PEANUT GALLERY: Harry Callahan vs. Jade on presuppositional apologetics

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

This thread has been set up to provide a Peanut Gallery for a FORMAL DEBATE (http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=80583) between Harry Callahan and Jade.

Using the Transcendental Argument for the existence of God, Harry Callahan will argue that logic, science, and morality can only be grounded under the presuppositions of the worldview of Christian theism and that metaphysical naturalism fails.

Jade will argue that the Transcendental Argument for the existence of God fails, and that logic, science, and morality can successfully be grounded within the worldview of metaphysical naturalism.

The debate will use a special format, will last 10 rounds, and each post submitted per round will be validated by the moderators as concurrent statements (i.e. simulataneously revealing both posts as they are received).

We ask that the formal debate participants refrain from posting in the Peanut Gallery until after the debate is over.

Keep in mind that there will always be a link to the Peanut Gallery in the first post of the formal debate thread in case you cannot find the gallery later.

Enjoy the debate!

Jason

[luvluv]

I think the link might be broken.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

I think the link might be broken.

Thanks, got it. :cool:

Jason

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

I'm surprised that this debate hasn't got much attention. :confused:

Rainbow Walking, where are thou? :cool:

Jason

[the fonz]

IMO, on Callahan's part, nothing substantial has really been said yet. He just stated that he will defend TAG.

Jade's post said essentially the same thing but introduced TAG better and included some initial arguments and rebuttals. It seems Jade's points against TAG are much more devoloped than what I have read in the past. I'm curious to see how his/her (?) points on turning Christianity into Metaphysical Naturalism are going to end up being relevant.

So, Jade's defense is new to me. Something I haven't seen before. I'm definitely interested. :)

[Harry Callahan]

Nevermind, i just noticed that Jade and me are not supposed to post here. EDIT!


- Harry

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Nevermind, i just noticed that Jade and me are not supposed to post here. EDIT!


- Harry

Hissssss!!!! http://instagiber.net/smiliesdotcom/contrib/ruinkai/spanka.gif

[Spenser]

Bravo Jade! Using the presuppositionalist approach to presuppose presuppositionalist out of the picture. Bravo!



- theist - You cannot possibly be right because you have to borrow from my system to even make that statement!

- atheist - Not true, you cannot possibly be right about me not being right because you have to presuppose my system in order to presuppose your system!



Ha! The debate is doomed to be a draw which only damages the presuppositionalist approach; which to me is a victory!!!

[rainbow walking]

Harry the ghost in the Callahan Machine needs to explain or define what he means by "account for" and were I Jade I'd take a closer look at his definition of Presupposition. I think he'll find Harry has sort of taken liberties with this term and convoluted the term in his favor. Not all presuppositions are created equal Jade. But then, you already know that... :)

[mosaic]

I'm thoroughly impressed with Jade's presentation though I disagree with the redefining of naturalism, and especially the all-inclusive nature of his defintion of materialism. Its good that the debate as specific topics in rounds because I'd encourage Harry to vigorously attack the definitions( fact is, the redefintions neccesitate materialism and naturalism leaving no room for harry's argument or anything else--its ingenious but its very open to criticism.) I've seen Harry's TAG argument before and I await a more robust presentation of it--as it stands its way too familiar and suffers some pointed problems.

[luvluv]

Good stuff all around. I agree with Mosaic that Jade's argument is weakest at the point of his definitions. I'm not sure, presently, that I know exactly what he means by his terms. I think I can imagine something existing without context (perhaps a possible world where God alone exists timelessly). And I thought I understood what he meant by presence until he stated that the laws of logic have a presence. I assume by presence he doesn't mean spatialized location, I guess he means generic existence. Now if the poor fellow takes it upon himself to define what existence is, I wish him luck.

But more than that, even if the TAG has to presuppose MetaNat, I still don't see how MetaNat can do without God and provide a proper foundation for the things Harry has explicated. For instance, I will be very impressed if Jade can establish an objective and binding non-theistic system of ethics. (I'll also wonder what anybody who is capable of doing such a thing is doing playing around on this board!) Frankly, if one defines MetaNat as believing only in the existence of the entities defined by science, then I don't see how anything can be grounded by it. The metaphysics and ontology proposed by science changes everyday, and some scientific ontologies contradict other scientific ontologies. I really get upset when people define naturalism or scientism like that, like science should be spelled with a capital "S", and is one monolothic, coherent system. Folks, science is a mess of contradictory opinions and hypothesis that are in the middle of being worked out and explicated. Science is populated with entities we can't imagine and can't fathom, and the very proponents of many scientific entities warn us not to take these entities literally, but to conceive of them instrumentally. To commit oneself to believing only in the entities of science is to have absolutely no idea what one believes in, from day to day and from hour to hour.

Anyway, I'm done ranting.

[TheGreatInfidel]

[QUOTE=luvluv]....... I'm not sure, presently, that I know exactly what he means by his terms. I think I can imagine something existing without context (perhaps a possible world where God alone exists timelessly)......

.....Folks, science is a mess of contradictory opinions and hypothesis that are in the middle of being worked out and explicated. Science is populated with entities we can't imagine and can't fathom, and the very proponents of many scientific entities warn us not to take these entities literally, but to conceive of them instrumentally. To commit oneself to believing only in the entities of science is to have absolutely no idea what one believes in, from day to day and from hour to hour.[QUOTE] (emphasis added)

I guess it all boils down to intuitions. Another reason why philosophy is going out of business (as if it ever was).

[rainbow walking]

Good stuff all around. I agree with Mosaic that Jade's argument is weakest at the point of his definitions. I'm not sure, presently, that I know exactly what he means by his terms. I think I can imagine something existing without context (perhaps a possible world where God alone exists timelessly).


rw: And when asked to define world and timelessly, how do you propose to do so without context?

And I thought I understood what he meant by presence until he stated that the laws of logic have a presence. I assume by presence he doesn't mean spatialized location, I guess he means generic existence. Now if the poor fellow takes it upon himself to define what existence is, I wish him luck.

But more than that, even if the TAG has to presuppose MetaNat, I still don't see how MetaNat can do without God and provide a proper foundation for the things Harry has explicated.


rw: Depends on what you mean by "proper foundation". Usually what a theist means by this is origins. Do you always question the origins of the meat that goes into the makings of a hamburger from McDonalds prior to eating?

For instance, I will be very impressed if Jade can establish an objective and binding non-theistic system of ethics. (I'll also wonder what anybody who is capable of doing such a thing is doing playing around on this board!)


rw: Why "binding"? Why are theists so infatuated with authoritative bindings that lock them into a specific set of choices regardless of the circumstances while proclaiming freewill as their defense in many other arguments?

Frankly, if one defines MetaNat as believing only in the existence of the entities defined by science, then I don't see how anything can be grounded by it. The metaphysics and ontology proposed by science changes everyday, and some scientific ontologies contradict other scientific ontologies. I really get upset when people define naturalism or scientism like that, like science should be spelled with a capital "S", and is one monolothic, coherent system. Folks, science is a mess of contradictory opinions and hypothesis that are in the middle of being worked out and explicated. Science is populated with entities we can't imagine and can't fathom, and the very proponents of many scientific entities warn us not to take these entities literally, but to conceive of them instrumentally. To commit oneself to believing only in the entities of science is to have absolutely no idea what one believes in, from day to day and from hour to hour.

rw: That is why we hold to the various components of our worldviews tentatively and not dogmatically. I can't speak for other atheists here but I am committed only to that which can be reasonably established empirically to exist, either in concrete form or abstract conception, reserving the right to differentiate between the two.

[Gary Welsh]

God... Is it just me, or is this debate hopelessly tedious to read? Or is it just that any presuppositional position is hopelessly dull to read about? There is so much in the way of preface, introductory statements and tentative definitions put forth, it never really seems to get into the meat or the heart of the issue. I don't mean to be rude, but these sorts of debates just seem so formalized and antiseptic anymore... They seem bloodless.

[Gary Welsh]

I will be very impressed if Jade can establish an objective and binding non-theistic system of ethics.

What is a binding theistic system of ethics? Obviously, its not binding if you don't believe in the god in the first place. Here is the fundamental problem with presuppositionalism... Instead of wanting to first establish that god exists through evidence, the cart is put before the horse. Ethics, knowledge, logic and your mother's fruit basket can only exist if you first presuppose the existence of god, and not just any god, but the Christian God. So instead of leading us to the burning bush that talks, you just wave your arms and shout "All of this is proof Y(e)H(o)W(a)H exists!" Really.

[Stacey Melissa]

God... Is it just me, or is this debate hopelessly tedious to read? Or is it just that any presuppositional position is hopelessly dull to read about?
I have found the opening round to be quite interesting, and I hope the subsequent rounds remain so.

Of course, I also loved reading Michael Martin's Atheism: A Philosophical Justification for its rigor. So I suppose you can take my opinion with a grain of salt.

[rainbow walking]

Well, Harry has weighed in with his next installment on Presuppositionalism and its rather comforting to see that there really is nothing new under the theists sun. Once again we find the tired old attempt to use sleight of hand techniques to shuffle his god into the front of the line by using categories and sets of things that have one common denominator and ignoring the obvious. Harry has zeroed in on logic, created a set of abstract things common to the human condition and inserted his god hypothesis into this set, claiming his hypothesis, (which he arbitrarily asserts is not only true but accounts for all other abstract concepts), is both internally consistent and coherent. Well, so what? First we must ignore the completely inconsistent and incoherent rationale that he will never bring to the table for why we must allow his god equal status in this set. His sleight of hand technique also incorporates a completely erroneous assumption about Metanat and how we can account for logic. Unlike his god hypothesis, logic is directly connected to the human condition and experience in ways his god cannot boast in. We can verify the validity of logic, for instance non-contradiction, by pointing to an object and confirm that the thing is itself and not both itself and something else at the same time. Can Harry do this with his god? Can he point this god out to us and show us that this god is itself and not something else altogether? No, he cannot. Thus Harry, true to all Presuppositionalists and their disingenuous tactics, has attempted to surreptitiously insert an abstract into a set where it does not judiciously belong. There are many abstract concepts in the range of human experience. Love and hate for instance or mathematics or anxiety or fear are all abstract concepts with one thing in common that Harry’s presupposed god does not share. They can all be empirically verified with observable evidences as to their validity and commonality to the human experience. We can point to human behavior to verify the objectivity of hatred or love, anxiety or fear. We cannot do the same for Harry’s god. Thus his god does not belong in this set of abstracts nor does presupposing the truth of assuming a god exists qualify such inclusion. Nor is Harry being honest with us or himself when he claims that such abstract concepts have no metanat connection to the material existence of this universe. I can defeat Harry’s claims by simply re-adjusting my own presupposition along this line and claim that the abstract concept of Anxiety accounts for all the other abstract factors of the human condition. I can simply and arbitrarily assert that Anxiety accounts for all human behavior both abstract and concrete. I can assert that anxiety explains logic and mathematics because humans are motivated by anxiety to interpret their observations logically and communicate them mathematically and linguistically. As you can see, this ad absurdum does Harry’s argument extreme damage at the outset. Since Presuppositionalism is nothing more than bland assertion of the arbitrary as an excuse for claiming the impossibility of the contrary…anything goes and can be used in place of god as the placeholder.

Internal consistency and coherence are irrelevant to truth value. Claiming demons and blue fairies as presuppositionally true can also be made internally consistent and coherent but this does not render them accurate, functional or true.

Harry has not only made an unsupported assertion, that placing both god and logic in the same catagory based on abstractness somehow magically invests this god with the same literality of existence as logic, (in spite of using only the attribute of abstractness as his justification), but he has installed an additional presupposition into his argument and is no longer proceeding on the initial presupp of an existent god. He has started working over the tired old shell game of investing his assumption with a heirarchy that transcends all other existent things that require no arbitrary assertions to verify their existence and functionality. And, I might point out, that Harry had to borrow from the functionally abstract usage of logic to make his argument, faulty as it is.

Good try Harry but I ain't gonna let you get away with it.

[Gary Welsh]

Yeah, that's right rw.

1. An invisible spirit with lots of magical powers is an abstract concept.
2. Logic is an abstract concept.
3. Therefore, an invisible spirit with magic powers and logic have the same ontological status.

Like I said, dull.

[Prof]

Fun debate, although I was disappointed Harry seemed to ignore much of what Jade wrote and simply asserted more detail of the TAG.

There's so much bogus about the TAG it's hard to know where to start.
I'll leave the direct attack to the much more capable Jade and instead simply offer a few observations:

1. Like many Christians, the proponents of TAG make the assertion that without Christianity morals, good and evil don't exist; they become simply subjective opinions. Whereas Christianity (and TAG) DOES contain an objective set of morals, and it allows people to "know" that something is good or evil. (The tired old: "In an atheistic universe, on what basis can you know Hitler was evil? Christianity gives us the grounding to know that fact").

Yet Christianity has been unable to demonstrate such a moral touchstone actually exists and that it does indeed provide objectivity for the Christian. They haven't even come close. Their touchstone, the Bible, is full of contradictory notions of morality, as does it's central Character (God).
Nor can we infer from the behavior of Christians themselves that they are in touch with an objective morality. Christians can be found all over the map in terms of their views on moral issues (capitol punishment/abortion, you name it). Christians can not agree on what God condones and does not condone. There is all the evidence that Christian come to their "morals" as interpretively and subjectively as they accuse the atheist of doing. (Not that I necessarily think atheistic morals need not be objectively based to some degree...that's another discussion).


2. Then there's the self refuting, logical incoherence and self-contradictions of the Bible. The Bible itself contained many self-contradictory elements. And the very use of reason supposedly given foundation by the Bible refutes much of what the Bible reports about our world. (Science refuting the Genesis account and much more).

What do we do when the very use of reason that is supposedly given foundation in the Bible points to the Bible being wrong? TAG people don't like to go near that because their answers open up a huge can of worms that undermines the very use of the power of reason, which they wish to hold on to. (For one instance, the idea that The Fall made mankind's reasoning unreliable, which supposedly explains how science can come to results that contradict the "truth" of the Bible, obviously puts in disrepute the very faculty that is used to support TAG).

3. The TAG has little persuasive force unless you already believe it's central premise (Christian God exists). In general, it's intellectual dishonesty and attempts at logical sleight of hand are so palpable that it does not make a serious impression on a rational, non-believer. (At least, I've never seen a non-believer who was fooled by any of it).

In contrast, meta-nat, or empirical/scientific arguments clearly are more forceful and contain elements of "truth" such that even Christians find them undeniable. Christians have had to let naturalistic explanations take the place of many of their supernatural ones (again, see Genesis etc). Many Christians even now accept evolution as fact. In other words, Christians often accept the "truth" of many theories that come out of a non-theistic epistemology, because the arguments and evidence supporting them are that persuasive. In contrast, I don't see that theistic-based explanations have made any contributions to science, or that atheists have been compelled to adopt theistically derived theories into their world view.

Prof.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Fun debate, although I was disappointed Harry seemed to ignore much of what Jade wrote and simply asserted more detail of the TAG.


This is part of the first phase of the debate. They won't starting rebutting each other's argument until round 5, in the next phase.

PHASE ONE: (Note: in this phase, the debate participants will posts their positions only and not engage in rebuttals)

Jason

[Soundsurfr]

Seems like the whole thing can be boiled down to the argument I hear all the time from theists, and my standard response - specifically:

Theist: "All reason ultimately relies on one or more unsupported assumptions and is therefore ultimately unreliable."

Atheist: "Did you use reason to come to that conclusion or some other method?"

:rolleyes:

[Stacey Melissa]

Synopsis of the debate thus far:

Round 1: Jade defines some terms. Dirty Harry loads .44 Magnum.
Round 2: Jade summarizes logic as it fits in with MetaNat. Dirty Harry takes aim at strawpunks, then strangely shoots self in foot.

Score 2 for Jade, 0 for hobbled Harry.
....

I question whether Jade really needed to go into quite so much detail in explaining some of the methods of logic. Those of us who have taken an intro logic course already know these things well. Other people will need much more detail to really grasp Jade's explanation. Harry did better at that particular part by keeping it short and sweet with just a few of the obvious laws of logic.

Beyond his discussion of exactly what logic is, Harry's connection of it to God was nonexistant. He asserted a connection and then did nothing to back that up.
....

TAG:

1. ((L . S . M) IFF G)
2. (L . S . M)
---------------------
3. G

Where L=logic, S=science, M=morality, and G=God

TAG is deductively valid, but not deductively sound, because the first premise is false.
....

Harry finds his way to a strawpunk:
So when we examine these laws, we see that they are abstract, invariant, and self-evident. How are such abstract concepts possible in an atheistic universe? Are they reducible to matter? Metaphysical Naturalism is defined as:

�…a term coined by philosophers for any worldview that holds that nature is all there is. Philosophers call this a “closed� system because nothing more is needed to explain why it exists or why it is the way it is: it just is. All explanations for any phenomenon or event ultimately end up at the same place: the nature of the universe.�
Apparently, Harry thinks MetaNat leaves no room for abstract concepts. Does he think logic must be defined as a material thing within a MetaNat framework, or something? <sarcasm>Yes, Harry. We've finally located logic. It is located just above the firmament, where only God has access to it. And while we were looking, we also happened to notice mathematics and Plato's Forms hiding on the dark side of the moon.</sarcasm>

In reality, as Jade argues, MetaNat leaves room both for things that are not composed of matter, and, more importantly, abstract concepts, so we must modify the TAG:

1. ((S . M) IFF G)
2. (G -> L)
3. (L . S . M)
------------------
4. G

Once again, it is deductively valid, but not sound, because Harry fails to show that the second premise is true. (Let alone the first premise. That's for later rounds, though.) Harry is unable to show that logic necessarily follows from God. All Harry can say is that


The Christian theist can rationally account for abstract, invariant, self-evident entities. God is not material:

“God is spirit, and his worshipers must worship in spirit and in truth." ~ John 4:24

Thus, abstract entities are perfectly consistent and coherent.
Non sequitur. Just because the theist might be able to rationally account for a particular non-material entity, it does not follow that they can then account for any abstract concept. Furthermore, there is no such thing as an entity that is abstract. An entity might be non-material, but it cannot be abstract, even in the theist's worldview. One wonders if Harry thinks God is an abstract entity, since God is the example he uses of an abstract entity which Christians can rationally account for. I find this amusing, since earlier, Harry defined "abstract" as


Such principles are not concrete, or material in nature. They are conceptual in nature, non-material. As Gordon Stein asked in his debate with Greg Bahnsen, “How can a law be material?� [9] They can’t be material, so they must be abstract.
I wonder if Harry notices that he just said God is "conceptual in nature." Concepts don't exist apart from conscious minds, such as the minds of humans. And we atheists could certainly agree with Harry that God only exists in some peoples' minds. According to Harry, God does not objectively exist because he is conceptual. God didn't create us; we created him. Now that Harry has shot himself in the foot with his big gun and conceded the debate, how about we all go home?

God is eternal and does not change:

“For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities--his eternal power and divine nature--have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.� ~ Romans 1:21

Thus, abstract, invariant entities makes sense and can be accounted for.
What?! How did we get from "God is eternal and does not change" to "thus, abstract, invariant entities makes (sic) sense"? That's quite the non sequitur.


But even if Harry could prove the second premise, this is not what he wants:
Further, this would make the laws of logic contingent, and if this is the case, then why are there not other systems of logic that are equally valid?
Harry doesn't just want a conditional for the second premise; he wants a biconditional, as in the original formulation of the TAG. Yet, as already pointed out, this is something he cannot have.

We'll see if Harry can do any better with science or morality. My prediction is that he will not. In the end, the TAG will be reduced to:

1. (L . S . M)
---------------
2. (L . S . M)

I don't see a "G" anywhere in there.

[dshimel]

Okay, I must admit I've not read every sentance of Dirty Harry's 2nd post.

However, to me it seems the TAG can be simplified to:

Assumptions:
God exists and is the source of everythng that exists.
Knowledge, logic and morality are things.

Therefore, God exists.

Further, everyone that has knowledge, uses logic, or has a moral code, really beleives in God, but they pretend not to for some stupid reason.

Like most proofs of God, this is clearly just more circular reasoning. It assumes God, then sets out to prove God.

This is just more justification for God. If I believe in God, then I am justified in believeing in absolute knowledge. If you don't believe in God, than you can't believe in absolute knowledge.

Well, I can if I just assume absolute knowledge. This seems to be the MetaNat that Jade uses. Let's just assume that "Exists" has some meaning. Now, whether you put that level of assumption below God, or with God, is irrelivant. At some point, the assumption has to be made.

Without the basic assumption of existance, than any discussion of Gods existance is meaningless.


So, TAG assumes God is existance and anti-TAG assumes existance is existance.

The difference is that TAG permits the theist to justify all kinds of otherwise unjustifiable beliefs. Lying is immoral, because God exists. Killing is immoral becuase God exists. I can know The Truth, because God exists.

Once again, the argument of God's existance really just boiles down to an circular reasoning based excuse for using the appeal to unqualified authority fallacy to hold whatever view the thiest chooses to hold.

[rainbow walking]

Fun debate, although I was disappointed Harry seemed to ignore much of what Jade wrote and simply asserted more detail of the TAG.

There's so much bogus about the TAG it's hard to know where to start.
I'll leave the direct attack to the much more capable Jade and instead simply offer a few observations:

1. Like many Christians, the proponents of TAG make the assertion that without Christianity morals, good and evil don't exist; they become simply subjective opinions. Whereas Christianity (and TAG) DOES contain an objective set of morals, and it allows people to "know" that something is good or evil. (The tired old: "In an atheistic universe, on what basis can you know Hitler was evil? Christianity gives us the grounding to know that fact").

rw: Another problem that emerges for the Tager is a philosophical quagmire of contradicting truth theorems between his appeal to revelation and god as an absolute objective moral foundation, and his subjective appeal to internal consistency and coherence as the criteria by which he claims his worldview trumps all others. The tager probably doesn't even realize he's weilding the coherence theory of truth, (which mistakes consistency for truth), as his underlying premise for these criteria...and the coherence theory of truth is definitely a subjective theory of true belief. So the tager, on one hand, flaunts his presupp of a creator god whose existence "accounts for" all other attributes of the universe and appeals to the authority of revelation as his "objectifying " base of standards for morality and other aspects of the human condition...then turns around and establishes a criteria for weilding this assertion against all other worldviews that is both subjective and ineffective in accomplishing his alleged ends of demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary. Apparently, revealing the logical flaws in this argument is not among the tager's revelational instruction book. What ever happened to simple truth-value as a criteria for making such comparisons? I suspect the Tager has attempted to load the dice by chosing these particular criteria to judge and compare worldviews.

[bd-from-kg]

Stacey Melissa:

An excellent post. Unfortunately it stole some of my thunder by making a couple of the points I had intended to make!

To all:

There’s one other important point that doesn't seem to have gotten much attention yet: the demand for an “externally coherent� worldview. This is crucial because it’s central to the “impossibility of the contrary� argument that TAGers love to harp on.

Harry puts it this way:

To say that a worldview should be externally coherent is to say that a worldview should meet further criteria other than internal consistency and coherency. Further criteria such as:

1) Applicability.
2) Adequacy.

When speaking about applicability, I mean to say that such systems of thought should be able to properly describe reality, and when I say adequacy, I mean that, �…a world-view is intended to be a conceptual synthesis, it must in theory be capable of accounting for all possible experience.�

Now the first question that has to be dealt with here is: if this is what the TAGer means by a “worldview�, is it necessary, or even desirable, to have a “worldview� at all? That is to say, why would anyone be expected to, or even want to, have a theory that is “capable of accounting for all possible experience�? And for that matter, is the demand for such a theory even logically coherent - that is, is it possible in principle to have an explanation in hand for “all possible experience� - i.e., a “theory of everything�?

Consider, for example, a very simple experience: my experience of looking out the window and seeing the oak tree that’s been there for years. What would constitute an “account� of this experience? Well, I could tell you about the acorn that landed there and eventually grew into that oak. I could also give an account of how I came into existence and came to have eyesight and cognitive faculties capable of recognizing objects like trees. But would this be a complete account of my experience? No, it would not. For one thing, it starts somewhere, at some particular time, and fails to give an account of how the state of affairs existing at that time came into existence. Also, it presumes a number of regularities or uniformities in the natural order, and I am unable to give an account of why these regularities exist. Nor am I able to give a complete account of how I know about them; among other things, I cannot give a rational justification for induction (or more generally, the process by which we move from specific observations to generalizations about the natural world).

But is it necessary that I be able to provide any such complete “account�? If so, what is it necessary for? I seem to be able to get along just fine without anything of the sort.

At any rate, I certainly have no hope of giving any such complete “account� without making any number of totally unsupported guesses or hypotheses. It seems clear that, if the job can be done at all, it can be done by any number of quite different (sufficiently comprehensive) hypotheses, none of which, unfortunately, have an empirical basis. Moreover, any account of how I came to have reliable cognitive faculties would inevitably be circular in the sense that it would be based on the assumption that I have reliable cognitive faculties (and thus have some basis for making rational judgments, including judgments about how I came to have reliable cognitive faculties). So while I might be able to give an account of how I came to have such faculties, this account would in no way justify my original assumption that I do indeed have them.

So it’s hard to see what rational purpose would be served by accepting the numerous empirically unsupported hypotheses that would be needed to give the kind of complete “account� of my experiences (indeed, of all possible experiences) that the TAGer demands as a necessary condition for having a “coherent� worldview. Any conclusions derived from these hypotheses could not be used to justify the hypotheses themselves - or indeed, anything else. In particular, it’s hard to see what purpose would be served by adopting doubtful hypotheses that would allow me to “account for� the (apparent) reliability of my cognitive faculties, or “ensure� that what seem to be sensory inputs coming from the “real world� are indeed what they seem to be, or that induction is a valid method for drawing inferences about that world. I can’t imagine being more confident of the correctness of any such hypothesis than I already am of the truth of these things. And in any case, how can unsupported hypotheses provide a foundation for knowledge? How can conclusions be more firm than the foundation on which they rest?

Finally, it seems to be impossible in principle to give any such account as the TAGer demands. Any “account� of anything must necessarily be in terms of something else. Thus, we can “account� for why grass is green by pointing out that it contains chlorophyll, and we can account for why chlorophyll is green by giving a detailed explanation of it molecular structure and the physics of light. But if we’re then asked to account for the physics of light, we shall soon find ourselves out of explanations: the laws of physics are ultimately a “brute fact� admitting of no further explanation. And so it must go for any “account� of anything whatsoever. Thus, if we’re asked to “account� for “all possible experiences� we must necessarily be at a loss, because by definition there is nothing “left over� in terms of which any such account or explanation could be given.

The theist attempts to get around this problem by claiming that God - his ultimate “explanation� for everything else, is not in need of explanation; there is no need to give an “account� of His existence, His nature, His preferences and purposes, etc. God, it is alleged, is a “necessary being�, and that’s that. But even if this were so, a complete account of “all our experiences� would then have to include an account of why God is a necessary being; of how there can be such a thing as a “necessary being�. And such an account is clearly impossible in principle, since (according to theists) there’s nothing “left over� in terms of which any such account could be given: everything that isn’t God (the thing we’re supposed to explain) was created by God, and thus cannot be part of an explanation of God.

Now of course it might be argued that some version of the Ontological Argument “explains� why there must be a necessary being, and why such a being would have to have the essential characteristics attributed to God. But aside from the fact that all versions of the OA are transparently fallacious, this argument represents an abandonment of the TAG, since if any version of the OA were sound the TAG would be superfluous; theists would already have a rigorous demonstration of God’s existence without having to resort to anything as tenuous as the TAG. Moreover, The OA rests on logic, which (according to TAGers) was itself created by God (or emanates from God, or whatever. Thus logic cannot be responsible for the supposed “necessity� of God: God could hardly be responsible for His own necessity.

So the demand for an “externally coherent worldview� is nothing but a red herring. There is no need for any such thing; it would profit us nothing to invent one even if it were possible to do so; and nothing of the sort is logically possible in any case.

[rainbow walking]

Good post bd_from_kg. When the Tager uses the term "accounts for" what he's really pleading is that presupposing the existence of a "creator god" stops the infinite regress and thereby provides a starting point for explaining all subsequent conditions of reality. Unfortunately he seems oblivious to the fact that he is only exchanging infinite regress for circularity. He still hasn't accounted for god and just asserts this arbitrarily. So he's basically asserting the arbitrary to claim the impossibility of the contrary. And, as you so lucidly pointed out...to support the arbitrary takes him into waters that contradict his initial presupposition since Ontological arguments are anything but presuppositional.

The Tager also seems oblivious to his subscription of god as a true presupposition being based on a coherence theory of truth which is entirely subjective while postulating his presupposition renders an objective accountability to the human condition. I've never seen a Tager argue for how ubjective belief in the truth value of a presupposition instills such alleged accountability with objectivity.

[Prof]

Well, I'm currently debating a Christian who is using a presuppositionalist approach. The conversation has taken precisely the same course as with every other presuppositionalist: He offers up some specific concepts of his faith (in this case, attributes of God), I point out the contradictions and incoherency of those attributes; he leaves those contradictions dangling in the wind and retreats behind the smokescreen of the presuppositionalist, which is instead of resolving his contradictions he begins attacking my epistemological right to evaluate anything.

Sigh. Right from the Presup manual. It's sad how such an approach short circuits someone's ability to think through an argument on their own terms, and in fact short circuits his ability to ever evaluate the verity of his own beliefs.

Prof.

[the fonz]

Harry Callahan has informed us that he cannot continue with the formal debate and will withdraw.

Blast, I was looking forward to seeing how this debate would play out. I was especially looking forward to the round on morality.

I'm curious to see how Jade is going to end the debate. We'll see...

[JLK]

I too would hope that Jade finishes all the posts in his affirmative and defends them against typical TAGisms.
There's no reason for him to waste time refuting the TAG.

[Prof]

Yes, I'm very disappointed too.

Jade, if you have anything more prepared I'd really enjoy reading it as well.

Thanks,

Prof.

[Harry Callahan]

I apologize to the readers for not be able to finish the debate. I struggled with what to do for a week - I really did not want to drop out. But my time became so limited, I had no choice. I have been working from morning until 10 at night (one such job landing 5 grand for a week), and have been out of town every other week work related, and I coach soccer. When I get home at night, I am ready for bed. At any rate, thank you for reading the debate, and my hats go off to Jade for doing a suberbalous (is that a word? I was amazed at Jade's insights), wonderful job, and Nightshades efforts. My opinions of infidels has changed greatly - for the better! Thanks guys, and I am sorry to leave you hanging.

[Prof]

No problem Harry. This horrible heathen certainly understands :)
I appreciat(ed) your presence on the forum and hope you can return sometime.

Cheers,

Prof.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Jade has submitted his concluding statement, officially ending the formal debate.

Jade and Harry Callahan may now post here if they wish to. Thanks again to Jade and Harry's participation. :)

Jason

[OnTheThirdRail]

Does Jade's Anti-TAG destroy Michael Martin's assertions against John Frame's notion that logic, ethics, uniformity of nature flow from the nature of God? Seems Michael Martin's arguments would also apply to metaphysical naturalism. Any thoughts?

[Jade]

Does Jade's Anti-TAG destroy Michael Martin's assertions against John Frame's notion that logic, ethics, uniformity of nature flow from the nature of God? Seems Michael Martin's arguments would also apply to metaphysical naturalism. Any thoughts?
How would Martin's arguments apply to MetaNat?

[OnTheThirdRail]

How would Martin's arguments apply to MetaNat?

In Martins' second rebuttal to John Frame he says the following:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martin-frame/tang2.html

B. Logic
1. I argued that according to advocates of TAG, logic presupposes God. But what could this mean? One obvious interpretation is that logical principles are created by God and are contingent on Him. This view is clear but absurd. Logical principles are not contingent; they are necessary. To his credit, Frame rejected this view. He says that logic is not arbitrarily decreed by God and that logic is necessary.

2. However, Frame's less clear alternative construction of what it means for logic to presuppose God is problematic. He says that logic is not "above" God and that the "ultimate basis" of logic is God's "eternal nature." In one obvious sense logic is above God: God presupposes logic and not the reverse. God's action and His attributes presuppose the law of contradiction. God cannot do act A and not A at the same time; God cannot have property P and not P at the same time, and so on. On the other hand, there is no inconsistency in both denying that God exists and affirming the law of contradiction. Moreover, basing logic on God's nature does not overcome the problem. If God's character were different, logical principles would be different, and the law of contradiction would not hold. But this is absurd. Could Frame reply that God's nature could not be such the law of contradiction would fail? The only reason for making such an assumption about God's nature is that it must exemplify some independent standard of logic. This is just to say that logic does not presuppose God.

From your debate:
A) Metaphysical Naturalism entails the uniformity of nature: In a universe in which everything has a nature and ‘obeys’ that nature completely, and in which a system of objects has a nature completely defined by the Form and Context of its components, nature is necessarily uniform. If an entity with a given nature does X, then anything else (anywhere and at any time) with an ‘essentially similar’ nature (see Essay 2 on Universals) will do X as well. If an entity suddenly changes its behavior, that is because something about its nature required that change -- if we know the nature of a thing, then we can always know what it will do, and what it has already done. If a universe is not MetaNatural, then uniformity is impossible. Therefore, Metaphysical Naturalism is the true presuppositional foundation for the uniformity of nature, and of the rationally grounded practice of induction and science.

So then things must necessarily obey their nature but Martin seems to be saying that it must be contingent?

Maybe its an apples to orange thing? Not sure?

[Jade]

So then things must necessarily obey their nature but Martin seems to be saying that it must be contingent?

Maybe its an apples to orange thing? Not sure?
Well, Frame seems to have tried to escape from this Euthyphro-like dilemma by saying that logic depends on God, but that because it comes inevitably from God's nature and because God's nature is eternal, that logic is unchanging and non-arbitrary. God couldn't have made logic any different, and it won't suddenly change tomorrow.

However the problem with this escape route is that it presupposes the classical laws of logic. 'Logic' could not have 'come from' God's nature and be non-arbitrary and unchanging if God wasn't God (i.e. if ~[A=A]), or if God could both be God and ~God at the same time (i.e. if [A and ~A]). Thus, by claiming that logic flows from God's eternal nature, Frame presupposes the antithesis of his own words.

MetaNat is not caught in the same conundrum because it doesn't posit logic somehow flowing from or dependent upon the nature of a particular entity -- rather logic flows from the nature of Nature; the nature of Existence. That is, when things exist and have a nature, they are such that they are identical to themselves, and are not both themselves and not-themselves at the same time, and so on... If Existence were not this way (i.e. if a thing could exist but have a contradictory nature, or no nature at all) then logic (certainly as we know it) would be impossible w.r.t. those things. Notably, my definition of 'supernatural' includes such hypothetical entities.

[theophilus]

Well, I'm currently debating a Christian who is using a presuppositionalist approach. The conversation has taken precisely the same course as with every other presuppositionalist: He offers up some specific concepts of his faith (in this case, attributes of God), I point out the contradictions and incoherency of those attributes; he leaves those contradictions dangling in the wind and retreats behind the smokescreen of the presuppositionalist, which is instead of resolving his contradictions he begins attacking my epistemological right to evaluate anything.

Not that I have any reason to think you're talking about me here, but that really doesn't matter, as you are misrepresenting the truth in either case.
I never attacked your "epistemological right" to evaluate anything. I challenged you to declare and defend your epistemology as a standard to test any other truth claims.
You, like every other TAG protester, declined to do this, leaving me with but one conclusion, that you have no foundation for knowledge and, so your objections to Christian Theism (not presuppositionalism) are irrational.
Now, as I clarified NUMEROUS times, the simple solution to this is for you to declare your philosophical system and AT LEAST TRY to demonstrate that it supports an epistemology that is adequate to evaluate truth claims.
However, I don't expect that; you'll simply continue to brag how you pointed out all the contradictions and the "pre-supper" couldn't handle the power of your argument and crawled whimpering into his hole, muttering "TAG, TAG, TAG."

Sigh. Right from the Presup manual. It's sad how such an approach short circuits someone's ability to think through an argument on their own terms, and in fact short circuits his ability to ever evaluate the verity of his own beliefs.

Sigh, indeed.

[theophilus]

Well, Frame seems to have tried to escape from this Euthyphro-like dilemma by saying that logic depends on God, but that because it comes inevitably from God's nature and because God's nature is eternal, that logic is unchanging and non-arbitrary. God couldn't have made logic any different, and it won't suddenly change tomorrow.

However the problem with this escape route is that it presupposes the classical laws of logic. 'Logic' could not have 'come from' God's nature and be non-arbitrary and unchanging if God wasn't God (i.e. if ~[A=A]), or if God could both be God and ~God at the same time (i.e. if [A and ~A]). Thus, by claiming that logic flows from God's eternal nature, Frame presupposes the antithesis of his own words.

MetaNat is not caught in the same conundrum because it doesn't posit logic somehow flowing from or dependent upon the nature of a particular entity -- rather logic flows from the nature of Nature; the nature of Existence. That is, when things exist and have a nature, they are such that they are identical to themselves, and are not both themselves and not-themselves at the same time, and so on... If Existence were not this way (i.e. if a thing could exist but have a contradictory nature, or no nature at all) then logic (certainly as we know it) would be impossible w.r.t. those things. Notably, my definition of 'supernatural' includes such hypothetical entities.

Fascinating.
Logic doesn't flow from a "particular entity," it flows from the "nature" of Nature. and what, exactly is the nature of Nature, why it is what logic tells us it is; it is the law of contradiction.
So, logic flows from logic, don't you see. It couldn't flow from the character (not nature) of God because (somehow) that must presuppose the law of contradiction, and we know that logic ... oh, well, never mind.

[Jade]

Not that I have any reason to think you're talking about me here, but that really doesn't matter, as you are misrepresenting the truth in either case.
If you will note the date on Prof's post, you will see that he very probably was not talking about you at all. This is actually a fairly old thread, recently resurrected, and not at all to do with your latest smackdown thread...

[Jade]

Fascinating.
Logic doesn't flow from a "particular entity," it flows from the "nature" of Nature. and what, exactly is the nature of Nature, why it is what logic tells us it is; it is the law of contradiction.
So, logic flows from logic, don't you see. It couldn't flow from the character (not nature) of God because (somehow) that must presuppose the law of contradiction, and we know that logic ... oh, well, never mind.
I know you can do better than Straw Men, theophilus. Logic doesn't flow from logic -- it flows from the Nature of Existence. If a thing exists, then one can make truth-bearing propositional statements about it, construct arguments with such statements, and then evaluate those arguments using logic.

Have you even read the Formal Debate which this thread was the Peanut Gallery for?

[OnTheThirdRail]

Jade,

Can you post a some sites that have info about Metaphysical Naturalism. I tried to do a Yahoo search and didn't find anything that had more than a couple of paragraphs on it... Thanks!

[Jade]

Jade,

Can you post a some sites that have info about Metaphysical Naturalism. I tried to do a Yahoo search and didn't find anything that had more than a couple of paragraphs on it... Thanks!
MetNat is a horribly ill-defined phrase; which is one reason why I took it and ran with it in my debate (by giving it my own definition). One definition is in the mission statement (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/mission.shtml) for the IIDB, and you can find more by searching for "Naturalism" and/or "Philosophical Naturalism" (and by using Google). Usually you will find a few paragraphs on methodological naturalism and maybe a few lines on metaphysical naturalism (if you're lucky). However, since such descriptions usually say only that MetaNat denies the input of 'Supernatural' entities in the running of the universe, and do not usually define what the difference between a 'natural' and a 'supernatural' entity is, such definitions are about as much use as saying "A is ~B, and B is ~A".

For what its worth, one big reason why I used the term 'MetaNat' is because I thought it would piss off Harry to hear me say that the Christian God presupposes the truth of Metaphysical Naturalism.... :)

[the fonz]

Jade,

I was really looking forward to round 3 on morality. Care to give us a rough outline (or anything) on the points you were going to cover on the topic?

I also remember that you aren't a moral objectivist. A couple months back, you attacked Alonzo Fyfe's theory with an emotivist argument. So, because of your non-objectivist position, I'm curious as to how you would defend it.

Thanks.

[Jade]

Jade,

I was really looking forward to round 3 on morality. Care to give us a rough outline (or anything) on the points you were going to cover on the topic?

I also remember that you aren't a moral objectivist. A couple months back, you attacked Alonzo Fyfe's theory with an emotivist argument. So, because of your non-objectivist position, I'm curious as to how you would defend it.

Thanks.
That is not entirely correct -- I am a moral objectivist in that I think certain kinds of moral statements can be 'objectively' true. However, I am not a Desire Utilitarian because I do not think it is possible to meaningfully bridge the Is/Ought gap. In other words, I think it is possible to have an objectively true descriptive moral system, but not an objectively true prescriptive moral system. So I DO NOT think statements like "We should not torture babies for fun" can be true or false, but I DO think statements like "torturing babies for fun is evil" can be (objectively) true or false.

I'll say more after work.....

[Jade]

I am rather short for time, but I don't want to leave you hanging, so I will post my rough outline in two sections. Part two will come later tonight when I have more time to elaborate...

Part One: Why I think prescriptive moral systems are not objectively true.

"Ought" statements are not 'truth-bearers' (they are not 'propositional'). Rather than reflecting reality (the ways things are), they reflect our desires (how we want things to be). One can agree with and/or empathize with an Ought statement, i.e. when you share the same desire expressed by the Ought statement; but this does not mean that the Ought statement is 'true'. Truth-bearing statements attempt to correspond with the reality they refer to, and Ought statements simply do not. Not being truth-bearers, Ought statements cannot validly be incorporated into logical arguments. The two arguments below are essentially similar in that they incorporate non-propositional statements as their conclusions (and are thus not valid logical arguments):

i) It is uncomfortably hot in here.
ii) If we go for a swim we can alleviate the discomfort of heat.
iii) So let's go for a swim!

...and...

1) It is uncomfortably hot in here.
2) If we go for a swim we can alleviate the discomfort of heat.
3) So we should go for a swim!

There are two kinds of arguments: those that appeal to Reason (logical arguments), and those that appeal to our desires and motives (such as the two examples above). Reason, as I defined it in my essays, is the ability to form observations about reality (the way things are); and arguments which appeal to Reason are thus arguments which attempt to convince a person to adopt a particular observation. However, arguments which appeal to our motives and desires attempt to enflame a particular drive within us, and/or to link a given drive with an observation of reality (giving that desire the decision-making advantage of situational relevancy); the goal of this is to affect what we want to do. It is perhaps a little misleading, but a quick and dirty way to think of this is that logical arguments attempt to affect what we believe, while the second type of argument attempts to affect what we want and do.

The short and sweet of it is that one cannot actually use logic to analyze prescriptive arguments, nor are prescriptive moral systems "objectively true". I am willing to discuss Alonzo's solution to the Is/Ought problem and why I am not convinced by it, but this is probably not the best forum to do that in.

[Stacey Melissa]

That's an interesting way of thinking about descriptive versus prescriptive statements, Jade. I hadn't ever thought of it that way before, but I'm sure it could be a helpful way to look at those sorts of things.

[Prof]

Not that I have any reason to think you're talking about me here, but that really doesn't matter, as you are misrepresenting the truth in either case.
I never attacked your "epistemological right" to evaluate anything....(etc. etc. etc.) Sigh, indeed.

Just caught this now. I actually wasn't referring to you Theo, but to someone else on another forum.

Prof.

[OnTheThirdRail]

I know you can do better than Straw Men, theophilus. Logic doesn't flow from logic -- it flows from the Nature of Existence. If a thing exists, then one can make truth-bearing propositional statements about it, construct arguments with such statements, and then evaluate those arguments using logic.

Jade,

I was going back over the debate from a while ago and had a few questions...

1) Does MetaNat exist? Is it "natural"?

2) You say that Laws of Logic have "a form of existence" Are abstract universals "natural"?

3) Is an imaginary being "natural"? - ie. unicorns, space aliens etc...

[Francois Tremblay]

"Ought" statements are not 'truth-bearers' (they are not 'propositional'). Rather than reflecting reality (the ways things are), they reflect our desires (how we want things to be).

That is only true if one supports a desire-based moral system such as Desire Utilitarianism. A simpler system does not need to reflect our desires instead of reality.

For a simple account of moral objectivity based on causality, see my article on the topic at http://www.strongatheism.com/philosophy/objectivemorality.html
For an article on Desire Utilitairanism, see Alonzo Fyfe's article at http://www.strongatheism.com/philosophy/desireutil.html

[Jade]

Jade,

I was going back over the debate from a while ago and had a few questions...

1) Does MetaNat exist? Is it "natural"?

2) You say that Laws of Logic have "a form of existence" Are abstract universals "natural"?

3) Is an imaginary being "natural"? - ie. unicorns, space aliens etc...
An useful tool to answer these questions is the 'Bearer/Maker' distinction for propositions. That is to say, all sentences which have truth values are truth-bearers, and the states of reality to which they refer are the truth-makers. If a statement which refers to a state of affairs describes that state of affairs accurately, then it is 'true', if it is not accurate (or if there is no truth-maker in that it refers to something which does not exist) then it is 'false'.

Laws of logic (and of science and morality) are statements about reality. As such, one can break them down into the truth-bearers and the truth-makers. The truth-bearers certainly exist; after all, people have spoken about laws of logic, have written them down, etc. Statements about logic, as with any statements, are real physical things uttered by real physical beings. However, our statements are not 'laws that rule the universe' -- our words and thoughts do not govern existence, they are just our comments on how the universe is (unless of course we are making comments about our comments, in which case the truth-bearers and truth-makers are the same).

The truth-makers also certainly exist: the truth-makers of laws of logic, science, and morality are quite simply the facts and states of affairs to which such comments refer. So, for example, if all pairs of material objects experience a force (or something which can be called a force) upon them that is a function of their masses and the distance between them (i.e. if such is the nature of matter), then Newton's laws are true. But the crucial thing to note is that the nature of the things in question is the governor of their behaviour. Things are not attracted towards each other because some phantasmagorial and immaterial 'law' drifting above the spheres of the universe commands them to; they are atracted to each other because that is their nature, and because (like all 'natural' objects) they must do only what it is in their nature to do.

Human laws are thus attempts to observe and describe the natures of sets of things -- i.e. sets of objects with essentially the same nature. So something which applies to just about everything (like the law of identity or whatnot) does so because the set of objects and entities which have natures that are accurately described by that statement is very large.

Another thing to note is that there is no such truth-maker as a 'Universal' (as far as I see it) -- there is no "Form of Red" existing immaterially which participates for some reason in the various 'particular' vessels of the material world. No, one can have universal statements (i.e. truth-bearers), but such statements do not refer to "A Universal"; but rather refer to sets of entities. The thing to be careful about here is that properties can be 'similar' to each other; the redness of my apple can be very similar to the redness of your apple, such that we would call both of them "Red". Indeed, things can have properties so similar to each other that the properties are indistinguishable from each other, apart from their 'belonging' to different entities. So universal statements refer to sets of things which all have one or more properties which are very similar to those of all other elements of the set. In another more abstract example, the concept "three" refers to the set of all sets with three elements; there is no "Form of Threeness" or "immaterial abtract entity called the Number Three" drifting above the dome of the sky.

As for imaginary beings, on the one hand statements which refer to them are all false (since there is no truth-maker for such statements). On the other hand, if we reinterpret such statements are referring to the stories and images of such creatures, then there are truth-makers (i.e. the stories and images and so on). That is why the statement "dragons breathe fire" is somewhat meaningful and many will agree with it, even if in the strict sense it is as false as "the present king of France is bald". i.e. People tell stories about dragons, and most of them involve dragons breathing fire.

As for MetaNat 'existing' -- well, MetaNat is just an ideology, a group of statements about reality. As such, it exists and has a nature in pretty much the same way that any group of comments and ideologies do.

[OnTheThirdRail]

Thanks for the quick reply... I am going to need some time to think about this and get back with you.

As for MetaNat 'existing' -- well, MetaNat is just an ideology, a group of statements about reality. As such, it exists and has a nature in pretty much the same way that any group of comments and ideologies do.

How can MetaNat be the transcendental foundation of everything when it also is "natural" - wouldn't there then be another foundation under that that covers both the foundation of MetaNat and all other entities?

Thanks!

[Jade]

Thanks for the quick reply... I am going to need some time to think about this and get back with you.



How can MetaNat be the transcendental foundation of everything when it also is "natural" - wouldn't there then be another foundation under that that covers both the foundation of MetaNat and all other entities?

Thanks!
No, the nature of existence (what it means to exist) is the 'foundation'. MetaNat is just the belief-system which says only 'natural' things exist (which, if you recall, I meant as "Only those things which have natures"....or something, it's been a while since I looked at my essays :o).

[OnTheThirdRail]

No, the nature of existence (what it means to exist) is the 'foundation'. MetaNat is just the belief-system which says only 'natural' things exist (which, if you recall, I meant as "Only those things which have natures"....or something, it's been a while since I looked at my essays :o).

Oh... ok - thanks!

[Prof]

Excellent Jade. Well reasoned and clearly stated, as usual.

Prof.

[Jade]

Excellent Jade. Well reasoned and clearly stated, as usual.

Prof.
Purrrrr! Purrrr!
:D