends�

In your first post you wrote: “I think it will suffice to say that morality is, by its nature, prescriptive.�

Prescriptive – (from the OED) - That prescribes or directs; giving definite, precise directions or instructions.

You have given two conflicting accounts. Which is it?

On to substance…

Xorbie begins his third post with an example, however I’m unclear on what this example seeks to show. “You have to understand that just because life makes value possible does not in and of itself ensure that life is an ultimate value,� hey says. Then the example of this is provided with the conclusion: “…it would certainly be absurd to say that Adam’s death is the ultimate value in this scenario, even though Adam’s death enables Bob’s life, it is Bob’s life which is the ultimate value.� So as an example of how life would not be the ultimate value, you offer a scenario in which, according to your words, life is the ultimate value? Am I misinterpreting the example?

Since I “have to understand that just because life makes value possible does not in and of itself ensure that life is an [I am not saying that life is an ultimate value, but the only ultimate value] ultimate value,� provide me with an example of value that could be an alternative to life as the ultimate value.

You said, “Just because life is gained and kept until the last moment of our life does not mean it is a goal in itself.� Since my argument is that, ultimately, all values are reducible to life, this objection depends on the validity of your more fundamental criticism that life need not be the ultimate value. So, to repeat my previous question, “What is an example of a non-life ultimate value?�
Xorbie:
Other living things act to reproduce, not to stay alive. Many organisms reproduce in a way which means certain or near certain death. True, they act to stay alive, but faced with the option of reproducing and dying, they choose it. And happiness is not a requirement for human life, you have to understand that there are grey areas. Nothing is a requirement for human life except for some very minimal bodily activity, people who are in a coma are still alive. Life is maintained on a daily basis by mentally and physically sick individuals – through the care of others. What you are saying is simply false.
An animal has no choice in its actions. It performs actions that it was genetically programmed to do; actions that its initial existence depends on.

Life of mentally and physically sick individuals is maintained only by the grace of the technology or care from others that allows them to stay alive. They are not alive as autonomous beings. Life: a process of self-sustaining and self-generating action. A vegetable is not alive because of his own actions. Metal health, motivation and physical health are required for autonomous human survival.

Xorbie:

Now, I have taken nothing as a given. I believe that morality, to the extent that it exists, is subjective. You believe that morality is objective, and have failed to demonstrate that Objectivism is this objective morality and that it is, in fact, objective. I don’t care that it is practical, what you have to understand is that if I said that “keeping your shoes clean is the one ultimate value from which everything stems� that would certainly not be an objective morality in the sense that you want Objectivism to be. However, keeping your shoes clean is often quite practical. So what?

The original criticism of my position was that my “oughts� said nothing about morality, and were merely advice for obtaining practical ends. Your argument was, in part, that I did not address morality because the basis of my ethics was life and all that is needed to maintain it. You dismissed it as a simple practical issue. See your entire first post.

Xorbie continues to talk about a different ultimate value, and I am still waiting for an example of one. He also makes reference to the issue of free-will, but I think we’d be better off leaving the entire free-will issue aside, as it just as complicated as the current issue. I will leave the rude nature of the “absurd Objectivist notion� comment aside, as well. I will ask, as a personal favor, that you not make condescending remarks like that unless you are actually going to develop the argument.

Xorbie:
I believe you rather missed the essence of the argument. Objectivists claim that people choose their own values. Thus, any value people have was chosen, either rationally or irrationally. If we say that people choose all their values irrationally, then what we have is six billion people world wide surviving on a daily basis despite the fact that they are being irrational! I simply don’t understand how Objectivism can pretend to have an argument in the face of this fact.

If I were to say that people choose all their values irrationally (which I don’t, nor does any Objectivist I’ve ever read) then yes, I would have quite a problem on my hand. But I don’t claim that, so the point is moot.

Xorbie:
Now, if you were to say that values are chosen rationally, then what we have is values which don’t necessarily contribute to life necessary (or may even risk shortening it), but which we still have. Now, if these values were chosen rationally, then we can deduce (from the definition of rational), that they must serve some other greater value. However, if they don’t serve life, life is not the ultimate value (or at least not the only ultimate value). QED.

It is very easy to speak of these values which are chosen rationally and serve something other than life without naming them. What are these values that don’t serve life, and what is this non-life ultimate value?

[xorbie]

Xorbie: “To me, it seems clear that a morality can only tell us what a desired end is, it is up to us to use whatever means we posses to achieve those ends�

In your first post you wrote: “I think it will suffice to say that morality is, by its nature, prescriptive.�

Prescriptive – (from the OED) - That prescribes or directs; giving definite, precise directions or instructions.

You have given two conflicting accounts. Which is it?

My apologies for any misunderstanding. By prescriptive, I mean that morality prescribes certain values for us, I thought I was clear about this when I defined morality. And as you have had two posts since that definition and have not come up with your own, I can only assume you accept mine. Keep in mind that the onus in this debate is on you to prove that Objectivism is, in fact, an objective moral system.

Xorbie begins his third post with an example, however I’m unclear on what this example seeks to show. “You have to understand that just because life makes value possible does not in and of itself ensure that life is an ultimate value,� hey says. Then the example of this is provided with the conclusion: “…it would certainly be absurd to say that Adam’s death is the ultimate value in this scenario, even though Adam’s death enables Bob’s life, it is Bob’s life which is the ultimate value.� So as an example of how life would not be the ultimate value, you offer a scenario in which, according to your words, life is the ultimate value? Am I misinterpreting the example?

Yes, you are misinterpreting it. I didn't say that my example conclusively proved that life was The Ultimate Value. What my example showed was that if A is necessary for the acheivement of B, that does not mean we actually value A. Of course, all I really need is the much weaker truth that just because A is necessary for the acheivement of B does not make A an ultimate value. That is to say, just because life is necessary for the acheivement of anything does not make life an ultimate value, from which all other values stem. You have, as of yet, given no actual argument that life is the ultimate value besides asking me what is, if not life.

Let me just say that I don't believe there is one ultimate value, and that the fact that one would posit such a thing makes it seem as though one is quite ignorant of psychology. The idea that such an ultimate value exists is something that Rand and some other philosophers believe in, but this does not mean such an ultimate value exists. It is you who must prove that such a thing does exist (a single ultimate value from which all other values stem) and that only life can be this thing. And then you need to show that Objectivism is the only moral system consistent with this value, and then you need to show that it is "wrong" to choose a moral system that is not purely consistent with this value. Have at it.

Since I “have to understand that just because life makes value possible does not in and of itself ensure that life is an [I am not saying that life is an ultimate value, but the only ultimate value] ultimate value,� provide me with an example of value that could be an alternative to life as the ultimate value.

Well, see above. But I could say that if we are to consider this "ultimate value" then country, love, family, friends, happiness and various socio political causes could all be seen as the "ultimate value", seeing as how people have given their life for it.

You said, “Just because life is gained and kept until the last moment of our life does not mean it is a goal in itself.� Since my argument is that, ultimately, all values are reducible to life, this objection depends on the validity of your more fundamental criticism that life need not be the ultimate value. So, to repeat my previous question, “What is an example of a non-life ultimate value?�

That all values are reductible to life is not an argument, it's just false. All the time, people give up life so that something else can be acheived.


An animal has no choice in its actions. It performs actions that it was genetically programmed to do; actions that its initial existence depends on.

You asked for examples of animals acting in ways contrary to preserving life, I gave them. Also, note that humans are animals.

Life of mentally and physically sick individuals is maintained only by the grace of the technology or care from others that allows them to stay alive. They are not alive as autonomous beings. Life: a process of self-sustaining and self-generating action. A vegetable is not alive because of his own actions. Metal health, motivation and physical health are required for autonomous human survival.

The original criticism of my position was that my “oughts� said nothing about morality, and were merely advice for obtaining practical ends. Your argument was, in part, that I did not address morality because the basis of my ethics was life and all that is needed to maintain it. You dismissed it as a simple practical issue. See your entire first post.

I think you simply fail to grasp the crux of the argument. What your ethics or morality is based on is of no significance. If we are to assume that life is the only value we should hold (and then any value that stems from it), then obviously any action that opposes life is morally wrong. You have yet to prove that it is objectively true that life should be this one Ultimate Value.

If I were to say that people choose all their values irrationally (which I don’t, nor does any Objectivist I’ve ever read) then yes, I would have quite a problem on my hand. But I don’t claim that, so the point is moot.

I think you fail to understand the problem on your hand. According to you, people have an ultimate value, from which all other values stem if we are rational. The point is that people follow non-Objectivist moral systems, which Objectivists claim is irrational, but have no problem surviving. If the whole point of Objectivism is that you must preserve life, than Objectivism as a whole doesn't seem to be a more "moral" moral system than several others.

Frankly, I'm a little disappointed with this debate. Atlas has only on a few occasions actually set forth any arguments, an they have been frequently on the order of a sentence or two. No proof has been offered to show that we indeed have an ultimate value, or that life must be it

Joel

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Atlas51184 and xorbie have agreed to make the 7th round the concluding round of the formal debate.

Jason

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Atlas51184,

This is just a reminder that the one week deadline for your next statement has passed as agreed to from the parameters (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=77525). However, the rules permit a grace period until Tuesday, May 4.

Thank you for your consideration,

NS (FDD moderator)

[Atlas51184]

I think you fail to understand the problem on your hand. According to you, people have an ultimate value, from which all other values stem if we are rational. The point is that people follow non-Objectivist moral systems, which Objectivists claim is irrational, but have no problem surviving. If the whole point of Objectivism is that you must preserve life, than Objectivism as a whole doesn't seem to be a more "moral" moral system than several others.

Frankly, I'm a little disappointed with this debate. Atlas has only on a few occasions actually set forth any arguments, an they have been frequently on the order of a sentence or two. No proof has been offered to show that we indeed have an ultimate value, or that life must be it.

Frankly, I’m at a loss as to what to say to a comment like this. My first post provided a sustained argument for my position. You then criticized my argument, and I responded to that criticism. And on. Do I need to re-post my initial argument every time an objection is raised?

Rand began her ethical inquiry with an analysis of the concept “value.� Fundamentally, she concluded, only a living being is capable of valuing something. Without the alternative of existence versus non-existence, the concept value is useless. Value presupposes life. I have said this before. Objections to this have been raised, I have addressed them, and they have all been dropped. Each new post by Xorbie offers a new objection, without concern for previous objections. Have those objections been dropped? Forgotten?

The only objection that has been raised in every post is the contention that life is not the ultimate value. As to the Bob and Adam example: I understand the point now, I misread it last time. There is still a problem, though. It is not my claim that everything (A) that helps to the achievement of something (B) is a value. It is my contention that life, however, is always a value in rational action, hence life is the standard of value. Life takes a unique role as both a standard and as a value. Do I need to re-post the argument for that from my opening post?

As I said before: country, love, family, friends, happiness, they pre-suppose that someone is alive and valuing them. Dying in defense of one’s values (values ultimately reducible to life) is dying in defense of one’s life.

I think you fail to understand the problem on your hand. According to you, people have an ultimate value, from which all other values stem if we are rational. The point is that people follow non-Objectivist moral systems, which Objectivists claim is irrational, but have no problem surviving.

But this isn’t a problem. Some people take contradictory actions. To the extent that a person survives, he is working to achieve life. He may not take this as a consistent course of action, but all that means is that he is being inconsistent.


Sorry for the delay and brevity of my response. It’s finals time at school.

[xorbie]

As I said before: country, love, family, friends, happiness, they pre-suppose that someone is alive and valuing them. Dying in defense of one’s values (values ultimately reducible to life) is dying in defense of one’s life.

To me, this sums up the argument for Objectivism. It might sound nice, but is utterly devoid of meaning or substance. Here, Atlas is defining life as life qua man, the concept that, as I have mentioned, Objectivists fall back on when their argument is shown false. However, this concept is poorly defined, meaning "life with all your values fulfilled" as best as I can tell. Of course, this has two problems. First of all, yes we can obviously say that this is the "Ultimate Value" insofar as one exists, but only because it encompasses all values. However, we now have the more important problem of Objectivism not telling us which values we can morally hold, such that completion of them leaves us with life qua man. If I value the death of all black people, and then begin a murdering spree, can I be said to be good? After all, I am simply acting to gain or keep my value of life as life qua (KKK member) man. The attempt to duck all of these other values in is disingenuous at best, and defeats the purpose of creating an actual moral system, because anything is good so long as you want it.

Now the argument that Atlas presents:

It is my contention that life, however, is always a value in rational action, hence life is the standard of value. Life takes a unique role as both a standard and as a value.

This is not an argument that life is an Ultimate Value, a term which you continue to fail to define, along with morality and rational. Life is a value in rational action, because maintaining life is generally the best way to achieve some other, higher value. Life is thus a value, but not a standard. What you have above is an assertion, and what you posted in your opening statement was as well. I have since then asked you to post an actual argument, complete with an actual definition of what an ultimate value is, a proof that one exists and a proof that life is the only such value. You have failed to do so.

So, in your next post perhaps you should define the various terms you use, such as "rational," "life," "morality," and "ultimate value."

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Atlas51184,

This is just a reminder that your statement is overdue. It has been more than a week since xorbie's last post. We will grant you a grace period, extending the deadline to May 16th, but please note that a third late will result in a forfeit.

Thank you for your consideration,

NS, FD Moderator

[Atlas51184]

Judging by the last few posts, this debate is over. I suppose I will be the first opt out. So, I'll end with this: For those interested in a full presentation and defense of Rand's theory, see Tara Smith's book Viable Values. All of the topics discussed here are discussed in depth by Smith. Anyone who is interested in Objectivism should, obviously, research it for himself and come to his own conclusions, etc. Thanks to xorbie for participating and to Nightshade for moderating.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Since Atlas51184 has chosen to withdraw from the debate, xorbie may submit a concluding statement if he wishes to. After that, this thread will be closed.

We would like to thank xorbie and Atlas51184 for their participation.

- NS (FD Moderator)

Edit: xorbie has declined to submit a final statement. This thread will now be closed.