Divine Omniscience and Freewill

[Steven Carr]

God is omniscient and infallibly knows , for example, exactly what Gore would have done if Gore and not Bush had been elected President.

Gore would have done *something*, and God infallibly knows what that something would have been, although God has not seen a real President Gore make a real decision.

Clearly this means that Gore, and all other humans, do not have libertarian free will. God knows infallibly what we will choose, and does not have to see us actually make those decisions to know what they would have been.

God infallibly knows all counterfactuals of freedom, which blows away the idea of libertarian free will, which denies that counterfactuals have a truth value to know.


Does anybody want to debate the proposition 'Divine omniscience is incompatible with libertarian free will'.?

[wiploc]

Does anybody want to debate the proposition 'Divine omniscience is incompatible with libertarian free will'.?

I'm almost tempted. I have a debate going now, but when it's over, if you haven't got a taker, then I expect that I'll be all the way tempted. :)

crc

[Mad Zur]

Could you define "free will"?

[Steven Carr]

Could you define "free will"?

I define libertarian free will as the concept that , if placed in situation S , a person might do action A or might do a different action B, and it cannot be known what action will be taken until the person actually is in situtation S.

[wiploc]

I define libertarian free will as the concept that , if placed in situation S , a person might do action A or might do a different action B, and it cannot be known what action will be taken until the person actually is in situtation S.

Then you already won the debate by jiggering the definitions.

We can give you this part ...
I define libertarian free will as the concept that , if placed in situation S , a person might do action A or might do a different action B,
... and still have something to debate; but if you define libertarian free will as incompatible with god's foreknowledge, then there is no room left to debate whether it is compatible with god's foreknowledge.

And yet, if you leave off the ...
and it cannot be known what action will be taken until the person actually is in situtation S.
then I suspect you're going to automatically lose the debate, if you allow that god can do miracles. Knowing the future is impossible, so it would take a miracle. If god can do the miracle at all, then I don't see how come he can't miraculously know the future without impinging on libertarian free will.

I have the urge now to argue the other side by saying that knowing the future without impinging on libertarian free will would be a logical impossibility, that is, an impossibility (like making a rock too big for himself to lift) even for a miracle-throwing god. But, first, I don't know how to make that argument. And, second, if I managed to make it logically impossible to know the future without impinging on libertarian free will, then I don't see how I would do that without also making it logically impossible to know the future in a way that did imping on libertarian free will. Rather than make you go back and read that again, I'm going to write it again: If it is logically possible to know the future, then it is logically possible to know the future without impinging on libertarian free will. Anyway, that's what I suspect.

crc

[Steven Carr]

Then you already won the debate



Hooray!.


by jiggering the definitions.




I knew there was a catch.

I thought my definition of libertarian free will was pretty standard. Somebody in situation S can choose action A or a different action, and if replaced in situation S time and time again, sometimes action A will be chosen and sometimes action A will not be chosen.

Isn't that what libertarian free will is?




If it is logically possible to know the future, then it is logically possible to know the future without impinging on libertarian free will. Anyway, that's what I suspect.



Ah, but God is omniscient and knows even counterfactuals of freedom. They are not part of the future, as they are not actualised.

[wiploc]

If it is logically possible to know the future, then it is logically possible to know the future without impinging on libertarian free will. Anyway, that's what I suspect.

Ah, but God is omniscient and knows even counterfactuals of freedom. They are not part of the future, as they are not actualised.

That doesn't take away from what I said. Let's have an example:

===begin example===
Factual: God's going to jigger the weather so that it dawns clear tomorrow. He knows that if he does so, I'll have scrambled eggs for breakfast. He knows that if I have scrambled eggs, I'll great my boss by saying, "Hey, there!"

Counterfactual: If god weren't going to jigger the weather, it would dawn cloudy. If it dawned cloudy, I would have cold cereal. If I had cold cereal, I would great my boss with the more formal, "Hello there!"
===end example===

Some people (call them Group No) say that god's choice of weather determines/causes/fixes the future, casts it in concrete. They'll say we can't have libertarian free will if an omnipotent omniscient god exists. Such a god wouldn't have to do anything; his mere existence would preclude free will.

Others (Group Yes) say that god's foreknowledge is not coercive. God knows what I'll choose for breakfast, but he doesn't cause me to choose it. My free choice is what determines/causes/fixes what god knows, rather than the other way around. These people will say that, at the time that they make a choice, their choice is effected freely, by their own will as a first cause, and that they therefore have free will. They would say that the fact that god and wiploc know what they are going to say doesn't mean they aren't free to say something else. :)

Therefore, the fact that an omniscient god would know the "counterfactuals of freedom" does not mean free will would not exist.




I thought my definition of libertarian free will was pretty standard.

I can't claim any authority on the meaning of "libertarian free will." But my belief is that it means that your choices are determined by your will alone, as opposed to being the deterministic result of prior causes. If so, then Group No may regard your attempt to insinuate, "and it cannot be known what action will be taken until the person actually is in situation S," into the definition as a harmless attempt to conflate an inevitable result of a definition with the definition itself. Group Yes, on the other hand, thinks you've tried to stick a foreign object into the definition, something that doesn't go there at all. They might even point out that if you defined a foot as something at the end of a leg, you would never thereafter offer to debate whether a foot is something at the end of a leg---and that the mere fact that you offer to debate whether libertarian free will is compatible with foreknowledge means that you should recognize that it isn't really defined as being incompatible with foreknowledge.




Somebody in situation S can choose action A or a different action, and if replaced in situation S time and time again, sometimes action A will be chosen and sometimes action A will not be chosen.

Isn't that what libertarian free will is?


You talk like free will is a random number generator: "Will you give me a really dull fork, please? I'd like to use it to eat these scrambled eggs---but I'd like it dull because (since I do have free will) I can't be certain I won't use it to try to castrate myself."

crc

[Mad Zur]

I define libertarian free will as the concept that , if placed in situation S , a person might do action A or might do a different action B, and it cannot be known what action will be taken until the person actually is in situtation S.
I thought my definition of libertarian free will was pretty standard. Somebody in situation S can choose action A or a different action, and if replaced in situation S time and time again, sometimes action A will be chosen and sometimes action A will not be chosen.
Those are two different statements. I would consider debating you if you use the second one, but not the first.

So it's very important that you pick a definition to go with.

[Steven Carr]

Aren't they the same situations?

Anyway, I am happy with my second definition which is 'Somebody in situation S can choose action A or a different action, and if replaced in situation S time and time again, sometimes action A will be chosen and sometimes action A will not be chosen.'

Doesn't this mean that there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, and so contradicts straightway a claim that God knows all counterfactuals of freedom?

[Mad Zur]

If there aren't any "counterfactuals of freedom," then it would be logically impossible for God to know them. That doesn't contradict omniscience, though, does it? I think we're going to have to define that, too.

Now using the second definition probably won't be very good, because it doesn't entail the ability to choose either one at any given time. God knows you'll choose A this time and B the next and so forth, and that doesn't conntradict the definition in the way you're arguing. How about something like this:

Free will - The ability in any given situation to perform any action A over action B and vice versa without restriction.

[wiploc]

Free will - The ability in any given situation to perform any action A over action B and vice versa without restriction.

What if you're in jail? Does that count as a restriction on action?

I suggest the emphasis be on the choosing rather than the performing.

crc

[Common_Cents]

Well it goes like this IMHO. If i watch a movie and then sit down with you and watch the same movie i will know what is going to happen when i watch it with you. I could even tell you what is going to happen but it doesn't mean that i made it happen. For obviously to watch someone do something isn't making them do something.

[OnTheThirdRail]

Well it goes like this IMHO. If i watch a movie and then sit down with you and watch the same movie i will know what is going to happen when i watch it with you. I could even tell you what is going to happen but it doesn't mean that i made it happen. For obviously to watch someone do something isn't making them do something.

This analogy doesn't really match the question at hand. If God infallibly knows before you are even created that in situation S that you will choose option A over option B. Then when you, in time, get to situation S can you choose option B?

If you can, than God is fallible and not omniscient.

[wiploc]

This analogy doesn't really match the question at hand. If God infallibly knows before you are even created that in situation S that you will choose option A over option B. Then when you, in time, get to situation S can you choose option B?

If you can, than God is fallible and not omniscient.

God would be fallible only if you actualy do choose option B, not if you merely can choose option B.

crc

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

Hi folks,

Unless you wish to set up a formal debate on the issue, please take this discussion to the Existence of God(s) forum.

Thanks :)

Jason

[wiploc]

Hi folks,

Unless you wish to set up a formal debate on the issue, please take this discussion to the Existence of God(s) forum.

Thanks :)

Jason

I like it. Let's go a few rounds at EoG, and then we'll know if we want to have a formal debate.

crc